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Abstract 
 
The lack of available good eggs – fertile and mature oöcytes – for the technique of Somatic 
Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) poses interesting sociological questions regarding the conduct 
of promising science. This thesis examines current debates regarding whether women should 
donate oocytes or be paid. A payment system is expected to increase the number of oöcyte 
providers by providing an impersonal rather than personal incentive: cheaper fertility 
treatment or interest in the therapeutic benefits of SCNT research. The contemplation of a 
payment system marks a shift from Titmuss’s model of altruistic tissue donation. However, 
this contemporary debate continues to insist that the ideal donor is disinterested in some way: 
by giving without economic or therapeutic recompense. In order to explore these issues, I 
report on empirical data collected through interviews and focus groups. Three cohorts were 
recruited: fertility patients, reproductive oöcyte donors and ‘healthy’ donors. Interviews and 
focus groups were employed to provide insight into practical contexts of providing oöcytes 
and embryos. I found that providing oöcytes for SCNT research is unappealing because good 
eggs are essential to achieve one’s maternal aspirations and the process of oöcyte extraction is 
perceived as requiring an extraordinary amount of physical and emotional discipline on the 
part of the donor. However, the results indicate that these concerns are mitigated when oöcyte 
and embryo provision occurs for a personal incentive. This affective framework—the 
identification of a specified benefit or beneficiary—can change perceptions of effort, risk and 
reward. A woman may be transformed into a ‘good egg’ – a donor providing social benefit – 
if there are concrete, rather than abstract, dimensions to the process of scientific research. 
Hence, these findings indicate that connections between femininity and altruism are flexible 
and I sustain this claim by discussing the concept of discretionary reciprocity. Furthermore, I 
argue that concerns regarding payment reveal deep-seated cultural anxieties about donor 
autonomy and motivation. Money may be regarded as an impersonal incentive and its 
advocates recall the figure of the citizen who should behave as disinterested—detached from 
his or her personal benefit. However, for the participants in this study, payment represents an 
inappropriate motivation on which to base contributions in scientific research. I show that that 
contributions to science are interested and occur in relationship between an individual, the 
tissue and the collective the research claims to benefit.  
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Glossary 
 
Allogeneic transplant: the implantation of organs and tissues into the patient that are 
obtained from another person. 
Anonymous tissue provision: this occurs when, at the time the tissue is provided, the donor 
and recipient(s) are unknown to each other. They may however, understand that their tissues 
are being provided to others in a specific geographical location.  
Autologous transplant: the use of organs or tissue that are the patient’s own. 
Blastocyst: A blastocyst is the name given to a fertilised oöcyte which develop in vitro for 
five to six days and divide into 70 to 100 cells.  
Cleavage embryos: fertilised oöcytes which have divided into 6-8 cells. 
Cloned embryo: the cell created through SCNT using a fertile oöcyte and adult cell. 
Embryo: the cell resulting from the fusion of oöcyte and sperm.  
Gamete: reproductive cells such as oöcytes and sperm. 
Identified tissue provision: this occurs when, at the time the tissue is provided, the donor 
and recipient(s) are known to each other.  
Induced pluripotent stem cells (IPS cells): adult cells which have been programmed to 
revert back to stem cells before reprogramming the stem cells to develop into a differentiated 
trajectory. 
Multipotent cells: cells which have the potential to differentiate into some types of cells. 
Oöcyte: female reproductive cell, sometimes referred to as ova (plural) or egg. 
Pluripotent stem cells: cells which have the potential to differentiate into every type of cells. 
Reproductive oöcyte provision: this involves the transfer of oöcytes from one woman to 
another in order to have a child/ren. This may be called therapeutic if infertility is considered 
a medical issue. This may occur within contexts of anonymous or identified provision. 
Scientific oöcyte provision: for the purpose of the discussion contained in this thesis, this 
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term refers to the transfer of oöcytes from a woman to researchers who are undertaking 
research in SCNT. This may include non-profit, university-based or profit oriented research. 
Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT): the technique of transferring an adult cell into a 
fertile oöcyte, reverting the cell into undifferentiated stem cells before programming the cells 
to develop a differentiated trajectory, including tissues and organs. The oöcyte cannot have 
been fertilised prior to this and its own DNA removed. 
Totipotent stem cells: cells with the potential to differentiate into all types of cells including 
extra-embryonic tissue. 
 
A further note on style and word choice 
 
Occasionally, I have used the terms “succumb” and “disposition” to a) refer to process by 
which clinically-viable embryos are removed from storage, withheld from further use and 
allowed to expire and b) the choices made by individuals regarding “surplus” embryos after 
their own fertility treatment is finished. It may be argued these terms may appear emotive and 
more applicable to a human person, especially if the reader defines human life as beginning at 
birth, however, both terms are often used in the literature. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have used British-English rather than American-English spelling 
variations of words such as organisation, recognise and behaviour, except where I have 
directly quoted the latter versions. 
 
I have consulted the following in my use of the author-date referencing system.  
The University of Chicago. 2010. The Chicago Manual of Style. 16th ed. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
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Chapter One 
 
Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), sometimes referred to as therapeutic cloning, is a 
technique through which scientists can create a ‘cloned embryo’ by programming cells to 
return to a state where they have the potential to grow into any cell. Cloned embryos can be 
used to make patient-specific stem cell lines and tissues including whole organs like the 
heart, liver and kidney. The technique requires ‘good eggs’ – fertile and mature human 
oöcytes – and their removal requires women to have medication and surgery.1 Scientists 
believe that developing patient-specific stem cell lines on a large scale would enable 
widespread autologous organ transplant. If this proves correct, many of the current 
challenges associated with allogeneic organ transplant, such as a negative immunological 
response and organ shortages, may be avoided (Gearhart 1998). Pursuing SCNT may lead to 
other breakthroughs in the area of regenerative medicine including the treatment of spinal 
cord injury, Parkinson’s disease, Motor Neuron disease (MND) and diabetes (de Wert and 
Mummery 2003).  
 
The conduct of SCNT research in Australia is strictly regulated. In 2006 The Prohibition of 
Human Cloning for Reproduction Act and The Regulation of Human Embryo Research 
Amendment Act, were passed in the Australian Federal Parliament with state and territory 
governments jointly agreeing to pass uniform regulations (National Health and Medical 
Research Council 2011). This legislation gives scientists permission to derive stem cells 
from cloned embryos but explicitly precludes the purchase of oöcytes for such research, 
maintaining Australia’s strict adherence to the notion that the human body should remain 
outside commercial trade. According to the terms of the current Acts, oöcytes may only be 
given within the established model of altruistic donation where reimbursement is offered for 
documented travel and childcare expenses, a premise which remains in place after the review 
of legislation in 2011 (Legislative Review Committee 2011). A payment system would 
resemble commercial exchanges of goods and services where financial remuneration is 
offered for oöcytes and may include a free market model where the price is determined by 
demand or regulated by an overseeing body. 
                                                
1 While the primary focus of this thesis is the utilisation of oöcytes for SCNT research, data was also collected 
in relation to perceptions and attitudes towards embryo donation. I draw on this information in a secondary way 
to highlight the utilisation of reproductive tissues is dependent on a number of different factors.  
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The model of altruistic donation is common to all forms of human tissue provision to 
scientific research in Australia. However, as with most jurisdictions in the Global North, 
Australia has witnessed a lack of oöcyte donation for SCNT research, leading to the closure 
of laboratories and a shift to alternatives (Braun and Schultz 2012). One notable example of 
this decline in research is the decision by prominent scientist Ian Wilmut to migrate into the 
field of induced pluripotent stem (IPS) cells in 2007. Wilmut’s expertise had been 
fundamental to the creation of Dolly the cloned sheep and thus to the establishment of SCNT 
as a successful technique in complex organisms (Franklin 2007). He attributed his migration 
from SCNT research to its inefficient use of “precious” human oöcytes and his perception 
that IPS cell research is more socially acceptable than SCNT (Highfield 2007). Wilmut’s 
changed research trajectory is but one consequence of the scarcity of good eggs that are 
needed for both research and reproductive purposes in a globalised economy in which the 
trade and movement of scientists, women providing or needing oöcytes is less subject to 
national or state regulations.2 In contrast, the altruistic donation of tissues such as blood, 
DNA, cancerous tissue and embryos does not pose quite the same problems of supply in 
Australia. Acquiring sufficient numbers of these tissues can often be complicated and 
difficult but researchers do not face the prospect of having to abandon entire research 
programs as a result. 
 
Legislative responses to the general lack of oöcyte donation to SCNT research have varied 
around the world. Two jurisdictions, New York and the UK, have instituted a specific 
market mechanism designed to mobilise women, making it legal to pay up to $10,000 in 
New York (Nelson 2009) and £750 or cheaper fertility treatment in the UK (Haimes, Taylor 
and Turkmendag 2012). These payments are given to women in exchange for their oöcytes, 
sometimes before they have been used for their own reproductive purposes. Such measures 
have achieved varied success in increasing supply of oöcytes for SCNT research, however 
and it has been reported that women do refuse to give their oöcytes in exchange for cheaper 
fertility treatment (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 2012). The altruistic donor model 
                                                
2 There are exceptions of course. For instance the Indian government very recently banned gay couples from 
contracting Indian women as surrogates. 
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remains in place in the state of California, 3 Canada, New Zealand and the European Union 
where it continues to be illegal to purchase oöcytes for scientific research. There is little 
consensus that either model may sufficiently capture the complexities of oöcyte provision to 
SCNT research. For instance, one basis for this debate is the fact that the oöcyte is a basis for 
research and the development of stem cell lines, a patentable entity expected to yield 
commercial value (Waldby 2002; Dickenson 2006), rather than a tissue used for therapeutic 
purposes. 
 
This thesis is concerned with this scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues and 
particularly debates regarding which economic models should be instituted for the provision 
of oöcytes for SCNT research. This thesis regards the scientific utilisation of reproductive 
tissues as an indicator of socially and historically specific relationships between scientific 
institutions, the community as a whole and individuals within the community. I also consider 
what it means when women are central to the development of scientific knowledge. 
Untangling these relationships is complex because science is no ordinary social institution 
being a practical process by which to 'discover' the world, an integral ethos of modern 
Western society (Harvey 2007) and yet increasingly subject to scrutiny by new experts and 
lay people.  
 
Aim 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine and analyse what the scientific utilisation of 
reproductive tissues (oöcytes and embryos) can mean for women and develop a conceptual 
framework that can encompass the tensions and differences. Understanding these meanings 
is a valuable study for four reasons. Firstly, by situating the difference with reference to 
social norms regarding motherhood and family, we can contribute to knowledge about 
different donation rates. Secondly, we can assist in destabilising analytical boundaries 
between giving and altruism on the one hand and selling and instrumental relations on the 
other. Borrowed from gift giving scholarship, we generally understand that reciprocity is a 
universal part of gift giving. Providing reproductive tissues as a “free” gift (that is, without 
                                                
3 In the US, regulations vary state by state. The government of California has invested significantly in stem cell 
research. While scientists in the state cannot purchase oöcytes it has been reported that they have used donated 
oöcytes which were legally purchased for reproductive purposes there (Braun and Schultz 2012). 
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reciprocity) creates and/or maintains unequal power relations between the donor and the 
recipient. Within the existing paradigm, giving without reciprocity is generally regarded as 
altruistic without potential for instrumental motivations and vice versa. The two models of 
behaviour can be regarded as reifying gift-giving as a static practice, largely enacted in the 
same way regardless of time and space. Thirdly, we can partially evaluate whether the 
introduction of a payment system will provide the incentive for women to provide their 
oöcytes. Finally, we can consider the myriad ways that people contribute to scientific 
research without subjecting it to narrow expectations about political behaviour. This will 
have implications for our knowledge about the development of scientific research which 
relies on “the appropriate conduct of publics” (Irwin and Michael 2003, 37).  
 
Current fields of literature 
 
There is presently empirical research published on the scientific utilisations of oöcytes 
and/or embryos (Haimes and Luce 2006; Svendsen 2007; Haimes et al. 2008; Svendsen and 
Koch 2008; Waldby and Carroll 2011; Braun and Schultz 2012; Haimes, Taylor and 
Turkmendag 2012). These examinations of attitudes, perceptions and practices of oöcyte 
provision can be situated within “tissue economies” literature: inter-disciplinary work on the 
social aspects of giving reproductive tissues that is characterised by questions pertaining to 
tissue provision, property relations and donor equity. Underlying much of the current 
research (including this thesis to a degree) is the idea that experts determine current policies 
and in order to make tissue provision socially and ethically sustainable, the views of 
potential donors are essential.  
 
However, this thesis departs from existing theoretical and empirical research in the following 
ways. Firstly, in contrast to principle-based approaches (Titmuss 1997 [1970]; Thompson 
2007; George 2008; Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez 2008; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008; 
Skene 2009; Thompson 2009; Widdows 2009) it analyses concrete scenarios and connects 
individuals with their immediate social context where personal identity, social roles and 
institutions are all interconnected (Davidman 1999). Secondly, it does not situate these 
questions in an existential framework regarding timeless or absolute concepts of freedom 
and donor equity. Instead, this thesis considers the lack of oöcytes for stem cell research as 
providing a wonderful opportunity to study the current status of relationships between 
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‘scientists’, ‘the public’ and the state which are always changing. The analysis is cognisant 
of asking what it means to pose these questions in 2013. In this way, parallels can be drawn 
between the development of my analysis and that found in some public understanding of 
science and technology (PUSET) literature, scholarship that is more explicitly engaged with 
the changing status of scientific knowledge (Irwin and Michael 2003). This paradigm 
explicitly engages with scientific knowledge as a heterogeneous institution, imagining 
possibilities of engagement beyond coercion and resistance to understand that trust and 
ambivalence always co-exist. However, I diverge from a PUSET approach in that my aim is 
to theorise how scientific research can proceed with specific tissues rather than evaluate the 
degree to which “the public” understands scientific discourse or if they employ their own 
explanations for phenomena.  
 
Towards an analytic framework  
 
The present study proceeds on three assumptions which form an eclectic framework. Firstly, 
I contend that the heated discussion about which economic model better manages oöcyte 
provision does not pay sufficient attention to the complex relationships between humans and 
their material world. Introducing money into the equation does not just increase women’s 
vulnerable social and economic positions vis-à-vis men but evokes social anxieties about 
being primarily motivated by a material substance. Without understanding that money-as-
currency has a certain subjectivity, we cannot understand aversions to accepting it in 
particular circumstances.  
 
Secondly, the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues is not an “external” threat to 
women’s existential condition. Science is not a fixed category or monolithic institution but 
subject to its own economic and political pressures for legitimation. Thus, the “answer” to 
the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues is not just resolved by the individual’s own 
moral authority through a enhanced process of informed consent or the implementation of 
new property relations but an analysis that addresses the fact that the social milieu in which 
individuals exist and is characterised by an ambivalent social status of scientists and 
scientific processes. This has implications for understanding oöcyte extraction as “risk”. I do 
not consider risk to be a universally understood, ‘fixed’ and necessarily minimised or 
avoided altogether but a social construction which individuals negotiate in relation to their 
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gendered, aged and cultural identities (Bunton, Crawshaw and Geen 2004). In this way, the 
risks of oöcyte extraction are not undertaken by women improperly informed or so 
vulnerable as to dismiss all danger but situated within narratives regarding the pursuit of 
motherhood for oneself or another.  
 
Thirdly, my approach analyses aspects of the framework that effectively insists the best 
‘donor’ is disinterested. I proceed from the view that this norm is itself a social construction 
which is based on a binary between reason and emotion that privileges the former. 
Existential questions about freedom and dignity that emerge regarding the scientific 
utilisation of reproductive tissues presuppose that freedom involves a detachment to the 
personal and specific and transcendence to the universal and abstract. However, we can 
consider that oöcytes and embryos exist in their own specific regimes of meaning. Giving 
these tissues away have different implications for women and realising their needs may not 
mean the same thing in both contexts.  
 
Statement clarifying relationship between PhD and ARC-funded project 
 
My candidature was part of a three-year research project funded by the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) called Oöcytes for stem cell research: donation and regulation in Australia 
(2008-2011); several people were involved in participant recruitment, ethics applications, 
data collection and interview transcriptions. Three principal investigators coordinated the 
project, Professor Catherine Waldby, Associate Professor Ian Kerridge and Professor Loane 
Skene. One postdoctoral fellow, Katherine Carroll, was also employed as the project 
coordinator and principal data collector. As a project based on the collection of empirical 
data gathered by qualitative methods, the principal investigators designed the research 
protocol in collaboration with a non-profit, fully-independent, fertility clinic attached to a 
major teaching hospital in Sydney. This clinic was considered the university-based project’s 
industry partner, hence the title of my candidature scholarship (Australian Postgraduate 
Award - Industry, or APA-I). Most of the study’s participants were recruited through this 
collaboration as we (the university-based researchers) were given limited access to the 
clinic’s patient database to maintain strict confidentiality.4 
                                                
4 As an industry partner, the fertility clinic provided cash and in-kind benefits to support the project. Funds 
were provided for research assistance, audio recording equipment, computers, qualitative data analytical 
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I began my candidature at the end of June 2008 with Professor Waldby and Associate 
Professor Kerridge as my dissertation supervisors. As a PhD candidate, my role during the 
three and a half years the project was funded was to assist in the development of participant 
information sheets, consent forms and interview schedules as well as collect and analyse 
data. The sample included three cohorts to determine the effect of specific lived experience 
on perceptions and attitudes towards providing oocytes for SCNT research in Australia. The 
cohorts were designated by experience and age: cohort one comprised of women treated for 
fertility issues, cohort two consisted of women who had donated oöcytes for reproductive 
purposes and cohort three comprised of women aged between 18 and 30. This last cohort is 
often designated in biomedical literature as the “healthy donor” because these women are not 
being treated for fertility issues and their fertility is at its peak (Fiszbajn et al 2004).5 
 
In order to recruit this sample, the project submitted two ethics applications. The first was 
submitted to the Sydney West Area Health Service Human Research Ethics Committee – a 
document to which I contributed some basic information and helped to proofread. During 
face-to-face meetings or email correspondence, Professor Waldby, Dr Carroll and myself 
produced participant information sheets, consent forms and interview schedules. I was also 
in attendance at meetings with the fertility clinic staff updating them about the project’s 
progress and results. Professor Waldby usually chaired these meetings and minutes are 
available. Data collection did not begin until Sydney West Area Health Service Human 
Research Ethics Committee granted approval in late July 2009. In the temporary absence of 
Dr Carroll in August 2009 who was intended to be the principal data collector for cohorts 
one and two, I individually interviewed three women in cohort one and two women in cohort 
two. 
 
In 2010, I independently organised the focus groups with cohort three. This involved 
coordinating the submission to the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee (with input from Professor Waldby, Dr Carroll and Associate Professor 
                                                                                                                                                 
software, travel costs associated with research meetings, costs associated with the recruitment and 
reimbursement of research participants, travel and venue hire expenses associated with the National Oocyte 
Donor Workshop and costs associated with the production and dissemination of the final Discussion Paper. 
5 I hope that readers will recognise that using this label is necessary in order to engage in similar concepts and 
language that exist in the literature. 
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Kerridge), focus group information sheets, consent forms and the discussion schedule. From 
May to July 2010, I was responsible for advertising and liaising with potential participants 
by email (copies available) when they expressed interest in the study by providing them with 
an information sheet. In my ‘first-response’ email, I asked potential participants to be patient 
as I was ‘collecting’ as many expressions of interest as possible. In August 2010, I 
individually moderated three focus groups. I booked and set up the rooms (putting signs on 
doors), greeted participants, arranged seating, food, drink and paperwork. When all 
participants had arrived, I handed out the information sheets/consent forms they were 
required to read and sign. I then began the focus group by turning on the audio recorder and 
referring to the questions on the schedule.  
  
A party external to the research team transcribed all interviews and focus groups which were 
then stored on a secure computer server. The data collected by myself and Dr Carroll was 
considered a common resource from which all researchers could draw. There were meetings 
in which data codes were discussed without necessarily reaching consensus. Ultimately, the 
responsibility to analyse the data in a coherent narrative was an individual one where my 
own assertions, validated by the evidence, were established.6 The analysis presented in this 
PhD dissertation is entirely my own. Please see Chapter Four for further discussion about 
my role within the project.  
 
Thesis outline  
 
This thesis is in three parts: background, results and synthesis. The following section 
outlines the significance of each chapter. 
 
Part one develops the background knowledge of the research undertaken. It is made up of 
three chapters including the present one. The following chapter will provide technical 
information about stem cell research and SCNT and the current regulatory frameworks in the 
UK and Australia, describing important features of women’s reproductive capacity, common 
                                                
6 I think this is evident in the approach undertaken in this dissertation. I feel that as my candidature progressed, 
I became critical of many of the assumptions made by the existing scholarship, including the original research 
protocol, and sought to develop an approach that was more aligned with my understanding of sociological 
inquiry, please see the section titled ‘This Thesis is not a Sociological Study of Ethics’ in Chapter Four. Please 
also refer to Appendices O and P for a comprehensive list of publications arising from the common dataset 
including texts I have written or contributed to. 
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issues in the use of ARTs and the extraction of oöcytes. Chapter three will discuss the 
principle-based approaches to the issue of oöcyte provision. My examination of the 
bioethical literature will be complemented with reference to the “tissue economies” 
approach. This will include an in-depth examination of Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) text on 
blood provision and the recent critique of its legacy.  
 
Part two will develop a framework for the present study and describe the results of the 
research. Chapter four will draw out the implications of the current approaches to the issue 
and develop the trajectory of my own analysis. Chapter five will introduce elements of the 
research design, outlining a theoretical approach that seeks to draw new connections 
between conceptual ideas about gifts and the substantive issue of tissue provision. I will 
argue that a sociological approach can balance analytical models of understanding thus far 
advanced. I further discuss epistemological issues related to this research and will outline 
precisely how this study was undertaken and why methods such as interviews and focus 
groups were chosen to elicit data from participants. 
 
Chapter six will discuss preferences about the utilisation of oöcytes and embryos. Broadly, I 
examine the utilisation of oöcytes and embryos within Robert’s (2007) framework which 
distinguishes between “kin” and “life” ethics. I move beyond this framework to understand 
these differences in relation to the maternal social role and the means by which oöcytes and 
embryos distinctly constitute this role. This chapter will also report attitudes towards 
donating oöcytes for SCNT research. I will describe perceptions of “ideal” conditions and 
the introduction of different incentive models including payment, compensation or egg 
sharing schemes. 
 
Chapter seven will demonstrate that some instances of giving embryos and oöcytes occur 
within an affective framework – where the donor has identified a specific benefit or 
beneficiary. I examine the practice of oöcyte donation for reproductive purposes and explore 
the narratives of this specific cohort in order to understand how and why they came to make 
the decision to give their oöcytes to another woman. I argue that oöcyte donors act with both 
altruistic motives and instrumental concerns and these are oriented to the family they are 
helping to create, rather than themselves. I will contrast these responses with participants’ 
views about providing embryos for scientific research. This chapter shows that the affective 
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frameworks in which oöcytes are given is based on identifying a specific benefit or 
beneficiary while embryos are given in a spirit of embracing the “universal stranger”. 
 
In Part three, I will synthesise the results of the research. I intend to draw the results together 
in order to discuss literature regarding women and altruism and the significance of gift 
giving and reciprocity for tissue contributions to scientific research. Chapter eight will 
introduce the concept of discretionary reciprocity in relation to arguments made about 
women as altruistic including their social roles as women, mothers and citizens. These social 
roles will be located within contemporary social and political contexts in order to discuss the 
tensions of living and contributing to scientific research within a society that has an 
ambiguous relationship to scientific institutions. I will argue that, contrary to ideals of 
citizens as acting impartially, their ‘passions’, which are directed at a specific benefit or 
beneficiary, are a significant determinant in the provision of reproductive tissues such as 
oöcytes and embryos. This is also evident in the issue of establishing a financial equivalent 
in exchange for oöcytes. I discuss participants’ distinctions between two forms of the same 
thing ‘payment’ and ‘compensation’ – money, as revealing deep-seated cultural anxieties 
about donor autonomy and motivation. My framework to understand this complexity draws 
on critical studies of materiality which provide an alternative narrative to arguments based 
on universal and rationally-derived principles about paying women for oöcyte provision to 
SCNT research. Chapter nine will conclude the thesis and point to potential policy 
implications and directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Regulatory Trajectories of SCNT Research 
 
Introduction 
 
Stem cell research is an umbrella term for a number of methods and processes. Producing 
stem cell lines from embryos became scientific fact in the late 1990s and was subject to a 
globalised debate between scientists, patients and their advocates and politicians. Despite the 
global dimensions of the debate, national contexts remain important in defining the 
parameters of scientific conduct. This largely descriptive chapter will provide important 
background information about regenerative medicine, of which SCNT research is part. I will 
define key terms and comprehensively examine the legislative trajectory of SCNT research 
in Australia and the UK. The information will demonstrate the social specificities in which 
stem cell research is conducted and provide the reader with accurate information about 
current developments in the science.   
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What are stem cells? 
 
Stem cells can divide indefinitely, either continuing to replicate themselves (as stem cells) or 
differentiating into particular cells (Thomson et al. 1998; de Wert and Mummery 2003; 
Wallenfang and Matunis 2003). Stem cell research is part of the broader biomedical science 
of regenerative medicine, which focuses on utilising the potential of cells to be 
reprogrammed and manipulated in order to prevent or treat disease (Thomson et al. 1998). 
The science radically departs from traditionally linear perceptions of cells by destabilising 
the fixed trajectory along which cells travel–from inception to degeneration (Cooper 2006; 
Franklin 2006). Most somatic cells have a fixed trajectory and can only divide a limited 
number of times before beginning to degenerate. The capacity for infinite replication is 
called immortalisation and was once considered the distinctive feature of pathological or 
cancerous cells (Cooper 2006).The extent to which stem cells may be classified as either 
multipotent, pluripotent and totipotent is determined by their source (National Stem Cell 
Foundation 2010a).  
 
Stem cell lines can be produced from embryos (including cloned embryos) and adult cells 
(de Wert and Mummery 2003). Embryonic stem cells (ESCs) are only found in embryos, 
tissue created through the fusion of oöcyte and sperm. The fertilised oöcyte produces an 
inner cell mass (ICM) and it is from this that stem cell line can be extracted (de Wert and 
Mummery 2003). While embryonic stem cells are pluripotent with the capacity to develop 
into any somatic cell (and perhaps gametes such as oöcyte and sperm), they do not develop 
into ‘extra-embryonic’ tissue like the placenta or membranes, which are crucial for the 
growth of the foetus (de Wert and Mummery 2003; Couzin 2005; Vogel 2005; Ledford 
2009). Adult stem cells are found in most tissues in the foetus and after birth, such as the 
brain, kidney, intestine, heart, connective tissue, skeletal muscle, bone marrow and umbilical 
cord blood (Waldby 2002; Dennis 2006; Holden 2007). These stem cells are defined as 
multipotent because they exhibit a high potential to develop into somatic tissues but are still 
more specialised than pluripotent stem cells (Waldby 2002; de Wert and Mummery 2003). 
Stem cells can also be produced in vitro by inducing genetic change in adult somatic cells. 
These cells are called Induced Pluripotent Stem (IPS) cells because their production involves 
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the reprogramming of differentiated (adult) cells to behave like embryonic stem cells but do 
not involve the use of embryos or oöcytes (Cyranoski 2009).7  
 
The extraction of embryonic stem cell lines was first reported in 1998 by a team lead by 
James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin in the US, using fresh and frozen embryos 
donated from fertility patients (Gearhart 1998; Thomson et al. 1998; Cyranoski 2009).  Prior 
to Thomson et al.’s (1998) research, scientists had only been able to derive stem cells from 
some mammalian species (Gearhart 1998). Since 1998, there have been many embryonic 
stem cell lines established around the world. The first UK stem cell lines were successfully 
derived in 2003 (Franklin 2006). Other developments have been made, including “insights 
into normal and pathological cellular biology, production and embryogenesis and the 
creation of disease models and systems for predicting toxicology and drug screening” 
(Kerridge and Bendorf 2010, 156). Currently, some beauty treatments utilise stem cells 
(Harvey 2011) and autologous stem cell therapy is used to treat osteoarthritis, psoriasis and 
multiple sclerosis in Australia (Macquarie Stem Cells 2013). In India and China, stem cells 
are used in clinical treatments for patients with spinal cord injury (Ryan et al. 2010).  
 
What is somatic cell nuclear transfer? 
 
Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) involves the creation of a cloned embryo. This occurs 
by inserting the nucleus of an adult somatic cell into an enucleated oöcyte (an ovum that has 
had its own DNA removed). With manipulation, an enucleated oöcyte has the capacity to 
‘unpack’ the information of the adult cell or reprogram it to behave like embryonic stem 
cells. After this, a stem cell line may be extracted. SCNT is also known as cloning because 
the tissue and organs derived from the process and grown are expected to be the exact 
genetic match of the ‘donor’ adult cell (see figure 1 below). Research into SCNT requires 
fertile and unfertilised oöcytes, rather than oöcytes that have failed to fertilise and are termed 
“clinically unviable” (George 2008). 
 
                                                
7 By avoiding the use of these controversial and/or scarce tissues, IPS cell research has become a focus of 
intense scientific investigation worldwide (Baylis and McLeod 2007; Braun and Schultz 2012). 
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Figure 1, The technique of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) 8 
 
As figure 1 indicates, a number of cells can be produced from a cloned embryo. While it 
may be argued that this figure is inappropriate because it depicts the process of SCNT using 
monkey-cells, the illustration nevertheless is a clear and straightforward depiction of the 
process. In particular, patient-specific stem cell lines are expected to contribute to the 
development of scientific knowledge and the management of chronic diseases largely 
affecting people in the developed world, such as diabetes, spinal cord injury and lesions, 
Parkinson's Disease, stroke, arthritis, multiple sclerosis and heart failure (de Wert and 
Mummery 2003). There are also predictions that transplant medicine is on the verge of an 
important transformation – one that will be able to deliver patient-specific (or autologous) 
tissues (Dennis 2006; Roberts and Throsby 2008). This means that the problems of 
allogeneic transplant, including the lack of donated organs and negative immunological 
responses, may be avoided by providing tissues from the actual patient (Scheper-Hughes 
2007). It will be the patient's (healthy) somatic cell that will used to regress into stem cells 
before being directed to grow into a particular organ; this way, the cell's reintroduction9 will 
not generate resistance and the cell will not be attacked as a foreign object (Waldby 2002; 
Dennis 2006; Roberts and Throsby 2008). More generally, stem cell research is expected to 
relate to a variety of areas of scientific knowledge, including developmental biology, 
reproduction and ageing (Gearhart 1998; Thomson et al. 1998; Waldby 2002; Wallenfang 
and Matunis 2003; Dennis 2006). Creating cloned embryos is a complex and technically 
difficult procedure for scientists and to date, the existence of only one stem cell line has been 
verified. The company Stemagen (2008) announced that it had “become the first in the world 
                                                
8 http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v450/n7169/fig_tab/450485a_F1.html (accessed 14/12/2012). 
9 Since the tissue is the patient’s own, the word transplant, while familiar, is technically incorrect.   
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to create – and meticulously document – a cloned human embryo using somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT)”. However, a stem cell line was not created (National Stem Cell Foundation 
2010b).   
 
Female reproductive biology 
 
Oöcytes are female reproductive cells that carry the woman’s DNA. As noted above, oöcytes 
also have the ability to unpack and transform the adult cell, unlike a sperm cell which only 
carries DNA. In a ‘normal’ cycle, women ovulate one oöcyte per month that may either be 
fertilised or shed during menstruation. Biologically, men and women differ in terms of 
whether gametes are regenerative or not; sperm is a regenerative tissue, having no finite 
number, while the number of ova an individual has is limited in both number and lifespan; 
this means that the younger the oöcytes, the more fertile they tend to be. While sperm has no 
such ‘expiration date’, the viability of semen can be influenced by environmental factors 
(Oliva, Spira and Multigner (2001) but ultimately may be tested and known. In contrast, the 
fertility of oöcytes is largely unknown until fertilisation is attempted.10 If successful, an 
embryo is created; if not, oöcytes are designated as clinically unviable. Oöcytes are more 
fragile tissue than either sperm or embryos; they deteriorate by the hour (Braun and Schultz 
2012) and are less successfully frozen and thawed. 
 
In clinical fertility treatment, the maturation of a single oöcyte has been considered 
inefficient and it has been clinical protocol to stimulate the development of more than one 
ovum; this is called ovarian stimulation (Thompson 2005). This process involves the self-
administration of injections and nasal sprays over a four to six week period. Initially drugs 
are used to stop the woman’s regular menstrual cycle (weeks one to two) before the injection 
of gonadotropins, which are used to simulate “the development of several egg-containing 
follicles” (Pearson 2006, 608). The final stage of medication involves hormones to mature 
the oöcytes. During this time, the patient will have blood tests and ultrasounds to monitor the 
development of follicles and at the end of the cycle, she will undergo a day-procedure 
requiring intravenous sedation and local anaesthetic. The oöcytes are aspirated through a 
large glass needle inserted into the ovary through the vaginal wall (Pearson 2006, 608).  
                                                
10 In reproductive medicine, fertilisation refers to the fusion of the oöcyte and the sperm while in SCNT 
research this would involve the insertion of the somatic cell.  
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Undertaking oöcyte extraction may have short and long term health consequences. Reactions 
to medications vary between individuals and are impossible to predict. Yee, Hitkari and 
Greenblatt (2007, 2047) describe it as “a very physically invasive procedure” while 
Dickenson (2002) likens it to live kidney extraction. Common side effects may resemble 
symptoms women experience during their menstrual cycle, including fatigue, bloating, 
moodiness as well as cramps and breast tenderness. However, some women may develop 
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS). The symptoms of OHSS are much more 
pronounced and include “depression, short-term memory problems, insomnia, bleeding, 
hyperovulation stress syndrome [and] weight gain” (Ikemoto 2009, 770). Hospitalisation is 
usually necessary to treat OHSS. Little is understood about the long-term effects of oöcyte 
extraction, as no studies have been conducted on women who undergo the process for 
themselves or others. Pearson (2006) suggests that few fertility clinics are eager to report 
cases of OHSS among their own patients or donors and this may impact on scientific 
knowledge about the effects of oöcyte extraction.11  
 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) and stem cell research 
 
The emergence of ARTs, which use highly interventionist methods in comparison to other 
practices of fertility treatment (Haimes 1993), is crucial to the advent of stem cell research. 
Both practices share a range of techniques as well as tissues for clinical and research 
purposes (Waldby 2002; Franklin 2006; Haimes and Luce 2006; Parry 2006). Since the 
1970s, scientists and medical doctors have attempted to treat infertility in a number of ways 
(Thompson 2005). One of the most significant developments to have emerged in this era was 
the creation of embryos in vitro (in glass). In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) uses gametes 
extracted from potential parents12 and literally externalises fertilization by mixing extracted 
oöcytes and sperm in a petri dish. The resulting embryo(s) is then implanted into the uterus 
of the patient who gestates the foetus. The development of IVF changed the nature of 
reproduction by involving a number of individuals, including parents, gamete donors, 
                                                
11 In Australia, the Fertility Society advises that clinics must advise patients and/or about the risks of OHSS and 
how to manage symptoms or seek assistance. The code of conduct does not stipulate that records must be kept 
(Fertility Society of Australia 2010). 
12 I use this term loosely as gametes may be derived from people who do not intend to inhabit the social role of 
parent. 
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gestational surrogates as well as the doctors, nurses, counsellors and embryologists who 
perform these techniques (Sawicki 1991; Thompson 2005; Franklin 1997; Shaw 2007). The 
term IVF is commonly used to refer to fertility treatment generally, but it is just one 
technique among a myriad of others described under the umbrella of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART). ARTs can include Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT), which 
involves the injection of oöcytes and sperm directly into the woman’s fallopian tube for 
fertilisation to take place and Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI), by which the sperm 
is directly injected into the oöcyte (Serono Symposia International 2004).  
 
ARTs are used in many parts of the world and, while their use within Australia has grown 
steadily in the past decade, the first decline of 12.4% was reported in 2010 (Macaldowie et 
al. 2012, 49). In 2010, 30,558 women undertook approximately 56, 489 treatment cycles 
from which 13, 215 clinical pregnancies and 10, 897 live births resulted. This indicates an 
overall success rate in relation to treatment cycles of 18.1%. More statistics collected about 
reproductive medicine in Australia and New Zealand show that most women being treated 
for infertility with ARTs used their own oöcytes (95%), with a clear majority (63%) having 
cycles using embryos which have not yet been frozen (“fresh embryos”) (Macaldowie et al. 
2012).   
 
Legislating stem cell research  
 
The therapeutic promises of stem cell research are a major factor in its appeal (Rubin 2008); 
yet, it is legislated differently across the world in part because of its controversial use of 
embryos. When stem cell research was first debated, advocates of the methods argued that 
they will ultimately relieve untold patient suffering. The political implications of permitting 
stem cell research were two-fold: firstly, several governments considered that stem cell 
research may be a novel solution to the rising economic costs of chronic disease and ageing 
populations (Ehrich et al. 2012; Cooper 2006); secondly, as an increasingly industrialised 
endeavour, biomedicine is a significant part of some national or regional economies such as 
California, the European Union, Singapore and South Korea of which stem cell research is 
part (Jasanoff 2005; Gottweis, Salter and Waldby 2009). While the potential economic 
windfall and health management of its populations are appealing prospects to governments, 
there has not been a uniform response to the conduct of stem cell research. On the contrary, 
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regulatory frameworks are deeply reflective of national values and histories as well as 
economic and social factors in a globalising world (Jasanoff 2005; Franklin 2006; Gottweis, 
Salter and Waldby 2009). For instance, religious views and institutions such as the Catholic 
Church have been involved to a significant degree in the formation of policy (Isasi et al. 
2004; Fink 2007). This does not suggest that religious views or institutions inevitably create 
scientific policy because the political power of say, the Catholic Church varies nationally 
(Fink 2007). Indeed, it may even be used as a counterpoint. One interesting example of this 
is the way policy makers in Britain sought to assert themselves specifically in relation to the 
bioethical policies of the Europe Union which contended with the Catholic Church in a more 
explicit way (Jasanoff 2005). 
 
The diverse regulatory frameworks that are in place and the debates that shaped them 
demonstrate that the therapeutic and economic possibilities of stem cell research are far from 
irresistible. In other words, stem cell research means many things to different groups in 
society and its status as a legitimate avenue of research is a matter of engaging with – and 
contesting – those meanings. The following section will examine the United Kingdom and 
Australia in-depth. These two countries have a shared cultural heritage and close economic, 
intellectual and political ties (Franklin, 2007), as well as significant (and changing) 
nationalised health services. However, as will be discussed, the development of regulations 
pertaining to SCNT research have been very different.  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
Its existing regulatory framework was one of the main reasons why the UK was the first 
country in the world to legalise stem cell research using embryos in 2001. While the passage 
of legislation was not uncontroversial, the UK’s history of cutting-edge reproductive science 
and medicine (it is the birthplace of the first IVF baby, Louise Brown as well as Dolly the 
sheep) was a key factor in its proactive and wide-ranging approach to the novel techniques 
(Gottweis, Salter and Waldby 2009). In the 1980s, the Thatcher government established the 
Warnock Committee to review ART practices, given their growing use. Among the 
committee's recommendations, reported in 1984 but not implemented until the early 1990s, 
was the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). The 
HFEA is an independent statutory body which administers and licenses ART clinics and 
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research involving reproductive tissues for fertility purposes (Harvey 2008; Gottweis, Salter 
and Waldby 2009). The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 stipulated that 
embryos could be used for fertility research or as Jasanoff (2005) argues that the Committee 
permitted scientists use the pre-embryo. According to the Committee, the pre-embryo is 
characterised by the division of cells in contrast to the differentiated cells that characterise 
the embryo (evident from day 14 of fertilisation). The Committee argued that the ‘pre-
embryo’ was an entity that existed prior to the development of the ‘primitive streak’ and was 
thus incapable of feeling pain (Gottweis, Salter and Waldby 2009). As Jasanoff (2005: 155) 
argues, the “ontological and political reality [of the pre-embryo] was not a product of 
biological knowledge alone but was created (or coproduced) out of a complex mix of 
pragmatism, empiricism, and trust in experts”.  
 
The legacy of this legislative framework and regulatory environment played a significant 
part in Britain’s debates for stem cell research in the new millennium. Treading new but still 
familiar territory, Britain became the first country to permit embryonic stem cell research, 
the utilisation of animal oöcytes and the method of SCNT with human oöcytes. The latter 
stipulation was made explicitly on the basis that embryos created through SCNT were 
effectively the same as an embryo created through the fusion of sperm and oocyte and thus 
covered by existing HFEA regulations. This ruling was the result of court proceedings which 
ultimately ended when the House of Lords ruled against a campaign by pro-life organisation, 
the Pro-Life Alliance in 2003 (Jasanoff 2005). Britain is considered to have the most 
regulated – yet permissive – research culture in the world, what Jasanoff (2005, 9) considers 
to be a “relatively uncontested space for embryo research”. This was achieved after an 
organised campaign by government agencies, scientific societies and patient groups. In 
addition to this, the government considered that there was economic as well as scientific 
value in allowing such promising research to proceed and that the HFEA, a publicly trusted 
and internationally recognised body to oversee it, would allay some fears around the new 
science (Jasanoff 2005; Gottweis, Salter and Waldby 2009). Part of the legislative 
endorsement scientists received in order to proceed with the use of embryos for non-
reproductive purposes, the practice of SCNT and animal oöcytes to create stem cell lines, 
was the increasing scrutiny by researchers regarding the social impact and/or significance of 
the research (Franklin 2006).  
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Australia 
 
In Australia, events such as the creation of Dolly the sheep or Thomson et al.’s (1998) 
research did not immediately propel the government into decisive action over stem cell 
research including SCNT, despite the fact that it had also enjoyed the reputation of once 
being at the forefront of ARTs (Franklin 2007).13 In 2002, federal legislation was first 
introduced in relation to the new methods and two paths were taken: embryonic stem cell 
research was allowed using embryos created during fertility treatment prior to April 5, 2002 
but use of embryos subsequently created as well as the specific creation of embryos for 
research or through SCNT was prohibited (Harvey 2008). The administration of the new 
regulations was given over to a Licensing Committee, within the broader statutory body of 
the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). However, this licensing body 
was not given the same statutory weight or remit for public engagement as the HFEA in 
Britain. Such legislation was seen as a suitable compromise that allowed research to proceed 
during a time of exceptionally conservative government in Australia (Harvey 2008). The 
legislation was scheduled for review in 2005, during which time any developments in the 
science were to be considered along with “changes in community standards since 2002” 
(Ankeny and Dodds 2008, 221). The Lockhart Review was expected to be broader than the 
process involved in the initial legislation and to publicly consult the community. Apart from 
its specific recommendations, a principal function of the committee was to request that the 
NHMRC produce a working definition of the human embryo, as had occurred in Britain 
years earlier. As Harvey (2008) argues, this kept the debate focused on the technical 
dimensions of the embryo and was similar to those in the UK during the 1980s. This allowed 
the tissue to continue to have ‘special’ status whilst permitting experimentation.  
 
The degree to which the Committee was able to capture the diversity of community views is 
controversial; as Ankeny and Dodds (2008) argue, the dissemination of the consultation 
process showed a prevalence of ‘expert’ views, well-organised institutions and religious 
groups. In his critical examination of the committee’s report, Parker (2009) asserts that the 
committee’s framework was based on a number of inconsistencies. Notably, that despite the 
fact that the committee professed the implementation of more ‘neutral’ imperatives such as 
‘social justice’ and ‘human flourishing’ to assess the issue, a utilitarian framework was used. 
                                                
13 Australia is also distinct from Britain because it is a federation of states that legislate their own laws. 
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Parker bases his claim on the fact that the recommendations of the committee ultimately 
privileged the potential benefit of embryonic stem cell research over the potential ‘harm’ to 
embryos or donors and those opponents were responsible for proving that the research 
should be banned.  
 
In June 2007, the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of 
Human Embryo Research Amendment Act came into law in the federal parliament of 
Australia, with all states and territories passing their own identical legislation (Kerridge and 
Bendorf 2011). This legislation brought Australia largely into line with Britain by permitting 
the conduct of SCNT research. One significant difference is the use of animal oöcytes, 
which Australia continues to ban in contrast to Britain (Harvey 2008). The Licensing 
Committee implementing the regulations has since only permitted research that utilises 
clinically unviable oöcytes.14 While experiments on such oöcytes will enable scientists to 
perform essential ‘practice’ work, mature and fertile oöcytes are essential for producing stem 
cells and ultimately patient-specific tissues (Klitzman and Sauer, 2009). 
 
Oöcyte provision for SCNT research in a global context 
 
Britain and Australia are similar in their approach to sourcing tissues required for stem cell 
research in principle. The commercial trade of human embryos and oöcytes, like other 
bodily tissues, is not permitted and are classified as gifts (Franklin 2006; Dickenson and 
Alkorta Idiakez 2008; Waldby 2008). Australia is not unique in its insistence of altruistic 
donor models; both Canada and New Zealand prohibit the buying and selling of human 
tissue (Shaw 2007; Yee, Hitkari and Greenblatt 2007). Recently, however, the UK has 
considerably widened interpretations of the gift ethos and has introduced egg-sharing and 
payment schemes. The Newcastle egg-sharing research scheme has had two iterations 
(Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 2012). Firstly, in 2005, researchers initially asked women 
to give two oöcytes if their clinicians had anticipated they would produce more than 12 
oöcytes. Since the response to this was negligible, in 2007 the second development was 
licensed in which women “could be given a fees discount of £1500 for supplying half their 
fresh eggs retrieved during a treatment cycle” (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 2012, 
                                                
14 The reasons for this are unclear and the licensing committee does not undertake the same level of public 
engagement as the HFEA. 
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1201). This discount for private IVF patients is funded by the Medical Research Council 
(Braun and Schultz 2012, 149). One rationale for the application was that egg-sharing for 
research should be treated in exactly the same manner as for fertility treatment. However, 
there were various conditions for the provision of oöcytes to SCNT research; patients had to 
have experience of the IVF cycle, needed to volunteer themselves rather than be approached 
and undergo a consent process conducted by an independent research nurse. The number of 
oöcytes retrieved before any could be given to research was reduced to six, “allocated one-
by-one, immediately on retrieval, with no regard to quality; if they produced 5 or fewer eggs 
they would keep them all and still receive the discount” (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 
2012, 1201). 
 
Since 2011, in addition to egg-sharing where in-kind benefits are exchanged, the HFEA has 
licensed the ‘compensation’ of women in Britain to provide oöcytes for research purposes 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2012a). Currently, the amount is £750; 
prior to this, donors (of both semen and eggs) could claim travel expenses in addition to a 
maximum of £250 for loss of earnings, as is the custom with jury attendance (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2012a). In the late 1990s, donors were paid a token 
sum of £15 (Byrd, Sidebotham and Lieberman 2002, 175). The recently increased payment 
is available to both British citizens and non-permanent residents, although women in the 
latter category cannot “claim an excess to cover overseas travel expenses” (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2012b). The HFEA position now corresponds with 
the view of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011, 11) that women should be paid to 
provide oocytes to research because they are undergoing significant discomfort, 
inconvenience and potential health risks “in order to contribute to the common good of 
research”.15 Since 2009, the state of New York has permitted the payment of up to $10,000 
to women who provide oöcytes to SCNT research (Nelson 2009). The publicly-funded 
                                                
15 The Council’s recommendation is made in light of its view that that any non-altruist-focused interventions 
that are developed to increase supply of limited tissues “may need to be subject to closer scrutiny because of 
the threat they may pose to wider communal values” (2011, 8). The Council also makes a concomitant 
recommendation that may radically reconfigure the structural property relations that govern the provision of 
tissues to research: that “once donated for research purposes, bodily material should be regarded as a public 
good: researchers should make the most efficient use of it possible, and must be willing to share it on the basis 
of scientific merit” (2011, 12).  
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Hospital La Fé in Valencia Spain utilises oöcytes from fertility patients without any payment 
to the individual (Braun and Schultz 2012).  
 
The IVF-Stem cell interface  
 
The relationship between ARTs and stem cell research is complex. ARTs are the more 
established field of medicine and have played a vital part in the latter’s formation. ARTs 
maintain a monopoly of legitimacy over tissues such as oöcytes and embryos and stem cell 
research is yet to firmly establish a momentum of its own. This is evident in the fact that 
rates of oöcyte provision for stem cell research are much lower compared with reproductive 
oöcyte provision. In response to frustrations expressed by some scientists that embryos 
which could be potentially used in stem cell research were going to ‘waste’ because of 
bureaucratic inefficiency, the UK government instituted measures to ensure the safe and 
efficient transfer of reproductive tissue between fertility clinics and stem cell laboratories. 
Franklin (2006) labelled this the IVF-Stem cell interface. The interface developed with 
specific funding by the Medical Research Council to physically connect IVF clinics with 
stem cell research laboratories (Ehrich, Williams and Farsides 2010). However, the 
development of this interface is reported to be uneven. 
 
Braun and Schultz (2012) argue the success of the IVF-Stem cell interface in procuring 
oöcytes is dependent on individual researchers implementing mechanisms to do so. This 
recent study demonstrates that research centres in Europe and California often utilise 
personal relationships and geographical proximity to IVF facilities in order to source oöcytes 
for their SCNT research. In each case, “the leading clinician at the facility where the oöcytes 
were obtained was also the researcher who led the respective SCNT project” (Braun and 
Schultz 2012, 144). However, scientists who were interested in SCNT research but worked 
in centres where no SCNT research was undertaken, reported that they practiced a form of 
self-censorship by refusing to ask women for oöcytes; this hesitancy was not necessarily due 
to regulations prohibiting the request, but a personal concern or fear of potential negative 
consequences and public scandal.  
 
Attempts by the UK government to support stem cell research by funding the physical 
connection between fertility clinics and stem cell research laboratories has not resulted in a 
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uniform supply of embryos. Some attempts to ensure the supply of embryos to stem cell 
research are more successful than others. As Ehrich, Williams and Farsides (2010) report 
from their qualitative research in clinics/stem cell research laboratories, the classification of 
embryos in ‘normal’ contexts of IVF and those created in the context of pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD) is very different. This research shows that in the context of “normal 
IVF”, embryologists and other fertility clinicians are often equivocal about the status of an 
embryo and there is often little agreement regarding the provision of ‘fresh’ clinically-
unviable embryos to stem cell research. ‘Fresh’ embryos have not been cryopreserved and 
are unlikely to be implanted because of poor cell fragmentation. ‘Frozen’ embryos have been 
cryopreserved and stored with the intention of using them if earlier implantations are 
unsuccessful. There are different factors which converge in the embryologist’s decisions to 
classify embryos as viable or unviable. These factors can be technical, such as the number of 
cells into which the embryo has divided or they may be social details, such as the local 
authority’s funding of fresh cycles and patient narratives. In other words, classifying 
embryos involves human discretion rather than only biological properties (Ehrich, Williams 
and Farsides 2010).  
 
In another iteration of the same data, Williams et al. (2008) report that stem cell scientists 
regard embryos that have been classified as affected with genetic disorders as ethically non-
contentious tissue to use in stem cell research. In the context of fertility treatment using 
PGD, affected embryos are clinically unviable and will be discarded anyway. In contrast to 
the UK authorities, Australian policies are not similarly geared towards the development of 
the IVF-Stem cell interface. Oöcytes used in stem cell research are clinically non-viable as 
stipulated by current NHMRC (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013) 
guidelines. 
 
Current knowledge regarding oöcyte provision for SCNT research 
 
There is some published research into the attitudes and perceptions of oöcyte providers to 
SCNT research, but it is relatively small in comparison with research into oöcyte provision 
for reproductive purposes and other forms of tissue provision to scientific research. The 
dearth of information regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research is a consequence of its 
relative novelty. This section surveys the available studies regarding oöcyte provision to 
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research. Without understanding the specificities of scientific oöcyte provision, designing a 
conceptual framework that may contribute to appropriate regulations will be ineffective. 
 
While SCNT research is novel, researchers have been surveying women’s attitudes of oöcyte 
provision to research almost as long as reproductive technologies have allowed for the 
externalisation of oöcytes. For example, Kazem et al. (1995) report on attitudes towards 
reproductive and research provision in the UK. The researchers distributed their survey 
among women who had attended antenatal clinics, postnatal wards and fertility clinics as 
well as donors and recipients of oöcytes (the groups were largely defined as ‘fertile’ and 
‘infertile’). Researchers also surveyed a selection of male partners in each cohort (n= 117). 
A total of 258 women were surveyed and the overwhelming majority (91.8%) thought that 
oöcytes should be used for therapeutic rather than research purposes, however, there were 
differences between each cohort. For instance, infertile women were more interested than 
fertile women in giving their oöcytes to research (although elaboration on what kind of 
research is absent).  
 
Other scholars have found that openness to donation for research was found to be highly 
dependent on the participant’s fertility status with less-fertile women being more likely to 
donate their oöcytes for research purposes (Purewal & van den Akker 2009). Kazem et al. 
(1995) also reported a significant lack of approval in obtaining oöcytes for reproduction 
from other sources such as cadavers and aborted or miscarried foetuses; however, the 
authors do not note whether this same aversion would be applicable for research purposes. A 
study by Byrd, Sidebotham and Lieberman (2002) also surveyed reproductive oöcytes 
donors in the UK (n= 113) and found that 52% of participants would agree to provide 
oöcytes to research for a variety of reasons, including the benefit of research and minimising 
the waste of oöcytes.16 
 
A recent survey in the US asked women who were providing oöcytes for reproductive 
purposes about their attitudes towards doing so for SCNT research. Klitzman and Sauer 
(2009) recruited women who were enrolled or participating in the Columbia University 
reproductive donor program (n=230) for which they received US$8000. The centre has 
                                                
16 The authors do not differentiate between research.  
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screened over 1000 women in five years but has enrolled only 250 to become providers. 
While the majority of respondents were Caucasian (62%), other ethnic categories were also 
represented, including Hispanic (11%), Asian (10%) and African-American (11%) (2009) 
women. In this study, 40% of respondents did not state a preference about whether their 
oöcytes were given to research or reproductive purposes, although 51% preferred 
reproduction; 82% stated that they would be willing to provide oöcytes to medical research. 
74% of respondents expected to be compensated the same amount of money to provide 
oöcytes for research or reproductive purposes while one third of the sample expected to be 
paid a minimum amount of US$8000 for research.  
 
The studies cited above report attitudes and experiences of potential or actual donors as well 
as the general public. This scholarship remains descriptive, reporting in terms of tolerance or 
preferences towards the practice of oöcyte provision for research and speculating on the 
potential to increase the numbers of providers. In contrast, the discussion of the Newcastle 
egg-sharing research scheme (NESR) does conceptualise the practice of egg-sharing for 
SCNT research (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 2012). This study into the NESR is one of 
the first to publish results regarding participants’ views on providing oöcytes and is an 
important reference for this thesis. The study involved two samples, interviewing women 
who had given their oöcytes for SCNT research (n= 29) and women who had given their 
oöcytes for reproductive purposes (n= 21). The authors focus on the issue of exploitation, 
providing qualitative data in relation to assertions made in the scholarly literature by 
Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez (2008) and Roberts and Throsby (2008) regarding the NESR 
as structurally limiting women’s choices about utilising their oöcytes.  
 
During interviews, participants did not, of their own volition, raise the issue of exploitation 
but neither did they express surprise at being asked questions in relation to the topic. Rather, 
participants responded in two ways: they either articulated, in a detached manner, that the 
NESR was potentially exploitative but did not acknowledge that exploitation had occurred, 
or they “refuted [the charge of exploitation] outright” (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 
2012, 1203). The authors (2012, 1208) suggest that “concerns about exploitation are not 
uppermost in women’s accounts of their experiences of the NESR,” demonstrating that 
participants expressed the ability to rationally consider the costs and benefits of the scheme. 
The researchers argue that many women ultimately refused to share their oöcytes with SCNT 
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researchers “despite their desperation” (2012, 1209) to have a baby. ‘Desperation” refers to a 
construction of fertility patients common in both journalistic and social scientific literature. 
Presumably, in a context such as exists in the UK, where the National Health Service (NHS) 
restricts the provision of fertility treatment on the basis of age, whether the couple already 
have children and their residential location, the ‘desire’ to have a baby is hampered by 
bureaucratic regulations. The opportunity to partake in discounted fertility treatment is 
expected to be appealing. Underlying this scheme then is the presumption that because one 
cycle of IVF is rarely sufficient to produce a pregnancy or “live birth”, patients/participants 
should not focus on individual IVF cycles but the potential for many, ideally facilitated by 
discounted fertility treatment. Rapport (2003) believes that this broader social context is an 
important factor in the decisions of women and/or couples to participate in egg-sharing 
schemes. By saving money on individual treatments, women and/or couples can pay for 
more treatments. At the NESR clinic, staff observed a decline in the number of women 
agreeing to take part in their egg-sharing scheme and attributed this to recent increases in 
NHS funding for fertility treatment.  
 
This recent study adds a novel dimension to the vigorous debate regarding the potentially 
exploitative nature of egg-sharing for research purposes. Examining the attitudes and 
experiences of participants in the NESR is an important contribution to knowledge for policy 
makers. The study draws attention to the importance of contextualising participants’ 
responses in specific temporal and geographical conditions. For example views regarding the 
state provision of fertility treatment are different from the UK of the 1980s and thus are 
different to Australia in 2013. The analysis provides important evidence regarding the degree 
to which women may choose to provide oöcytes at the same time as being treated as a 
fertility patient. Currently, there is a lack of data about women’s attitudes to stem cell 
research generally and SCNT in particular in the Australian context. We do not know 
whether Australian women agree that they should be paid to provide oöcytes for research 
purposes or if infertile women are more likely to provide their oöcytes for research than 
fertile women. Our knowledge regarding views of egg-sharing models during fertility 
treatment is also limited. More importantly, there is little conceptual analysis of why women 
in Australia and other parts of the Global North have thus far “failed” to donate their oöcytes 
to SCNT research. Current approaches will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Conclusion 
 
To advance the aims of this thesis, this chapter has provided important background 
information regarding technical aspects of stem cell and SCNT research and female 
reproductive biology. The conduct of stem cell research is subject to competing frameworks 
which are imposed by states as well as scientists. Thus, we can see that attending to specific 
national contexts remains important despite the global nature of scientific research where 
such boundaries are ostensibly less important. However, the development of the IVF-Stem 
cell interface also shows that expectations regarding the conduct of scientists exist within 
competing frameworks. In some cases, stem cell research may be legally permitted but 
scientists refrain from soliciting oöcytes for their research. This dissonance is central to 
questions about the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues and indicates the various 
tensions which characterise its conduct. Chapter three will address normative approaches to 
the question, first discussing principle-based approaches in the bioethical literature. I will 
then situate this debate within the “tissue economies” literature by examining the legacy of 
Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) The Gift Relationship.   
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Chapter Three: Principle-Based Approaches Regarding the 
Scientific Utilisation of Women’s Reproductive Tissues  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter has two sections. Firstly, I will review the substantive literature regarding 
oöcyte provision to stem cell research and largely focus on the debate by various scholars in 
the English-speaking world about the consequences of paying women (if they constitute 
healthy research subjects or tissue donors), the risks and benefits of the procedure and the 
efficacy of stem cell research. I organise this debate between scholars who advocate 
payment for women to provide oöcytes to SCNT research as a way of reconciling the 
importance of such research and recognition of its specific conditions, and scholars who are 
critical of women assuming the burden of experimental research. This chapter demonstrates 
that most scholarly literature is concerned with motivations and attitudes of potential or 
actual donors and does not conceptualise the practice in sociological terms by situating the 
discussion within specific temporal and geographic contexts.  
 
The second section will evaluate current approaches to oöcyte provision for SCNT research 
in relation to “tissue economies” literature, a growing field of scholarly work that examines 
issues related to property and forms of exchange. This begins with an in depth discussion of 
Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) The Gift Relationship focusing on his dichotomous portrayal of 
‘donors’ and ‘vendors’ before a discussion of recent critiques from political-economy 
perspectives. I suggest that even though Titmuss’s approach has come under sustained 
critique and may now seem anachronistic, it continues to be an important reference point for 
more contemporary approaches in unexpected ways. 
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Bioethical debates regarding the provision of oöcytes to SCNT research  
 
For feminist scholars, the scientific utilisation of women’s reproductive tissues poses 
significant questions about women’s social, civil and political status. These concerns have 
been channelled into a debate which has largely focused on whether altruistic or payment 
models can realise women’s rights to liberty. The payment system is advocated as a way of 
changing relationships between women and scientists in one of two ways; firstly, to 
economically recognise the labour of the women providing their oöcytes in a heavily 
commercialised field of scientific research and secondly, to transform social expectations 
that femininity is predicated on women being altruistic. However, payment systems are 
controversial for three reasons: firstly, because they undermine the notion that participation 
in scientific research should be autonomous and voluntary and occur without undue 
inducement. Secondly, paying women in particular provokes questions about specific forms 
of coercion based on a generalised vulnerability. Finally, a payment system commodifies 
things or social relations to which prices had not previously been attached. Whether scholars 
advocate a payment system or are critical of expectations that women contribute to scientific 
research, they are united in an assumption that an ethical decision is the outcome of 
calculating costs and benefits and the inclusion of money into this process is considered a 
way of mitigating the costs to women or increasing the risk that their bodies will be subject 
to commodification.  
 
Citing the Belmont Report of 1975, Lo et al. (2004), Levens and de Cherney (2008) and 
Mertes and Pennings (2007) contend that oöcyte provision for SCNT research is simply 
another form of participation in scientific research. Mertes and Pennings (2007) recognise 
the “special status” of oöcyte providers as providers of material, rather than test subjects, but 
insist that this difference does not fundamentally change the broader framework in which 
they should be placed. For scholars who regard oöcyte provision for SCNT research as 
comparable to participation in clinical trials, the mechanism of informed consent is 
considered a sufficient means to ensure the autonomy of women (Haimes et al. 2013). 
However, what constitutes necessary information is heavily contested. Lo et al. (2004, 560) 
make the distinction between the provision of oöcytes and embryos, which should follow 
“explicit and specific” procedures of informed consent, and the use of cancerous tissues, 
which are removed during treatment. The information presented to oöcyte providers should 
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include knowledge about the use of embryos, including their destruction, the potential 
commercial value of the research and the sharing between researchers and institutions. 
Oöcyte providers in particular “need to understand that the resulting cells will be, except for 
mitochondrial DNA, genetically identical to the somatic cell donor and that they will not be 
used to create a pregnancy” (Lo et al. 2004).  
 
Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez (2008, 140) are not only critical of paying women to provide 
their oöcytes to SCNT research but argue that “conscientious researcher[s]” should not be 
asking women to provide oöcytes at all and they propose a moratorium on oöcyte provision 
for research until the risks are better understood. They questions whether women can fully 
consent if there is insufficient information about the procedure. Without “full disclosure”, 
potential donors cannot adequately calculate the risks and benefits of oöcyte extraction. The 
authors suggest that the long-term health and well-being effects of ovarian stimulation have 
not been definitively established and therefore, participants cannot be adequately informed 
and their consent is effectively hollow. George (2008) shares concerns that the process of 
informed consent cannot be considered a solution that reconciles the complexity of the issues 
at hand. Specifically, given the ‘speculative’ nature of SCNT research, oöcyte donors cannot 
be likened to kidney or liver lobe donors whose recipients usually stand to tangibly benefit 
from the donation; neither should oöcyte provision be compared with clinical trials because 
“there are [no] clear benefits for the indicated population” (George 2008, 288).  
 
Clearly communicating the risks of any procedure is essential for the process of informed 
consent. However, within this sub-discipline, there is little consensus regarding the long or 
short-term risks of oöcyte extraction and the political implications of making such 
pronouncements are disputed. Scholars manage this uncertainty in specific ways; Levens and 
DeCherney (2008, 2175, emphasis added) rather optimistically state, “there is no conclusive 
evidence linking fertility drugs to breast, endometrial, or ovarian cancer risks”, yet they also 
suggest that there is a risk of OHSS which can be fatal in rare cases and a potential reduction 
in future fertility. Other scholars maintain an ambiguity in their own pronouncements by 
referring to both abstract and specific contexts. For instance, Mertes and Pennings (2007, 
630 emphasis added) state that because “ovarian stimulation and oöcyte retrieval are 
common procedures in infertility treatment, and thus, accurate data are available on the 
immediate health risks for women…research into the long-term risks of ovarian stimulation 
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are still underway, and many of the existing studies present conflicting data”. At the same 
time, they also suggest that women should be informed of the uncertainties related to the 
effects of drugs and procedures of oöcyte extraction.  
 
Other scholars insist that the medication and procedures used in the process of oöcyte 
extraction pose serious risks to women who undertake the process (Dickenson and Alkorta 
Idiakez 2008; Thompson 2009). George (2008, 289) argues that the risks of oöcyte provision 
for healthy donors and fertility patients are immense and cites clinical practices moving 
toward lower dose and more “natural/minimal stimulation IVF where fewer oöcytes are 
extracted than with standard IVF” as evidence that protocols seeking to maximise the 
number of oöcytes will automatically harm women. Mertes and Pennings (2007, 630) argue 
that OHSS is most likely in young donors with comorbidity factors, such as polycystic 
ovaries. Moreover, like George (2008), they suggest that to avoid OHSS, tempering the 
stimulation regime to more ‘natural’ levels of oöcyte maturation because the donor, unlike 
the fertility patient, is unlikely to benefit from the retrieval of high numbers of oöcytes. 
Thompson (2007) suggests mitigating risks of harm by using fertility clinics whose statistics 
show low rates of pregnancy and OHSS for providers, to oversee oöcyte extraction, arguing 
that less responsible clinics should not be used. This is the same view of the International 
Society for Stem Cell Research (cited in Haimes et al. 2013). However, the feasibility of this 
strategy is uncertain because as some researchers admit, clinicians may be reluctant to report 
if their patients or donors suffer from OHSS because of potentially adverse consequences 
such as bad publicity (Pearson 2006). 
 
New empirical research has reported the medical effects of oöcyte extraction. Maxwell, 
Cholst and Rosenwaks (2008, 2166) undertook a retrospective analysis of donor charts at the 
New York Presbyterian Hospital-Weill Cornell Medical School between 1991 and 2007. The 
sample included donors (both anonymous and identified or directed) who participated in 
almost 1000 cycles (n= 587). The research was designed to study the rate of both minor and 
serious complications related to oöcyte retrieval and found that the rate of serious 
complications was less than 1%. Serious complications include “moderate OHSS requiring 
hospitalization, ovarian torsion, infection, and a ruptured ovarian cyst” (Maxwell, Cholst and 
Rosenwaks 2008, 2169). The rate of minor complications was 8.5%; which was defined as 
mild or moderate symptoms of OHSS. Jayaprakasan et al. (2007) designed their study in 
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order to understand the potential risks of OHSS for the specific practice of oöcyte retrieval 
for research. The participants of the study included women undergoing fertility treatment at 
a NHS-funded centre in the UK (n=339), specifically those who developed a particular 
number of follicles after ovarian stimulation. The researchers reported that 14.5% of women 
required hospital admission to treat symptoms of OHSS, a figure Schneider (2008, 2016.e2) 
regards as “sizable”. Schneider draws attention to the fact that the studies related to short and 
long term risks of oöcyte retrieval have been based on the samples of women who have 
undertaken fertility treatment and is critical of assumptions that they may be translated to the 
‘healthy’ oöcyte donor for stem cell research.  
 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the risks associated with oöcyte extraction in the short 
and long term can be used as a basis for deciding which is the “best” oöcyte provider to 
SCNT research. These arguments are largely premised on the idea that justice should 
determine the selection of research participants. Just subject selection is a concern of the 
bioethical community that is critical of the recruitment of particular populations–usually 
prisoners or the economically disadvantaged – that are less capable of exercising their 
autonomy. This includes views regarding the consequences of introducing financial 
remuneration on different groups of women. For instance, Thompson (2007) argues that 
maintaining an altruistic system will inhibit the recruitment of “the healthiest possible 
donor” (women who are nonetheless inherently vulnerable in specific ways). The ‘healthy 
donor’ is not a fertility patient but a woman whose fertility is at its peak. According to 
Thompson, an altruistic system invariably puts pressure on women who are “vulnerable” 
because they are motivated by the potential outcomes of the research (i.e. women who are in 
someway closely related to prospective beneficiaries – those with diseases or genetic 
dispositions which SCNT research may help alleviate or cure). A payment system will 
alleviate the pressure on such women – those providing oöcytes in “specific” and “concrete” 
circumstances by giving women with no such motivation a reason to provide their own 
oöcytes (Thompson 2007; George 2008; Thompson 2009).  
 
Introducing a payment system to ‘healthy donors’ to provide oöcytes for SCNT research is 
also expected to alleviate pressure on other potential donor populations, specifically women 
who are undergoing fertility treatment. Like Thompson (2007), this argument is based on the 
principle of just subject selection because paying healthy donors will increase the number of 
 
34 
oöcytes for research and distribute the risk across the society. Citing the IVF-Stem cell 
interface, Ballantyne and de Lacey argue that women undergoing fertility treatment are 
currently most vulnerable to becoming the population of providers by default. Fertility 
patients are unlike patients enrolled in randomized control trials (RCTs) because giving 
oöcytes to SCNT research does not represent any therapeutic benefit for their infertility.17 
However, this cohort should only be approached to participate in research that specifically 
benefits them as fertility patients. The International Society for Stem Cell Research (Haimes 
et al. 2013, 288) regards the provision of some ‘reward’ to “women in fertility treatment 
programs…[as] ethically justifiable to compensate them for their willingness to accept added 
anxiety and some risk of reduced chances of pregnancy”. Ultimately, the view that ‘healthy 
donors’ rather than fertility patients are ideally approached corresponds with the positions 
taken by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011) and Levens and DeCherney (2008, 2175) 
who argue “reasonable financial compensation is grounded in fairness to donors in exchange 
for the burden borne on behalf of the recipient or society in the case of donation for 
research”. However, it diverges from the suggestion made by Mertes and Pennings (2007, 
631) that the benefit to providers should be increased by prioritising research into genetic 
research rather than “expensive tailor-made stem cell therapies”. 
 
These views proceed from the desire to maintain respect for the human body and insist that 
paying providers does not automatically entail the commodification of human tissues. 
Scholars such as Thompson (2007), Isasi and Knoppers (2007) and Levens and de Cherney 
(2008) seek to temper their advocacy of payment by insisting that it should not be introduced 
in isolation. Other measures must be instituted in order to protect women who will be 
attracted to the financial compensation. This includes follow-up medical and/or 
psychological care for providers (Mertes and Pennings 2007; Thompson 2007). This is 
particularly apt in the context of the US and other jurisdictions that have minimal or 
restricted, rather than universal, provision for healthcare.18 Other scholars stipulate a number 
of conditions to mitigate the risks, including the number of oöcytes collected, regularly 
screening donors for medical problems, monitoring specifically for symptoms of OHSS, 
                                                
17 Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) do not discuss the fact that RCTs enroll patients who are given potentially 
new treatments (the experimental group) and others who may be treated with the established medicine or 
placebos (the control group).  
18  In Australia, the Medicare system is comprehensive and covers emergency treatments and some non-
essential healthcare. 
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restricting providers on the basis of age (minimum 25 years) and parity and allowing only 
two donations per woman (Thomspon 2007). Levens and de Cherney (2008, 2174) 
recommend that oöcyte providers should be between 21 and 34 years of age (despite the 
legal age of consent being 18) and that they submit to psychological assessment in order to 
avoid potential long-term psychological effects, that have been reported by women who have 
provided oöcytes for reproductive (namely that they are not aware of the outcome). 
 
Many scholars who advocate for payment to healthy donors insist that this constitutes neither 
coercion nor commodification (Thompson 2007; Skene 2009). For example, in their 
recommendations, the Committee for the International Society for Stem Cell Research 
(Haimes et al. 2013, 285) propose that any “compensation is not for the eggs, but rather for 
undergoing the processes involved in providing those eggs”. Isasi and Knoppers (2007, 42) 
argue “linking compensation to risk…preserves the essence of donation as a gift”. 
Commodification occurs if women are paid for the amount and quality of oöcytes they 
provide (i.e. providers would only be paid if they produced 15 fertile oöcytes). Payment is 
advocated on the basis that it is given for “the work of undergoing the donation procedure”, 
rather than the oöcytes provided that will commercialise “that which should be not be 
commercialized” (Thompson 2007, 209). Comparisons between other forms of onerous 
work and oöcyte donation should be made in order to determine the payment. Situating stem 
cell research in a more overt economic context, Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008, 160) argue 
that it is unjust to prohibit donors from receiving any monetary recompense for their efforts 
because the oöcytes are economically valuable and contend that “[c]ompulsory altruistic 
donation of eggs does not prevent the commodification of eggs; it simply prevents women 
from sharing in the financial benefits of the research”. Distinct from these approaches, the 
legal scholar Skene (2009, 28.4) argues that since oöcyte extraction is akin to ‘risky’ jobs 
such as film stunts or bridge construction, monetary payment is necessary to counteract the 
onerous “time [commitments] and invasiveness of the procedure”. Skene’s (2009) argument 
is based on the principle of autonomy and is critical of the state’s authority to regulate the 
decisions women can make about their bodies. 
 
As the discipline of bioethics is heterogeneous, advocating for the introduction of a payment 
for healthy oöcyte donors is not without its detractors. Refuting Skene’s (2009) claim that 
payment does not automatically involve the commercialisation of oöcytes and human bodies, 
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Thompson (2009) argues that it is highly likely that providers will be poor if Australia 
legalises the payment of oöcyte provision to SCNT research. The basis of Thompson’s 
(2009, 29.1) claim is the idea that “a person uses her body and how she allows her body to 
be used are forms of self-expression that are intrinsically tied to her self-conception and the 
value she puts on her relationships with others”. This and other critical perspectives insist 
that any kind of payment is a form of undue coercion because it is likely to influence the 
individual to make a decision without proper consideration of the potential risks (Dickenson 
and Alkorta Idiakez 2008; Roberts and Throsby 2008; Widdows 2009).  
 
Paying women to provide oöcytes for SCNT research does not necessarily relieve pressure 
from other potential donor populations; rather, given that women experience social and 
economic disadvantage in comparison with men, it would represent the potential for 
exploitation of women on a global scale, particularly those who live in nations where ethical 
oversight is often negligible (Dickenson 2002; Widdows 2009). In these countries, oöcyte 
provision for SCNT research will become a source of income (as is the case for some 
women in Romania) (Nahman 2008). In a similar vein, George (2008) does not believe it is 
possible that any form of oöcyte provision for SCNT research (paid or unpaid) can occur 
without harm to women and supports measures taken by the European Parliament to fund 
alternative research. 
 
An important feature of these critical perspectives is a scepticism regarding the efficacy of 
SCNT research and thus the justification of bearing the risks of oöcyte extraction. Thompson 
(2009) asserts that the potential benefits of SCNT research should not be considered as a 
good in itself. Imperatives to improve healthcare and quality of life cannot be necessarily 
privileged at the expense of other social or ethical values. Similarly, Baylis and McLeod 
(2007) suggest that given the potential risks for women undergoing oöcyte extraction, 
scientists should focus on other viable and less socially controversial forms of stem cell 
research such as IPS cells. These approaches clearly resonate with community opposition to 
the HGDP discussed in chapter four; they demonstrate a cynicism about the benefits of 
scientific research and argue that the cost to women’s bodily and psychic integrity is too 
high. 
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Women and vulnerability 
 
The commentators discussed in the preceding section acknowledge and address vulnerability 
in very different ways. Vulnerability is an intensely debated concept in bioethical literature 
and its meaning is contentious. Macklin (2003) surveys a number of examples and argues 
that defining exploitation is an important basis for determining vulnerability –whether 
individuals or groups have the ability to exercise protection of their own interest. Unequal 
power relations involve “wealthy or powerful individuals or agencies [taking] advantage of 
the poverty, powerlessness, or dependency of others by using the latter to serve their own 
ends…without adequate compensating benefits for the less powerful or disadvantaged” 
(Macklin 2003, 475). Macklin draws on two case studies: the testing of a drug for meningitis 
in Nigeria during an epidemic of the disease and the ‘importation’ of Estonian citizens as 
research subjects into Switzerland where few local people were enrolled in clinical trials. In 
addition, Macklin discusses the way in which religious and customary social contexts often 
create overt relations of gendered dominance. Macklin defines exploitation by calculating 
costs and benefits to the individual or group. This is distinct from Hurst’s (2008, 198) 
assertion that the potential vulnerability of research participants must be assessed in relation 
to specific wrongs that could eventuate from specific research projects. Hurst shifts the 
emphasis of vulnerability from being an essential trait in a particular social status such as 
gender, race, class or sexuality to an assessment of the potential harm a specific research 
protocol may pose.  
 
Like Hurst, Luna (2009) is sceptical of approaches that simply use vulnerability as a label 
and dismissing the idea that vulnerability can be a natural fact, a part of the human 
condition. Instead, Luna constructs a dynamic and relational view of the concept and 
proposes that vulnerability be conceptualised as a layer, which can be placed on an 
individual within a particular context. A woman may or may not be vulnerable depending on 
the political and social context in which she exists and the rights that she can exercise. This 
approach is distinct from others that label specific populations or groups as vulnerable and 
render them a homogenous mass despite their complexity. It acknowledges that vulnerability 
is not a permanent state. Luna asserts that women have varying levels of social and 
economic capital that they may draw on in order to realise their interests.  
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that the concept of vulnerability is subject to specific 
debates regarding its meaning and application. The debate regarding oöcyte provision to 
SCNT research remains largely within the paradigm that a population is inherently 
vulnerable, with some attention to the specific context of oöcyte provision. For instance, 
even scholars advocating for the introduction of a payment system argue that it must be 
checked and balanced with other measures to mitigate the risk that women will sell their 
oöcytes because of the vulnerability caused by their economic and social deprivation. On the 
other hand, critiques of both payment and altruistic systems suggest that women are 
vulnerable to expectations of altruism and self-sacrifice because of conventional norms of 
femininity. This static view of women as vulnerable is also evident with regards to women 
and risks associated with oöcyte extraction, to be discussed further in chapter five. 
 
Tissue economies: the legacy of Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship 
 
It is necessary to situate the foregoing discussion regarding the regulatory regime in which 
the scientific utilisation of oocytes can occur with reference to Richard Titmuss’s (1997 
[1970]), The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. This is because 
contemporary debates are seeking to change the status quo, and Titmuss’s altruistic-donor 
model for blood transfusions remains the template. As mentioned in chapter two, the 
altruistic donor model remains in place in Australia and many parts of the world. Efforts to 
introduce different models are always made in relation to Titmuss’s precursor even if this 
reference is implicit. For this thesis to progress, the arguments contained within The Gift 
Relationship must be discussed. I do not mean to suggest that blood and oocyte provision are 
biologically and technically analogous. However, I do wish to assert that by exploring 
Titmuss’s continuing legacy, we can examine the underlying social and political 
implications of specific models of tissue provision.  
  
Titmuss was one of Britain’s important social thinkers of the post WWII period. His seminal 
work was written wrote at a time of significant transition in British history. It was a period 
defined by the remnants of the empire, immigration from former colonies, the continuing 
legacy of the Second World War, the emergence of the European Common Market and the 
universalisation of access to healthcare and education (in policy at least), notwithstanding 
the entrenched social class system. The book was published during what is now considered 
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the nascent phase of economic de-regulation which would eventually result in the retreat 
from directly delivered state services. Titmuss's text was expected to act as a bulwark against 
the increasing encroachment of market forces into once sacrosanct social spheres (Waldby 
and Mitchell 2006). 
 
It is important to recognise that Titmusss did not just discuss blood transfusion simply in 
terms of its medical benefits. His (1997 [1970]) analysis of competing economic models for 
therapeutic blood provision was an ethical and political statement not unlike the discussions 
made by feminist scholars regarding oocyte provision to SCNT research in the last decade. I 
sustain this claim on the basis that both refer to concepts such as liberty and rights. Titmuss’s 
analysis of blood provision services of the United States and the United Kingdom, with 
comparisons drawn from South Africa, the Soviet Union and Japan, treated the issue of 
therapeutic blood provision in economic language, discussing the creation of demand and 
supply. The basis of Titmuss’s argument is his discussion of the potential need of a 
substance that everyone has. Recipients were not extraordinary people; rather they were 
specific cases of a more general human vulnerability. One may need blood simply by 
coming face to face with fate and having an accident. In pregnancy and childbirth any 
woman may need blood. If the reader did not have a wife, daughter, sister, niece or aunt, 
they certainly had a mother. Need was based on medical criteria not social divisions such as 
class, ethnicity or gender (1997 [1970). In this way, Titmuss was using and encouraging the 
emergent human rights discourse. 
 
To assert that blood donation systems were invariably healthier, more equitable and efficient 
than paid systems, Titmuss examined in depth the models of the US and UK. At that time 
and today, the UK was characterised as a donor system because neither recipient nor donor 
was required to pay or be paid for the contribution. The cursory discussion of British 
(English and Welsh) donors shows that Titmuss was keen to emphasise the representative 
nature of the donor pool, stating that there is near-equal participation of male and female 
donors. Titmuss does not examine in much depth the lifestyles of British donors, as they are 
considered so normal as to resist description.19 Taking into account “the possible effects of 
the age-incapacity and reproductive factors,” the study implies that donors are “regular” 
                                                
19 Titmuss was almost certainly assuming a normative distinction between illicit and licit drugs. 
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Brits doing their bit , rather than the marginalised of society (1997 [1970], 186). Titmuss’s 
account shows that at the same time in the US, people gave blood under different 
circumstances and included donors and vendors to blood collected from an individual or 
their family because of their own use of blood, or those depositing blood for their individual 
use. Titmuss particularly focused on the selling of blood for monetary payment in the 
American context and drew on data showing that vendors were socially and economically 
deprived and that they sold their blood when they had no other means of income. His claim 
is sustained by studies showing that commercial blood was drawn precisely from this “skid-
row” population – one that was more likely to have serum hepatitis than others in the general 
population. Titmuss offered little elaboration about the characteristics of these socially 
deprived individuals and their unhealthy bodies. Moreover, in surveying the overall 
demographics of vendors, Titmuss regularly emphasised the over-representation of 
“Negroes” but provided little evidence as to why these men in particular posed a medical 
risk to the population of blood recipients.20  
 
Titmuss’s gift and gift-exchange 
 
Titmuss’s analysis of the motives of vendors and donors clearly sought to establish a 
hierarchy of ethical conduct in the public sphere.21 This is shown through the connection he 
made between the transactional nature of the exchange with the idea that using money as a 
means to establish a supply of blood was not only morally wrong but therapeutically 
dangerous. In such transactions, Titmuss implied that neither the vendor nor procurer will 
make ethical decisions. On the one hand, vendors sell their blood when they need to, usually 
in a time of personal crisis or in order to obtain their next drug ‘hit’. These are personal 
                                                
20 Titmuss may have been looking to highlight the endemic racial inequity in the US by suggesting that 
African-American men were barely able to experience their civil liberties but could sell their blood. However, 
the conflation of captive donors in Bantu communities in South Africa and "American Negroes" suggests that 
Titmuss (1997 [1970], 255) was prone to essentialising racial identities; for instance  “like many American 
Negroes, [Bantus] are unlikely to internalize a wish to help the unseen stranger. The psychological processes of 
internalising values in adult life can only be nourished in association with self-respect and personal freedom”. 
However, given that the mere suggestion that African-American males are part of the blood vendor pool seems 
to be disturbing enough, something else is going on here. I would resist dismissing this racism (for lack of a 
better word) as simply anachronistic and instead suggest that Titmuss is imposing a particular meaning on these 
bodies – as symbolically threatening to the mainstream [white] population. Such concerns continue to exist in 
debates albeit in less overtly racist, sexist or homophobic terms. 
21 Titmuss drew on ideas about moral weakness produced by poverty. This is certainly not a discourse that 
Titmuss himself created; as commodities became more available to the less wealthy (because high scale 
production made them cheaper), there were often debates as to how much these lower classes should have 
access to such objects in terms of their spiritual weakness (J. Shaw 2010). 
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reasons that do not take into account the ultimate destination of the blood and the unhealthy 
recipient. The vendor does not have any reason to be honest about the purity or health of his 
or her blood because the vendor has no relationship with the recipient. The exchange is 
transient and outside of ethical considerations because it is premised on blood for money 
rather than blood for health. On the other hand, Titmuss argued that due to the chronic 
shortage of blood, the principle of caveat emptor – let the buyer beware – is easily 
overlooked by procurers. The nature of the market transaction will inevitably distort the 
medical basis on which to distribute blood, forcing doctors to be expedient rather than 
cautious in order to treat their patients. 
 
In designing a system to elicit altruistic behaviour, inter-personal anonymity was a central 
feature for Titmuss; a system in which donors and recipients could not identify one another 
made reciprocity logistically impossible. Both parties are forced to be in a quasi-relationship 
with each other in a more dignified way because it occurs for the benefit of another’s health 
and wellbeing, rather than for money or self-interest. More precisely, the altruistic donation 
of blood allowed donors to actively embrace the universal stranger and could thus have 
important implications for social cohesiveness generally. It allowed donors to find their inner 
‘moral compass’ of empathy towards countless others whose only commonality is their basic 
human frailty. Titmuss’s appeal to embrace the ‘universal stranger’ through blood donation 
was built on connecting people through generic identification.  
 
It might be argued that the inter-personally anonymous basis of blood donation is a 
bureaucratic response to the fact that blood can be banked and lots of it needed, not because 
of preferences at an institutional or personal level. However, my research of Titmuss’s texts 
indicates otherwise. My critique is not based on whether it is true that interpersonal 
anonymity will preclude cycles of reciprocity but rather the emphasis put on the 
biological/technical aspects of blood provision does not tell the story Titmuss intended. 
Titmuss asserted his claims in opposition to the analyses made by Mauss (2002 [1954]) and 
Levi-Strauss’s (1969) work on gift-exchange and generalized exchange respectively. 
Titmuss very clearly argued that inter-personal anonymity is a condition of altruism and 
without it reciprocity (in the immediate or long term future) will invariably prevail. I provide 
two quotes to sustain my claim: 
 
42 
 
In reference to Levi-Strauss’ claim that Christmas gift giving is one giant potlatch, 
Titmuss (1997 [1970] 277) asserts that “these examples…indicate that the personal 
gift and countergift, in which givers and receivers are known to each other, and 
personally communicate with each other, is characterised by a great variety of 
sentiments and purposes…Within all such gift transactions of a personal face-to-face 
nature lie embedded some elements of moral enforcement or bond. To give is to 
receive- to compel some return or create some obligation…No such gift is or can be 
utterly detached, disinterested or impersonal.  
 
There is in all of these transactions an unspoken assumption of some form of gift-
reciprocity; that those who give as members of a society to strangers will themselves 
(or their families) eventually benefit as members of that society. There is, 
nevertheless, a vague and general presumption of a return gift at some future date, 
but a gift that may not be deliberately sought or desired by the individual concerned – 
as with voluntary blood donors. (Titmuss 1997 [1970] 282) 
 
As we can already see, Titmuss made his case for giving blood with reference to the Essai 
sur le don (translated as The Gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies), 
first published in 1923 by French anthropologist Marcel Mauss (2002 [1954]).22  Mauss’s 
work sought to challenge common-sense ideas about the “free gift”: that people give out of 
spontaneous generosity and do not expect anything back (Douglas 2002 [1990]). Drawing on 
anthropological fieldwork from the Trobriand Islands and Indigenous groups in northwest 
Canada, Mauss asserted that self-interest and rivalry are the mechanics that drive the 
exchange of gifts in traditional societies (Frow 1997). Gifts actually create debt and act more 
as loans because they are always returned, oftentimes with interest (Waldby and Mitchell 
2006). By insisting that donors and recipients in contemporary Britain could engage in 
anonymous, transient and obligation-free relationships, Titmuss conflated the language of 
gifts with the process of gift-exchange and thus the gift of blood was actually closer to the 
ideal of the free gift (Carrier 1995; Frow 1997). 
 
                                                
22 Unlike many anthropologists, Mauss did not undertake research in the field but drew on the studies of others 
who had (Liebersohn 2011).  
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While Mauss (2002 [1954]) argued that obligations to give, receive and reciprocate were 
overt or latent motives behind the exchange of gifts and that this system is the basis for 
establishing and maintaining hierarchical social relations, Titmuss (1997 [1970]) radically 
insisted that giving could be free, that is spontaneous and democratic. The free gift was not a 
social fiction but rather an activity that had to be instituted and protected particularly under 
the condition of inter-personal anonymity. He also contended that people had as much “right 
to give” as they had “right to sell”. Even though the approaches taken by Mauss and Titmuss 
are different, both seem to suggest that gift giving within personally identified contexts is 
unlikely to be “altruistic”, that is “free” and that people known to each other will continue 
cycles of reciprocity.  
 
Challenging the altruistic-donor model 
 
Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) legacy regarding gifts and tissue provision has come under 
sustained critique as anachronistic and bearing little relevance to the complex relationships 
that now characterise blood provision or the conduct of scientific research. The most 
sustained critique of the dichotomous assumptions made by Titmuss appears in Tissue 
economies: blood, organs, and cell lines in late capitalism (Waldby and Mitchell 2006), 
which charts developments in biomedical research and the utilisation of tissues by 
individuals, communities and companies. Waldby and Mitchell (2006) argue that the binary 
of commodity and gift and the social relations that Titmuss argued they engender, do not 
adequately capture the significant political, social and economic transformations that have 
occurred since he wrote his book. In contemporary society, Titmuss's legacy needs to be 
significantly re-assessed. 
 
One critique posited in the book is that Titmuss’s model of altruistic [blood] donation has 
been erroneously applied to novel contexts of scientific research.23 Translating a model used 
                                                
23 Waldby and Mitchell’s (2006) assert that the altruisitic-donor model has been erroneously applied to all 
forms of tissue provision regardless of whether it fits with their distinctive features. In light of this, some might 
argue that it is more appropriate to compare oocyte extraction with live organ donation. However, as already 
mentioned, Titmuss and the altruistic-donor model remains paradigmatic; I have used Titmuss’s work because 
of its centrality to the social scientific debate regarding tissue provision (there is a very clear lineage between 
contemporary bioethical and tissue economies literature and Titmuss’s work). I also think that the importance 
of Titmuss’s work was that it was intended to be a political statement based on the organisation of tissue 
provision in his society. He was not just talking about the transfusion of blood in a biological or technical 
fashion but the potential social relations that may organise it. Or rather, he took up the subject of blood 
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for a specific form of tissue implies that all tissues are the same regardless of their biological 
properties or social significance. Titmuss himself is unlikely to recognise the field of blood 
transfusion in the UK if he were alive today. Waldby and Mitchell (2006) demonstrate that 
since the 1970s, technological advancements have meant that blood can be fragmented to 
such a degree that whole blood transfusion is rare and one extraction will result in a 
multiplicity of recipients. These developments are claimed to undermine the relationship 
between the two strangers (mediated by medical professionals) that Titmuss regarded as 
emblematic of broader social relations. Furthermore, blood screening is now able to identify 
many diseases such as hepatitis C and HIV, thus removing some of the onus on providers to 
entirely tell the truth.   
 
Another basis of critique by Waldby and Mitchell (2006) is that in Titmuss’s work there is 
little acknowledgement regarding the power relations that are attached to gift giving. They 
contend that there is a lack of critical awareness regarding property relations around donor 
paradigms. As biomedical research is increasingly industrialised24 tissues have become the 
material for the production of sophisticated technologies that are expected to be patented and 
recoup initial investments.25 These structures are upheld by government regulations and 
legal judgements and rely on specific understandings of labour and the legitimate forms of 
rights in property.  
 
One example that is closely related to this thesis is the use of embryos for stem cell research. 
Patients who have undertaken fertility treatment may designate stored embryo(s) to be used 
for research purposes, for reproductive donation26 or to allow embryos to succumb. As 
Waldby and Mitchell (2006, 70) argue, regulatory bodies have consistently borrowed the 
                                                                                                                                                 
donation to refer to the issue of collective relations, not just a medical procedure. Scholars debating oocyte 
provision to stem cell research have a similar focus in their discussions of women-as-individuals and the 
industrialisation of scientific research. In both contexts, questions of the public good and the individual in 
relation to it are under scrutiny. Please see the section titled Issues comparing ideal donors in the context of live 
organ transplant in chapter four.  
24 The following is an example of the potential commercial value that stem cell research signifies; when the 
first stem cell line was created in 1998, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) applied for a 
patent on the method of deriving stem cell lines as well as “all mesodermal, endodermal and ectodermal hES 
cell lines, regardless of the way they were derived” (Gottweis, Salter and Waldby 2009, 39-40). WARF’s non-
profit subsidiary was established to license use of its stem cell lines with the cost of a commercial research 
license requiring a $100,000 upfront fee and a further $25,000 to renew the license annually. Non-commercial 
research is licensed at $500 but must not result in commercial applications.  
25 This is distinct from suggesting that tissues no longer have a therapeutic purpose without scientific 
mediation. 
26 This involves the embryo being given to another woman or couple needing fertility treatment. 
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language of the gift for therapeutic tissue circulations but do not refer to the “gift of potential 
knowledge to a medical researcher”. However, the therapeutic paradigm is distinct because it 
involves the transfer of embryos to become children. The research paradigm involves the 
transfer of the embryo as research material and the relationship between donor and recipient 
is characterised by mutually exclusive property rights. Yet, the authors (2006) argue that this 
model of embryo provision to stem cell research is not just a means of conveying 
information to the donors but is a de facto contract. Consent forms include provisions for the 
donors to relinquish any property in the tissue and subsequent creations. This means that 
once the embryo is provided to the researchers, any potential stem cell lines and/or therapies 
are the property of the researchers and/or companies.  
 
Critiques of tissue provision in contemporary society often reveal deep-seated assumptions 
about Western notions of property, labour, and the body. Contemporary scholars such as 
Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) and Waldby and Mitchell (2006) regard Titmuss's model of 
the gift as incapable of justly serving individuals and society given the changes in economic, 
political and technological structures. However, it is not just Titmuss’s intellectual legacy 
that requires re-evaluation but fundamental premises on which contemporary social thought 
and legal practice is based. For example, the work of German philosopher Immanuel Kant is 
often drawn into debates regarding notions of human dignity. Kant’s democratic approach to 
dignity was radical for the 18th century because it dismissed the conventional structures that 
accorded dignity based on inherited status (Sullivan 1994). Kant (1976 [1949], 91) argued 
that rational beings engage with other rational beings on the basis of reason which has no 
other motive other than the “dignity of a rational being”. One consequence of this is that 
individuals should regard others as ends in themselves rather than means to an end. For 
Kant, “dignity” and “price” were mutually exclusive with the innate dignity of each rational 
being. On the one hand, those “things” which can be replaced and are utilised for “human 
inclinations and needs” have a price (which may be relative). On the other hand, unique 
“things” such as human beings have an inherent dignity and are “above all price, and 
therefore [admit] of no equivalent” (1976[1949], 92).27  
 
                                                
27 This brief reference to Kant is intended to indicate that Titmuss’s ideas belong to a lineage within Western 
thought that encompasses philosophy, law, religion and economics. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
develop the point beyond this.  
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Labour and property rights: patent and the facilitation of knowledge 
production 
 
Waldby and Mitchell’s critique may echo generally with approaches taken by critical 
theorists who argue that, within capitalist societies, ideological apparatuses are directly 
related to the mode of production and will obscure the latter's reality (Widdows 2009). 
While their analysis is crucial for understanding how the field is broadly constituted beyond 
the purview of most people’s understanding, they do not suggest, however, that private 
property is necessarily the basis of exploitative appropriation. Rather, Waldby and Mitchell 
emphasise that the structures in which tissue provision and biomedical research exist can be 
utilised differently by individuals and companies. They demonstrate that some community 
groups are able to use the language and artefacts of capitalism to their own advantage. One 
example is PXE International, a foundation established by Patrick and Sharon Terry after 
their children were diagnosed with the disease pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE). In 
collaboration with the University of Hawaii, the foundation funded research to isolate the 
gene that causes PXE and was subsequently patented. Since then, the foundation has used 
profits made by selling licenses to researchers around the world as a way to fund research 
which will contribute to curing PXE.28 The patent gives the foundation leverage to negotiate 
with companies that would otherwise avoid researching PXE for its lack of anticipated 
profitability. This example shows that forms of private property can be used as a means of 
generating research rather than as a basis of exclusive property rights that stifle research 
(Waldby and Mitchell 2006).  
 
The contemporary bioethicist Dickenson (2007, 2006) has analysed the issue of oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research and argues that contract law, under which commercial 
exchanges of tissue would necessarily fall, is inadequate to capture the relationship between 
the ‘self’, the ‘person’ and their body. In common law, the self does not own its own 
property – the body – and therefore body parts cannot be sold. Drawing on the arguments of 
17th century political philosopher John Locke, Dickenson argues that there continues to be 
differences between that which is created by humans (goods that can be sold) and that which 
is a naturally occurring entity (such as the body, which cannot be legally sold).  
 
                                                
28 The researchers who purchase a license may conduct their own research within a company or university. 
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The intellectual property rights that pertain to SCNT research are imbued with Western ideas 
of labour; intentionality and consciousness are privileged over the body, which is 
constructed as merely dumb matter (Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Dickenson 2007). Women 
are not considered creators of the oöcytes they provide for SCNT research. In the 
conventional model favoured by capitalist trade institutions, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Development (OECD), cognitive labour is considered crucial to creating 
something in which property rights may be vested. In this context, the oöcyte is the research 
material and the stem cell line into which it is transformed is the patent-able creation. With 
property rights vested only in stem cell line, research scientist and company, oöcytes 
becomes analogous to natural growing resources such as land and trees (Waldby and 
Mitchell 2006).  
 
However, Dickenson (2006) is critical of the appropriation of biological tissue by capitalist 
organisations, which she argues is a contemporary form of enclosure, imitating the 16th 
century enclosures of pastures in the UK. Dickenson intends to counter this process of 
exclusion with an artefact which is also used as a means of exclusion: the contract, arguing 
that a technology that has often been used to undermine the autonomy of women can be 
made to adhere to feminist principles of social justice.29 Individuals providing human tissue 
for SCNT research should not be excluded from rights in the tissue once it is provided. One 
way this can be done is to recognise the labour involved in oöcyte extraction; women labour 
to produce more oöcytes than are usually matured through a natural menstrual cycle. This is 
similar to an argument made by Waldby and Cooper (2010) who argue that to extract 
oöcytes, which naturally remain in vivo, women must consciously adjust the chemical 
balance of their bodies with hormonal drugs prior to undergoing surgery.  
 
In discussing oöcyte provision to SCNT research at the structural level, Waldby and Cooper 
(2010) and Dickenson (2006; 2007) uncover an inherent paradox: maintaining an altruistic-
donor system is tantamount to enshrining the body beyond commerce. This formulation 
allows the products of the body to be used as the basis of commercial expansion but 
necessarily excludes the providers of the resource material. It also means maintaining a 
privileged space for property relations based on a particular definition of labour. The other 
                                                
29 As will be noted later in this chapter, between Titmuss and more contemporary, feminist-oriented scholars, 
there are fundamentally different conceptions of social justice and the individual.  
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side of the equation is that introducing a payment system is expected to invariably encourage 
contractual relations in all spheres of life. The ‘right to give’, that Titmuss (1997 [1970]) 
claimed to be based on the individual donor’s recognition of others’ universal human needs, 
will be increasingly subsumed by the ‘right to sell’. Yet, despite the structural focus, the 
solution is directed towards the individual in the short term, that is a payment for oöcyte 
providers, rather than provoking questions regarding the products of this scientific research 
in the long term.30 The individual’s ‘right’ to their moral authority subsumes the question of 
the ‘public good’ of scientific research.  
 
Conceptualising the commercialisation of human beings as undignified, coupled with the 
increasing commercialisation of biomedical research, currently leaves the body as a free 
resource in which its vitality may be extracted and profited from without compensation. This 
novel situation offends contemporary sensibilities; indeed, the metaphor of a mine is often 
invoked. Yet, the inclusion of some economic benefit for oöcyte providers evokes the 
spectre of the contract and the situation Titmuss ultimately sought to avoid; a collection of 
individuals who associate with others on an instrumental basis and where transactors have 
neither relationship nor obligation to one another beyond the transaction. The paradox of the 
situation is evident in the legal structures under which this field may fall. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As examined in detail in this chapter oöcyte provision to SCNT research is usually discussed 
with a focus on whether women can participate as autonomous and free individuals or 
whether they are likely to be exploited by economic and social structures which undermine 
the importance of their labour. Yet the normative emphasis on existentialist questions such 
as freedom has so far restricted the scope of inquiry to whether payment will facilitate or 
inhibit women’s autonomy further and the kinds of risks that oöcyte extraction, particularly 
in the context of “healthy donation”. Consequently, this principle-based framework avoids 
three important questions. Firstly, does the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues 
distinctly constitute women’s social roles and thus help us understand the different donation 
rates between embryos and oöcytes? Secondly, does the development and utilisation of novel 
                                                
30 By transforming oöcyte providers into “labourers” in the emerging bioeconomy, capitalist property relations 
are left in place because the capitalist maintains property over the creations of the labour.  
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scientific methods in the biosciences say anything specific about sociological questions 
concerning the relationship between institutions and individuals in our specific historical or 
social context? Thirdly, how do values regarding political behaviour help to shape ideas 
about economic forms and thus questions of providing tissues to scientific research? 
 
This thesis cannot answer these questions by identifying principles with which to guide the 
conduct of scientific research or women’s social roles but will explore them by drawing on 
empirical data from Australia. I intend to explore the gendered identities which may 
materialise by contributing to scientific research with tissues such as oöcytes and embryos. 
In doing so, I examine the way participants imagined their contributions and argue that this 
needs to be understood, acknowledged and accommodated within existing structures. I do 
not proceed a priori that the scientific utilisation of such tissues is based on or reproduces 
gendered inequality by referring to the relative social and economic disadvantage of women 
vis-à-vis men. Gendered social relations exist in all spheres of life but they are not evident in 
exactly the same way. Scientific research is an important social institution but it is not a 
monolithic entity without its own pressures for legitimation. Moreover, this exercise also 
involves destabilising assumptions that the best contributor to scientific research must 
possess certain attributes. Thus, this analysis does not just refer to the substantive issue of 
whether payment will or will not resolve the lack of oöcytes, but facilitates the development 
of a conceptual framework that connects gifts and giving, constructions of gender and 
contemporary scientific research. 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn out the political and ethical aspects of Titmuss’s altruistic 
donor model, his critique of the ‘right to sell’ and how this might be contrasted with 
contemporary approaches regarding women’s right to their bodies and the effects on the 
‘public good’. In the next chapter I will demonstrate that the specific limitations to Titmuss’s 
approach have not been fully dispensed with. Examining the contemporary debate regarding 
oöcyte provision in light of Titmuss’s text reveals values underlying the views regarding 
financial remuneration in exchange for oöcytes to SCNT research. I will show that there are 
points of convergence between Titmuss and contemporary scholars; while the contemporary 
debate generally involves the inversion of Titmuss’s concerns about paying providers, who 
he assumed would contaminate the blood supply, the problem of interested donors and the 
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introduction of monetary payment and the relationship to the ‘public good’ remains and is 
fundamental to the current impasse regarding future policy. 
 
In addressing the limitations of the current framework, I develop my own approach, which is 
based on a sociological analysis of empirical data, not normative abstractions. This paradigm 
situates the ethical decisions made by individuals within a historically and socially specific 
context. This involves focusing attention on how participants perceive and ‘rationalise’ the 
risks of oöcyte extraction and taking into account the specificity of the tissue, the procedure 
of its extraction and its effect on the donor. However, I do not simply seek to diverge from 
the emphasis of analytic knowledge regarding oöcyte provision but intend to look more 
broadly at conceptions of women as political subjects, practices of gift giving and 
reciprocity. I suggest that understanding the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissue can, 
in part, be achieved by connecting the provider, the recipient, the tissue. We must understand 
the social roles women inhabit within a society that predominantly values scientific research 
and that sanctions those contributions it deems as ‘disinterested’.  
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Chapter Four: Towards a Framework for Analysis 
 
This chapter develops an eclectic approach to assist in analysing the scientific utilisation of 
reproductive tissues and particularly debates regarding which economic models should be 
instituted for the provision of oöcytes for SCNT research. This approach is primarily 
informed by a sociological lens that contextualises social problems as historically and 
socially specific, postulating what they can reveal about contemporary values regarding the 
relationships between individuals, their tissues and social institutions. In its study of social 
life, sociology situates ethical practices within broader social relations particularly in relation 
to the context of modernity or post-modernity (Giddens 1991).31 Locating the individual in 
his or her immediate social context and highlighting connections between identity, social 
roles and institutions achieves this intention (Davidman 1999). Sociological approaches are 
distinct and can assist in shifting the creation of analytically-derived policies to take into 
account the social context in which ethical norms are formed and sometimes contradicted.  
 
My reference to a sociological lens should not be taken as representing the discipline as 
homogenous; indeed, sociology is constituted by a variety of approaches, including (but not 
limited to) conflict theory, structural-functionalism and symbolic interactionism, each 
explaining social life in unique ways. There are also many diverse methodologies (Furze et 
al. 2012). Notwithstanding this multiplicity, my reference to a sociological lens echoes 
Mill’s (1959) concept of the “sociological imagination”. This approach connects an 
individual's biography with his or her historical moment, starting from questions regarding 
the kinds of human nature privileged in the social context and where that society stands in 
relation to its contemporaries and its past.  
 
This chapter has three goals: firstly, to sketch an unfamiliar way of understanding gifts and 
giving; secondly, to develop a more nuanced account of science in/and society than currently 
exists in critical approaches to oocyte provision and thirdly, to critique an important 
                                                
31 Without discussing the convoluted history of sociology, the discipline came into being and examined the 
nascent emergence of the modern period resulting from the “great transformation”. In Europe and the US in the 
18th century, structural revolutions occurred in three distinct spheres: the political and the emergence of 
democracy with the French and American Revolutions; the economic and the emergence of capitalism with the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain; and the social with the development of the Scientific Revolution and 
urbanisation in Europe. Sociologists are interested in the attendant factors that shape social relations and public 
institutions that emerged from these shifts (Giddens 1991; Shilling 1993). 
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assumption about political behaviour upon which this debate this based: that there is one 
model for political activity which must involve the effacement of the specific and embrace 
of the general and abstract. In order to achieve these goals, the analysis must critically 
address the assumptions that inform the current frameworks’ approaches to the scientific 
utilisation of reproductive tissues. I begin with a discussion regarding gifts and commodities. 
I contend that the current literature tends to reiterate categorical binaries between these 
constructs and importantly refers to the material world as inanimate. I draw on critical ideas 
of materiality that do not privilege the social space as occurring between human individuals 
and groups (precisely that which sociology is meant to examine) but which also pays 
attention to the mutually constitutive relationship between humans and things. This is crucial 
in connecting the biological properties of the tissue and its social utilisations. 
 
In order to develop a more fruitful account of the relationships involved in oöcyte provision, 
I then turn my attention to events in South Korea, the only country to witness a sustained 
effort on the part of many women to donate their oöcytes to SCNT research. Following this, 
I discuss feminist-informed analysis of this context and the legacy of feminist scholarship 
regarding women’s reproductive capacity. I argue that by emphasising the existential 
dimension to the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues, this framework does not allow 
for the diverse and sometimes contradictory developments that have shaped the conduct of 
scientific research in recent decades. The next section will examine approaches to political 
behaviour. I assert that while the contemplation of a payment system ostensibly marks a shift 
from Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) defence of altruistic blood donation, ultimately both bioethical 
and tissue economies literature are suspicious of those who may have personal interests and 
seek to organise political behaviour that is impersonally motivated. 
 
This thesis is not a sociological study of ethics. 
 
In order to substantiate my assertion that I am employing a sociological approach to the 
scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues, that is distinct from a ‘sociology of ethics’, it is 
necessary to briefly trace the trajectory of my PhD candidature. When I began my 
candidature, I had no prior knowledge of stem cell research and because I was overseas at 
the time, missed the debate regarding its legislation in Australia. I initially made sense of the 
literature by occupying myself with the sociology/ethics disciplinary borders debate (see 
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Shaw 2006). At this time, I constructed my dissertation as part of a recent, more explicit 
incursion of sociological scholarship into areas of bioethical concern such as the governance 
of medical knowledge and practices, including but not limited to emerging technologies, 
patient-practitioner relationships and health funding.32 This sociological literature often 
made critical reference to approaches and tenets of institutionalised bioethics, a discipline 
with an effective monopoly on questions regarding the conduct of medical and scientific 
research since the 1960s. The question posed by sociological scholarship to which I was then 
hoping to contribute, indeed as posed by Haimes (2002) herself is, ‘what can the social 
sciences contribute to the study of ethics?’ made me reconsider my own intentions and 
objectives, particularly whether I could or ought to contribute to this literature. In the article 
of that name, Haimes outlines the theoretical contributions of Weber, Foucault, Bauman and 
Giddens as well as examining recent empirical studies by Franklin (1997), Price (1992) and 
Edwards (1998). In particular, the empirical work quoted “reveals [for Haimes] how ethics 
are ‘done’ (identified, thought about, acted upon) in everyday life” (Haimes 2002, 99). Yet, 
as I read more widely, I began to challenge the idea that since the topic of oocyte provision 
to stem cell research had been hitherto discussed by ethicists, lawyers and scientific 
researchers, that my own contribution as a sociologist, necessarily needs to be a ‘sociology 
of ethics’, or in Haimes’s words “how ethics are done”. I will outline my reasons in the 
following section.  
 
As a sociologist, I have often been intrigued by and rather dismissive of the apparently 
central question in bioethics. While it is a broad church, bioethics is predicated on 
identifying moral principles with which to guide clinical and scientific conduct, its central 
question being ‘how am I to proceed?’ (Komesaroff 1995). I wish to use it in order to 
elaborate why I did not choose to undertake a ‘sociology of ethics’. When I refer to my own 
understanding of sociology I am not so naïve as to want to repeat the same ‘sins’ I see in the 
discipline of bioethics. Furthermore, I am acutely aware that sociology is a hetereogeneous 
discipline. How then to persuasively distinguish a sociological approach to the scientific 
utilisation of reproductive tissues without centralising the ethics that inform it? 
 
                                                
32 In this construction, sociology has evolved as a discipline from a place where two of its foundational thinkers 
(Weber and Durkheim) rejected a normative approach to the study of society to an explicilty engaged one. 
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Firstly, to the question, ‘how am I to proceed?’; I make the critique that the ‘I’ asking the 
question is a social construct. I do not mean to suggest that the ‘I’ does not exist but rather 
that to ask the question in the first place requires a certain social context, a context in which 
there is always a potential to make choices. As sociologists who can make comparisons with 
other historical eras, we can ask basic questions about who is able to ask this question, what 
are the existing moral values that may shape the answers, are there any factors that may 
affect the answer? Are these based on biology (race, gender, age), sexual orientation, 
economic class or religious belief? We can also ask a different question, one that relates to 
the connection between individuals and institutions; what role does the person asking the 
question in the society hold? By looking at the role of the medical doctor in contemporary 
society, we can unpack the historical legacy of medical autonomy and its current 
manifestations. We will also need to look at what institutional structures exist in which these 
‘ethical’ questions are asked. For instance, we need to look at the context of the Australian 
federal government’s funding of a universal system called Medicare, the hospitals that are 
largely funded by state governments, differences between urban and rural hospitals and the 
political infighting that affects the provision of healthcare (between political parties and 
members of the medical establishment). These institutional structures also exist within a 
specific social context in which ideas about health and wellbeing evolve. Again, in the 
Australian context, the introduction of a 30% rebate for private health insurance33 had an 
effect on the establishment and utilisation of complementary therapy (this of course is not 
the only reason why more people use CAMs) which may in turn have an effect on patient 
relations with medical doctors. The clinician asks a question about a particular scenario with 
numerous competing factors shaping the interaction between him/her, other staff, the patient 
and perhaps his or her family. Thus the ethics of the individual clinician are shaped and 
shape these institutional structures. The above is a primary level sociological insight into 
bioethical approaches. It is useful for getting first-year students to think critically about the 
objectivity of the social world and the so-called limitations of our freedom. Yet, it is a 
critical difference between the disciplinary paths that scholars may travel.  
 
Secondly, I have made the assertion of ‘my own understanding of sociology’. As I am 
individual like any other and having argued such as I have above, how can I assert that I 
                                                
33 This was a key policy of the Howard government (1996-2007). 
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have created or used my own sociology? In fact, I do not make this claim. As a teacher of 
introductory sociology, social theory and sociological approaches to other subjects such as 
religion and the media, I have been exposed to a great deal of sociological thought and ideas. 
I understand that there is an objective dimension to the discipline of sociology, whether it is 
looking at the ‘three fathers’ – Marx, Weber and Durkheim – or theories on deviance, risk 
and modernity (there are more theorists and theories – too numerous to name here). 
However, I am lucky enough to know that I can relate to a specific part of the sociological 
pie. As a scholar, I need to ask how I shall conduct myself within the constraints of 
disciplinary/academic sociology. Is it enough to drop names like Weber, Giddens, Haimes, 
Bauman, Waldby, Rose or Foucault? In order to move forward, I made specific decisions 
regarding the kind of scholar I intended to be. I began again from about 2011 with the data I 
helped to collect. I looked critically at the literature written on oocyte provision for stem cell 
research.  
 
As I have argued, this literature is permeated by a focus on whether it is appropriate to pay 
women to provide their oocytes for stem cell research. I saw that there was a dissonance 
between what had been predicted and what has actually happened in the first ten years since 
SCNT research had been legalised in the UK and five in Australia. From reading literature 
on tissue provision more broadly, I knew there existed a number of examples where people 
do give their tissues. I was intrigued that the connection between oocytes, stem cell research 
and its apparent therapeutic benefits appeared to be so tenuous and unmotivating. I wanted to 
explain this dissonance, and the more I read and thought about it, another dissonance 
emerged: most of participants in the study tended to think quite positively about scientific 
research. In comparison with other nations too, Australian society has a relatively 
harmonious and positive relationship with ‘Science’, evident in little controversy about its 
legitimacy (with the exception of climate change since 2008 – yet even in this context, the 
public debate doesn’t focus on individual scientists or their “faulty” work but on how 
correctly we can predict something based on the facts to hand). In addition to this, what is 
the significance that these questions only relate to women? Could I think about these 
questions differently to the existing feminist literature, again given the dissonance between 
the predictions and the reality? 
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By doing so, I made the decision to disengage (by about 2012) from ‘existentialist’ questions 
that permeate the debate regarding oocyte provision to stem cell research: of whether women 
who accept or decline money for their oocytes as free, resisting, oppressed, self-sacrificing, 
deluded by therapeutic promises and misguided by naïve understandings of science. I made 
these decisions because I believe it is possible to refer to the existing literature and create a 
new direction for scholarly work to proceed; I do not have to respond to such questions with 
an empirical basis. For example as already mentioned Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 
(2012) present empirical evidence in relation to the Egg Sharing for Research Scheme at 
Newcastle, specifically in response to the criticism from authors such as Dickenson and 
Alkorta Idiakez (2008) and Roberts and Throsby (2008). The authors report that participants 
did not particularly feel exploited while simultaneously declaring that these decisions are 
made in a context not really of their own making. Such an analysis highlights a tension or 
conflict between the trends towards democratic or subjective knowledge (perhaps 
poststructralist is the best shorthand) and the ongoing need as scholars to find an objective, 
indeed structuralist dimension when analysing social problems. 
 
To reiterate, this thesis does not engage in a ‘sociology of ethics’ and it does not want to 
restrict itself to an analysis of institutional impacts on individuals. I agree with (Haimes 
2002, 105) that “we have to engage in the detailed, contextualised dilemmas” but as social 
scientists, the data analysis we undertake does not have to be restricted to pre-existing 
questions about the existentialist nature of the actions or attitudes of the sample. We can 
expand the focus to look at many issues, not least the relationships between social 
institutions and communities within the context of social development. But we should not 
resort to simply reporting participant’s views. My aversion to such an analysis is based on 
my own scholarly interests and a conviction that such debates limit the potential for complex 
sociological analysis. 
 
On a more personal note, I should also acknowledge that when writing was difficult and I 
was very unsure about my analysis, it was good for me to return to the scholarly work that 
inspired me. One example of this is Lawton (1998). There are no connections between 
Lawton’s work and my own. I came across the article as a teacher on an introductory 
sociology course in 2010 and cried as I read the article. More importantly, I wanted to 
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emulate Lawton’s sophisticated analysis. Lawton looked at patient care in palliative nursing 
homes but her analysis made the connection between everyday reactions to terminal cancer 
and Elias’s study tracing the historical developments of bodily functions in Western society. 
It reminded me of Weber’s analysis in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
Both of them are beautifully written but neither of them are primarily focused on 
existentialist questions (although it hard to ignore the implications of Weber’s analysis, 
particularly with the image of the iron cage with which he ended the book), but instead a 
empathic curiosity with everyday actions and the broad-sweep of social development 
contained therein. 
 
Giving gifts in real time 
 
At a very basic level, this thesis is interested in gift giving and tissue provision. The debate 
regarding oöcyte provision recalls fundamental ideas about different economic forms, 
divisions between giving and selling. For Titmuss (1997 [1970]), only the free gift was an 
ethical category, a deviation from Mauss’s rejection of the free gift among actors known to 
each other. From the proceeding chapters, it is clear that the ethical legitimacy of 
implementing a market mechanism to resolve the current lack of oöcytes for SCNT research 
is contentious. The current impasse is likely to remain unless we interpret divisions between 
gifts and commodities as suggestive of profound tensions about the human condition, the 
body and materiality, situating the “things” we circulate and how we circulate them in a 
much broader question of ethical life.  
 
In order to develop my own analysis, it is important to recognise that the Maussian approach 
to gift exchange to which Titmuss inconsistently referred emphasised that reciprocity was a 
universal part of gift-giving where an equivalent object is returned when one is given out of 
obligation and social necessity. The Maussian approach to gift giving emphasises reciprocity 
that is based on an equivalent object given. Drawing on the work of anthropologist, 
Bronsilaw Malinowski’s ethnography Argonauts of the Western Pacific in 1922, Mauss 
(2002 [1954], 29 original emphasis) describes the objects of the kula ritual involving tribal 
chiefs exchanging the following objects:  
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the mwali, which are beautiful bracelets, carved, polished, and placed in a shell…and 
the soulava, necklaces fashioned by the skilful craftsmen of Sinaketa in a pretty 
mother of pearl made from red spondylus . 
 
Mauss’s (2002 [1954], 4 original emphasis) intention was to identify how the obligations to 
give, receive, and reciprocate are actually experienced and enacted and the central question 
of his study was: “what power resides in the object given that causes its recipient to pay it 
back?” His answer, addressed to a curious Western audience ‘imbued’ with secular 
rationality, was that there was something sacred in the objects that were exchanged on the 
Trobriand Islands during kula; they had a spirit of their own, an individualising force, and as 
such compelled the recipient to maintain its movement until it returned ‘home’. Thus, in 
contrast to Western society, everything, not just people are imbued with spirit: 
  
What imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the 
thing received is not inactive…invested with life, often possessing individuality, it 
seeks to return to…its “place of origin” or to produce on behalf of the clan and the 
native soil from which it sprang (Mauss 2002 [1954], 15-16). 34 
 
Because the basis of gift-exchange is a spiritually active world where the objects are 
compelled to return to their initial place, Mauss’s analysis portrays the development of the 
money economy as the movement to detachment, objectification and disconnection between 
individuals and their material world. Another element of the analysis is that Malinowksi’s 
reporting of kula is characterised as if it were “a timeless, self-contained process” (Rosaldo 
1993, 16), without specific reference to historical developments that contributed to the 
performance of the ritual. For instance, Mauss himself did not ponder how the equivalent 
between the objects was established. The two objects at the centre of the kula exchange were 
only discussed in relation to their vital properties. Mauss focused on the fact that these 
objects were traded without money and surmised that they were non-commodities or gifts–
objects with special properties which circumvented their trade with money. I argue that 
Mauss theorised that the exchange of kula objects as a gift economy because it was devoid 
of currency. Indeed, Mauss (2002 [1954], 29) broadly defines the mwali and soulava as “a 
                                                
34	  Here, Mauss borrows the concept of the “hau” from New Zealand Maori culture. The “hau” is a spirit which 
resides in things and is represented as needing to move towards its place of origin (Mauss, 2002 [1954], 15).	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kind of money,” as these objects could also be used as a form of currency on the Islands. The 
probability that these objects do not have the same significance as the “government-backed 
legal tender” (Zelizer 2011, 89) that we know today, with its complex history of promissory 
notes and other transportable symbols of wealth, is not examined in any depth by Mauss and 
thus perhaps his own notions of currency as a trading counterpart were transposed on the 
kula system. The problem of establishing equivalency remains.  
 
Paradoxically, Mauss’s analysis of the kula exchange between inhabitants of the Trobriand 
Islands challenges and supports what I shall term the ‘paradise lost’ thesis: the idea that 
commodity and gift economies are diametrically opposed as ethical categories and that the 
former superseded the latter in the development of civilisation. ‘Paradise’ represents a state 
of grace when individuals interacted with one another in less instrumental ways without the 
use of money (as currency) to arbitrate exchanges. This is evident in Cheal’s (1988, 4) 
statement, the “tension [between market relationships and personal relationships] is not 
found in the simplest societies, where an institutionalized market economy does not exist”. 
Each economy has its characteristics which are mutually exclusive. Therefore, in the market 
economy, things bought and sold in commercial transactions are “not linked in any 
significant, personal way to the transactors: it is an alienable and impersonal property” 
(Carrier 1995, 11). Commodification is characterised interchangeably as a process of 
monetization, when such things can become exchangeable for something as anonymous as 
money. One example of such a transaction involves a motorcar where “the buyer and the 
seller are identified without any ambiguity, so that property rights can be exchanged. As for 
the car, it is because it is free from any ties with other objects or human agents, that it can 
change ownership” (Callon 1998, 18). Market transactions are also voluntary and represent 
the individual’s best efforts to maximise their utility (Sandel 2012). 
 
In contrast, gift-exchange involves obligatory reciprocity between parties. Moreover, gift-
exchanges are the ‘natural’ state of social relations and objects (variously defined as created 
objects, people or their organs), connected or attached to their local environment and social 
setting (Callon 1998). The ‘paradise lost’ thesis relies on the idea that impersonal relations 
impose unnatural expectations over ‘natural’ social relations including the misappropriation 
of the producer’s labour and insistence that market transactions satisfy human needs and 
require no regulation, particularly from the state. This view is clearly evident in Titmuss’s 
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analysis which he intended to act as a protecting those parts of social life which had not yet 
been touched by the market.  
 
Rather than define gift-exchanges as maintaining social relations and the monetised-
exchanges as undermining them, I suggest that it is more fruitful to examine the significance 
in maintaining these distinctions, even if it is merely a matter of rearticulating that 
difference. I do so by drawing on critical materiality studies that critique preconceptions of 
the social sciences that social world is made in reference to the material world and instead 
examines the relationships between objects and humans as mutually constitutive. This view 
acknowledges that despite the prevalence of the money economy, the notion that Western 
societies uniformly regard mundane objects in rational ways has been destabilised to a 
degree (Gibson 2010; Miller 2003; 2005). Such a model can facilitate an adequate 
understanding regarding the choices made about different reproductive tissues, the 
relationship between the donor and recipient and how this may influence the donor’s 
decision to circulate the tissue in a gift or commercial relationship. In other words, I proceed 
from the assumption that the tissue (and by extension other ‘objects’) does not have an 
intrinsic quality of ‘commodity’ or ‘gift’ but that its meaning is relationally constructed. In 
asserting that it is necessary to examine the social significance of contributing to scientific 
research with one’s own tissues, examining the real time effect on different social roles, I 
challenge claims that commodification is effectively the same process everywhere for 
everything. For instance, slavery in ancient and modern times illustrates that being part of 
the human species did not automatically entail an individual to be considered a legal 
‘person’ (Kopytoff 1988).  
 
To elaborate on my own approach, I refer to the work of contemporary anthropologist 
Kopytoff (1988). Kopytoff’s framework adds a dynamism to establishing the equivalence of 
objects and may resolve limitations evident in Mauss’s (2002 [1954]) approach to gift 
giving. Drawing on anthropological data concerning the Tiv society of West Africa, 
Kopytoff (1988) argues that the circulation of things is hierarchically organised into separate 
universes of exchange value. The Tiv have three such spheres: subsistence items, prestige 
items and rights in people. Only objects within the same sphere may be traded for others. 
“Spheres of exchange” are dynamic and socially situated; for example, in times of hardship, 
objects from one sphere do become exchangeable with objects from another. Kopytoff’s 
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framework can be used to examine the designation of objects-as-gifts as a sociological fact 
rather than something having an inherent status. 
 
Kopytoff’s (1988) argument has two important implications for this analysis. First, people 
interact with and circulate things in many different ways and designations of an object to a 
sphere of exchange do fluctuate. Second, classifications of value often involve a negotiation 
between individuals and others. What is priceless to the individual may be worthless on the 
market and vice versa. The central point I draw from Kopytoff’s framework is that 
everything is potentially tradeable but only in relation to those things that are designated as 
belonging to the same sphere of exchange. My analysis diverges from Mauss’s (2002 
[1954]) dichotomy between things that are entangled (and given) because they are vital and 
things that can be commercial traded because they are disentangled from their ‘natural’ 
social environment. Rather than reify the object given as a gift because it is given in 
exchange for something other than money, it is possible to consider that the decisions made 
by participants about reciprocity and equivalence are an issue of transforming spheres of 
exchange.35  Returning to Mauss’s example of kula as gift-exchange, ‘things’ such as 
bracelets are designated as belonging to a particular sphere of exchange, equivalent objects 
to necklaces, and nothing else. 
 
Within my framework, the analysis will inevitably involve looking at the meanings of 
oöcytes and embryos as the basis of decisions in giving them to scientific research. I do not 
focus on reasons to become or not become an oöcyte donor because simply paying attention 
to the reasons, while insightful, tends to treat the giving of oocytes in a rather abstract sense. 
There is often considerable time between making the decision and fulfilling it and there are a 
number of smaller parts that make up the whole process, including medication, medical and 
psychological appointments, communication between parties and of course oöcyte extraction 
(Kirkman 2003; Warren and Blood 2003; Shaw 2007, 2008a).36 How donors maintain their 
commitment is rarely examined. Furthermore, scant reference to whether the relationship 
between the donor and recipient is important, tells us too little about whether the recipient 
                                                
35  The specificities of this need to be explored, for example Almeling (2009) reports that the commodification 
of semen does not generates the same level of anxiety as do oöcytes.  
36 This remains the case for both “anonymous” and “identified” donation for reproduction because in the case 
of the former, the donor the time between the donor being enrolled on the register and being chosen to provide 
oöcytes can be considerable. 
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has specific characteristics or, following Titmuss (1997 [1970]), if he or she represents the 
“universal stranger”, an abstract concept which relies on the universalised and inherent need 
of fellow citizens. In other words, can giving be instrumentally as well as altruistically 
motivated? Understanding the specificities of giving oöcytes for different purposes can build 
nuanced knowledge regarding giving tissues in contemporary society. However, given that 
these undertakings do not occur in a social and historical vacuum, it is now necessary to turn 
attention to the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues and the questions this may pose 
for women.  
 
Altruistic fervour in South Korea 
 
Across the Global North, altruistic donor models have not produced sufficient supplies of 
fertile and mature oöcytes for SCNT research. In contrast, significant numbers of women in 
South Korea expressed their desire to provide their oöcytes – or did in fact do so – in a 
context of altruistic donation. In 2004 and 2005, prominent South Korean stem cell scientist 
Hwang Woo Suk published claims in the prestigious journal Science that he had created 
patient-specific ESC lines from a cloned embryo through the process of SCNT (Hong 2008). 
The claim was of huge significance to the scientific community, which had been “waiting” 
for such news. However, the claims were later retracted after South Korean investigative 
journalists working on the television program, PD Su-cheop, uncovered inconsistencies in 
the research (Hong 2008). In addition to this, it was revealed that the practices surrounding 
the procurement of oöcytes used in the research had been misrepresented. According to PD 
Su-cheop, the number of oöcytes Hwang used was actually over 2200 instead of the 250 
reported and two unpaid egg donors were members of Hwang’s own staff (Hong 2008). In 
addition to this, 66 out of 119 women had been paid to provide oöcytes, (Gottweis and Kim 
2010) although it is claimed that Hwang was not aware of this (Cho, McGee and Magnus 
2006).37 
 
The South Korean community continued to support Hwang and his research despite 
revelations of his fabricating evidence. A significant number of women in South Korea 
continued to express their desire to donate their own oöcytes for Hwang’s stem cell research 
                                                
37 Other scholars (Leem and Park 2008, 11) report different numbers: 121 women supplied Hwang’s team with 
2,221 oöcytes, 85 of which were paid and two of the 36 unpaid donors were part of the research team. 
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efforts (Parry 2005; Kim 2008). On December 6 2005, women rallied to show their support 
for Hwang’s research and declared the goal of finding 1000 donors. “The “one-thousandth 
woman” said “I finally made a decision to donate my eggs for my sister who suffered from 
leukemia. I hope many people participate in egg donations because it will help to save other 
people’s lives” (Yonhap News, 6 December 2006)” (Leem and Park 2008, 21).38 Moreover, 
public opinion continued to show support for Hwang, his research and procurement 
methods. Kim (2008, 40) reports that the monthly science magazine aimed at popular 
audiences Donga Science surveyed Koreans in an internet-based poll in November 2005, 
specifically asking questions related to their perceptions about the relationships between 
senior and junior scientists in Hwang’s team; 72% of respondents answered that the junior 
scientists had voluntarily provided their oocytes.  
 
Initial efforts at analysing this unique situation emphasised the ethical failure of the 
regulatory environment (see Cho, McGee and Magnus 2006; Saunders and Savulescu 2008) 
or problems posed by an over-zealous state keen for the development of biotechnology. For 
instance, prior to his downfall, Hwang embodied the state’s ambitions to situate South Korea 
as a leader in regenerative medicine and was given considerable financial means to conduct 
his research (Hong 2008; Kim 2008). However, Leem and Park (2008, 18) argue that 
connecting South Korean nationalism with emergent biotechnology industries does not 
adequately address the gendered dimensions of the country’s “unique donation culture”. 
They develop a feminist analysis showing that many women who expressed a desire to 
donate their oöcytes to Hwang’s research regarded their decision as “natural” as being 
indicative of the paradoxical place of women in patriarchal South Korean culture; women 
and their bodies are both highly visible and invisible. This ambiguous situation is due to 
traditional expectations about women’s roles as mothers and developments in biomedical 
technology that are utilised to enhance women’s physical appearance and attain this role 
(reproductive medicine and cosmetic surgery). 
 
According to Leem and Park (2008) motherhood is still the most privileged social role for 
women and the utilisation of reproductive medicine is attributed to the continuing primacy of 
the nuclear family. Fertility treatment is reported to be very common among married women 
                                                
38 The authors cite this quote from a newspaper article dated 2006, however the article itself was dated 2005 
and this earlier date corresponds with events in South Korea reported by Gottweis and Kim (2010). 
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after one year of marriage. However, since its emergence in the 1980s, the reproductive 
medicine industry has not been subject to much regulation because it was considered to 
belong to the private realm of the family. Similarly, the visibility of women’s bodies has also 
been evident in cosmetic surgery, which is another common practice among women. 
Through the augmentation of their physical features, women become “better commodities” 
(Leem and Park 2008, 20) in the marriage marketplace. Together, these technologies 
facilitate the fragmentation of women’s bodies into individual parts: oöcytes, breasts, nose, 
mouth/lips. SCNT research emerged within this culture and exploited the objectified status 
of women’s bodies. 
 
Leem and Park’s analysis interprets the scientific utilisation of women’s reproductive tissues 
as based on and continuing of unequal power relations with a narrow focus on their 
reproductive capacity and the normative context in which it occurs, the family. Here, 
medical and scientific institutions constitute a powerful claim on women’s bodies. In such a 
paradigm, women’s desires to give their oöcytes are aligned with mechanical and alienating 
views of their body, discourses produced in the context of medical knowledge (Martin 
1988). As the following discussion will show, women’s reproductive capacity and 
technology innovations in this field are an important area in feminist scholarship regarding 
women’s subjectivity. Situating Leem and Park’s analysis in this scholarship will assist in 
fully appreciating the assumptions which underpin feminist discussions of scientific 
utilisation of reproductive tissues in contemporary society. 
 
Feminist approaches to reproduction 
 
A hallmark of feminist social policies in the 20th century has been the establishment of 
women’s rights to decide if and when they bear children.39 Medical technologies used to 
inhibit conception or pregnancy are still areas of contestation between politicians, women’s 
groups and religious conservatives in countries such as the US and Australia. That medical 
technology does not just inhibit conception but seeks to produce it, is more politically fertile 
ground for feminist scholarship. Reproduction occupies a deeply ambivalent space within 
feminist scholarly paradigms, as the literature has historically examined the connections 
                                                
39 Whether these are distinctly “political”, “social” or “civil” rights is complex; women’s rights can be 
expressed in laws which decriminalise abortion but that also provide access to contraceptive devices. 
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between ideals of femininity and practices of reproduction and has highlighted 
“motherhood” as a central feature of femininity. Constructions of womanhood involved not 
just the onus to be fertile and carry a child through pregnancy but to become the primary 
caregiver, making motherhood the only legitimate role for some women in society.40 
 
Women’s reproductive capacity has been overlaid with negative connotations in both 
religious and secular Western traditions. In contrast to “male” spheres of life like production 
and labour, which are imbued with intention and consciousness, reproduction is seen as 
natural and unconscious. This rather negative view of reproduction was evident in feminist 
work that emerged in 1960s and 70s where women’s reproductive capacity was seen as a 
fundamental obstacle to achieving the full subjectivity enjoyed by men (Evans 1998). 
Largely derived from the analysis found in de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (2010 [1949]),  
women’s reproductive capacity severely limits their capacity for active life projects. Political 
subjectivity required “freedom” from destiny and for women this meant that their 
reproductive roles had to be inhibited entirely or managed carefully to facilitate their ability 
to pursue their life projects (Evans 1998). Practically, this meant more freedom to manage 
fertility through contraception and abortion and the choice between a public role (a career) 
over the private one (motherhood). Given its reliance on a repressive power/subject model,41 
these approaches inverted the value of such roles and women who continued to “choose” 
motherhood were assumed to be blindly adhering to traditional views of femininity and 
lacking conscious autonomy.  
                                                
40 This caveat is necessary because while motherhood is probably an essential part of any traditional view of 
women, it is only within certain economic and racial categories that it became the role to the detriment of other 
possibilities. Poor black and white women have seldom had the opportunity to be full time mothers and indeed 
are often the targets of imposed fertility control (Takeshita 2012). This claim corresponds with that made by 
Pollack (2003), based on her research into reproductive oöcyte provision in Massachusetts. Reporting on her 
own participant observation as an oöcyte provider and in depth interviews with others, Pollack argues that 
oöcyte donor recruitment agencies and fertility clinics construct the recipient woman as normatively feminine 
because she desires a family. In contrast, the oöcyte provider’s selling of motherhood is effaced by the 
manufacture of “donor” altruism narratives by egg broking agencies. It should be noted as well that this study 
operationalised its aim to understand the practice of oöcyte provision by narrowly focusing on the decision to 
be a provider while simultaneously discounting these as conforming to conventional femininity. 
41 This term broadly refers to theories of power relations between individuals, others in the community or to the 
state. In opposition to liberal theories, including Marxism and liberal feminism, the philosopher Michel 
Foucault (2008 [1976]) argued that power is generative rather than repressive and that it functions by enabling 
behaviour rather than suppressing it. Individuals actually behave in relation to norms, not through force but 
through occupying subject positions where power operates by inciting desires and fulfilling real needs 
(Foucault 2008 [1976]; Sawicki 1991).  Foucault’s model challenges the dichotomy between intentional agency 
and false consciousness where it is assumed that the status and behaviour of those considered powerless is a 
result of their conditioning and therefore freedom or truth exists outside the dominant discourse of the 
“powerful” (Foucault 2008 [1976]). 
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The American writer, Shulamith Firestone (1971) pursued a similar idea by arguing that the 
subordination of women as mothers was a natural extension of the biological process of 
gestation. In order to counter this, science and technology should be harnessed to remove the 
onus on women’s bodies to carry children. If neither sex had a monopoly on the bearing of 
children, the sexual division of labour would be fundamentally challenged and society could 
start from scratch in terms of gender roles (Firestone 1971). Clearly, both de Beauvoir and 
Firestone read reproduction and motherhood in one way with little appreciation of the 
experiences and subjectivities involved in its process; in effect, they rearticulated the 
Western tradition of negating “feminine” experiences and the body (Evans 1998). What is 
interesting about Firestone’s (1971) argument is that she viewed science and technology as 
liberating women from their social oppression, a view from which some feminist-oriented 
scholars discussing oöcyte provision to SCNT research such as George (2008) and Baylis 
(2009), diverge.  
 
Both de Beauvoir (2010 [1949]) and Firestone (1971) were discussing traditional models of 
reproduction, centered on heterosexual intercourse before the development of ARTs as 
discussed in chapter two, which significantly changed the terrain of the debate. Novel 
questions emerged once medical technology sought to rationalise and manage conception. 
Feminist reactions to these new developments, while complex, were often non-celebratory 
despite Firestone’s utopian vision of rationalised reproduction. Perhaps due to the 
transforming perceptions of technoscience, some feminist scholarship examining ARTs 
tended to carry the weight of multiple strategies; they would encourage roles for women 
beyond motherhood while validating experiences of motherhood and they would explore the 
potential for specific feminine subjectivity while being critical of increasing medicalised 
management of female reproductive capacity.  
 
The complexity of giving due consideration to the subjectivities engaged without losing 
sight of the inequitable social relations between men and women, patients (often female) and 
doctors (often male) and donors and recipients is evident in Corea’s The Mother Machine 
(1985) an example of critical approaches to ARTs. The book is centered on the idea that “the 
once unified biological processes of motherhood [being made] into separate functions [was] 
a dangerous degradation of motherhood” (cited in Sawicki 1991, 72). Women were being 
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dominated by [male] medical institutions who were appropriating the only space available 
for female subjectivity. While de Beauvoir (2010[1949]), Firestone (1971) and Corea (1985) 
saw the links between reproduction and politics very differently, they converged when 
discussing the roles of women involved. Women who desired motherhood to the extent of 
engaging in modern reproductive medicine did so at significant cost to their own freedom by 
continuing to adhere to patriarchal social expectations despite the space opened to them by 
feminist thought.  
 
A shift has since occurred in feminist approaches to ARTs which counter Corea’s (1985) 
critical analysis. Employing a foucauldian framework, Sawicki (1991), asserted that the use 
of ARTs was likely to be enabling as well as limiting; by providing new ways of conceiving, 
new forms of motherhood and female subjectivity are engendered. For Sawicki (1991), 
despite the fact that women’s marginalisation from mainstream society has historically been 
based on their reproductive capacity, women who utilise medical science to become mothers 
are not necessarily naive or passive subjects of patriarchal control. An ethnography of ART 
clinics in the US in the 1990s also questioned rigid assumptions about human beings 
dominated by technology or women dominated by male medical authorities (Thompson 
2005). As individuals become ART patients, they exhibit a particular agency which allows 
them to be subjected to ART specific treatment decisions and choices. Thompson (2005, 
191) introduced the term ontological choreography to conceptualise the process by which 
patients “willingly accept the role of being the object of the medical gaze and in fact actively 
participate in it”. From this study, Thompson extrapolated about women’s experiences of 
ARTs and challenges distopiain views that reproductive technologies inevitably involve 
women’s objectification and commodification. 
 
While it is clear that there has to some degree been a shift regarding the relationships 
between women and science in other fields of feminist inquiry, debates regarding oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research in particular tend to rearticulate views that science is an external 
imposition on women’s freedom by reproducing or exploiting unequal power relations 
(Martin 1988). The emphasis on autonomy evokes a virtually pre-social conception of 
individuals whose rights and obligations simply exist without reference to time and space. 
Women’s contributions to stem cell research cannot simply be examined by arguing whether 
they have an inalienable right to choose whether they provide their oöcytes (they do) but 
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understood as a practice which uses their reproductive capacities in novel ways while at the 
same time constituting that reproductive capacity in distinct ways. One way to discuss the 
utilisation of medical and scientific technologies is through the concept of risk. The risky 
nature of ovarian stimulation and oöcyte extraction, in the context of SCNT research, where 
the provider does not expect to receive direct benefit from the process, is a major issue for 
both advocates and critics of a payment system.  
 
Examining the assumptions about the physical side effects of oöcyte extraction may help to 
illuminate the meanings that are shared in common amongst commentators in the field, 
particularly in relation to femininity and risk taking. Scholars such as Thompson (2007), 
Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008), Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez (2008). Skene (2009) and 
Widdows (2009) take risk to be fixed and universal and advocate for risk minimisation or 
avoidance. For instance, if any risks of oöcyte extraction exist, they can be mitigated by 
minimising the number of times an individual may undertake the process, providing post-
extraction health care or monitoring each individual woman for long term health effects 
(Isasi and Knoppers 2007; Thompson 2007; Skene 2009). More “critical” commentators 
such as Widdows (2009), Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez (2008) and George (2008) assert 
that oöcyte provision for SCNT research should not occur under any of the current 
circumstances because the risks are likely to outweigh any potential personal benefit. 
 
By constructing practices of tissue provision as a process of calculating risks and benefits, 
the parameters of the debate remain aligned to a positivist rendering of risk. That is 
individuals who undertake risk analysis and avoid risk are actually embodying modern 
constructions of the “rational” subject. Within a modernist framework, risk needs to be 
managed by projecting into the future and ascertaining what the present self might do to 
mitigate potential risks to the imagined ideal outcome (Giddens 1991). Social scientific 
approaches to risk unsettle this simplicity; risk is socially constructed rather than a neutral or 
natural category and thus reveals the boundaries, anxieties and values of a social order 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Examining risk in this way is itself a critical approach to 
social relations. For a number of scholars, the social construction of risk marks the shift from 
a traditional social order to a modern one. As Scott and Freeman (1995, 151) argue, risk 
management, particularly in relation to health, is a specifically modern preoccupation: 
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Risk is a relatively modern concept, to the extent that it is a product of a particular set 
of understandings of free will and decision-making as well as the result of an 
increasingly manipulated environment. 
 
The relationship between gender and risk is a significant one but also requires elaboration in 
relation to age. Constructions of masculinity and femininity inherently involve a relationship 
between the individual and the external world and how he or she should negotiate unwanted 
events and risks. While young people in general are considered to take more risks and are 
“risky” in comparison to older people (Mitchell, Bunton and Green 2004), young 
masculinity is centered around the taking of risks while young women are “routinely warned 
to guard against risk, to keep themselves safe and to be cautious of strangers” (Green 2004, 
57). However, the way people understand risk varies and research by Bunton, Crawshaw and 
Green (2004) has found that there are not always significant gender differences in taking 
risks but in the feelings associated with them.  
 
Orthodox feminist views do not interrogate the idea that normative notions of femininity, 
particularly in relation to women’s reproductive capacities, regard that the best approach to 
risk is its minimisation or avoidance. By assuming that the only relationship between the 
rational subject and risk is one of minimisation, it does not acknowledge that definitions of 
risk are dynamic, contextual and whether “risky” actions can be rationalised within a 
specific narrative, such as gift giving. This is not to suggest that women undergoing ovarian 
stimulation and oöcyte extraction for research purposes should be uninformed about the 
procedure but rather, to point out that such an emphasis implicitly implies that risk is a fixed 
concept and that physical or emotional side effects of ovarian stimulation, in the short and 
long term, are risks which are themselves socially constructed. I suggest that understanding 
how and why women are motivated to undertake oöcyte extraction, particularly for another 
person, should be located within a context that admits risk is contextual and thus women do 
not necessarily need to avoid risk to be “rational” because this actually adheres to more 
conventional constructions of femininity. 
 
Science in society 
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I have so far situated feminist-oriented interpretations of the scientific utilisation of 
reproductive tissues within a broader undertaking of feminist scholarship regarding women’s 
subjectivity and reproduction. Hopefully, this is an indication of the direction in which this 
theoretical framework is moving. I argue that it is important to be critical of assuming that 
the scientific utilsiation of women’s tissues is reflective of women’s alienated experience 
wrought by powerful medical and scientific discourse (Martin 1988; Dickenson 2006; Leem 
and Park 2008; Waldby and Cooper 2010). These discourses and the institutions that 
produce them change as do meanings of freedom. In order to develop my own framework 
for analysis, it is necessary to sketch a more complex view of science as an institution than 
currently exists within the “tissue economies” literature. This involves a recognition that 
science is not an autonomous or monolithic entity and that is has significant power together 
with and separate from the state. I will attempt to capture the fact that science is not a static 
social institution but has been subject to major changes. These changes are diverse and at 
times paradoxical but ultimately they necessitate understanding that ‘science’ does not 
simply impose an external set of burdens on women from which they must be liberated. 
 
Science is a distinct form of human conduct, subject to specific rules and its momentum is 
modeled on democratic collective endeavour. Unlike traditional social relations built on 
‘natural’ hierarchies and where knowledge is embodied in a wise individual, is divinely 
bestowed or inherited, the scientific model of knowledge relies on the idea that it is 
transparent and can be transmitted between individuals with effort (Ezrahi 2004). There are 
also symbolic aspects that ‘science’ embodies the democratic spirit of modernity, distinct 
from the old claims of feudal and religious authority to which individuals had to submit, and 
thus the production of scientific knowledge is characterised as value-free (Smith Keller 
1992).  
 
As a social institution, science is a practical process by which to 'discover' the world and an 
integral ethos of modern Western society (Harvey 2007). However, its pre-eminent position 
as the default explanation of phenomena (Irwin and Michael 2003) has been increasingly 
destabilised in the post WWII period. These transformations shaping scientific conduct in 
the last part of the 20th century can be considered as an effect of science itself. According to 
Beck’s (1992) Risk Society thesis, science is no longer the unequivocal bearer of progress 
but “manufactures” risk too, ultimately undermining its own narrative that it can simply 
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remove or resolve humanity’s problems. “Manufactured” risks include the development of 
nuclear weapons or pollution from industrialised production and produce their own 
unintended consequences. For Lyotard (2001 [1984]) an erosion of trust in scientific 
narratives is emblematic of the postmodern condition. Lay people and other emergent 
experts such as feminists increasingly contest the truth claims made by scientists (usually 
those working within the natural sciences).  
 
Scientific research has also been subject to more scrutiny in the second half of the 20th 
century despite the fact there have been many examples that it has progressed through 
unscrupulous means long before.42 The increasingly ambiguous epistemological position of 
science has unfolded in parallel with, or perhaps in reaction to, rationalising the conduct of 
scientific research. The earliest example is the Nuremburg Code of 1947 that emerged in 
light of Nazi atrocities. Other protocols include the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) and The 
Belmont Report (1975). These documents stipulated that, at the very least, scientific 
researchers should recruit their subjects and/or contributors only if they had been informed 
correctly and consented (Campbell, Gillet and Jones 2005).  
 
From a Weberian (1948) perspective, efforts to counter these tendencies by governments, 
scholars and professional bodies, such as the World Medical Association, are indicative of a 
process of rationalisation that have transformed other areas of social and economic conduct 
in the modern period in similar ways. Rationalisation is “orientated exclusively toward the 
efficient maximization of practical goals” and involves the institution of universal norms 
over a certain field in order to become more economically efficient (Scaff 1998, 38). Ethical 
rationalisation may appear to be paradoxical given that ethics are the opposite of 
                                                
42 For example, as medical research became more competitive, medical scientists in 19th century Britain often 
paid grave-robbers to supply corpses (Lock 2001). Throughout the 20th century, questionable methods 
continued to be used under the auspices of national governments. Well-known examples are Nazi research 
experiments in which captured Jewish, homosexual and mentally-challenged individuals were subjected to 
extreme experiments (Rhodes 2010). Other state-sanctioned regimes, besides the Nazis, oversaw experiments 
and procedures which amounted to abuse and the violation of human rights as we know them today. Prisoners 
were often enrolled in phase-one clinical trials42 (Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008). During the 1980s, women in 
New Zealand were subject to the “unfortunate experiment”, in which treatment for ovarian cancer was withheld 
from patients (Campbell, Gillet and Jones 2005). More recently, it was revealed that researchers at a UK 
hospital had removed and stored the organs from the bodies of deceased children for future use in scientific 
research without the knowledge of their parents (Waldby and Mitchell 2006). 
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instrumental concerns but the ethical and economic rationalisation43 of scientific research 
have occurred in parallel with each other. These developments have generated new forms of 
‘experts’ who act as intermediaries between the ‘scientists’ and the ‘public’. On the one 
hand, these new experts may assist in destabilising the autonomy of scientific conduct by 
subjecting it to the scrutiny of social and ethical norms but on the other hand maintain its 
privileged status by allaying the public’s concerns that scientists work within a regulated 
environment.  
 
“Houston, we do not have a problem”: politics and the conduct of scientific research 
 
Developments in broader social and political milieu have also contributed to destabilising 
the transcendent position of science in recent decades. I have already referred to feminist 
analyses of scientific and medical discourses that interpret them within the context of 
questions related to autonomy. In these paradigms, science stands accused of being partisan 
rather than neutral arbitrator among members of the community and the ‘public good’ of 
scientific research is challenged on the basis that rather than being an objective and neutral 
process, it is constituted by and helps to reproduce social inequalities. One issue in 
particular, prior to the emergence of stem cell research, is likely to have had an implicit – but 
strong – influence on the latter’s legislative and regulatory trajectory as well as its 
constructions by predominantly feminist scholars. I refer to the Human Genome Diversity 
Project (HGDP), which involved a number of genetic scientists in the 1990s proposing to 
collect tissue samples from people around the world “with a view of creating a database for 
the benefit of the scientific community” (Lock 2001, 78). The ostensibly benign endeavour 
to create a database of genetic material obtained through blood or saliva samples “to anchor 
understandings of human evolution” (Reddy 2007, 430) encountered strong resistance by 
some groups from which scientists sought samples. Members of indigenous groups around 
the world expressed concern about scientists’ lack of consultation and cultural insensitivity 
(Lock 2001). Some activists went further and interpreted the assumption of their 
involvement as evidence of their continually marginalised political status. For these groups, 
the HGDP was part of a long history of colonial dispossession and occupation. Scientific 
research that had accumulated and stored human tissue from indigenous people was another 
                                                
43 Dickenson (2007), Waldby and Cooper (2010) and Baylis (2009) may refer to this more critically as 
commercialisation of scientific research. 
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means by which the oppression of indigenous peoples was achieved. This history involved 
but is not limited to the illegal or false removal of indigenous bodies and property as well as 
the development of scientific knowledge about racial hierarchies, which contributed further 
to their oppression (Lock 2001).  
 
In the responses by indigenous people to the HGDP we see parallels with Leem and Park’s 
(2008) analysis of South Korea’s “donation culture”. The HGDP controversy was a powerful 
an event that destabilised yet again the narrative of scientific research as a “public good” - 
universally applicable and beneficial. 44  Importantly, the responses emerged from 
communities rather than experts. In light of the HGDP, more attention has since been paid to 
the social significance of scientific research as policy makers have sought to redress some of 
these issues by engaging with communities beyond the “deficit model”; that is, by taking 
their potential concerns, opposition or apathy seriously (Hoeyer 2006b). This development 
shows that the autonomy presumed by scientists is increasingly subject to questions that go 
beyond its epistemological merit, and indicates that to maintain its legitimacy science 
changes its relationship with its constituents.  
 
These issues are evident in the experience of Reddy (2007), who was engaged in a mediatory 
capacity in a scientific project seeking blood/DNA samples from an Indian Gujarati 
community in Houston, Texas. In the wake of the HGDP controversy, policy makers and 
scientists expected to find similarly hostile views from the community. However, Reddy 
found that the project occurred in a straightforward and relatively non-confrontational 
manner. He encountered little hostility but much enthusiasm from blood/DNA sample 
providers regarding the claims of “public good” by researchers. In his account, Reddy refers 
to the dissonance between the expectations of researchers and policy makers regarding the 
community and the actual attitudes of the community. He reports that his researcher 
colleagues even queried “Why [he was telling them] all about what you have not found in 
Houston?” (2007, 455). 
 
The extent to which similar concerns of exploitation and oppression characterise all novel 
scientific research cannot be assumed. Taken together, the development of new scientific 
                                                
44 Public good may be used interchangeably with the term ‘common good’. 
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research methods, the changing status of science and scientists including more ethical and 
social oversight and a skepticism from other ‘experts’, science cannot easily be understood 
as a monolithic entity which exercises domination over women. Tilting the axis in the 
opposite direction and problematising all research as constituted by, and reproducing, 
unequal power relations is actually based on the same proposition that led to the HGDP 
controversy in the first place – that the scientific utilisation of tissues has the same meaning 
for all individuals or communities regardless of time and space (Irwin and Michael 2003). 
By emphasising individual rights, current frameworks analysing oöcyte provision to SCNT 
research perpetuate monolithic conceptions of ‘science’ and ‘the public’. According to 
Dixon-Woods et al. (2008, 72) this often reduces the complexity of the inter-subjective 
process within which people make sense of tissue provision and neglect the potential for 
“diverse ‘publics’ and ‘sciences’ [to] come together to form highly distinctive hybrid social 
worlds with their own norms, practices and logics”.  
 
Given such complexity, the question of contributing one’s own tissue to scientific research 
cannot be exclusively examined by assessing whether the individual is participating in an 
autonomous and voluntary manner but by asking what scientific research can represent in an 
individual and collective sense. For instance, the lack of donated oöcytes in the Global North 
clearly indicates an antipathy on the part of women but does not to explain the rates of 
embryo donation. We have not witnessed a similar assembly of women concerned about the 
scientific utilisation of their reproductive tissues; it has so far remained the concern of 
scholars. These factors indicate that the lack of donated oöcytes is unlikely to be based on a 
view that the scientific utilisation of women’s reproductive tissue exploits women’s property 
or expectations of altruism. Clearly, women have specific relationships to scientific research 
and a discussion of their contributions must situate practices of giving within women’s 
experiences and social roles. Therefore, understanding broader narratives in which 
individuals may refer to scientific knowledge production is an important step to developing 
frameworks that can accommodate the scientific utilisation of tissues which are associated to 
a large degree with women’s social roles. This proceeds from understanding science as a 
dynamic institution, increasingly entrenched in complex economic, political and social 
bonds and thus is not a clearly delineated institution that can simply reproduce social 
inequality. 
 
 
75 
The Scientific Utilisation Of Reproductive Tissues as a “Public Good”: 
Individuals, Collectives and the ‘Ideal’ Donor. 
 
I have already discussed feminist approaches to the scientific utilisation of reproductive 
tissues as being based on unequal social relations where science is characterised as a static 
institution which invariably hinders women’s autonomy. Yet this discussion perpetuates an 
emphasis on the individual as separate from their social milieu rather than being constituted 
by it. Here, questions regarding the exercise of freedom and rationality are posed at an 
individual level. However, it is necessary to develop another dimension of the framework 
regarding normative political behaviour – what should happen when individuals become a 
collective. Managing the ethical dimensions of science may be considered political theory in 
a different guise because it is prompts people in society to consider the “good” and how 
science fits into these questions. The ‘public good’ is a social construct and provokes 
discussion regarding the values, if any, that should ‘society’ affirm. In this section I develop 
a critique of the assumptions that are inherent in both Titmuss’s views on altruistic blood 
provision and current debates about oöcyte provision to SCNT research by asserting that 
political behaviour does not have to embrace the general and the abstract but that the specific 
and “passionate” are important considerations. 
 
The ‘public good’ prompts reflection about the aim of political association, relationships 
which are usually contrasted with intimate relations based on kinship, as well as whether the 
“public good” is natural or the result of values being imposed by others whose interests have 
little public spirit. According to Frazer and Lacey (1993) and Yeatman (1994), the liberal 
tradition of political thought has a less than well-developed conception of the ‘public good’ 
because it is contrary to its chief principle regarding the moral authority of the individual and 
their liberty to exercise choices to achieve their happiness. Liberal premises regarding the 
importance of individual liberty might be averse to a view of the ‘public good’, which 
presumes a consensus about moral values, because the latter can be used to override an 
individual’s view of the good. The state should be a neutral mechanism between individuals 
and avoid imposing any of its own values on the citizenry (Frazer and Lacey 1993).  
 
Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) discussion of therapeutic blood provision clearly shows that he 
intended to formulate a comprehensive and explicit statement regarding the achievement of 
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the ‘public good’. The contest of interests between the individual, the collective and the role 
of the state is addressed by Titmuss who believed that a market mechanism or any 
commercialisation of blood provision would undermine the positive properties of transfusing 
blood. Titmuss’s defence of altruistic blood donation as the ‘right to give’ is complex 
because he invoked the model of the social contract. By doing so, he suggested that the 
social contract is dynamic and changes over time. This constituted a novel way of 
challenging the narrow focus of neoliberal thought, which increasingly threatened “positive” 
notions of liberty with its emphasis on “negative” ones. Berlin's (1969) distinction between 
the negative and positive dimensions of liberty is implicit in Titmuss’s work. Negative 
freedom is the absence of interference from engaging – or coercion to engage – in activities, 
and is aptly expressed in the libertarian view of liberty. In contrast, positive freedom is the 
ability to be “the instrument” of oneself and is a fuller expression of autonomy (1969, 131).  
 
Titmuss (1997 [1970]) did not argue that individuals could be obliged to give blood, 
however, if they are likely to do so, it should be done under the auspices of the altruistic-
donor model. The gift of blood was mutually constitutive of social relations: it would help to 
generate and reinforce fellow feeling between citizens (Waldby and Mitchell 2006). There 
were, however, individuals within the citizenry whose ability for altruism was compromised 
by their economic or social status and “to choose always their own freedom” should not take 
precedence over the therapeutic objective of blood transfusion (Titmuss 1997 [1970], 310). 
Because of this policy, blood donation in Britain and the US at that time was as much a 
question of exclusion as it was of inclusion. In the contest between individual rights and 
achieving a “public good”, Titmuss consistently argued that individuals whose personal 
interests could pose a threat to the “public good” needed to be excluded from giving blood.  
 
Comparing approaches to the public good through oocytes and blood: 
problems of ‘technicity’  
 
It is important to address the appropriateness of comparing oocyte provision for SCNT 
research and Titmuss’s views on blood donation. It may be argued that the basis for 
comparison is tenuous given that the biological properties and the technology involved in the 
extraction of each tissue is so different. Indeed, a comparison will show live organ transplant 
is much closer to the topic of oocyte provision. However, my analysis indicates that even 
 
77 
with biological and technological similarities between oocyte and live organ extraction, 
blood donation remains paradigmatic. It is my intention to argue that ethics councils and 
legislators do not doggedly adhere to Titmuss’s altruistic-donor model because they 
inadequately perceive the biological and technical features of the procedure but on the basis 
of the social relations the model was designed to promote. 
 
Biological factors are intertwined with technical ones as a matter of technicity; that is, “the 
intersection of the material qualities of tissues – their location and function in the body; their 
durability, their immunological specificity – with the kinds of technology available to 
procure, potentiate, store, and distribute them” (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 32). By looking 
at their material qualities, oocytes differ from blood in several ways: firstly, they are 
reproductive tissues, secondly, they do not regenerate. Thirdly, it is not possible to refer to 
the provision of oocytes for reproductive purposes as a transplant/transfusion per se: if 
transferred between one woman and another, the recipient woman does not ‘absorb’ the 
genetic problems contained in the oocyte’s DNA (the child might). Neither will this occur if 
using the oocyte to grow a stem cell line because the donor’s DNA is removed. Fourth, 
while oocytes and ovarian tissue can be frozen in advance of medical treatments such as 
chemotherapy, oöcytes are generally not banked (for personal or research purposes) because 
their quality deteriorates by the hour (Braun and Schultz 2012). Cryopreserved oocytes (even 
if they are frozen within the first hour) do not have the same quality as ‘fresh’ ones. Finally, 
the technology used for oocyte extraction involves prolonged medication, surgery and 
perhaps prolonged recovery. In contrast, blood donors do not need to significantly prepare 
for the process (as will be discussed, being a blood donor is enabled by a healthy lifestyle). 
Blood provision as discussed by Titmuss is a therapeutic practice and can pose a threat of 
physical harm to the recipient.45 This is because blood is a biological substance that can 
become infected. Technologically during Titmuss’s time and now, the potential to cleanse 
infected blood is limited.  
 
As discussed in chapter three, Skene (2009), Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) and Thompson 
(2007) and the Nuffield Council of Bioethics (2011) advocate for the payment of women for 
                                                
45 Currently, the recipient would be the researcher(s). However, if a stem cell line was created from a cloned 
embryo and the ensuing patient-specific tissue was implanted into the patient, this person would be referred to 
as a recipient.  
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their oöcyte provision to SCNT research based partially on the difficulty of the technological 
process.46 As outlined above, it is not difficult to dispute Titmuss’s altruistic-donor model on 
the basis of ‘technicity’ – no one can seriously suggest that the provision of oocyte is 
analogous to blood in biological and technological terms. But to retreat here and indeed treat 
the issue of oocyte provision for SCNT research simply as a question of ‘technicity’ is to 
miss fundamentally important and even interesting questions about the intersection between 
‘technicity’ and social relations. It is here that I compare the implications of Titmuss’s 
ambivalent legacy with the ethical and political assumptions of oocyte provision to SCNT 
research.  
 
For Titmuss, achieving the ‘public good’ had three interconnected physical (biological and 
technological) and symbolic dimensions. Firstly, the blood supply had to remain free from 
physical pollution by excluding ‘bad blood’. The connection between blood borne diseases 
and social deprivation and economic poverty is often self-evident and there is overwhelming 
evidence connecting poverty with vulnerability to disease and lack of resources to alleviate 
them. No doubt, Titmuss was both pragmatic and idealistic in maintaining a certain purity in 
the blood supply. Indeed, in the 1980s, the blood supply of Britain was contaminated 
because plasma obtained from paid vendors in other countries was imported (Waldby and 
Mitchell 2006). Secondly, a clean blood supply meant the “public good” had been cleansed 
of private interests. For Titmuss, because blood vendors were putting their own interests 
ahead of the recipients, individuals with limited economic and social integration into society 
could symbolically pollute the ‘public good’. Finally, paying people to provide blood 
transformed the process into transaction and undermined the social relationship between 
individuals by allowing the unfettered satisfaction of one’s own needs. In contrast, blood as 
a free gift invoked the individual who could discern the humanity of his or her fellow 
citizens, whose giving was not based on expectations of reciprocity and thus a sense of being 
interested in the gift or its return.  
 
Titmuss drew on deep-seated values related to the division of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in social 
life. Private interests are a threat to the common good and need to be excluded as much as 
possible for the health of all by removing the inducement from the poor – money. 
                                                
46 The literature related to blood provision in Australia and globally is vast. Given the scope of this thesis, the 
details given here are limited. I do not mean to suggest that there are no current problems in relation to it. 
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Ultimately, maintaining the traditional conflation between poverty and physical pollution 
and money, self-interest and symbolic pollution proved disastrous for blood donor systems 
in the 1980s with the emergence of new viruses, particularly the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) and its association with more diverse parts of the population.47 For instance, in 
France, blood donors were venerated to such a degree that the risk of offending altruistic 
people contributed to the prevention or delay in implementing recommendations to verbally 
screen donors (Rabinow 1999). Titmuss himself, exhibited a similar sense of reverence for 
donors by conflating the symbolic (altruism) with physical purity (good health) and thus 
neglecting the fact that those who are altruistic can also have ‘bad blood’ and represent a risk 
to their recipients (Waldby and Mitchell 2006). Ultimately, it is evident that all bodies – not 
just those of the poor – are vulnerable to disease. More precisely, conflating poverty with 
moral ‘weakness’, that is being ‘selfish’, is logically tenuous, if not elitist. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, I cannot definitively claim what Titmuss would have made 
about the scientific utilisation of oocytes for stem cell research but I suspect he would 
support oocyte donation for three reasons. Firstly, his support for blood donation was based 
on the idea that certain things or processes should remain outside market exchange and that 
all human tissues should only be given. Secondly, there is some suggestion in The Gift 
Relationship that the same “right to give” upon which he based his argument for blood 
donation is akin to contributing to scientific research (although there is no discussion of what 
should happen if that research becomes commercialised). Thirdly, I think he would have 
adhered to his opposition that the individual has an inherent “right to sell”, especially if that 
right poses a danger to others. Titmuss may have suggested that there is a symbolic threat 
rather than a therapeutic one if oocyte provision was conducted as a commercial transaction.  
 
Just as Titmuss (1997 [1970]) positioned blood provision within broader social relations, 
contemporary scholars debating oocyte provision to SCNT research do the same in two 
ways. Firstly, by contemplating a non-altruistic donor model, they imagine social relations in 
distinct ways. Secondly, they offer a different picture of the ‘public good’: they invert the 
premise of social relations on which it is based, dismissing the “right to give” and insisting 
that the rights of the woman-as-individual should take precedence over the collective. As 
                                                
47 The effects of these new viruses as a result of social expectations regarding donors are not the responsibility 
of Titmuss.  
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previously intimated, the “political” implications of oöcyte provision relate to women’s 
social, economic and political status in society. The two economic models of tissue provision 
provoke questions about how the reproductive capacity of women is utilised in, or by, the 
‘public sphere’.48 Whether scholars in the contemporary debate agree about instituting a 
market mechanism, they are held in common by a belief that in this context, the presence or 
absence of payment will affect the individual rather than the collective (Baylis and McLeod 
2007; Dickenson 2007; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008; George 2008; Skene 2009; 
Thompson 2009). The emphasis on individual rights and interests is partially due to the 
liberal understanding of the self and community that feminism has derived (Strathern 1988) 
and the classic liberal antagonism between the self and the state, in which the latter assumes 
too much power and subjects the individual to expectations that are not in her best interest 
(although in many feminist campaigns, the state is used as a means of ensuring women’s 
interests) (Cornwall and Molyneux 2008). Oöcyte provision for research purposes tend to 
focus on the effects to the donor and ask, is a woman doing something in her own best 
interest?49 The question of the “public good” is neglected because the individual’s own 
moral authority should be the basis for any decision to participate.  
 
Introducing payment models in order for women to be motivated to provide oöcytes to 
SCNT research is not only reflective of a shift away from Titmuss paradigmatic model, but 
the relationship between the individual and the collective. The payment-for-oocytes model 
emphasises the vulnerability of the female individual and the potential exploitation and 
oppression paying her for oocytes may create or exacerbate. As noted in the earlier 
discussion regarding vulnerability, feminist-inspired50 views are predicated on a model of 
socialisation that presumes women’s integration into society is largely dependent on their 
embodying docile femininity in which their roles are defined in relation to men; for example 
women are not able to exercise their natural authority as moral beings because they are 
subject to expectations to conform to altruistic behaviour. The scientific utilisation of 
women’s reproductive tissues is an extension of these unequal power relations and thus 
                                                
48 This view is intimately connected to ideas regarding women’s reproductive capacity and its implications for 
their subjectivity as discussed in chapter three. 
49 Although there are some references to economic and racial or ethnic divisions between women (Dickenson 
and Alkorta Idiakez 2008), attention remains on the abstract notion of the individual woman–the central figure 
in "mainstream" bioethics–and her relationship to the state and/or society. 
50 This is distinct from arguing that feminism is a homogeneous monolith; I do acknowledge that there are 
many feminisms.  
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likely to be exploitative of women because women’s reproductive capacity is used as a basis 
of male power or capital accumulation. Although not explicitly referenced, Titmuss’s 
concept of the “right to give” is critiqued for its lack of attention to power relations and that 
women may be obliged to be self-sacrificing and other-oriented. In line with other 
contemporary debates regarding the payment of scientific research subjects, guinea pigging 
(Elliott 2008) and vulnerability, the focus has shifted to a more “sympathetic” one towards 
potentially exploitable individuals. This is clearly evident in the figures considered the most 
problematic providers of oöcytes to SCNT research in the current altruistic model: women 
who may give their oöcytes in order to help someone they know with a condition such as 
Parkinson’s Disease, diabetes or MND, or those who would exchange their oöcytes for 
reduced cost fertility treatment (Thompson 2007; George 2008). Giving oöcytes under these 
conditions does not constitute free and autonomous participation in scientific research 
because the woman is likely to be acting from pressure (subtle or overt); in other words, by 
directing one’s effort to a specific benefit or beneficiary, the act is concrete and passionate, 
rather than abstract and rational.  
 
Differences between Titmuss’s approach to blood provision and contemporary debates 
regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research are ultimately cosmetic. Despite the 
differences regarding the appropriateness of paying people, there is a similarity in the ideal 
donor or contributor in each context. This is the disinterested person who gives or 
contributes to an undifferentiated recipient and reaps benefits that are impersonal. This is 
more easily understood in the context of Titmuss’s blood donor: with the free gift, the donor 
exists outside cycles of reciprocity because the individual gives without expectation of a 
return. In the anonymous arrangement for which Titmuss argued, the recipient is 
undifferentiated, generalised and abstract: their need is not evaluated according to social 
status but their medical need. The donor gives without a specific beneficiary.51 In the context 
of oöcyte provision to SCNT research, ‘good eggs’ are women who provide their good eggs 
to SCNT research within the context of an abstract relationship between themselves, 
scientists and the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Remarkably, payment in this 
context serves as a means to exclude women who might give their oöcytes in an interested 
way: to obtain cheaper fertility treatment for themselves or to advance scientific research 
                                                
51 Reference to specificity relates to the recipient’s personal or moral character rather than blood type. 
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which may help a specific beneficiary (Thompson 2007; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008). For 
instance, Thompson (2007) argues that only monetary payment will attract the ‘healthy 
donor’. With sufficient numbers of ‘healthy donors’, women who have, or know someone 
who has, a disease that may be cured by SCNT research are likely to be relieved of pressure 
to provide their oöcytes to a science they see as having little chance of progression without 
them. Receiving financial remuneration to give oöcytes to SCNT research means that the 
recipient is undifferentiated and generalised; women are giving their oöcytes to advance 
stem cell research without a specific benefit or beneficiary in mind.  
 
Constructing the Ideal Donor: Checking Passion at the Door 
 
Underlying much of these normative approaches to tissue provision in the context of therapy 
or scientific research, lies a suspicion of specific and interested motivations. In the context to 
SCNT research, giving oöcytes to a specified benefit or beneficiary is not regarded as 
voluntary and autonomous participation in scientific research because it apparently relies on 
women as giving and altruistic. For scholars who advocate payment, the relationship 
between women, scientists and society will be transformed into a rational relationship based 
on calculating risks and benefits (Isasis and Knoppers 2007; Thompson 2007; Ballantyne 
and de Lacey 2008; Skene 2009). For scholars who caution against implementing a model 
which provides financial remuneration to resolve the lack of oöcytes for SCNT research, 
relationships between women, scientists and society will continue to be based on the social 
disadvantage women experience vis-à-vis men (Baylis and McLeod 2007; George 2008; 
Thompson 2009, Widdows 2009).  
 
It is important to note that advocating payment on the basis that it attracts the ‘right’ donor 
maintains ideal distinctions between ‘public citizens’ and ‘private individuals’ where 
exhibiting a generalised interest and impartiality is expected of the citizen par excellence 
(Voet 1998). Citizenship is a broad concept used to refer to political relationships, usually at 
the level of the nation-state. Citizenship presupposes a specific relationship between the self 
and other selves/citizens; it “can, in principle, be both the relationships between a state and 
an individual citizen and the political relationships between citizens themselves” (Voet 1998, 
9). There is a substantial literature on the varied rights and duties that citizenship should 
entail as well as the exclusions that have applied (and in some cases continue to be) on the 
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basis of race, gender, religion, sexuality and age. My interest here is not to challenge the 
orientation of this literature but to argue that by constructing the "best" donor as rational – 
impartial to the outcomes of SCNT research – scholars in debating oöcyte provision to 
SCNT research reinforce the idea that the “public good” is exclusively achieved when 
individuals relinquish their own interests, their “specificity” rather than embracing it 
(Thompson 2007; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008). As citizens, individuals must be impartial, 
that is make decisions according to the needs of the general rather than the specific 
(themselves). As James (1992, 50) suggests. impartiality requires a virtual bifurcation of the 
self:  
 
To speak impartially…is not to speak in one’s own voice, informed by one’s own 
particular interests and affections, but to speak from a more distant standpoint, as one 
person among others.  
 
In historical terms, impartiality has been presumed to be the exclusive attribute of white, 
middle-class and heterosexual men. This is connected to constructions of male bodies as 
impermeable and stable and lacking the negative attributes associated with women’s bodies 
such as “personal receptivity, vulnerability, fluidity, and disintegration of the self” (Phelan 
1999, 59). The insistence that women and other marginalised identities may also act 
impartially is a radical turn in theories which seek to encourage participation in the public 
space. 
 
In political theory views about “passionate” and “rational” citizenship diverge. Beyond the 
expectation that only certain individuals may be impartial, the political theorist Phelan 
(1999, 63) argues that theorists of the Republic such as Pericles, Machiavelli or Theodore 
Roosevelt, are more likely than their liberal counterparts to accept their citizens’ feelings in 
the public sphere: “passions are important for liberals but are to be removed from the public 
sphere as much as possible”. The Civic Republic52 imagined by Republican theorists differs 
from view in the liberal political tradition by attempting to transform passions, such as love 
and hate, from an emotion directed at a specific individual to form the basis of a generalised 
and abstract relationship among the citizenry, not their exclusion. The emotion of love, 
                                                
52 These labels do not refer to the major political parties in the contemporary US. 
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which is usually directed toward a specific individual, must be abstracted (although this may 
be a contradiction in terms) and directed towards a generalised recipient. Bonds between 
citizens are not due to any “personal virtue or qualities, but because they are fellow citizens” 
(Phelan 1999, 63 emphasis added). Importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, these 
political theorists fear that “preferences among citizens…may lead one to neglect one’s civic 
duty in order to protect or privilege loved ones” (Phelan 1999, 64). This transformation from 
the specific and passionate to the general and rational appears to be the only the basis for 
political relationships. When making political decisions, citizens also need to be detached 
from themselves and avoid acting in ways to benefit themselves personally. This returns us 
to an important tenet of ethical behaviour that connects Titmuss (1997 [1970]) and scholars 
regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research: the exclusion of donors who will participate 
on the basis that it will benefit specific people with whom they are emotionally connected 
rather than the “universal stranger” or the abstract notion of scientific progress.  
 
The effect of privileging ‘rational’ contributions to scientific research is the denial that 
women may be positioned differently in relation to the outcomes of SCNT research simply 
because of their lived experience, that it may not be possible to remove or flatten these 
differences and ‘interested’ motivations can be integral to ethical decision-making. Critics of 
“passionate” donation do not doubt their assumption that women contribute to scientific 
research with the same attitudes and perceptions regardless of time and space. In this 
paradigm, there is one model of scientific research contribution: the rational approach which 
involves treating all potential subject-participants as a homogenous group as a way of 
protecting against harm. This model maintains the inter-personally anonymous and distant 
relationship between individuals and collectives that are analogous to the nation/citizen 
binary. Yet, like many efforts of rationalisation, the counter argument remains powerful: that 
rationalisation limits the capacity for human discretion and diversity and ignores the 
contextual and relational aspect of human life (Komesaroff 1995). 
 
Ideal donors in the context of live organ transplant 
 
Before closing this chapter, it is necessary to address another important issue. This relates to 
literature that has discussed the shift from anonymised organ donation to relational donation. 
Here, after a brief summary of literature regarding live organ donation, I argue that in spite 
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of operating on a similar logic oriented towards the construction of the ideal donor, the ideal 
donor is related and interested.  
 
Traditionally, organs such as kidneys have been sourced from cadaveric donors. 
Increasingly, there has been a trend to increase the number of live donors where the donor is 
a healthy, living person (Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002; Truog 2005; 
Scheper-Hughes 2007). From a medical viewpoint, transplants from living donors are 
generally more successful than those from cadaveric ones (Hilhorst 2005). Like any tissue 
provider, the live organ donor must be in generally good health – although more flexible 
criteria with regards to age and health are increasingly considered by transplant centres and 
surgeons to expand the donor pool – and undergo medical and psychological testing (Reese, 
Caplan, Kesselheim and Bloom 2006; Scheper-Hughes 2007). Donors need to undergo 
rigorous medical testing in order to withstand the operation to remove the organ (Truog 
2005). In most cases, the organ is not ‘matched’ to the recipient because he or she will take 
immuno-suppressant drugs to manage the effects of the transplanted organ. The recipient is 
on the waiting list for an organ transplant and in the case of kidney transplant, has probably 
been treated with dialysis for some years.  
 
There are several types of living organ donors (Truog 2005).53 Firstly, there are donors who 
are known to the recipient through an existing – genetic or social – relationship. These 
donors can include parents, children, spouses and friends (Hilhorst 2005). Secondly, there 
are donors who are unknown to the recipient and who are characterised as volunteers. This 
second category may be further divided into two groups: firstly, donors who respond to 
public appeals for an organ (and therefore the recipient is identified) (Hilhorst 2005; 
Friedman and Friedman 2006) and secondly, donors who volunteer to give organs under the 
condition of inter-personal anonymity, renouncing a claim to direct their donation (Ross, 
Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002; Hilhorst 2005). All the types of donors listed 
above are subject to medical and psychological testing. All decisions to proceed with live 
organ donation (as with oocyte provision to SCNT research) are expected to be based on 
                                                
53 This discussion cannot refer to the different regulatory frameworks that exist for live organ provision or 
organ sellers around the world. Here it is sufficient to refer to the fact that there is documented evidence that 
poor people in countries such as the Philippines sell their kidneys to medical tourists from first-world countries 
(the Philippines government instituted a ban on this practice in 2008). It is also illegal to sell such organs in the 
United States, the European Union and Australia. However, it is legal to sell one’s kidney in Iran (Scheper-
Hughes 2007). 
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rational principles: that is, donors decide whether to donate (and medical staff should only 
proceed) when the benefits outweigh the risks of the operation and the effect of losing one 
kidney (Kahn and Matas 2002). 
 
The following analysis highlights that scholarship regarding living organ donors treats them 
inversely to the scholarship regarding oocyte providers to SCNT research. The former are 
constructed as ideally interested (identifying a specific benefit or beneficiary) while the latter 
are expected to be disinterested. Typically, in the context of kidney donation, doctors in the 
American context have been suspicious of people who altruistically and anonymously donate 
a kidney, often dismissing them as psychopathological (Truog 2005). Here we can see a 
divergence from Titmuss’s altruistic-donor who was lauded for embracing the ‘universal 
stranger’. This is because the decision to be an anonymous altruist has been interpreted 
through the prism of self-interest (rather than Titmuss’s ‘right to give’). In this paradigm, 
human beings are inherently self-interested; any virtue such as altruism is finite and should 
only be directed at people inside the immediate social circle (Sandel 2012). Despite these 
misgivings, the anonymous altruist is increasingly used in transplant situations for two 
reasons: first, chronic shortages from cadaveric organ donors and better transplant outcomes 
in comparison with cadaveric organs (Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002; 
Truog 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2007).  
 
The contrasting treatment of interested donors (those who are related to the recipient and 
therefore can identify a specific benefit and beneficiary) refers even more explicitly to the 
construction of an ideal donor in the context of oöcyte provision. In the context of live organ 
donation, the motivations of the interested donor are generally interpreted in kinder terms. 
There are two reasons for this; firstly, in keeping with the self-interested paradigm discussed 
above, individuals are expected to behave altruistically to members of their social circle 
(Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002). Such behaviour is socially expected 
and acceptable. Secondly, returning to the issue as a rational cost/benefit analysis: the benefit 
of donating a kidney to their relation is considered to outweigh the cost because the benefits 
are concretely experienced: the recipient gains their longer term health and by extension, the 
donor’s own life is not significantly disrupted by the continued treatment of dialysis or the 
death of their loved one (Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002). Some scholars 
assert that these benefits do not concretely exist between an altruistic and anonymous kidney 
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donor and recipient (Kahn and Matas 2002; Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 
2002). The condition of inter-personal anonymity does not permit the donor to direct their 
donation to a person of specific gender, race, age or medical history. These scholars interpret 
the condition of anonymity as meaning that the donor can only attach their action to an 
abstracted entity where the benefit of the donation is only an imagined experience not a lived 
one.54 
 
Most of the scholars surveyed in this brief section view live organ donation between related 
individuals in positive ways, notwithstanding some concerns with the practice. For instance, 
there is concern expressed that donors may feel obliged or coerced into providing the organ 
to the relative. Generally, the testing process and counselling from hospital staff is 
considered sufficient to minimise this risk and if necessary, clinicians may invent a medical 
excuse to avoid putting a family member through the operation (Truog 2005; Scheper-
Hughes 2007). Yet, scholars such as Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite (2002) go 
so far as to argue that related donors will undergo more risk precisely because of their 
existing relationship with the recipient. This position is vehemently opposed by Scheper-
Hughes (2007, 510) whose reference to ‘organ capture’ is indicative of her overall claim that 
live organ provision by a related donor is inherently exploitative and should be decreased. 
According to Scheper-Hughes this practice is inequitable for two reasons: firstly, that living 
donors are made invisible by the social expectation that gifts are not mentioned lest the 
recipient feel that the gift be reciprocated. Secondly, there is a documented bias between 
donors in terms of gender: women are more likely to be donors than recipients. Underlying 
this position is the ‘anthropological’ view regarding “families [which] are often violent and 
predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members” 
(Scheper-Hughes 2007, 508). 
 
Overall, concerns raised by the utilisation of related and non-related living donors reveals a 
similar propensity to the literature on oocyte provision to stem cell research to construct an 
ideal donor. This propensity does not result in the same ideal donor. In the organ transplant 
context, the ideal donor is generally interested and their motivations and actions are least 
problematic because they are interpreted in relation to the public/private divide where 
                                                
54 It is necessary to clarify that the recipient does not becomes less than human if such particular markers are 
absent. I wish to thank Professor Michael for pointing this out. 
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private social relations are characterised by altruism rather than self-interest. In contrast, the 
altruistic anonymous donor is problematic because the cost/benefit calculation appears to be 
irrational (Kahn and Matas 2002; Ross, Glannon, Josephson and Thistlethwaite 2002).  
 
For the majority of feminist scholars discussed in chapter two, specifically Thompson 
(2007), Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) and Skene (2009) who advocate for the payment of 
women to provide oocytes in order to ‘relieve’ pressure from the related donor, the interested 
oocyte provider is acting from similar expectations about behaviour within the private sphere 
but these expectations are interpreted in largely negative ways (although there are explicit 
affinities with the approach taken by Scheper-Hughes 2007). Feminism critiques 
constructions of women’s behaviour as different from men and divorced from rationality. 
Within the context of cost/benefit analysis, there is little doubt that helping to progress 
scientific research (because the results cannot be immediate) is a cost without [rational] 
benefit. The oocyte provider who is motivated by impersonal [commercial] reasons – money 
– rather than emotional bonds or her own cheaper fertility treatment is the ideal donor 
because she is acting in the spirit of the public sphere, not necessarily for the public good. 
Thus, ideal donors are important in each context but each field of literature constructs its 
ideal donor differently.55  
 
Conclusion: research questions  
 
The scientific utilisation of human tissues varies considerably and it is an important political 
issue because it provokes questions about equality and representation as well as “public 
good” (and indeed there are questions about equal access to deciding the “public good” that 
cannot be addressed in this thesis). Current regulatory regimes, an effect of ethical 
rationalisation in recent decades, focus on the process of informed consent as a way a 
realising individual autonomy. This seems to be the means of deciding whether the conduct 
of scientific research is a “public good”, following the liberal conviction that the individual 
                                                
55 I do not wish to preempt my discussion of the results. However, I will note here that my overall argument is 
not necessarily undermined by the different constructions of the ideal donor in specific contexts. In chapter 
eight, I discuss other forms of tissue provision (cancer cells, blood, DNA) and the social contexts in which they 
are given – who does the donor imagine they are giving to and why? My argument that tissues are given to 
specific communities (inter-personally anonymous, national, international, abstract etc) captures the different 
forms of donor (not necessarily the constructions made by scholars about who is best). What is beyond the 
scope of this thesis is an understanding of how the kidney has become a tissue that can be given in two 
different contexts (specific and general). 
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is their own natural moral authority (Frazer and Lacey 1993). However, recent controversies 
such as the HGDP show that this question of the “public good” cannot simply be resolved 
with reference to individual autonomy because scientific research is part of broader political 
processes (Jasanoff 2005). What happens in the realm of science can reflect wider society 
and vice versa. One repercussion of the HGDP controversy should be the acknowledgement 
that different groups regard scientific research differently. 
 
The approach undertaken here shifts the focus from gift-giving as self-contained and static 
rituals to reciprocal relationships enacted within specific social contexts. I have shown that it 
is important to depart from existing approaches to gift-giving practices, exploring their 
variations and situating them within a specific historical and social context. The latter view 
takes into account the object given or traded, the people involved and the motivations for 
giving. Drawing on critical approaches to materiality (Kopytoff 1988; Miller 2001, 2003; 
2005 and 2008), the framework I employ analyses the diverse relationships which emerge 
from giving reproductive tissues that destabilise both the vital status of objects-given-as-gifts 
and the mechanistic meaning of money. In widening the net of analysis wider, my approach 
also refers to established feminist views regarding the relationship between science as a 
monolithic entity and women. “Tilting the scales” in the opposite direction and assuming 
that the scientific utilisation of oöcytes and embryos can inevitably be regarded as similarly 
based on unequal power relations does not allow us to adequately understand the social 
significance of giving reproductive tissues to scientific research. I suggest that we can better 
understand giving reproductive tissues to stem cell research by allowing for a complex 
relationship between institutions of scientific research and women as members of the ‘lay’ 
community, for whom scientific research constitutes an important part of their everyday 
lives. The final dimension of my framework is a critical approach towards normative 
political or collective behaviour based on the inevitably suppression of specific and concrete 
concerns in preference for general and abstract ones.  
 
Based on the preceding analysis and development of my own eclectic framework, the current 
study seeks to address substantive and theoretical dimensions pertaining to oöcyte and 
embryo provision to stem cell research. This will be achieved by engaging with potential 
donors to understand their attitudes, perspectives and practices. The following research 
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questions are distinct from those the principal investigators devised in the original grant 
submitted to the ARC.56 
 
Firstly, the following empirical questions need to be answered: 
1. What are the views of participants regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research?  
2. Are these views different to oöcyte provision for reproductive purposes? How? 
3. What are the views of participants towards embryo provision to stem cell research? 
 
Secondly, more conceptual questions need to be answered; 
1. How does the ‘public good’ figure in preferences for providing ooyctes and embryos 
to stem cell research? 
2. How can we explain the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues in relationship to 
citizenship and women without resorting to normative and ahistoric assumptions 
about autonomy and rationality? 
3. Specifically, how does the empirical data relate to constructions of the ideal 
[disinterested] donor discussed in chapters three and four? 
4. By using an approach that considers the relationships between objects and humans as 
mutually constitutive, as discussed in chapter four, how can preferences regarding 
payment models be understood? 
5. How do preferences regarding oocyte provision for reproductive and research 
purposes reflect and challenge existing paradigms regarding gift-giving? 
 
Chapter five will outline the research methods used and the means of recruitment to achieve 
the aim of this research; to develop a conceptual framework that better captures what the 
scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues means for women. I also examine specific 
epistemological concerns regarding the collection of data through research tools such as 
interviews and focus groups. 
  
                                                
56 Appendix 2 contains an abstract of the original submission.  
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Chapter Five: Designing Research to Examine the Scientific 
Utilisation of Reproductive Tissues  
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have provided technical information about stem cell research, female 
reproductive biology and the properties of oöcytes that make them a valuable but fragile and 
difficult tissue to manipulate for research purposes. The preceding literature reviews focused 
on two fields of scholarship which proceed from a principle-based approach. Firstly, the 
debate regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research with an emphasis on whether a 
payment system should be introduced to address the present shortage. Secondly, the field of 
tissue economies, with a focus on Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) work sought to assert the validity 
of altruistic donation for blood provision. Despite differences in time periods, the biological 
and technical aspects of each tissue discussed, the appearance of immense philosophical 
differences between the field of scholars discussing oöcyte provision to SCNT research and 
Titmuss is only superficial. In both contexts the ‘ideal’ donor or contributor of human tissue 
is constructed a disinterested individual. His or her contribution is based on a generalised, 
rather than specific, benefit or beneficiary. The implication of this expectation is significant. 
It is my intention to discuss the idea that contributing human tissue to scientific research can 
be ‘interested’ and targeted towards a specific benefit or beneficiary.  
 
As noted above, imposing a donor or payment system has so far emerged from a principle-
based approach to the issue of contributing tissue to scientific research. An underlying 
assumption of such approach is that that contributing tissue to scientific research has one 
meaning for everyone in all contexts. However, an approach which collects data from 
potential donor populations is necessary to develop a conceptual framework that can capture 
the reproductive significance of oöcytes and embryos and the social roles women may create 
with their varying utilisations. This chapter will outline how I approach such complexity in 
my research design and collection of evidence. The rationale for this study will be discussed 
following an outline of the methods chosen; namely, participation selection and recruitment.   
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Outlining the research study 
 
Looking at practical contexts of reproductive tissue provision relies on understanding the 
meanings people give to things and practices. Meaning-making is itself a complicated issue, 
and there are many debates about how different perspectives come to be produced and 
reproduced and how some rather than others become legitimated as self-evident knowledge. 
Sociologists working within paradigms such as Feminism, Marxism and Queer Studies are 
critical of the power relations that impact meaning-making and the ways in which some 
meanings become legitimated as morally right or scientifically objective, while others are 
dismissed or denigrated. While there is certainly a critical dimension of this thesis, I am 
primarily interested in the meanings of specific practices and perspectives rather than 
focusing on how some meanings are made more legitimate than others.  
 
This research is situated within the interpretive research paradigm because it “combine[s] an 
empirical focus on the language and gestures of human interactions with a theoretical 
concern with their symbolic meanings and how the ongoing social order is negotiated and 
maintained” (Alford 1998, 42). As a social researcher, the significant question is that of 
precisely delineating the object of study. Is it enough to know what people do or what it 
means for them to do it? Interpretive research was chosen for this project because it allows 
for an in-depth and contextual examination of what constitutes an oöcyte and what its 
utilisation means for different people. The interpretive paradigm is contrasted with the 
approaches that emphasise causal or historical explanations in the research process (Alford 
1998). In the social scientific disciplines, the interpretive paradigm is related to 
hermeneutics, often contrasted with positivist sociological approaches borrowed from 
physical sciences such as biology. Bryman (2004, 13) argues that the key difference between 
the two traditions is that positivist approaches “seek to explain human behaviour while the 
latter seeks to understand it”. Human social life is considered much more complex than the 
physical world because “facts” are invested with meaning that are culturally and historically 
specific.  
 
Knowing experience? 
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Undertaking social scientific research involving human subjects provokes questions about 
the authenticity of research participants’ perspectives. Many historians of marginalised 
groups and/or political movements, Scott (1991) argues, take the perspectives of their 
informants as unproblematic truth. Because these participants are designated as social others 
or deviants, they are expected to reveal the existence of oppressed identities and practices. 
This may resemble a naïve approach to Foucault’s concept of “subjugated knowledge”- that 
which is marginalised because it is perceived to be “unscientific”, “subjective” or “specific” 
(Foucault 2008). This concept is broadly situated within the Foucauldian paradigm of 
biopower, which provides a useful means for understanding specifically modern forms of 
political subjectivity (Sawicki 1991). In applying these ideas, Foucault suggests an 
“analytics of power from below” by looking at the subjective experience of individuals who 
occupy lay positions within discursive fields (Foucault 2008). Scott (1991) argues, however, 
that historians cannot simply reveal marginalised experiences as if they constitute a specific 
identity without questioning the social and historical specificity of subjectivity; indeed, “it is 
not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. 
Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation…but rather that 
which we seek to explain” (Scott 1991, 779-780). Scott thus emphasises that a Foucauldian 
approach analyses power to understand what identities, desires and behaviours are evoked on 
an individual subjective level.  
 
Silverman (2007) contests the assertion that focus groups or interviews are ideal methods to 
gain insight into the diversity of human experience and advocates using data which is not 
manufactured such as ethnography or textual analysis with little or no direct questioning of 
participants. This is because people rarely “think” about what they do, rather people “act” 
and then produce coherent stories to explain them. The data gathered in focus groups and 
interviews is simply a record the individual’s version of events rather than an analysis of 
actual events. Silverman’s model is also based on social constructionism, but his approach 
“prioritises interaction over meaning and…prefers to look at what people do without any 
necessary reference to what they are thinking or feeling” (2005, 10). This “interactionist 
model” differs from the “emotionalist model” defined as the “study of perceptions, meanings 
and emotions” (Silverman 2005, 10). Such data is manufactured by directly talking to people 
as individuals or in groups in order to document and understand phenomena from the 
individual’s point of view. Silverman’s “interactionist model” appears to be rather positivist 
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because he treats the study of the social world as if it can correspond to the study of the 
physical world. For example, in asserting that asking people about their behaviour is likely 
to elicit a socially-appropriate narrative he dismisses an important dimension of what it is to 
be human: to report, narrate or perhaps even embellish various moments in our lives. 
Silverman’s approach can also be critiqued on the basis that it resembles other symbolic 
interactionist researchers who emphasise the episodic and dynamic nature of social life, 
while neglecting the importance of memory and social structures in sustaining relationships 
(Farganis 2008; Dillon 2010).  
 
The points raised by Scott (1991) and Silverman (2005, 2007) are useful in helping to 
calibrate a view of social science research that assumes it is possible to reveal the 
participants’ insights or experiences as if they are indeed authentically their own. Although it 
is necessary to distinguish between the research framework and the methods used to 
implement it. For instance, talking to people individually or in groups does not necessarily 
presume that the researcher is seeking to reveal a hitherto oppressed truth; it is meant to 
reveal the lived experience of another human being and how it makes sense to her. While it 
is unlikely that the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues will have the same meaning 
to women in the community, these are likely to differ to the principle-based approaches thus 
far discussed. My intention is to incorporate these responses into a conceptual framework 
that can express the tensions between the reproductive significance of oöcytes and embryos 
and the social roles women may create with their varying utilisations. In the process of 
understanding the social significance of contributing reproductive tissues to scientific 
research, concepts such as gifts, reciprocity, materiality and subjectivity will be drawn into 
the analysis. 
 
Data Collection  
 
In order to procure ARC-funding and prior to my participation in the research project, the 
principal investigators identified three broad aims. Firstly, to contribute to existing 
knowledge data from a small sample focusing on the attitudes of potential donors in 
Australia regarding the scientific utilisation of reproductive tissues. Secondly, to provide an 
empirical basis with which to engage key stakeholders such as stem cell researchers, fertility 
clinicians and policy makers such as the NHMRC. Finally, to produce an empirically based 
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submission to the federal government’s legislative review of The Prohibition of Human 
Cloning for Reproduction Act and The Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment 
Act scheduled for 2011. In addition to these aims, as a PhD candidate, I independently 
developed the aim of constructing a conceptual framework that captures the social 
significance of contributing to scientific research with one’s own tissues. This aim reflects 
my intention to move away from discussing the issue as if it were exclusively one of 
individual women’s autonomy.  
 
Given that the project’s partner fertility clinic was not involved in stem cell research and did 
not ask any of its patients to provide their oocytes for their own or other research projects, 
the data are based on hypothetical scenarios and responses. This research may be used to 
further develop hypotheses for future projects. Yet I do not necessarily acknowledge the 
extent to which the hypothetical nature of this project and its small sample poses a 
significant limitation to the results and implications discussed herein. As discussed in 
chapter two, there are many published papers regarding attitudes towards oocyte provision 
for research purposes. Not all the participants in these publications had direct experience of 
fertility treatment or oocyte extraction for another’s purpose. I should also like to point out 
that the dataset from which my thesis draws has already been discussed in peer-reviewed 
journals without in-depth examination regarding the implications of the project’s 
hypothetical nature or small sample (see Waldby, Kerridge, Boulos and Carroll 2013 and 
Appendix P). 
 
Ethics 
 
No research was undertaken until approval was obtained from the South West Sydney Area 
Health Service in July 2009 and the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee in November 2009. Further ethics approval was granted to provide payment to 
participants in the focus groups ($25) in July 2010. In consultation with Professor Waldby, I 
made the decision to seek permission from the University Human Research Ethics 
Committee to pay women to participate in focus groups. Prior to the offer of reimbursement, 
women did respond to the advertisements. However, given that these numbers were 
insufficient and we considered it important to maintain momentum, we offered 
reimbursement to add to the initial number of respondents to the advertisements.  
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Defining cohorts 
 
As mentioned above, the ARC funded the project between 2008 and 2011; I began my 
candidature in June 2008. However, the South West Sydney Area Health Service took 
almost a year to approve the ethics application and thus data collection did not begin until 
August 2009. This research involved engaging directly with women who were not currently 
involved in the provision of oöcytes to SCNT research residing in the greater Sydney region 
of New South Wales (NSW), Australia between August 2009 and August 2010. As Table 
One indicates, there are a total of three cohorts in this sample. Fertility patients (cohort one) 
were the primary cohort because existing SCNT, human embryonic stem cell and fertility 
research utilises the oöcytes of women who are undergoing treatment for infertility issues 
(Franklin 2006; Parry 2006; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008).57 This sample is expected to 
provide comparable evidence with other jurisdictions. We also included in our study women 
whose experience of oöcyte extraction occurs in different circumstances; for example, those 
who had undertaken the process of oöcyte extraction to help another woman become 
pregnant (cohort 2). The final cohort consisted of participants who represent the “healthy 
donor”, a label generated in biomedical literature pertaining to women who are not expected 
to have prior experience of fertility treatment, oöcyte extraction and who are between the 
ages of 18 and 30. The “healthy donor” label also refers to the biomedical perspective 
regarding women under 30 years of age being at their peak fertility with highly fertile 
oöcytes (oöcytes which are fertilisable). It might be argued that my use of this term is 
flawed, having been borrowed from medical literature to refer to individuals whose physical 
characteristics would qualify them to be considered as healthy donors by some clinicians 
and/or scientists. I use it because I think it succinctly sums up the women who participated in 
this cohort. After all, these participants cannot really be designated by any other common 
experience or feature except that they are “healthy donors” and were not being treated for 
fertility issues – notwithstanding further medical and psychological testing usually required 
of oocyte providers in paid and altruistic contexts (Bourne 2008; Almeling 2011). It is also 
interesting to note that the ‘healthy donor’ is particularly constructed in medical and social 
scientific literature as a direct contrast to the fertility patient who is undergoing medical 
                                                
57 As noted above, the NHMRC has licensed the use of clinically unviable oocytes obtained within the context 
of fertility treatment (National Health and Medical Research Centre (2013).  
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treatment. Cohort three was further divided between women in the “general” population (3a) 
and women of the same age who have a family member or friend with a medical condition 
that may eventually be treated through such techniques as SCNT such as diabetes, 
Parkinson’s disease or spinal cord injury (3b). It was anticipated that the second group 
expected to be more likely to be disposed towards research donation outside an IVF setting, 
thus yielding valuable data about the extent to which close family or friendship relations 
shape perceptions of research donation. Cohorts one and two were largely based on 
experience – that is, having prior experience of fertility treatment and/or oöcyte extraction. 
Participants in cohort three were not expected to have had such experience.  
 
Table 1 - outline of each cohort in the study 
Name Participant type Definition Number of 
participants  
Cohort 
One 
Fertility patients Experience of fertility treatment for 
their own infertility (may be “female”, 
“male” factor or both)58 
20 
Cohort 
Two 
Reproductive 
oöcyte donors 
Undertook oöcyte extraction for an 
infertile woman. 
5 
Cohort 
Three (A) 
“Healthy donors” 
– general 
population 
Women aged between 18 and 30, no 
prior experience of oöcyte extraction.  
14 
Cohort 
Three (B) 
“Healthy donors” 
– related 
population 
Women aged between 18 and 30, no 
prior experience of oöcyte extraction. 
Related to a family member with a 
diagnosed condition which may be 
helped by stem cell research. 
4 
 
The process of recruitment – cohorts one and two 
 
Cohorts one and two were recruited through a fertility centre in metropolitan Sydney. The 
Australian Research Council Linkage grant involved a partnership between academics at the 
Universities of Sydney and Melbourne and a large fertility clinic based at a public hospital. 
The Postdoctoral Fellow, Dr Carroll coordinated the ethics application, designing the 
information sheets and consent forms with input from myself, Professor Waldby and 
Associate Professor Kerridge. Once ethics approval was obtained, clinic staff conducted a 
                                                
58 These terms signify how clinicians sometimes referred to the source of infertility in either one or both 
patients. 
 
98 
search of the patient database to generate a list of women who had been treated for fertility 
issues in the previous two years but who were not actively engaged in treatment at the time 
of participation in the study. Clinic staff also identified participants they felt should be 
excluded from the study. The partnership between the clinic and researchers did not involve 
sharing the clinic’s patient database. Potential participants were invited to participate in the 
study. Dr Carroll and I mailed prospective participants a letter introducing the research 
project and an information sheet. The introductory letter was printed on the letterhead of the 
Fertility Clinic and signed by its director. Participants were invited to return the “consent for 
contact” letter directly to the university researcher whereupon Dr Carroll or myself would 
phone the respondent to arrange a time for the interview. It became clear during interviews 
that many participants in cohort one had taken a break from fertility treatment but considered 
the possibility of returning at some stage. The tables below show the selection period and 
how many potential participants were identified for cohorts one and two. Copies of the 
recruitment letter, information sheet and consent form are contained in Appendices A, E and 
F. Neither the researchers nor clinic staff kept a master copy of names to ascertain who did 
not respond. Appendix B shows the demographic information sheet participants were asked 
to complete. One participant’s data was lost due to equipment failure. 
 
Table 2 - Fertility Clinic Recruitment (first and second rounds) 
Cohort 
 
Selection Period Total No. 
Potential 
Participants 
on database 
No. Excluded 
(see Table 3) 
No. Sent 
Invitation to 
participate 
Ex-IVF 
Patient 
January 2008 – 
February 2010 
585 68 517 
Oöcyte 
donors 
January 2008 – 
February 2010 
35 2 33 
 
Table 3: Reasons for exclusion from study for cohorts one and two (first and second 
rounds) 
Reasons for exclusion Number 
Language Barrier (requires full interpreter service) 26 (IVF) 
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Rural home dwelling 42 (IVF) 
2   (Donors) 
Total 70 
 
The process of recruitment – cohort three 
 
Recruiting ‘healthy donors’ was also based on voluntary enrolment, involving some 
snowball sampling whereby participants volunteered to pass the information to interested 
friends or colleagues. My previous employment experience of organising focus groups 
taught me that obtaining an adequate number of participants to meet on the same day at the 
time involves a “process of attrition”. More participants than are needed to attend are still 
required to express an interest because the meeting time and day will not be suitable for 
everyone. Recruitment began in January 2010 and the primary advertising strategy 
throughout the Camperdown campus of the University of Sydney included A4 and post-card 
sized posters. These were placed in various lecture rooms, hallways, cafes and toilet doors. 
The research was also announced during brief speeches at the end of undergraduate lectures. 
Some effort was made to target faculties that can be female-dominated such as Nursing, 
Education and Arts and Social Sciences. By June 2010, it was evident that there was 
insufficient interest and the decision was made to apply for permission to pay participants. 
Further approval from the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee was 
obtained in July 2010, in time for second semester. The research was further publicised in a 
student representative council (SRC) publication, Honi Soit, as well as newsletters emailed 
by the University to all staff and students. Both staff and student members of the Sydney 
University community were invited to participate. Participants were asked to express their 
interest by email after which an information sheet was sent. When I perceived that an 
adequate number of respondents had volunteered, I sent further emails to set the meeting 
time and day. Copies of the recruitment poster and advertisement, information sheet and 
consent form are contained in Appendices G, H, I and K. Appendix J shows the 
demographic information sheet participants were asked to complete.  
 
The University of Sydney is largely populated with students from affluent areas of Sydney 
such as the north shore and eastern suburbs. Despite attempts by the university to diversify 
its student population, most students are at least the second generation to attend university 
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(University of Sydney 2013). In order to counter this “middle class bias”, attempts were 
made to recruit from the University of Western Sydney (UWS); specifically, the Bankstown 
campus), which accommodates students of the College of Arts and is likely to have a higher 
number of female students. Recruiting participants from this university would have provided 
further points of comparison between healthy donors of different ethnic, religious and socio-
economic backgrounds. Most students attending UWS are from first-generation ESL 
backgrounds and are often the first in their family to attend tertiary education. While the 
Executive Dean of the College of Arts granted permission to recruit participants, advertising 
on campus proved difficult because maintaining the visibility of printed posters and 
advertising through University-hosted websites proved difficult. This strategy ultimately 
proved unsuccessful and was abandoned. 
 
Research methods 
 
The methods used in this study are focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Both tools 
were used to examine the practical contexts of providing reproductive tissues. This research 
project was designed to be iterative and sensitive to participants needs. One way to achieve 
this was by piloting both the interview and focus group. This strategy is used in the 
preliminary stages of research projects in order to detect inaccuracies or points of confusions 
(Bryman (2004). Pilot focus groups and interviews drew on informal networks of colleagues 
and were conducted in the same way as the actual interviews and focus groups. 
 
Focus groups 
 
Three focus groups were held on the campus of the University of Sydney in August 2010. 
The discussions lasted approximately two hours and involved introductions, signing consent 
forms, reading time and discussion. Tea, coffee and cake were served throughout. 
Participants were given descriptions of SCNT and oöcyte extraction and were asked if they 
needed clarification about what they had read. Participants in the healthy donor cohort were 
not expected to have prior experience of fertility treatment or oöcyte extraction. Participants 
were asked about their knowledge of, and level of support for, stem cell research. 
Participants in the cohort 3b with a friend or family member who may be helped by stem cell 
research discussed any specific caring responsibilities they have towards that person. Copies 
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of the focus group discussion schedule and visual prompts are contained in Appendices L 
and M . 
 
Focus groups were chosen as the research method for the “healthy donor” cohort because the 
participants had no prior experience of fertility treatment or oöcyte extraction. This lack of 
experience meant that their attitudes towards oöcyte provision to SCNT research were 
mainly general and abstract. In order to draw out these attitudes, the focus group schedule 
was designed to elicit responses about oöcyte provision for SCNT research by comparing it 
to other forms of tissue provision such as blood and whole organs or oöcytes for 
reproductive purposes. Focus groups are often used in exploratory research where 
participants need no special qualifications to attend. They are used to elicit general social 
understandings about a particular topic rather than individualised narratives which emerge in 
interviews (Rice and Ezzy 2001).   
 
Given the nature of their design, focus groups posed three issues for this research. Firstly, 
focus groups are a mixture of foreign and familiar social elements; strangers converging to 
discuss a topic may be an ideal of deliberative democracy but in practice, it can be 
influenced by factors such as domineering or submissive individuals and clumsy 
organisation. Rice and Ezzy (2001) argue that researchers must facilitate discussion with 
strategies designed to produce conversation such as open-ended questions. This shows that 
the idea of free-flowing conversation is in fact a case of good management and rests on a 
fine balance between allowing individuals to contribute to the discussion as they wish whilst 
ensuring that contributions are well distributed among the group. The researcher cannot 
expect the conversation to take its course smoothly without some direction. 
 
Secondly, the dynamics created among many participants is a distinguishing feature of focus 
groups because participants are expected to interact with each other as much as possible. The 
moderator introduces subjects or topics through the use of visual or verbal aides and allows 
discussion to take place between participants rather than ask a series of questions to each 
participant (Rice and Ezzy 2001). This may correspond with Kitzinger’s claim that the aim 
of the focus group is to elicit a group perspective where consensus is built through 
complementary (“yeah…I agree because…”) or argumentative (“no, it's not that way for 
me…”) verbal interactions (cited in Bryman 2004, 357-58). In this way, focus groups allow 
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responses to be clarified or revised. As a predominantly peer-based interaction, more 
opportunities to “critically” examine participants’ responses are possible. Finally, focus 
group discussions will follow a certain plan in relation to the topics but because of their 
highly interactive nature will vary every time and are impossible to predict. 
 
Interviews 
 
Interviewing cohorts one and two began in August 2009. They were arranged individually, 
as contact-for-consent letters were returned in the mail and usually taking place in the 
participant’s home. The interviews generally lasted ninety minutes and were mainly 
conducted by both the post-doctoral fellow, Katherine Carroll (KC). I conducted five 
interviews in these two cohorts. Participants were asked if they read and understood the 
information sheets and to sign the consent forms; any questions were answered at the time. 
Interviews were tape-recorded and additional permission was asked prior to turning on the 
recorder. Before posing questions from the semi-structured interview schedule, I often asked 
why the participant had decided to participate in our study; this helped to “break the ice” and 
allow the interview to flow as a conversation. Participants were asked to recall their 
decisions to undergo fertility treatment or donate oöcytes and how they experienced the 
process.  
 
Interviews normally involve two people: the interviewer and interviewee and can range from 
formal structured interviews involving a strictly adhered-to schedule to less formal semi-
structured or in-depth interviews where the interviewee may be asked to narrate an 
experience and then be prompted to expand on their answers (Bryman 2004). More 
specifically, semi-structured interviews involve “a list of questions or fairly specific topics to 
be covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply” (Bryman, 2004, 321). The purpose of semi-structured interviews is 
to engage the participant in responding to the topic in their own words. Researchers use 
semi-structured interviews when they have a clear focus to their research rather than a 
general interest in a topic (Rapley 2007).  
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the method for cohorts one and two because they 
had the experience of fertility treatment and oöcyte extraction and to maintain confidentiality 
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regarding personal stories. The interview schedule were designed to elicit information about 
the participant’s fertility treatment as well as their views on oöcyte and/or embryo provision 
for research. These women had no experience of providing oocytes to research and our 
information sheet made it clear that we were social researchers, only interested in their 
views. In contrast to focus groups, interviews allow responses to be developed because 
participants are not “competing” with each other to speak and there is more time to clarify 
uncertainty. Interviews are also private and do not expose intimate details of participants’ 
lives with strangers (other than the researcher). The power dynamics of interviews differ 
from focus groups in some respects: in a one-on-one situation, interviewers can be reluctant 
to highlight inconsistencies or ambiguities in the participant’s narrative (Willis 1980; 
Alvesson 2002). The sensitive nature of being treated for fertility with ARTs sometimes 
meant that women expressed themselves emotionally to which I usually responded with 
sympathetic phrases or by taking a break. Copies of interview schedules for cohorts one and 
two are contained in Appendices C and D. 
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Demographic Information 
 
The following tables indicate the age range and educational attainment of participants by 
cohort. 
 
Table 4 - Cohort One Age Distribution 
 
 
Table 5 - Cohort One Education Attainment 
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Table 6 - Cohort Two Age Distribution  
 
 
Table 7 - Cohort Two Educational Attainment 
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Table 8 - Cohort Three Age Distribution 
 
 
Table 9 - Cohort Three Educational Attainment 
 
 
Data analysis 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the design of research tools59 and collection of data 
was a group effort. Dr Carroll, Professor Waldby and I all contributed to the ethics 
application, the composition of interview schedules, consent forms and patient information 
                                                
59 The principal investigators decided to use research tools such as interviews and focus groups. 
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sheets for cohorts one and two. I largely coordinated the same process in relation to focus 
groups for cohort three with some input and final approval by Professor Waldby. 
Transcription was outsourced to a professional company and a transcription of each 
interview was made as soon as it was completed. Audio files and transcriptions were stored 
on a password-protected university-based server to which immediate members of the project 
team had access. All data was held ‘in common’ by the immediate members of the project 
team and thus the five interviews I conducted in the absence of Dr Carroll were not “my 
property” and vice versa. Dr Carroll and Professor Waldby and myself (sometimes attended 
by the research assistant Brydan Lenne and Associate Professor Kerridge) discussed the data 
in relation to emerging themes and research being published overseas during face to face 
meetings. Dr Carroll and I produced coding reports in relation to our ‘respective cohorts’ and 
interests throughout 2010. These were distributed to other members of the team and largely 
acted as a quick reference guide to the data.   
 
Discussing the data did not raise significant dissent between the immediate members of the 
project team. After all, there was little confusion about the data we had collected 
(participants were not keen to donate oocytes but would do so with embryos etc). This is 
because this information is rather unambiguous. Diversions in analysis appeared at a more 
conceptual or abstract level and this was due largely to each member’s interest. For instance, 
Professor Waldby was keen to use the data within the paradigm of feminist political 
economy approach, specifically the construction of oocyte providers as labourers in an 
emerging bioeconomy. As she was interested in organisational policies and procedures, Dr 
Carroll focused on the issue of informed consent. I sustain this claim with reference to the 
author’s respective publications – please see Appendix P. My own basis for analysis 
changed significantly between 2009 and 2013. I became increasingly aware that the feminist 
scholarship was imbued with a tone of “moral panic”, which the benefit of a decade since the 
introduction of SCNT seemed a largely unwarranted anxiety. At the same time, I was 
teaching and trying to understand ‘precisely’ what a sociological approach to such issues 
could be. As a lecturer designing my own course, I considered it more important to 
understand sociological concepts (modernity, risk, rationalism to name a few) in light of 
novel technologies rather than focus on ‘existentialist’ questions of freedom, power and 
oppression. This reason and the fascination generated by reading Miller and Kopytoff’s 
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scholarship on materiality led me to think deeply about the distinctions between 
‘compensation’ and ‘payment’ made by participants. I also intuitively understood that oocyte 
provision for SCNT research could be considered a novel arena for ‘political’ theory where 
the intersection of gender, body tissue and novel social relations could be innovatively 
addressed.  
 
 I adopted a broad framework with which to analyse the collected data. The analysis was not 
structured in a specific way and borrowed features from various approaches such as 
grounded theory and thematic analysis (Dey 2007; Ezzy 2002). Grounded theory was not 
applied in its entirety because if followed closely, it expects the researcher to “enter” the 
field without preconceived ideas. However, the broad design of the research, established in 
order to obtain ARC-funding, explicitly made reference to debates, concepts and questions 
from existing literature. In this way, the data could be used comparatively with that of other 
projects. Approaches such as grounded theory also insist that research is not a linear process 
and that data collection and analysis should not be distinct phases of the research program. 
Instead, researchers should be reflexive, self-referential and follow unexpected leads. In line 
with dimensions of grounded theory, our early data collection and analysis did influence 
later stages (Dey 2007); for example, the issue of compulsory donor registers was explored 
with the healthy donor cohort because the law had come into effect the same year. 
Unfortunately, however, its relevance had not been fully appreciated during interviews with 
reproductive oöcyte donors who were directly affected by the legislation.  
 
Interviews and focus group discussions were transcribed and imported into the qualitative 
data software, NVivo as they were completed. A rigorous theoretical coding process was 
applied to the data (Flick 2006). Open codes were broadly applied during the initial stages 
where transcripts were read and re-read in an effort to comprehend the perspectives of 
participants (Ezzy 2002). Comparisons were made between my own codes and 
interpretations with existing literature. As Ezzy (2002, 81) argues, “qualitative research is 
demonstrably trustworthy and rigorous when the researcher demonstrates that he or she has 
worked to understand the situated nature of participants’ interpretations and meanings”. This 
includes listening to the diverse voices presented rather than effacing difference and 
representing the mainstream view; this is most evident in the analysis of Melissa’s 
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perceptions of oöcytes. Unfortunately, my own presentation of results may not satisfy 
Silverman (2007) who consistently laments the contemporary mainstream use and analysis 
of qualitative data collection through interviews and focus groups arguing that many 
sociologists resemble journalists because they do not comprehensively analyse their data, 
instead utilising a few quotes to support their arguments. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the methods which I will utilise to what the scientific utilisation 
of reproductive tissues means for women. This chapter has addressed the means by which 
the data was collected, including the definition and recruitment of cohorts and a description 
of the research tools used (interviews and focus groups). I have identified a significant 
rationale of this research: to specifically explore “lay” perspectives.  I have then discussed 
two research tools that are considered appropriate for asking participants to construct a 
narrative: focus groups and interviews. Yet, in light of critical perspective regarding 
marginality and speech, I do not proceed from the assumption that these views are 
“authentic” simply because the narratives are more marginal than medical or policy 
discourses.  
 
Part Two, comprising of chapters six and seven will present key findings from the data and 
address the research questions that ultimately seeks to achieve the aim of this thesis; namely, 
to discuss how oöcytes and embryos are used by women and how these various utilisations 
help constitute their intentions to become a mother.  
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Chapter Six: Reproductive Tissues, “Kin Ethics” and 
Preferences in Giving Oöcytes to SCNT Research 
 
Introduction 
 
Part one of this thesis has discussed the problem of altruistic donation of reproductive tissues 
to SCNT research, providing important background information and reviewing the 
substantive and theoretical literature regarding the practice. It has also introduced the reader 
to the guiding research questions and research methodology. The current chapter begins the 
discussion of findings; the first part addresses research questions regarding participants’ 
constructions of their reproductive tissues and their utilisation. I demonstrate that 
reproductive tissues are closely aligned or situated within a “kin ethics” framework (Roberts 
2007). These meanings are determined by the biological properties of the tissues as well as 
the broader social meanings. I argue that most participants attempt to quantitatively manage 
their supply to counteract the qualitative unpredictably of their oöcytes. The second part of 
this chapter outlines more specific attitudes beyond the general disinclination to provide 
oöcytes to SCNT research. I demonstrate there was little consensus about the establishment 
of a financial equivalence for which oöcytes may be traded despite their shared perception 
that oöcyte extraction requires an inordinate amount of discipline and their preference that 
the recipient be a research company. This preference is based on an expectation that the 
recipient is capable of transforming the gift into something useful. Ultimately, many 
aversions to providing oöcytes to SCNT research are revised if the tissue is given within a 
context of a specified benefit or beneficiary. Based on this, I suggest that the tensions and 
ambiguities of oöcyte provision to SCNT research can be mitigated with the establishment of 
an affective framework. 
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Reproductive tissues and the “ethics of kin” 
 
Discussing the attitudes and perceptions regarding oöcyte provision must make reference to 
other tissues. I will illustrate some of the complex meanings surrounding oöcytes and their 
potential utilisations with reference to another tissue discussed in detail in this study, the 
embryo. Attitudes towards oöcytes and embryos show that on one level, they are not 
analogous tissues even though they are both reproductive and necessary for having children. 
One way to understand this ambiguity is with reference to Roberts’s (2007) distinction 
between “life” and “kin” ethics. This binary was used as a conceptual framework to 
understand the fact that embryos are subject to competing moral frameworks. “Kin ethics” 
frames decisions about embryos in relation to their meanings as potential children, often 
privileging conventional notions of kinship based on biology such as the nuclear family. The 
opposing view, “life ethics,” emphasises that decisions about embryos must be made in 
relation to an inherent status as life and thus have an inherent right to existence; to ensure 
this life, embryos can and should be placed outside their original family. Roberts found that 
many of her participants preferred that their embryos succumb rather than provide them to 
other people for reproductive purposes. This was despite the fact that the couples were 
undergoing fertility treatment in Ecuador, a predominantly Catholic country. The Catholic 
Church is an institution that has consistently argued against the use of ARTs on the basis of 
its technical approach to reproduction, citing its grading systems, implantation of “good” 
embryos, the discarding of bad or old ones and the often indefinite storage of others.  
 
For participants in our study, irrespective of cohort, oöcytes are not situated within the “life 
ethics” framework or considered as an entity with a moral status – a finding that concurs 
with research by Purewal and van den Akker (2010) and Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 
(2012). Yet, this lack of moral status does not help to easily position oöcytes within the “kin 
ethics” framework. For instance, participants perceive their oöcytes in predominantly 
functional terms, as a means to an end, and their value is derived from this function. The 
following participants, all of cohort one, compare the status and importance of their oöcytes 
with the embryo, which unambiguously fits within the “kin ethics” framework. This is 
because the reproductive potential of embryos remains after the patient has finalised his or 
her fertility treatment. Participants emphasise that the status of the embryo as a potential 
child in relation to an imagined family and echo similar sentiments expressed by those in 
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Haimes et al.’s (2008, 115) study who regarded the embryo much closer to a baby than an 
oöcyte despite the fact that “the embryo was [not] simply seen as the equivalence of a baby”. 
 
Atilia: I can’t see the difference between an oöcyte and any other cell because an 
oöcyte…it can’t turn into a baby with sperm [sic] so I feel its [use in research is] 
alright…I think that the moment the oöcyte becomes human, when it’s fertilised, it’s a 
completely different story.   
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Mandy: Well, an embryo is just much closer to a possible baby. An oöcyte’s only one 
part of it; it’s only my part of it... I... Well, an embryo, life has already commenced, so 
that’s how I see it as different. The oöcyte is just potential; the embryo, life has already 
commenced, so that’s started already. So they’re quite different…to me.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Caroline: Because my oöcyte and Paul’s sperm together is our child.  My oöcytes are 
just one half of a child.  They’re not my child (sic).  You know?  Whereas an embryo 
would be ours; it is strange, I guess maybe in some ways it doesn’t make sense.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Irrespective of cohort, participants valued their oöcytes in relation to its reproductive 
function, as tissues with a significance derived from the capacity to help create children. 
When asked about potentially utilising their oöcytes in reproductive donation, participants 
responded that the biological properties of oöcytes – the transfer of DNA – situate their 
oöcytes within the “kin ethics” framework, although this may not be their own family.60 
 
Frances: if it’s my genetic material, it should go to someone I trust t bring it up 
properly, because I don’t think it would be right to give half of my DNA (sic) to go 
towards a child that would be in a horrible family.   
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
                                                
60 This emphasis is particularly evident in the responses of reproductive oöcyte donors in this study, to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Vanessa: I wouldn’t perceive it as my child, it’d just be my oöcyte, someone else’s 
child. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The connection between temporal and biological dimensions of oöcytes and embryos are 
two factors which help to further demonstrate why embryos are less ambiguously situated 
within the “kin ethics” framework compared with oöcytes despite the fact that without 
oöcytes (and semen) embryos could not exist. The first factor is that the potential of the 
oöcyte is future-oriented in that the capacity of particular oöcytes to be fertile is unknowable 
until attempts at fertilisation occur. Prior to fertilisation, oöcytes exist as an undifferentiated 
tissue; that is, they all have the potential for reproductive capacity. After fertilisation, 
oöcytes become confirmed as fertile or infertile, an absolute status with no capacity for 
human discretion or intervention. However a woman decides to utilise her oöcytes (for 
reproductive or SCNT research purposes), the decision must occur prior to fertilisation 
because these are mutually exclusive utilisations. The second factor in participants’ 
decisions is cryopreservation. While, there are many efforts to improve the success rate of 
oöcyte cryopreservation, it remains relatively low, particularly compared to semen and 
embryos (Homburg, van der Veen, and Silber 2009). The cyropreservation of embryos is 
generally successful and may act as an “affordance point”, a material practice which 
immobilises the development of the embryo and allows couples the time to consider their 
potential utilisation outside more immediate moments of fertility treatment (Waldby and 
Carroll 2011). By generating time between the immediate context of fertility treatment, 
decisions about the further utilisation of the embryo are not characterised by the same sense 
of urgency or irrevocability.61  
 
Quantitative risk management and oöcytes  
 
So far I have suggested that oöcytes are an initially undifferentiated tissue in that when they 
are removed from the ovaries they are all regarded as potentially fertile. It is the process of 
                                                
61 The existence of viable and frozen embryos and their potential uses are subject to intense public debate 
(Haimes and Taylor 2009). I shall discuss the various ways that embryos considered excessive to an 
individual’s fertility treatment may be used. This discussion will further elaborate on the differences between 
oöcytes and viable embryos and show that questions of utilising the latter are based on retaining their status as 
potential children. 
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fertilisation that acts as a means of differentiation and classifies some oöcytes as fertile and 
others as infertile. These functional designations are the primary basis for the tissue’s 
ontology and it is from this functionality that oöcytes derive their value. This lack of moral 
status should not be taken as an indication that participants have no specific intentions for 
oöcytes. In fact, in almost all cases, they prefer to use their oöcytes for reproductive, rather 
than research, purposes. This finding is consistent with data reported by Haimes (2013). This 
preference is connected to the woman’s intention to become a mother. Irrespective of cohort 
or whether their intentions to become a mother figured in their immediate, medium or long 
term plans, participants suggest that giving away unfertilised oöcytes seriously jeopardises 
the opportunity to become a mother.  
 
The specific biological properties of oöcytes help determine the way participants manage 
this tissue. Oöcyte management differs from managing the “health” of one’s own blood 
(discussed below) and embryos. As the fertility of oöcytes is a qualitative designation and 
impossible to determine, participants refer to quantitative strategies to manage their oöcytes. 
The number of oöcytes available for reproductive fertilisation must not be intentionally 
depleted with “extraneous” practices. Given the uncertain fertility of oöcytes, participants 
indicate that their form of risk management is to refuse giving their “good eggs” to SCNT 
research and keep them in order to fulfil their intentions to become a mother. Uncertainty 
regarding the fertility of oöcytes puts the onus on the individual to manage their supply in 
numerical terms, rather than in terms of its quality.  
 
Atilia: because you never know how many of my oöcytes will be fertilised, so I need 
as many oöcytes as I can have! 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Denise:  Um, I’ve got to be selfish. I don’t have oöcytes, so [those] I do have, I’m 
keeping for myself.  
Interview (K.C.): Yeah. And what if you had, say, ten or fifteen oöcytes – would you 
still go, "Nope, these are my oöcytes?" 
Denise: Yep.  
Interview (K.C.): Yep. So you think it’s not worth the risk, or..? 
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Denise: Yeah, and especially if... If I was guaranteed to be getting the best quality 
out of that? Fair enough, I might consider it. But if I’m... the mix of the good and the 
bad, then no. I’ve got to put me first. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Rebecca: do you take that chance that that one live child might have gone to research?  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Dominique: with embryos…I’ve taken what I need whereas with oöcytes you don’t 
know with them.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Isabel: But then I would have in the back of my mind, have they taken the ones that 
potentially would be fertilised?  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
The quantitative strategy women employ regarding their oöcytes is based on the relationship 
between the tissue’s biological properties and its social utilisation. Capturing the specific 
considerations involved in utilising oöcytes may be facilitated by discussing issues related to 
blood and its provision. As Valentine (2005) argues, donating blood in Australia continues to 
resonate with being a good citizen in a way that is implicit and explicit in debates about 
tissue provision for scientific research. In a society permeated with medical risk discourses, 
sharing the substance is an indication that the individual has been a good manager of their 
blood because they have avoided risk. According to Valentine (2005, 116), blood “bears the 
imprint of intimate practices – who we’ve had sex with and what that sex was, what drugs 
we’ve taken, what food we’ve eaten”. Thus, the act of providing blood is not just a matter of 
helping others but represents one’s status as having healthy blood. This issue is further 
explored in a publication by Waldby et al. (2004) showing the way blood serves to 
distinguish between people and the communities in which they may be included (and 
specifically focusing on interviews with people infected with the Hepatitis C virus).62  This 
group provides an opportunity to explore the connection between tissue and social identity 
                                                
62 Waldby et al. (2004) and Valentine (2005) refer to the same dataset.  
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and was reported to have internalised the “risk” they pose to others and were self-regulating 
their exclusion from the donor pool.  
 
The ability to share one’s bodily substances is subject to the tissue’s biological properties 
and its social meanings. In the context of blood provision, giving the substance is a positive 
sign of an individual’s generosity, health or status but in the context of oöcyte provision, it 
is the sign of poorly managing a scarce resource. As long as the fertility of a particular 
oöcyte cannot be predicted, hoarding the finite resource is one means of good management 
and evidence that the individual has ensured to some degree their chances of becoming 
pregnant.  
 
I conceptualise participants’ refusal for egg provision as a quantitative-based strategy, 
which can be considered as a form of risk management. The classic form of risk 
management is the economic view of utility maximisation where the costs of giving oocytes 
to research are compared with the benefits of doing so. By referring to a risk management 
strategy, I evoke a sense that participants calculated the costs and benefits of egg provision 
to research. In this respect, Haimes’s (2013) perfunctory analysis of women’s decisions 
differs from my own.  
 
Haimes (2013, 50) argues that few participants in her research project “engaged in detailed 
calculations of risk; most focused instead on their hope” and briefly draws ideas from 
Simmel63 and Gross (2012) to argue that non-information can be just as part of the 
deliberative process as rational calculation. However, I do not consider these to be mutually 
exclusive. Just because participants in the UK study expressed their hope that extra 
treatment might provide to their overall chances at pregnancy does not rule out a sense of 
rational calculation. Indeed, given the fact that fertility treatment is so unpredictable, it is 
reasonable to argue that such participants are engaging in rational calculation by situating 
one round of fertility treatment within many rather than focusing on the unlikely possibility 
that one treatment will suffice. Thus, the difference between the UK study and the one from 
which I refer is that participants in the latter considered one treatment cycle sufficient to 
result in a pregnancy. 
 
                                                
63 No specific reference is cited for this author. 
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Egg-sharing for SCNT research  
 
Egg-sharing involves the provision of “good eggs” by fertility patients rather than “healthy 
donors”. Egg-sharing schemes are regulated differently around the world and did not occur 
in the fertility clinic from which our sample was recruited. Participants in cohort one 
responded to the suggestion of egg-sharing schemes in overwhelmingly negative ways. This 
was partially based on the biological properties of oöcytes as fragile and unpredictable. 
Drawing on their experience of fertility treatment these participants considered egg-sharing 
as inherently exploitative, placing women in the difficult situation of choosing between their 
intentions of becoming a mother and the prospect of having to predominantly finance the 
process themselves.  
 
Mandy: Well, I wouldn’t do it, but that’s only because having gone through IVF, I had 
twenty two oöcytes, and ended up with, over two cycles, four – like four embryos that 
could be used. So knowing how the numbers can drop so dramatically, when obviously 
I saw the number twenty two and was like “Wow! That’s so many! You know, I’ll be 
able to get ten cycles out of that if I have to!” So knowing that, I... I can’t see how that 
would be an incentive for people, but I’m not in other people’s shoes. I would never do 
that, for five hundred dollars…I wouldn’t do it if they said they were going to pay the 
whole IVF fee, so I don’t know how other people are motivated by money... Yeah, so 
that’s hard, not being in someone else’s shoes, so... No amount of money would 
compensate me for the possibility of me losing oöcytes that might lead to a pregnancy. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Joanna: But to say that I have to give you this so I can afford IVF, because if it’s that 
expensive that people have to go down [that road] …you’re forcing people to do that. I 
think you should give people the choice, a proper choice, not a financial choice, 
because people with money don’t have to.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Nadia: Oh, that’s bad! It’s good in, like, one [way], because she agrees to do that, but 
if you look at that, she’s going through so much stress, like having a baby and those 
things, and then because of the financial matters she has to agree, even if she doesn’t 
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like, she has to agree to do it.  Maybe she doesn’t like it.  Definitely (laughs) doesn’t 
like it, but still there’s no other option, so it’s more stressful for people to get what 
they want. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
In the first study to evaluate the egg sharing scheme in Newcastle (NESR), considered 
controversial by scholars such as Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez (2008) and Roberts and 
Throsby (2008), Haimes Taylor and Turkmendag (2012) and Haimes (2013) contend that 
the establishment of egg-sharing programs, even in the UK where fertility treatment is not 
as heavily subsidised as in Australia, women’s participation in such a scheme is not fait 
accompli. Participants from the UK study generally asserted that they would not consider 
clinically viable oocytes available for research and most of the patients at the fertility clinic 
did not opt for the discounted treatment in exchange for their oocytes because they needed 
“enough” to be able to consider the possibility of giving away 50% of oocytes removed. 
Women earning high incomes were active participants in the scheme (2013). Further, 
participants did not express a sense of exploitation because they felt they made their own 
decisions (indeed a condition of participating as an egg-sharer is that the woman must 
volunteer herself and not be approached). Ultimately, it is acknowledged that the subjective 
and objective dimensions of this issue might not be satisfactorily resolved, suggesting that 
while women may not perceive themselves as exploited, “these are not necessarily decisions 
made under circumstances wholly of their own choosing” (Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag 
2012, 9).   
 
Studies looking at egg-sharing within the context of reproduction show that financial issues 
are very important in prompting providers. Blyth (2004, 157) reported on the experiences of 
women and their partners who had pursued or declined egg-sharing arrangements (n=38). 
The participants in the study could only access restricted NHS- fertility treatment and could 
not afford private services. The majority of respondents did not express their regret at 
partaking in egg-sharing and many agreed with the proposition that such regimes are 
mutually-beneficial to recipient and donor couples allowing each dyad to pursue their 
treatment. Donors were initially motivated to give their oöcytes for financial reasons, but 
empathy with the potential recipients became a significant motivating factor for egg-sharers. 
Blyth reports that participants in egg-sharing schemes who did not have enough oöcytes 
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retrieved to share them experienced feelings of sadness that the recipient may not have the 
opportunity to conceive.  
 
More recent research undertaken by Gürtin, Ahuja and Golombok (2012) report that the 
overwhelming majority of women in their study (both donors and recipients of oöcytes for 
reproductive purposes) experienced egg-sharing as positive. This study drew on 
questionnaires returned by women (n=86) who had participated in the egg-sharing program 
at the London Women’s Clinic between 2007 and 2009. Participants had the opportunity to 
select words to describe their experience and the most commonly used were “rewarding”, 
“satisfying”, “happy”, “grateful” and “nervous” (2012, 703). The authors also note that most 
of the participants (specifically the donors) are educated to tertiary level and work in 
professions – a variable that may provide some convergence with the research undertaken in 
this study. A significant majority of donors in the study (87.5%) disagreed with the 
statement that "egg-sharing is exploitative" while 4.2% agreed. The authors do temper their 
findings to a degree by pointing out that their sample is over-representative of women who 
have successfully carried a pregnancy to term in comparison with the general population of 
patients at the clinic. 
 
I suggest that differences between perceptions of egg-sharing schemes hinge on two factors. 
Firstly, the existing environment can influence participant’s expectations. For instance, the 
Australian health care system generates a sense of universal entitlement to fertility treatment 
by allowing heavy subsidies and not impose age, health or location restrictions on accessing 
the services means that patients do not have to necessarily ration the number of treatment 
they will access. Secondly, perceptions and decisions differ according to whether egg-
sharing occurs for reproductive or research purposes. Helping others to have children 
provokes different sentiments than helping scientists produce new knowledge and/or 
therapeutic benefits. 
 
Giving oöcytes to SCNT research as waste management  
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that for most women undergoing fertility 
treatment in our study, oöcytes are not given to SCNT research on the basis of their 
unpredictable biological properties. Since oöcytes are just a means to an end, however, once 
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they have been defined as unviable through fertilisation (a functional and technical 
designation) they are often viewed by participants as appropriate material for scientific 
research. This shows that beyond their functional utility, oöcytes have little sentimental or 
moral value for participants who are primarily intent on using them to become a mother.  
 
Interviewer (M.B.): Just say it was your next IVF cycle, would you donate any of 
those oöcytes from that batch to stem cell research? 
Caroline: Only if they didn’t fertilise. And only if they were no good to me…I’m not 
going to put my body and emotion and time through that just to give it away.  They’re 
too precious, when you’re going through IVF, to do that.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Bridgit: I would donate what was left over, because it’s such a waste, isn’t it? They 
just sort of get put down the gurgler and nothing gets done with them.   
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Distinctions of function influence whether oöcytes can be given to SCNT research. This last 
respondent specifically suggests that giving infertile oöcytes to scientific research is a form 
of waste management, a way of utilising oöcytes in a meaningful way if they prove to be 
clinically unviable. Infertile oöcytes are designated as waste in the process of fertility 
treatment by both clinicians and patients; for this reason, one might assume that giving 
infertile oöcytes to SCNT research would be uncontroversial.64  Giving away infertile 
oöcytes is possible because they do not undermine participants’ intentions to become a 
mother.  
 
Designations of waste are specifically based on the tissue and the symbolic or physical 
significance to the individual. In a study of cancer patients and staff in an Australian 
hospital, Morrell et al. (2011, 80) show that the participants exhibited a decided willingness 
or indifference to the donation of their cancerous tissue, regarding “their tissue [as] 
“useless”, “waste”, and was intended to be thrown away”. The tissue is a symbol of the 
                                                
64 The NHMRC has issued a number of Australian research licenses that exclusively use clinically non-viable 
oöcytes and only one centre (attached to a private fertility clinic), Genea, is currently licensed to use such 
oöcytes for its SCNT research (National Health and Medical Research Council 2013). 
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illness from which they need and want to be separated. I argue that it is possible to see 
similarities between oöcytes and other tissues that are categorised in relation to their 
biological utility rather than their social meanings. The removal of cancerous tissue in the 
therapeutic context is expected to bring the patient back to health. Moreover, given that the 
‘regular’ self has been literally threatened by the presence of the tissue, removing the latter is 
expected to restore the ‘self’ to normality. In the context of oöcyte provision to SCNT 
research, participants in cohort one can give their ‘waste’ tissue (infertile oöcytes) without a 
significant impact on their therapeutic goals whilst maintaining some sort of donor identity, 
albeit a very limited one. In refusing to give good eggs to SCNT research, these participants 
protect their intentions to become a mother because they perceive that this social role cannot 
be obtained if they pursue oöcyte provision for research.  
 
Oöcyte provision for SCNT research: extraction, time and lifestyle 
 
Donating oöcytes for research is perceived to affect one’s imagined future as a mother as 
well as the individual’s life as it currently is. This is based primarily on the idea that the 
participant already has commitments in her life that will be unsettled by the introduction of a 
new activity. ‘Time’ here is imagined as an entity that is possessed and spent in specific 
ways: in life, time is spent on various components such as employment, relationships and 
study. It is obvious that taking medication, undergoing ultrasounds and blood tests takes time 
but participants are not especially convinced that they have the time to undertake the 
process. Ideally, the intensity spent on regular activities is not expected to be reduced while 
the donor undertakes oöcyte extraction. Most participants perceive that to undertake the 
process will dispossess the donor of time usually spent on her “ordinary life” and thus do not 
wish to accommodate oöcyte provision because they are already busy.  
 
Grace: it’s also, like, when in my life could I do this?  Even for the money, I mean, 
when I’ve just got out of uni, maybe, when I get into a job.  Once you have a job, once 
you have family commitments, who can just really take eight weeks out of your 
life?...It’s just a big commitment, and I’m not sure who has that space in their life for 
that commitment.  Like I said, maybe when I’ve just finished uni, before I got into a 
set job, I would probably have that much time for that commitment, but that’s about it. 
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Then again, it’s probably when I’d most want to do it, because I’d have that damn 
HECS65 debt! (laughs). 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Interviewer (KC): And would you undergo an oöcyte collection cycle purely for 
donating oöcytes for research?  
Sarah: No not now, no…Now that I’ve got two children; well, one on the way... You 
know, it’s such a difficult thing to manage. For eight weeks you have to be regimented 
that at twelve-hourly intervals you’re doing a medication thing. And it extremely 
affects your mood: you can’t work and manage the drugs and manage a family life and 
all the balance…it’s a very difficult thing to do… [Research oöcyte provision] would 
mean a commitment from women to actually go in and purposely go through the 
treatment [stimulation] to donate. And I’m not prepared to do that. Because one, I 
don’t have the time. Two, it’s very traumatic rationally. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Jenny: A couple of times we were away and I had to kind of take it [medications] all 
with me and do it wherever I was, so I guess yeah, just trying to stick to the routine 
with all the other demands of children and so on was a bit challenging.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Julia: Yeah, it is kind of offputting.  Like, I didn’t know anything about the process, 
how intense it is.  It is kind of offputting.  It’s not like, “Hey, have my eggs,” it’s 
actually six weeks of what could potentially be awful. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Participants in our study suggest that oöcyte extraction requires a high level of effort that 
displaces other features of “normal” non-donor life because it reorders their life around the 
specific moments of ovarian stimulation. This indicates that potential donors assess the 
“social side effects” of the medical regime in addition to the physical ones. Combined, these 
                                                
65 HECS stands for Higher Education Contribution Scheme, introduced by the Australian federal government in 
1989. Students were charged tuition fees for tertiary education but were able to defer repayment until their 
salaries reached a minimum amount. 
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effects render the process of extraction as something akin to a job to which allows little 
flexibility to engage with other activities. However, as will be discussed below, the social 
and physical discipline does not equate to employment.  
 
The discussion of accommodating oöcyte extraction into the individual’s life is an infrequent 
subject of discussion in the literature (Kazem et al. 1995; Byrd, Sidebotham and Lieberman 
2002; Purewal & van den Akker 2009; Klitzman and Sauer 2009; Haimes, Taylor and 
Turkmendag 2012). Yet such an analysis is important in providing a more nuanced 
understanding regarding the dearth of oöcytes for research purposes. This discussion goes 
beyond reports that many women are likely to decline giving oöcytes once they have been 
informed of the procedure (Murray and Golombok 2000) by showing that the decision to 
decline to give oöcytes is based on how it affects the individual’s day-to-day life and long 
term future. 
 
Self-exclusion and hierarchies of emotional effort 
 
Participants irrespective of cohort, regarded the temporal demands required for oöcyte 
extraction to be extraordinary: that they exist outside ordinary life and for this are unlikely to 
be accommodated. In contrast, constructions of the emotional dimensions of oocyte 
extraction are more flexibly and dependent on the participant’s experience. Here it is 
necessary to point out that these constructions involve projecting certain characteristics onto 
groups to which one does not belong. For example, participants in cohort one considered 
oöcyte extraction as emotionally demanding and especially emphasise the emotional aspects 
of producing oöcytes in the context of trying to become pregnant.66 Participants in cohort 
one characterised the extraction of oöcytes, the result of weeks of medication, bloods tests 
and ultrasounds, as a moment of intense pressure because the number of oöcytes retrieved 
for that time is finite; the only way to get more oöcytes is to undergo another round of 
medication and surgery. The removal of oöcytes is always coupled with the outcome – 
having or not having a child.  
 
Lisa: for us, [patients] it’s a case of “Do we or don’t we get a child at the end of it?” 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
                                                
66 I am specifically referring to ovarian stimulation and oöcyte removal. 
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Interviewer (KC): And what do you think are the main aspects you’d want 
communicated to this young group of women about becoming an oöcyte donor?  
Dominique: The emotional aspect of it, definitely. It’s very up and down, and because 
the drugs escalate that as well…I guess if you’re just going through the process of 
giving your oöcytes up at oöcyte collection, then you don’t then have the – are they 
going to fertilise? Am I pregnant? So you don’t have all that which, certainly for me, 
was the worst part of it. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
In the context of fertility treatment, oocyte extraction is always a means to an end, not an end 
in itself. Within this context, oöcyte extraction is a symbolically potent signal of the patient’s 
fertility and the subsequent course of her treatment. The high emotional cost of the process is 
endured because it is a step to achieving one’s intention to become a mother. Outside the 
context of one’s own fertility treatment, oocyte extraction becomes an end in itself. Without 
the goal of getting pregnant, the emotional aspects become ‘traumatic’ and are thus used by 
respondents as a basis for refusing to give oocytes outside of fertility treatment. These 
responses diverge from studies which found that “less-fertile” women were more likely than 
fertile ones to provide their oöcytes for research (Kazem et al. 1995; Purewal and van den 
Akker’s 2009).67 
 
Participants in cohort one contextualise their experience of oöcyte provision within the 
precarious and unpredictable journey of trying to become pregnant and construct it as 
emotionally traumatic. Yet, the same participants often represent undertaking oöcyte 
extraction for SCNT research as lacking any of this intensity or meaning. Indeed, the 
“healthy donor” is presented as ideal for their social characteristics as much as their 
biological ones. An important dimension to this construction is that oöcyte providers to 
SCNT research are represented as undertaking the process in a perfunctory manner, devoid 
of emotional attachment or impact on the individual, precisely because she is assumed to 
have less at stake.  
 
                                                
67 It is not clear whether the women in these studies were more likely to give their unviable oöcytes and to what 
degree the timing of the donation mattered. 
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Mira: if…you’re doing it purely for research…they might think, "Oh, this is easy!” 
because they’ve got no emotional strings attached to it, whereas if I go through oöcyte 
retrieval, there’s a lot of emotion and, you know, feeling towards it”. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
  
Sarah: it’s not that overwhelming, it’s just more when you’re in a position where this 
is the be-all and end-all: to have your child, then it’s completely consuming.  If you’re 
going in for a totally different purpose, then you’re trying to assist others. It’s a totally 
different approach.   
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Participants in other cohorts share perceptions that research and reproductive oöcyte 
provision are different. These differences relate to the donor’s motivation and relational 
outcomes and expectations – to whom they will provide their oöcytes, its result and whether 
they will consider undertaking the process with or without payment. In contrast to the 
assumptions made by participants in cohort one, participants in cohorts two and three do not 
think that oöcyte provision for SCNT research can be undertaken in a detached way simply 
because one’s immediate fertility future is not at stake. It is, however, a process that does not 
attach them to other people in the immediate or long-term future. As the responses quoted 
below indicate giving oöcytes to SCNT research is different than its reproductive counterpart 
precisely because it does not create a new relational figure (a child) and it is acknowledged 
as a temporally delimited process, that is, it has a beginning, middle and an end. If the 
individual is willing to accommodate oöcyte provision, it is only for the duration of physical 
process rather than indefinitely, as is potentially the case in reproductive oöcyte provision, 
where children born from donor gametes may seek to contact that person once they turn 18 
years old. 
 
Julia: I’d probably feel differently about donating oöcytes for research as opposed to 
donating oöcytes for reproduction. Strangely enough, I think I’d feel happy about 
donating oöcytes for research rather than for reproduction, because I just personally 
don’t want to have a half-child out there and not know them. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
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Mathilde: Well, just the same reason – if it’s to reproduce, then it has the potential that 
it might have my kid somewhere on earth, and just that feeling might disturb me. But 
research – nothing’s going to happen at the end.  It’s just for the sake of science.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Reciprocity and oöcyte provision for SCNT research: unresolved tensions 
 
Differences between reproductive and research provision are also evident in the expectations 
for reciprocity. At first glance, scientific oöcyte provision appears to lend itself to a 
commercial transaction in contrast to giving oöcytes for reproductive purposes which 
participants insist should prelude monetary payment (this will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter seven). These views are rationalised in two broad ways; on the one hand, some 
participants argued that oöcyte provision to research is analogous to other forms of 
participation and contribution in scientific research such as clinical trials or surveys that, in 
the popular imagination, are usually based on commercial transactions. On the other hand, 
participants situated the expectation for reciprocity within the broader structural context in 
which scientific research is conducted. Without some form of net benefit, the individual is 
potentially being exploited for their generosity if companies will stand to benefit enormously 
from provided tissue. It is noteworthy that participants, quoted below, could not precisely 
articulate the basis of this difference but suggested that these invisible boundaries should not 
be breached. 
 
Rose: I don’t like the idea of payment for oöcytes for reproductive or other, 
really...especially reproductive. I don’t know why it’s different, but it feels different!  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Lisa: You know what? For some reason, I don’t really have a problem with people 
being paid by a research company to donate it [oöcytes] to research. I really don’t have 
a problem with that. I have a problem with it being to donate for reproductive 
purposes…because I mean now we pay people…doing weird study like injecting 
themselves with things…I can’t articulate why [I have a problem with payment for 
reproductive oöcyte provision]. 
 (Undergoing fertility treatment) 
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Donna: for stem cell research...I'd probably feel better about it if I got some form of 
compensation...when I donate to a couple it's the great joy that what's going to happen 
but for research I definitely think I wouldn't say no to it.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Grace: Yes. I have less of an issue with [payment for] research than for reproduction. I 
actually don’t know why! (laughs) I just do! Like, for research, it seems more like they 
should pay me for it, because you pay when you do research. You pay for things.  You 
pay for materials, you pay study subjects to do focus groups with you...! (laughs) So it 
just seems more fitting for there to be payment for research than it does for there to be 
payment for [reproduction]. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Raphaelle: Yeah, sort of or more from a line of, what you’re giving for free is 
contributing to their research which is going to make them a few billion dollars, so it’s 
kind of unethical for them to not, not even compensate‚ but not provide an equitable 
exchange.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The responses are similar to the results from Klitzman and Sauer’s (2009) survey of women, 
who overwhelmingly considered that research and reproductive oöcyte provision should be 
“compensated” with the same amount of money (US$8000). However, the degree to which 
these two studies may corroborate the other’s evidence is limited. Participants in Klitzman 
and Sauer’s study undertook the process in the US where reproductive oöcyte provision 
regularly occurs within a payment system. This institutional framework has significant 
repercussions for which is presumed “normal”.  
 
Despite the fact that the procedure is the same for reproductive and research oöcyte 
provision, the perception remained that they are distinct undertakings. No participant 
expressed the idea that they would give their fertile oöcytes to research without some form 
of reciprocity. In part, the responses from our study suggest that individuals do not perceive 
contributing to scientific research as rewarding in-itself. Moreover, the original claim that 
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reciprocity is more appropriate for oöcyte provision for research than for reproduction 
becomes on closer inspection a more fragile sentiment. In its own right, the introduction of 
payment produces anxiety not about the appropriateness of receiving money but rather being 
primarily motivated by it. If money is to be included in the relationship between individual 
donor and recipient, it should be peripheral rather than central to it.  
 
Interviewer (K.C.): And what do you think the right reasons [to provide oöcytes for 
SCNT research] are? 
Denise: To help someone else, whether it be for reproduction or research, you should 
be doing this, not because you’re going to profit from it.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Alicia: Because if you’re genuinely willing to do it, and go, “I get paid so that’s a 
bonus well that’s great, but I think if you offered to pay someone for donating their 
oöcytes, it would just get into too much of a risky business. People would be donating 
not because they wanted to, for the research, but because they need the money, and I 
don’t think that’s a good reason. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The responses from our participants reveal visceral reactions that are rather nebulous and 
they do not provide a rational basis for such responses. Instead the responses may point to 
norms about receiving money in exchange for a "gift" no matter how onerous the process for 
the donor.  
 
Yvette: For me, I wouldn’t want, I wouldn’t want to be paid for it, because I would 
feel uneasy about that, but I don’t know how I would feel about it being legal for 
people to be paid, or if people were paid for it.  I just know, myself, I would want to do 
it because I’d feel that that’s a good thing to do.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Mona: It’s a really difficult decision, because it kind of takes...I feel it takes a bit out 
of the whole donating and giving and stuff, if you’re expecting to be paid for your 
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services, then it’s just another...I don’t know.  I think I’d have a lot of issues.  If I’m 
getting reimbursed so I’m not losing anything other than the oöcyte that I’m donating.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Delia: Yeah. I have the same feeling with the money.  Like, I don’t know why, 
because you think, “OK, I’m providing them with something they need; why shouldn’t 
I get paid?” but when you introduce money into it, in some way it almost taints it, and 
I don’t know why that is. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The data depart from Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) views in particular on the vendors of human 
tissue such as blood. Participants do not necessarily regard oöcytes vendors as morally 
dubious characters although these claims too are contentious. Many participants in cohort 
one rejected the possibility that they would accept money or discounted fertility treatment 
but often expressed the view that women who fit the “healthy donor” category are ideal 
‘donors’ for social as well as medical reasons. That the “healthy donor” is invariably young 
and youth often involves the often-irresponsible pursuit of material possessions and/or 
money, the ‘healthy donor’ became a convenient counterpoint to the experiences and choices 
of the fertility patient. As indicated from the discussion regarding the emotional dimensions 
of oocyte extraction, the figure of the young woman is often constructed in opposition to the 
fertility patient. Young women have plenty of eggs to offer, their fertility is robust and if not 
infinite then as close as possible to it.  
 
In some contexts of tissue provision, the connection between moral identity and providing 
blood for money continues to be a concern and means of hierarchically organising “donors”. 
In her study of Australians’ attitudes towards blood donors Valentine (2005, 118) found that 
blood donors are perceived as actually doing something everyone has the capacity to do but 
often refrain from doing; as such they are “discussed…in language invoking moral 
superiority [and] are seen as more caring, compassionate, and generous than non-donors”. 
This perception is contrasted with that of potential vendors of blood and the question of 
whether payment for blood should be introduced in Australia. Participants in Valentine’s 
study assumed that if blood was saleable, socio-economic hardship and drug addiction would 
be the primary motivators of vendors. Participants constructed paid blood providers as 
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dangerous to recipients and “the moral valuing of the donor as a compassionate and more 
generous citizen than normal is reversed in assessments of the potential paid donor…because 
they may indulge in riskier practices [and be] willing to expose other people to harm” 
(Valentine 2005, 123).  
 
Compensating ‘healthy’ donors 
 
The process of establishing a financial equivalent for oöcytes in the context of SCNT 
research is further complicated by the concept of compensation. The term compensation was 
discussed by participants in all cohorts and referred as a separate option to paying women in 
an unregulated market. It was made clear to participants that compensation involved the 
provision of oöcytes for money but they determined its precise amount. For some 
participants, the difference between ‘payment’ and ‘compensation’ can be a simple question 
regarding the sum of money that constitutes both categories.  
 
Interviewer (M.B): Does anyone want to talk about a number or does anyone want to 
talk about the idea of compensation versus payment? 
Julia: I think five grand would be compensation and ten grand would be payment! 
That’s what comes to me. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Compensation was overwhelmingly considered an appropriate form of recognition and 
reciprocity for oöcyte providers to SCNT research with these responses indicating an interest 
in distinguishing between “payment” and “compensation”. Participants expect recognition 
for their effort through compensation and that is likely to be monetary. It also shows that 
donors make careful evaluations about the research to which they may contribute and assess 
recipients on the basis of whether they can deliver on therapeutic promises. 
 
Naomi: I like the compensation model.  I’m not really comfortable with the idea of 
paying for oöcytes, but if someone was really desperate for oöcytes for some kind of 
disease in particular, then I would be comfortable with paying women. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
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Giselle: Yeah. You should be compensated, because obviously you’re going out of 
your way, and there’s other things...you don’t want to be, like, at a loss in terms of 
emotional impact as well as financial and whatever other impacts come into it, but 
yeah, payment is anything above that, kind of thing. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Rose: I agree, even though I was the one who brought up the “I want to be paid for it!” 
Like, I wasn’t thinking exorbitant amounts of cash.  I was thinking more something 
along the lines of something that was more fitting with what you’d taken out of your 
time and everything to do, I guess. Like, ten thousand dollars sounds ridiculous to 
me…I was thinking a few hundred.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
So far, analogies to work convey the idea that the data corresponds closely to arguments 
made Waldby and Cooper (2008) and Dickenson (2006) that the process of oöcyte extraction 
is a form of production in an economic sense because it requires an embodied effort as well 
as extensive self-management. However, wider acceptance of a compensation model may 
indicate that strict analogies between work, effort and labour are too rigid. For instance, if 
these participants know that individuals are ‘paid’ for labour and not ‘compensated’, then 
rejecting ‘payment’ makes little sense. This also implies that participants do not want to 
maximise the profit that may be gained by undertaking oöcyte extraction for SCNT research. 
It suggests, on the one hand, that oöcyte extraction is laborious and the discipline needed to 
undertake it should not belittled but on the other hand, it is imprecise to categorise the 
process as ‘labour’ which should be treated as a regular commercial transaction where labour 
and products would be sold. This indicates that while participants do expect some monetary 
reward, they do not want to be ‘paid’ for their contributions. 
 
Views of stem cell research 
 
So far in my discussion of the meanings of reproductive tissues within the framework of 
“kin ethics”, I have already indicated that participants are most likely to give their oöcytes to 
SCNT research once fertilisation decides the oöcyte’s reproductive potential. The discussion 
focused on the tissue’s biological properties and the process of extraction as important 
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factors in their provision to stem cell research. I also examined the ambiguities of 
establishing a monetary equivalent for oöcytes given the context of commercialised 
scientific research. This analysis does not tell the entire story regarding the scientific 
utilisation of reproductive tissues because the issue gets reduced to a biological matter. 
Giving or not giving away one’s oöcytes is essentially a relational issue which in the case of 
donating oöcytes to SCNT research, women become involved in a relationship between 
science, researchers, companies, contemporary patients and future generations. In order to 
understand the circumstances in which women can give even their “good eggs” away, I will 
turn address views related to scientific research, values and disclosure. 
 
As discussed in chapter four, literature pertaining to the public understanding of science or 
utilisation of human tissues demonstrates that people do not always explain the world with 
scientific meanings or consider the production of scientific knowledge as a “public good” 
which can benefit everyone in the community (Lock 2001; Irwin and Michael 2003; Reddy 
2007). The HGDP is but one example of scientific controversy involving incompatibility of 
world views regarding scientific research. It is sociologically important because it galvanised 
an opposition to scientific research that could not be ignored or dismissed for its religious 
conservatism or Ludditism and provoked questions regarding the “politics” of science.  
 
In the public debates regarding the development of stem cell research, opposition 
predominantly concerned the utilisation of embryos. Within scholarly literature, particularly 
from feminist-oriented perspectives concerns were focused on the lack of comment 
regarding the supply of reproductive tissues needed for the research (Dickenson 2006). As I 
argued in chapter four, views regarding the provision of oöcytes to stem cell research tend to 
be based on underlying assumptions about the “public benefit” of scientific knowledge and 
applications. The regulatory environment based on informed consent cleanses different 
views regarding stem cell research by facilitating the decisions to be made on an individual 
level.   
 
Further discussion of participants’ attitudes towards providing their oöcytes to SCNT 
research must be examined in relation to their vies regarding the research generally. Here we 
can develop a deeper understanding of their views, moving away from biological factors. 
Stem cell research figured quite positively in the participants’ imaginations. Participants 
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generally approved of scientific research and occasionally situated it within a nationalistic 
discourse regarding Australia’s capacities and standing in a global order.  
 
Interviewer (K. C.): And do you have any professional, spiritual or religious views 
that influence your attitude to stem cell research? 
Paola: I am Christian. I believe God put us all here for a reason. And whether that 
reason is to do the stem cell research and to find cures, or to be part of that by donating 
your eggs to stem cell research...We’ve got some of the best scientific models in the 
world in Australia.  I don’t see why we can’t be leaders in the world in this.   
(Reproductive Oöcyte Donor) 
 
Raja: Yeah. If we’ve got the funds, yeah. Why not? I think the more countries that are 
involved with it, and the different researchers, the better the outcomes are going to be, 
and maybe we’ll find things faster that we can do. The more countries, the better. 
(Reproductive Oöcyte Donor) 
 
Raphaelle: I would probably wait till after I’d had my own children to do it, because 
of any risks involved for me personally. I wouldn’t want to risk my own ability to have 
children by doing it.  But I would have no problem donating my eggs for stem cell 
research. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The conduct of stem cell research was an important issue for Australian identity. 
Nationalistic under- or overtones are commonly attached to scientific research. Governments 
fund scientific research through competitive grants or secure funding in national interests 
such as The Manhattan Project which developed the atomic bomb in the 1940s. As discussed 
in chapter four, South Korean authorities fostered an economic and social environment 
which encouraged stem cell research as a key factor in the country’s modernisation platform 
(Hong 2008; Kim 2008).  
 
Interviewer (K. C.): Do you think Australia should be involved in stem cell research? 
Joanna: Definitely.  Definitely.  Definitely.  I think any western country should, 
especially now America’s involved! (laughs) 
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(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Francesca: Australia is a western country. We’re one of the countries that is fortunate 
to have what we have and we have in the past been successful with research and been 
the first country to discover other things, so why not? We could be the first country 
that’s successful with stem cell research, and that would be fantastic! 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Out of all participants, irrespective of cohort, two participants expressed skeptical or 
oppositional views regarding stem cell research. The first reveals an ambiguous view of 
biomedical science, drawing on the participant’s own life-preserving use of medication 
while simultaneously suggesting that ensuing healthcare benefits accruing from research will 
be reactive rather than preventative. The view is based on the difference between the 
lifestyle choices made by individuals rather than conditions which are derived from genetic 
or habitual factors. The use of morally contested tissues such as embryos was a significant 
issue for one participant, Kali, who situated embryos within the “life-ethics” framework and 
objected to stem cell research on the grounds that it destroyed embryos.  
 
Melissa: I just think it’s a shame that the whole medical research framework is looking 
at intervention at the other end of the spectrum. I can’t be black and white with that. 
I’m very grateful that they invented Oroxine, because that keeps me alive in terms of 
my thyroid not producing the hormones that it should be producing… I think it’s easy 
to put science on a pedestal and say, “Isn’t this amazing! We should be doing all these 
wonderful things because we can get some cures for some horrible things, and I’m 
very grateful that my children haven’t got any horrible genetic conditions, so I can be a 
bit more purist in my thinking,” but yeah, it just comes back to thinking, well, I’m 
doing things now – hopefully preventative – that will lessen the chance of my kids 
getting Type 1 diabetes or other things which are increasing in Australia…And as I 
said before, I just worry that there’s not a lot done in terms of preventative health. I 
look at my own family and friends, and thinking, well, the choices that you’re making 
with lifestyle aren’t good for you, you’re likely to end up with heart disease and other 
things, but that’s a choice that they’ve made, so why should we be doing all this other 
stuff with...and I know for some people there isn’t any choice, and horrible things 
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happen in terms of spinal cord trauma and genetically being predisposed to things...it’s 
terrible, and I don’t want to say that’s not terrible for them, but it’s just at what cost 
does a cure come, and is that OK? 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Kali: I thought about when I was thinking about whether I would – not so much 
“donate”, but whether I had issues with [stem cell research]. But…I came to the view 
that their life with whatever condition they had was the same value as that embryo, and 
so I wasn’t going to mess with that. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
The small amount of variety in responses indicate that while there are dissenting views 
regarding the conduct of scientific research as a “good” in and of itself, the consensus 
reflects a commitment to scientific research as a value and an essential way of organising 
explanations about human life and society in contrast to custom or religion (Irwin and 
Michael 2003; Harvey 2007). These views also concur with research by Allen and 
McNamara (2009) regarding the level of trust Australians invest in scientific institutions as 
being relatively high, particularly in comparison with the UK where trust in scientific 
authorities has dropped to “critically” low levels. 
 
The decided unwillingness to donate “good eggs” to stem cell research suggests a specific 
orientation towards scientific research. It indicates that there is a significant difference in 
declaring support for scientific research and actually contributing to its development. This is 
evident in the fact that many participants expressed strong interest and support in the nature 
of the stem cell research, whilst also insisting that they be given the opportunity to evaluate 
the research to which they would be expected to contribute. Participants expected their 
personal values coincide with the merits of the research which would be communicated 
directly to them. Although supportive of scientific research, scientists may not automatically 
lay claim to an individual’s oöcytes but must actively convince them of the meritorious 
nature.  
 
Raphaelle: If I was going to do it I'd want to know specifically what research my eggs 
were contributing to. I wouldn't just go, "alright, you need this? That's cool, do your 
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science". I'd want to know exactly what they were doing with [it], what the research is, 
what level they're at with it, what stage they're at with it...so I'd want to know exactly 
what it was going to do before. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Grace: Part of the question is: should you be made aware of it?  And I think we 
should, because it would play a part in the decision, as far as I’m concerned. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
As indicated by the quotes above, the process of informed consent was considered the 
mechanism through which problematic structural issues pertaining to the outcome of and 
funding of research could be assessed by potential participants and resolved according to 
their personal values. In this way, the imperfect marriage between commerce and science 
can be mitigated at an individual level. Participants across all cohorts expressed confidence 
that the full disclosure by researchers was an effective means of ethical oversight because 
the individual could decide to proceed with her contribution based on the information.  
 
Cara: I think all you need‚ my opinion, if it’s informed consent, then wherever you 
come from‚ I mean, there may be undue influence in this case, but I think that 
informed consent is the only bar to anything.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Sketches of an affective framework  
 
Participants in the healthy donor cohort show a distinct preference for a specified beneficiary 
or benefit. The small number of healthy donors in cohort 3b suggested that although they 
could identify a specified beneficiary, there was currently no specified benefit. This may 
indicate that like reproductive oöcyte donors, these respondents are keen to find worthy 
recipients and they do so mainly through their existing social relationships; namely, family 
(blood or marriage) or friends. Healthy donors feel that the risk oöcyte extraction poses to 
their reproductive hopes and/or health could be “worth it” if it is undertaken for a specified 
benefit or beneficiary:  
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Olive: I think it would have to be a very good cause, though. So, say – I don’t know, if 
I knew someone, or if my partner had a spinal injury, and the possibility of me 
donating my oöcytes after I’d had children would possibly find a cure for him, then 
yes, of course I’d do it, but it has to be a very good cause or a very personal cause, as 
opposed to just any old research. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
In addition to this, women in this study showed an inclination to give oöcytes for research in 
ways that actually resembles current forms of blood provision or organ transplant, in that it 
should have an immediate therapeutic benefit. These responses express a disinclination to 
follow the model currently in place for oöcyte provision to SCNT research in the Global 
North, in which the main objective is for scientists to do research and accumulate knowledge 
before creating therapeutic applications. While respondents do not dismiss the merit of 
research, they suggest that this is not a sufficient reason in itself to undergo the process of 
oöcyte extraction. Participants in the healthy donor cohort, quoted below, perceive donation 
as the opportunity to actualise their values by contributing to scientific research with which 
they agree.  
 
Giselle: Also, at this stage, it’s kind of like you need oöcytes to do the research, but 
it’s not particularly specific in terms of what they need them for… So it’s kind of like 
– it’s not justified as well as I would like it to be, to go through all of that for it. And 
obviously if you knew someone…if there’s a personal element to it, it would colour 
how you thought of doing it. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Kali: Well, if it got to the stage where stem cell research – like, it was actually having 
a really practical, positive and tangible impact on people, then it would kind of be at 
the level of donating blood.  If you go and donate blood, you don’t really need – no-
one really asks, “Where’s my blood going?” and stuff like that, because they know it’s 
working. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
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Julia: If it [therapeutic application] wasn’t imminent, then I would have my children, 
then I would donate.  If it was (sic) imminent, I would consider donating and then 
having children, yeah. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Yvette: I think I would be a lot less hesitant if the research was closer to being, “Yes, 
this is working,” that sort of thing yeah I think it would be important. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Alicia: Well, it’s research as opposed to actual medical application. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
These findings may diverge to those produced in Purewal and van den Akker’s (2010) study 
of participants who completed online questionnaires (n= 253), targeting women with an 
interest in reproductive health who were referred via internet search engines and 
reproductive health websites. The results indicated that approximately 38% of the sample 
would donate in the future and within in this group, “70% would consider donating their 
oocytes to find a cure for illnesses and diseases, 72% would donate to research trying to 
improve fertility treatment” (2010: 1084). 
 
As discussed in chapter three, scientific research has been increasingly subject to 
commercial principles relating to profitability and scholars such as Waldby and Mitchell 
(2006) and Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) argue that this has important consequences for 
the structure of the relationship between the provider of oöcytes and the recipients of 
researchers. Tissue providers are obstructed from economically benefiting from their tissues 
despite the fact that companies are increasingly able to reap their own economic rewards. 
While the public’s perception of this is little understood, one recent study examined public 
perceptions of the commercialisation of research specifically related to HESCR and 
therapeutic cloning (Chritchley and Nicol 2011). The survey was undertaken as part of the 
annual Swinburne [University] National Technology and Society Monitor and was generated 
from a representative sample of the Australian population (n=1000). The research found that 
“Australian respondents were particularly uncomfortable with research being undertaken in 
private companies” (2011, 361), showing that the broader structural organisation of research 
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is an issue of concern for the public. This study did not ask whether participating in such 
studies would be conditional on the funding source or if they argree whether universities or 
research companies could claim exclusive property rights to the materials they created.  
 
In contrast to the respondents in Critchley and Nicol’s (2011) study, our participants do not 
hold uncompromising assumptions about the nature of scientific research in contemporary 
society. The commercialisation of scientific research is not considered a significant factor in 
deciding to whom a donor may potentially give her oöcytes. Indeed, participants perceive 
companies, compared to non-profit outfits, to be better situated to make the best of the 
resource because they have the means to do so. This may suggest that the obligation of the 
recipient (in this case, the company) seems to centre on the capacity to transform the gift into 
something else. The gift may be wasted if idealistic considerations, such as a principled 
stance against commercialised research, rather than pragmatic ones are prioritised. It is better 
to transform the gift into a practical application (participants, irrespective of cohort, did not 
doubt that the research would advance to therapeutic applications) than let it be potentially 
wasted because the recipient is deemed to be more virtuous in principle. Participants make 
distinctions between those who can or cannot realise the aims of research and the 
benefactors of the research in the long-term.  
 
Cara: But how does...wouldn’t you think that if you’re going to donate it, let’s give it 
to the best chance, therefore go for a profit organisation?  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Mona: I personally wouldn’t feel like I was doing a bad thing by doing that.  Like, I’m 
still helping some people, and yes, it is the privileged few who could afford it, but if it 
came down to that or nothing, and not donating, then I’d still donate. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Erica: Because my opinion would be, you know...obviously, having informed consent 
and knowing that it is going to a profiting company, then that is very important, but 
whether that will affect my decision on whether I want to donate oöcytes or not, I 
don’t think it will, just because, like, as you [Cara] were saying, it’s still going to a 
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good cause, it’s still helping to develop technology, possibly at a faster rate in 
comparison to non-profit organisations, where they’ve always had issues with funding.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Umeko: I agree with that, because I personally feel that even if it is a profit 
organisation, if there’s the chance that it’s going to go out to more people, and it’s 
going to help more people, than that, ethically, appeals to me more. 
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
Overall, participants show a preference for giving to worthy recipients. In the context of 
oöcyte provision to SCNT research, companies are worthier recipients compared with non-
profit organisations because they are most capable of transforming the gift. Participants in 
the healthy donor cohort perceive that companies are likely to translate experimental 
research into clinical benefits more quickly. This may be considered the fulfilment of the 
obligation to reciprocate the initial gift of oöcytes and may not necessarily mean that such 
companies are obliged to share the benefits with countless others. The point is to transform 
the oöcytes and research into something of value. What is evident here is the implicit 
assumption that companies have the obligation to make sure the aims of the research are 
realised. 
 
These results suggest that donors make careful evaluations about the research to which they 
may contribute and assess recipients on the basis of whether they can deliver on therapeutic 
promises. In the context of oöcyte provision to SCNT research, relationships between the 
donor, recipient and reward – economic or otherwise – are more complex and ambiguous 
than they first suggest. Initially, participants perceive that they may navigate the process of 
oöcyte provision for SCNT research with relatively more ease than its reproductive 
counterpart because it does not result in a new being with whom the individual may have a 
relationship. This is a sentiment that was particularly appealing to participants in the healthy 
donor cohort. However, this negation ultimately undermines the development of a concrete 
motivation to give oöcytes to SCNT research in the here and now. Close inspection of the 
data shows that the reasons to contribute resemble the desire expressed by reproductive 
oöcyte donors in this study; that is, to do so in contexts of a specified beneficiary or benefit 
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for non-reproductive benefit. In both contexts, the participants express the desire to be clear 
about what the ‘gift’ will achieve.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the way women utilise their oöcytes relates to their 
intentions to become a mother. This has included an analysis of how participants construct 
oöcyte provision to SCNT research.  
 
The following results were discussed: 
1. Oöcytes are important for their functional utility and there is a significant difference 
between fertile and infertile oöcytes. Participants, particularly in cohort one, perceive that 
the latter can be given to SCNT research because they are not required to become 
mothers.  
2. The majority of participants seek to ‘efficiently’ manage their oöcytes in quantitative 
terms because their qualitative dimension–their fertility–is unknowable until fertilisation 
is attempted.  
3. Most participants construed oöcyte extraction as an onerous process that required the 
donor to sacrifice much of her time and identity (including work and social life). 
Participants in the fertility patient cohort imagined that the process undertaken for 
research would be devoid of the emotional labour they experience themselves;  
4. Participants may ‘risk’ their reproductive future for a specified beneficiary or benefit; 
5. If asked to consider donating to research, participants expect to evaluate the merits of the 
research of their own accord and contend that informed consent is a mechanism through 
which the individual’s personal values and the efficacy of the research can be negotiated; 
6. Participants in all cohorts expect some form of economic benefit as reciprocity and prefer 
‘compensation’ rather than ‘payment’ for this; 
7. (In the cohort one) imagined oöcyte sharing similar to that instituted in the NESR, to be 
highly exploitative 
8. Participants, irrespective of cohort, did not suggest that if women were asked to provide 
oocytes in exchange for monetary payment were morally corrupt or put others in danger.  
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By comparing oocytes and embryos, this analysis demonstrated that there is a specific logic 
to whether participants are likely to provide their reproductive tissues to research. I used 
Roberts’s (2007) framework as an important reference for understanding the broad 
categories in which reproductive tissues are placed. Oöcytes and embryos are both 
reproductive tissues but the symbolic regime in which oöcytes exist emphasise their 
functional value more than their status as children as is the case with embryos. My analysis 
built on this framework to demonstrate that the biological properties and social meanings of 
tissues cannot be easily separated. This is why I emphasised that in order to understand why 
women keep their “good eggs”, it is necessary to discuss their responses in light of their 
aspirations for motherhood. I did not neglect the biological properties of the tissue and 
technological mechanisms used to achieve social identity. Thus, one factor was the 
improbability of clinicians (and by extension patients) being able to definitively predict 
which oocyte would fertilise. Another factor discussed was the potential to freeze and 
subsequently thaw oocytes and embryos for use at a later date. An implication of this 
comparative analysis is that we can shift from assuming that the same tissue can be given 
away in the same process and for the same reasons.  
 
The results do not just shed light on the biological/technological differences between tissues 
or the ethical categories in which they can be placed; they also highlight broader social 
aspects of oocyte provision with reference to science. This is evident in the discussion of 
participants’ views regarding stem cell research. It was noted that there was a small variation 
in views regarding stem cell research with only a minority of participants across all cohorts 
expressing “negative” views about the research and/or its use of embryos. Therefore, I make 
my contribution by pointing out that the disinclination to provide oocytes to SCNT research 
must be understood with reference to the ‘paradox’ that the majority of participants 
supported stem cell research but excluded their own ‘good eggs’ from such use. By 
sketching an affective framework, we can begin to better understand those circumstances in 
which participants would give their oocytes to SCNT research. This was evident in the clear 
preference to provide their oöcytes for a specified benefit or beneficiary rather than the 
abstract accumulation of scientific knowledge.  
 
These results indicate the different expectations that shape decisions about providing oöcytes 
to research. It is clear that participants’ preferences cannot be easily accommodated within 
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the paradigm of the rational donor discussed in chapter four because no participant indicated 
that they would accept money in exchange for their oocytes. The rational donor model which 
relies on an exchange of money for tissue neglects to acknowledge the different personal 
investments in the conduct of scientific research. Ironically, while remaining sceptical of the 
public good of science, these rationalisations effectively flatten the social terrain and insist 
that there should be one form of tissue provision (the disinterested donor).  
 
It is clear that most participants privilege the reproductive utilisation of their oöcytes despite 
the fact that most are supportive of scientific research. However, the decisions of oöcyte 
donors in this study complicates simple connections between this utilisation and the 
reproductive future they are expected to create. In the next chapter, I will examine more 
empirical data to understand how oöcyte donors in our study undertook the donation process. 
Reproductive oöcyte donors maintain the reproductive utilisation of their oöcytes while 
disconnecting the tissue from their own intentions to become a mother. Despite this, they 
continue to privilege the reproductive utilisation of oöcytes. I will also discuss views 
regarding the provision of embryos to research. I examine these different responses and 
suggest that their commonality is based on an affective framework – the identification of a 
specific benefit or beneficiary. This element is precisely what is absent from oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research.  
 
 
145 
Chapter Seven: Giving Reproductive Tissues Within 
Affective Frameworks  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter six addressed data related to the meanings and preferred utilisations of oöcytes. I 
have claimed that participants categorise their oöcytes in predominantly functional ways and 
decisions about their use are made in relation to their reproductive capacity. Oöcytes are a 
means to an end and once they can no longer fulfil their reproductive potential, they are 
considered appropriate material for SCNT research. However, these findings do not entirely 
represent the complexity of the dataset and it is now necessary to explore contexts where 
reproductive tissues are given away. This refers to the cohort of oöcyte donors who do give 
away such “precious” tissues. In this chapter I examine the narratives of oöcyte donors and 
argue that oöcytes are given away in contexts where a specific benefit has been identified. 
The following analysis demonstrates that the recipient is an important figure in the decision 
to donate. Indeed, I claim that donor’s decisions reflect a mixture of altruistic and 
instrumental concerns; donors do not expect reciprocity but they select their recipients on the 
basis that they are “good” parents. This challenges the idea that gift giving in known 
contexts inevitably leads to cycles of reciprocity. Subsequently, I consider responses related 
to embryo provision for research and reproductive purposes. I show that embryos are given 
without the identification of a specified benefit or beneficiary. Whether embryos are given 
for research or reproductive purposes, the recipient is generalised and abstract. Embryo 
donors assume that the recipient’s needs are important without personally identifying them. I 
suggest that this relationship is built on the donor’s own fertility treatment, an experience 
that provides membership into a community of other fertility patients (in the past, present 
and future) from whom the donor feels they have received benefit.  
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Reproductive oöcyte provision: an overview 
 
Reproductive oöcyte donation remains a marginal practice in Australia and New Zealand, 
accounting for 5% of all treatment cycles (Wang et al. 2011). In Australia, the practice 
occurs on the basis of donation, that is women may only be reimbursed for documented 
travel and childcare costs expenses. If a woman presents to a fertility clinic and her oöcyte 
“quality” is deemed to be poor, the clinician may suggest using donor oöcytes. Oöcyte 
donation usually involves the transfer of oöcytes from a younger woman whose fertility has 
been proven through previous pregnancy. The age of donors, however, is a point of some 
controversy: in the UK donors should not be over the age of 36 (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority 2012a) while in Australia these decisions are made by the clinic. 
Recent research from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) indicates that 
women over the age of 40 did donate their ooyctes. The median age of women who donate 
oöcytes was 33 years while the average age of women receiving donated oöcytes or embryos 
was 40.9 years (Macaldowie et al. 2012).  
 
The sample under discussion includes five donors. Of the sample, three donors (Jenny, Paola 
and Donna) gave oöcytes to women they knew outside the context of donation: Jenny to a 
couple in her extended social network and who were not considered to be “great friends”, 
with sporadic contact over the year; Paola to a work colleague in her late 40s who had 
started a relationship with a new partner and Donna to a close friend. Two donors, Raja and 
Agnes had thought about donation prior to instigating a search for a recipient: Raja found an 
advertisement in the local newspaper and Agnes responded to a number of advertisements 
about oöcyte donation before selecting her recipient. Not all donation attempts were 
successful: of the sample, pregnancy ensued for the recipients of Raja, Agnes and Donna. 
Both Raja and Jenny undertook the process of extraction twice while other donors did so 
once.  
 
‘Disembodied’ motherhood 
 
In chapter six, I argued that participants, irrespective of cohort, valued their oöcytes for their 
functional capacity and did not perceive them as having an inherent moral status. Their 
oöcytes’ position within the “kin ethics” framework was ambiguous however, particularly in 
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comparison with embryos whose status as kin was clear for participants in cohort one. The 
oöcytes’ capacity as a reproductive tissue was the basis of participants’ refusals to give their 
“good eggs” to SCNT research – a potential threat to their intention to become a mother. 
Given that participants, irrespective of cohort, predominantly refused to give away their 
oöcytes, it may be unclear how and why participants in the donor cohort gave their oöcytes 
to other women to utilise for reproductive purposes. There were two significant factors in 
decisions to donate oöcytes for reproductive purposes: the donor’s own intentions to become 
a mother and a perception that the genetic attributes of the tissue does not create a social 
relationship between the woman and the child. 
 
Firstly, the decisions to donate are made in light of broader choices around personal fertility. 
Participants in cohort two either have no plans to have children, have children prior to 
donation or they have some reassurance that it will not affect their future fertility. Donors 
relied on different means to understand the effect of oöcyte extraction on their future 
fertility; for instance, Donna relied on medical knowledge while Agnes’ assurance came 
from a belief in not being punished (unable to bear children in the futre) for doing a good 
deed.  
 
Donna: I wasn’t going to tell the people I wanted to donate to until I was happy 
enough that I’d be comfortable to do it, so I kind of got some background info, um... 
And it was very, you know, like a zero, zero point nine per cent chance, but I don’t 
know, for some reason that was my worst fear. So I just had to clear my mind of that, 
and then um, yeah I just really wanted to do it 
 
Agnes: I’ve had three different psychics tell me I’m having twins…Even with the 
limited knowledge I had of the side effects [like] “What if something happens? You 
should only do it after you had your own (children)…” and I’m like, “It’s not…I’m 
doing it for a good cause. God’s not going to punish me and make me infertile for 
doing something good! [Its about generating] Good karma!” 
 
Donors also made the decision to give their oöcytes away by distinguishing between the 
reproductive capacity of their oöcytes and the expectation that that capacity be used 
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exclusively for their own intentions to become a mother. One way donors do so is by 
dismissing the idea that because the oöcyte bears DNA, that this inevitably results in a social 
relationship with the child they intend to help create. Unlike mainstream social sentiments, 
kinship – in this case – does not depend on a biological connection. To reinforce the 
disconnection between DNA and kin, reproductive oöcyte donors (quoted below) emphasise 
gestation and rearing as the constitutive elements of motherhood: 
 
Donna: And some people don’t really understand it’s just an oöcyte; but a lot of 
people think “well, that’s almost like that’s your child as well?” and it’s not. Because 
I’ve seen it grow in somebody else, and it’s all their chid – so for some people it’s a 
bit…“oh, that’s a bit weird!" 
 
Raja: I explained to him [donor’s partner] I don’t consider from the moment I was 
doing it that these are my children, they’ve got my DNA but that’s as far as it goes. 
 
Agnes: I never see it as “my child” or “half my child”, I guess it’s all just perspective.  
It’s in her.  She’s going to be pregnant, she’s going to give birth to her. 
 
Jenny: it’s hard to know [what] the relationships [between donor and recipient would 
entail]…what if there had been a child and they’d been parenting in a way I didn’t 
agree with?  Is it my place to say something?  Not really. It’s their child.   
 
Participants in this cohort rarely falter in their conviction that they are not “mothers” to the 
oöcytes they provide to other women. They often construct their contribution as virtually 
insignificant, despite the fact that without it, no pregnancy could ensue. This resonates with 
results from a large-scale survey conducted in Sweden. Skoog Svanberg et al. (2003a and b) 
report on a study with a sample of random participants (n=1000 men and women 
respectively) aged between 25 and 40 years. Women who were more likely to donate 
oöcytes for reproductive purposes did not place too much importance on the genetic basis of 
motherhood; however, they did expect children born from gamete donation to be told of their 
origins.  
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In the following extract, the participant explicitly contends with potential issues that may 
arise related precisely to the “common-sense” connection between biology and kinship. This 
occurs on the basis that the donor and Angela (the recipient woman) are phenotypically very 
different and the donor, Paola, presumes that this may cause attachment problems between 
Angela and the child. Paola resolves this issue by drawing on biological ideas about 
dominant and recessive genes and suggests that in this scenario, the problem she briefly 
imagined will ultimately be avoided because the dominant genes of John (Angela’s partner) 
would also overwhelm those of Angela. Paola is not suggesting that she and Angela are 
interchangeable but that her  potentially problematic presence (looking too much like the 
child) may be rendered less so by the fact that the child will not look like its “mother” in any 
case: 
 
Paola: When I met John [recipient’s partner] he’s got brown eyes, I’ve got brown 
eyes, he’s got brown hair, I’ve got brown hair…and Angela’s [recipient] blond hair, 
blue eyes, so the child would definitely look like John, it wouldn’t look like me.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Practices of assisted conception can disrupt the contemporary norm of the nuclear family 
where children are expected to have one mother and father from whom the child is given 
their genetic heritage. However, the practice of reproductive oöcyte provision represents a 
fundamental challenge to social ideas and legal definitions of motherhood in a way that 
semen donation does not. This, as Jackson (2006) argues, is because within English common 
law (from which Australian law is derived), the attribution of maternity, prior to the use of 
ARTs, has been an uncontested fact while the attribution of paternity has always technically 
been a legal fiction; this is based on historic modes of reproduction during which oöcytes 
remained in vivo while semen was always externalised.68In our study, participants highlight 
the tissue as providing DNA but reject it is the basis of social relationships. 
 
                                                
68 In NSW, legislation that covers practices of Assisted reproduction includes the Status of Children Act 1996 
No 76 and the Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (2009); parentage is defined as: 
3)  If a woman (whether married or unmarried) becomes pregnant by means of a fertilisation 
procedure using an ovum obtained from another woman, that other woman is presumed not to be the 
mother of any child born as a result of the pregnancy. 
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It is important to recognise that the views of oocyte and semen donors can diverge as 
Almeling’s (2011) research demonstrates. In Almeling’s study, male donors did consider 
themselves the fathers of the children they help to create while oocyte providers did not 
consider themselves the mothers. According to Almeling (2011), the basis of this difference 
are traditional cultural representations of paternity which considers semen the most 
important aspect of reproduction rather than women’s own tissues, DNA or the gestation 
process. Yet, it does not appear that Almeling sufficiently accounts for the legal aspects of 
paternity and maternity in that the former is always a legal fiction which must be established 
through trust or technical means (a paternity test) but it is only with the development of 
ARTs that involve the removal of oocytes from the woman’s body, that genetics and 
gestation can be separated. 
 
Suspending reciprocity in identified reproductive oöcyte provision  
 
The social relationships created through oöcyte provision not only adhere and challenge 
ideas about motherhood but gift giving as well. As we can recall, Titmuss (1997 [1970]) 
insisted that anonymity be a key feature of maintaining the provision of blood as a free gift. 
The premise of inter-personal anonymity was based on the presumption that gift giving in 
contexts where donor and recipients are known to each other will inevitably lead to cycles of 
reciprocity, where the pressure to return gifts will be immense. In contrast to Titmuss’s 
model and most arrangements around the world, Australian clinics do not act as brokers and 
by encouraging patients to find donors through their own social networks or by advertising 
in community publications such as Sydney’s Child, are informally helping to establish 
contexts of known oöcyte donation.69 This results in the formation of a relationship between 
donor and recipient that is largely self-regulated and as we shall see, does not necessarily 
lead to the establishment of a social relationship involving reciprocity. 
 
                                                
69 Sydney's Child is a magazine published 11 times per year and distributed freely across the city (indeed most 
major cities in Australia as well). It contains parent-related articles by professional writers as well as 
parent/readers and information on child related issues and events. The classifieds section contains 
advertisements for health and educational professionals as well as oöcyte donors (recipients advertising for 
oöcyte donors). From an irregular scan of the magazine, advertisers seeking oöcyte donors are mainly 
heterosexual women of various ethnicities. http://www.webchild.com.au/index.php/Our-Magazines.php, 
accessed 14/07/2010. 
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Donating oöcytes takes a lot of time and effort for both the donor and recipient woman who 
must also undergo an IVF cycle to prepare her uterus to implant potential embryos. In 
Australia, if the donor and recipient are unknown to each other, initial contact will involve 
phone conversations or email exchange during which both parties make personal 
assessments about the suitability of the other before meeting each other in person. Oöcyte 
donors must undergo detailed medical, social and family history examinations and be tested 
for venereal disease, Hepatitis B and C, HIV antibodies as well as traits for sickle cell and 
Thalassemia Minor (Bourne 2011). Legally, the oöcytes and any resulting embryos will 
belong to the recipient woman and/or her partner70 and donors do not have any legal rights 
or duties towards the child born. Recipients and donors both  partake in counselling sessions 
at the fertility clinic during which the social and legal implications of gamete assistance are 
discussed (Fertility Society of Australia 2010).71 Also discussed are the relationship between 
the donor, recipient and donor-conceived child, the level of disclosure about gamete-assisted 
conception and having a child who is not the genetic relation of one parent (Bourne 2011). 
 
Australia’s rather relaxed approach to the relationship between oöcyte donors and recipients 
is unique in a global context. Anecdotal evidence indicates that fertility clinics wish to 
cultivate a culture of openness between donors, recipients and children in addition to 
avoiding the cost of maintaining a database of potential donors.72 In contrast, countries like 
Sweden and the UK can restrict knowledge between donors and recipients at the time of 
donation (Skoog Svanberg 2003a; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2012b); 
in Spain, even if a patient brings her own provider to the clinic, these oöcytes will not be 
used but exchanged for those of another [anonymous] provider (Orobitg & Salazar, 2005). In 
her study of the nascent formation of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in the 
UK, Haimes (1993) examined the attitudes members held regarding the provision of semen 
and oöcytes and argued that while it essentially involves the genetic contribution of a “third 
party”, its symbolic representation is gender specific. As the following excerpt shows, the 
Warnock Commission placed significant emphasis on the principle of anonymity in gamete 
assisted conception but emphasised this more so in relation to semen donors (who were 
                                                
70 I am uncertain if any provisions which stipulate that the partner must be male.  
71 The code of practice by the Fertility Society of Australia stipulates that all clinics must appoint a senior 
counsellor.  
72 The same clinic may have different policy regarding semen: for instance, on its website IVF Australia states 
that it does not keep database of oöcyte providers but does recruit semen providers. 
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perceived as more threatening to the family) in comparison with oöcyte donors, particularly 
known donors (who were represented as much more innocent). Haimes (1993: 91) writes: 
 
“Semen donation is presented [in relation to] inappropriate sexuality, such as 
masturbation, adultery and illegitimacy…egg donation on the other hand, is presented 
as a new and complex procedure…is firmly located in a clinical setting and is 
essentially asexual…the egg donor apparently runs the risk of physical damage 
through her participation in the practice which serves only to enhance the view that her 
motives must be altruistic.” 
 
These claims correspond with studies of public perceptions in the UK around the same time 
and the US more recently. Bolton et al. (1991, 221) designed their study “to examine 
whether or not differences exist in attitudes towards egg donation compared with sperm 
donation”. Four groups (n=399) were surveyed about their attitudes toward each form of 
gamete transfer: one group patients using donated eggs; another group receiving donor 
insemination, one group of potential oöcyte donors73 and the general population people with 
no reported history of fertility problems. The results indicated that while there was little 
difference in approval for semen donation and oöcyte donation for fertility patients, 
anonymity was perceived to be of greater importance for semen donors; 59% of semen 
recipients wanting to maintain anonymity of the donor. In her study reporting on both semen 
and oöcyte provision in the US, Almeling (2009) contends that organisational structures 
similar to those reported by Haimes (1993) are embedded in the recruitment process of 
gamete providers; while oöcyte providers and recipients do not meet, the providers are 
identified by their physical traits and personality, as well as names, photographs and 
personal essays. In contrast, semen providers are identified with numbers and “under no 
circumstances are sperm recipients allowed to meet donors” (Almeling, 2009, 50). 
 
As this brief review indicates, anonymity in gamete provision has been strictly regulated 
around the world and this may or may not be applied in a ‘gender-blind’ way. 
Notwithstanding the broader social implications of embracing the universal stranger, for 
Titmuss, anonymity meant that cycles of reciprocity were unlikely to develop as they would 
                                                
73 The women were receiving treatment for infertility and were asked of their attitude toward donating excess 
oöcytes (Bolton et al. 1991). 
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in contexts of known donation. Titmuss’s model of the [inter-personally anonymous] free 
gift is compromised as the data collected shows that most participants in this study preferred 
to donate their reproductive tissues in identified contexts. Irrespective of cohort, participants 
report that they are more inclined to give oöcytes when the information to imagine the future 
family is available.  
 
Agnes: Um…I’d like to say “yes”, but I don’t know if I would…In one way, like, I did 
want to meet them.  I want to, sort of, know that my oöcytes are going at least to 
someone who’s worthy of them, in a sense. I don’t know if that sounds bad or not. 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Atilia: If I knew them [the couple] and if I’m really sure that everything will be alright 
with their baby, then yes I can do it but to an unknown couple, I wouldn’t donate.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Grace: If somebody is raising a child with half of my DNA…I’d probably want to 
know they’re going to a good home.  
(“Healthy donor”) 
 
It is possible to argue that the desire to know the recipient conveyed by our participants, may 
be based on the biological and symbolic properties of the oöcyte in creating a sentient being. 
This suggestion both concurs and diverges from other research. For instance, two studies 
reported that donors usually give their oöcytes to their own sister or close friend (Warren and 
Blood 2003; Yee, Hitkari and Greenblatt 2007). In contrast, Skoog Svanberg et al.’s (2003a) 
survey of women in Sweden showed that one in six respondents indicated that they would 
consider donating oöcytes anonymously in the future. 
 
For oöcyte donors in this study, preferences for identified donation may be incompatible 
with their earlier insistence that a social relationship does not inevitably emerge between 
themselves and the children created from their oöcytes. However, their preference for known 
donation relates to the donors’ desire to select the recipients of their oöcytes rather than the 
establishment of long-term social relationships and the attendant cycles of reciprocity 
Titmuss anticipated. As one donor, Raja, articulated, the children (twins) she helped to create 
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are not her own “kin” and she does not speculate about them as individuals. At the same 
time Raja is keen to draw boundaries around the family she has helped to create and spurns 
significant involvement in the children’s upbringing. The importance of the family-as-
nuclear is evident for the donor. Titmuss’s worry that cycles of reciprocity are a natural part 
of gift giving in known contexts is unfounded in the context of oöcyte provision because the 
context in which oöcytes are given shape the expectations of reciprocity. 
 
Interviewer (M.B.): did you discuss that beforehand…What kind of contact there 
would be? 
Raja: Yeah. The lady said that she would like contact and to be friends afterwards and 
everything, and I said, “OK, look, I don’t want to be a second mum or anything, but if 
you give me photos or an update every year or whatever, I’d be happy with that, just to 
see that everything’s OK.”  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Choosing ‘good’ parents 
 
Identifying one’s recipient is an important issue for donors in this study and I suggest that it 
has at two effects. Firstly, a certain intimacy characterises the relationships between donors 
and recipients as individuals while distance is maintained regarding the family. Secondly, 
the donor is able to evaluate and select their ideal recipient: people who adhere to social 
norms regarding suitable parenting styles.  
 
The largely self-regulated nature of oöcyte provision in Australia is one reason why intimate 
relationships, however transient, between donors and recipients emerge. By intimate, I refer 
to “a complex sphere of ‘inmost’ relationships with self and others [that are] not usually 
minor or incidental (although they may be transitory), and they usually touch the personal 
world very deeply” (Plummer 2003, 13). Although the degree to which intimacy 
characterises the relationships between donors and recipients in this study varied, some sort 
of identification is evident. The following quotes show a high level of identification between 
the donor and the recipient.  
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Agnes: And after, we met up, I had a dream on the same night that she [the recipient] 
had a dream, that because of this process she had a baby girl.  And she emailed me on 
Monday, “I had a dream on Saturday!” and I was like, “Oh, my god, no.  I had a dream 
on Saturday that you had a baby girl.” And it was just bizarre. She was like a forty-
three year old version of me. Like…it was very interesting; the same personality, 
temperament…we’re both nerds; we sit at home, reading a million books, mm, very 
nice. 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
I do not wish to suggest that all relationships between donors and recipients in our study 
exhibited a similar level of identification between the two parties, but it is interesting to note 
that such identification was an important necessary part of the process for Agnes and cannot 
be dismissed as contingently related to her match. In these self-regulated settings, donors do 
not have any other cues with which to evaluate the recipient. While there are varying levels 
of intimacy between donors and recipient(s) in our study, it is evident that the idea of a 
specified beneficiary and benefit is at the forefront of the donor’s intentions and contributes 
to their motivation to complete the process. This may be because the relationship is largely 
self-regulated, beginning outside the ART clinic. Even in cases where the donor and 
recipient are not known to one another previously, the relationship is initiated and 
established by individuals before they attend the clinic. I suggest that the clinic is a 
facilitator of technical aspects such as medical care and provides important legal and 
psychological oversight but does not define who is a good parent or worthy recipient and 
thus avoids operating as a moral gatekeeper. Private individuals deal with the relationship 
and all its effects – good and bad. Meeting recipients on a number of occasions ensures that 
some sort of relationship exists with both formal and informal aspects. This includes initial 
meetings and negotiations occurring privately and mandatory counselling sessions at the 
recipients’ fertility clinic. The resident counsellor facilitates these sessions and imposes a 
peculiar kind of intimacy as each party is subject to scrutiny that may not have emerged 
without their presence.  
 
The relationship between donors in our study and their recipients has another function. As 
the following participants suggest, the inter-personal dimension helps to psychologically 
sustain the donor until the goal of pregnancy is (hopefully) reached. 
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Raja: The first time…none of them [embryos] took, and she asked me if I would go 
through again, and I said, “Of course, until either you cannot have children, or you 
have a child.”  And the second time…both of them took, and they’re twin boys now…I 
think what made it easier was that the couple was really nice.  That made it a lot easier.  
If it had been just an anonymous donation, and having that similar experience, I don’t 
think I would have gone through with that.  I think I would have stopped.  But it’s just 
because the couple were really nice. 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
In these accounts, the donor is primarily focused on the recipient with whose needs and 
desires she can empathise. While the processes of ovarian stimulation and oöcyte extraction 
are necessary parts of the process, in this context they might be considered merely the 
technical elements to a much broader, more affectively-oriented undertaking.  
 
Donna: And then the first time I got ten oöcytes …but I didn’t realise how 
unsuccessful – like ten oöcytes, they only really got three [embryos] from it...from 
what they were able to get for me, they actually didn’t get a lot of success from that... I 
thought, a couple died, then when you freeze them, then they defrost, a few more die. 
So they tried once or twice, and it was unsuccessful. And then they had like two left in 
the freezer, so to speak, and I said, “Oh, because you haven’t really had much of a go, 
how about we have another go of it? 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Assertions made here about the importance of a specific beneficiary with oöcyte provision 
develop claims made in other research. A recent Canadian study conducted by Yee, Hitkari 
and Greenblatt (2007) reports that since laws prohibiting the sale of any gamete were 
introduced in 2004, known donation has become the default option. The authors studied 
oöcyte provision that had occurred between January 2000 and December 2005 between 
known parties  (n= 13) who were largely a combination of sisters and close friends. The 
authors (2007) report that donors were largely motivated by a desire to help others they 
consider to be struggling with fertility treatment and most of the participants said that the 
decision to donate oöcytes was not especially difficult. The results from our study show that 
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oöcyte provision between women known to each other outside the context of donation can 
occur within the framework of altruistic donation. In identifying a specified beneficiary 
connection, the donor undertakes the process within an affective framework.  
 
The identification of recipients is an important part of the process of giving away oöcytes for 
reproductive purposes. While donors are not particularly interested in ongoing relationships 
with the child, the care taken to find such recipients demonstrates that they are interested in 
the long-term consequences of their decision in a specific way. As we saw in chapter six in 
reference to choosing recipients in the scientific context, potential donors wanted to choose 
worthy recipients. Such recipients are those who are likely to transform the gift of the 
oöcytes into something valuable. For participants, it is better to choose the recipient on this 
basis rather than adhere to an ideological principle which separates private and public 
property and profit. I argue that a comparable process of identifying worthy recipients occurs 
in the reproductive sphere as donors attempt to find ‘good parents’. 
 
These assertions develop claims made by Rhonda Shaw (2007, 2008a and 2010) who has 
undertaken much research regarding what she terms ‘bodily gifting practices’ within New 
Zealand. Shaw (2008a) argues that reproductive oöcyte provision is a complex process that 
rarely resembles the gift ideology proffered by fertility clinics and government 
organisations. She contends that while the New Zealand jurisdiction prohibits the selling of 
oöcytes for reproduction, this does not necessarily mean that the women who do provide 
their oöcytes are simply altruistic. Thus, while monetary payment is absent, altruism is 
seldom the only motivation in the process of giving to others.  
 
On the one hand, the narratives of donors in this study echo Shaw’s (2008a, 16) definition of 
altruism as a feeling or behaviour “which…seeks to increase or enhance another’s welfare, 
life chances or pleasure, not one’s own [it is] voluntary [and] expects no external reward or 
reciprocation”. On the other hand, the considerable care exercised in selecting an 
appropriately worthy recipient indicates that altruism and more instrumental concerns are not 
mutually exclusive. This indicates that although they are being altruistic by sharing their 
oöcytes, they do not view ‘the infertile’ as an undifferentiated mass, all deserving of the 
‘gift’. Vetting potential parents and making value judgments about their suitability, in some 
ways, resembles a less regulated version of the assessment involved in adoption. Participants 
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in our study tended to represent their recipient as ‘deserving’ because their donation would 
redress a sense of imbalance in the recipient’s life. In some cases, they also implied that 
recipients who had not ‘struggled’ (to conceive) or did not display the required desperation 
may be less deserving of their help. In this respect, donors represented their chosen 
recipients in terms of their need; the more needy the recipient and the greater the obstacles 
that they have faced, the more appropriate the gift. This may relate to choosing childless 
couples over those who wish to add to their family. It may also be based on knowledge that 
recipients have been unsuccessful through their own attempts at becoming parents. The more 
needy the recipient seems and the obstacles they have faced, the more appropriate the gift of 
the donor.  
 
Donna: Um, I think because they were so great to kids anyway. And I know they’d 
been trying – they were so good to my first, my Benjamin, my son; and I thought, 
“God! You’d make great parents.” And they’re just so caring, and they give to 
everybody else – I was like, “Oh well, it’s time that you got something back.” And 
they’ve been trying as well.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Jenny: I remember just feeling very intensely that if I could help them, I would like to, 
because it’s something that she wanted so much, and I just thought myself how awful 
it would be, having had two children, to feel that I couldn’t have fulfilled being a 
parent, because it’s important to me and it was obviously very important to her as well. 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Donors have their own qualifications about who they consider to be a ‘good parent’. 
Importantly, as the excerpt from Agnes’s interviews suggests, recipients who placed 
conditions on the donor they sought disqualified themselves by not appearing to be 
unconditionally grateful.  
 
Agnes: And a lot of the ads – it was quite funny. They were very specific.  
Interviewer (MB): In what way? 
Agnes: You have to be a non-smoker.  You have to have fit (sic)– like, I know they 
recommend to have your own children first before donating oöcytes, but a lot of them 
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were very specific in regards to that.  You have to be Asian, or you have to be over – 
no, you have to be under 25, and…I’m like, woah!  But completed your own family!  
I’m just, like, “Alright.  You’re a bit too fussy!”  Then there were some other ads 
where they’d had their first child but wanted a second one, and I was, like, “No, I don’t 
want to go for them, because they’ve at least got one.  I want to go for someone who 
hasn’t." 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Other elements that figure in decisions about the right recipients are more socially-defined 
traits such as financial status, relationship stability, and personality. These attributes 
represent Australian norms about ‘good’ parents that reflect some of the diversity of 
contemporary society. For example, as the excerpt from Raja’s interview shows, sexual 
orientation is not a basis to exclude people, but donors in our study ultimately remain 
committed to an idealised version of relationships as long term and child-focused.  
 
Raja: I wouldn’t just donate and not know…I sort of need to know the couple’s 
financially secure and that their marriage, or relationship – I don’t care if they’re gay 
or whatever – that their relationship is strong.  They’re really two important factors 
for me.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
In the excerpt below, Paola represents the recipient, Angela, as a ‘good parent’ precisely 
because she already had children. Paola uses the evidence of Angela’s previous mothering 
experience as a basis for her claim that Angela will make a ‘good parent’. Thus, in contrast 
to Agnes above, a ‘good parent’ can be constructed by wanting more children. 
 
Paola: I’ve known Angela for a while, I’ve met her husband, I’ve met all her 
children…and I know for a fact that Angela would be a good parent…She’s quite strict 
with her children.  If she’d been my mum, I might have finished school, you know?  
Very strict.  So any kid having that kind of parent would be a good child. 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
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These responses show that, for our participants, donating eggs in identified contexts enables 
them to select a specific recipient among the undifferentiated mass of infertile individuals or 
couples. These attitudes return us to the initial discussion regarding the social relationship 
between the child derived of their oöcytes and the donor. While donors do not recognise the 
intended child as their own, they do not simply ‘abandon’ but rather entrust the children to 
‘good parents’. These findings correspond with others studies showing that donors make 
distinctions between the offspring of donated oöcytes and their ‘own’ children whom they 
have or will gestate (Kirkman 2003; Nahman 2008). These narratives suggest that when 
women give their oöcytes for reproductive purposes based on an altruistic concern to help 
another person, they also evaluate their recipients according to social norms about “good” 
parents. Altruistic and instrumental motivations are coupled together to ensure the child is 
raised in the right family.  
 
The reward of family 
 
As discussed in chapter six, participants in this study are easily able to articulate the 
difference between providing oöcytes for reproductive and research purposes; one leads to 
the creation of a child, the other leads to the production of scientific knowledge. 
Reproductive oöcyte donors insist that despite being emotionally taxing and onerous, 
donation is nonetheless a rewarding process. Reward is based on being able to witness the 
transformation of an infertile couple into a happy family. Furthermore, while these 
participants do not dismiss the idea that SCNT oöcyte provision has a dimension of the 
‘greater good’, it is perceived as less rewarding than its reproductive counterpart because the 
recipient and the outcome are not as personally constituted.  
 
Interviewer: Okay. Would you ever donate oöcytes for research into infertility?  
Donna: Probably once I’d got to the point that I’ve done enough for family 
reproduction, then, you know, maybe in another few years, before my oöcytes stop, I 
probably would…I think, yeah, even though I know the research is going to be a 
fantastic effect down the track, that’s an initial understanding with a couple, that you 
know you’re doing it for them... The little bit more of a personal – I think that there’s 
such a more personal connection with what you’re doing, and you can see, see it 
instantly? And you go, “God, the joy that I’m giving to them is enough for me?’” So, 
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when you give it to sort of anonymous, big bad – well it might not be bad, but the big 
world of science! – you kind of go, “Well, who knows where it’s going to end up? And 
thanks for coming.” Maybe it’s that whole, “This is a huge process for me!” and 
because it's somebody you don’t know on the other side, who’s just going to take them 
and do what they need to do, it may not be the same... personal recognition, maybe? 
Yeah, because it’s a pretty invasive thing!...Where giving to science – it could in the 
long run help somebody, you know, be healed from an actual disease, but there’s no 
direct link; I don’t get a direct reward from that…I don’t get to see the direct results, as 
I would for the couple. That’s probably the only difference – not saying I wouldn’t do 
it, but I think my priority is trying to help someone have a child, because they’ve been 
wanting to do it for years.  
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
Raja: because I think you don’t get the satisfaction of knowing that – you can’t see the 
outcome of your work as such.  Having seen the twins, I can sort of see something, 
whereas for research, you’re not really… 
(Reproductive oöcyte donor) 
 
The difficulty of establishing an equivalent for oöcytes in the scientific context, discussed in 
chapter six, does not appear in the case of reproductive oöcyte provision. What is apparent is 
an affective framework that involves the identification of a specified beneficiary. Knowing 
the donor facilitates the construction of an affective framework through which the extensive 
medical procedures can be experienced and tolerated. The medical procedures outlined 
above are a means to an end, not the end in itself. Helping a woman become a mother is the 
end. This data indicate that cycles of reciprocity are not the inevitable consequence of gift 
giving in known contexts. This suspension of social norms is based on two factors: firstly, 
when recipients have been identified as incapable of becoming parents without donor-
assistance and as a consequence are expected to accept the donor’s gift. Secondly, because it 
is more important to maintain the family as nuclear where the child born from donor-assisted 
conception effectively has one mother and father.  
 
Mobilising reproductive oöcyte donors for SCNT research 
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Speculating about whether reproductive oöcyte donors in this study are likely to represent a 
relatively uncontroversial population of donors to SCNT research is complex. Donors are 
constituted by the fact that they give some of their reproductive capacity (their oöcytes) 
away for other women to use.74 This decision distinguishes them from other participants in 
our study who do not want to jeopardise their maternal aspirations by giving away their own 
oöcytes. However, all participants, irrespective of cohort, do not consider their oöcytes to 
exist with the “life ethics” framework and were imagined as more closely aligned with the 
“kin ethics” framework. Donors went further and regularly referred to the oöcytes as simply 
carriers of DNA and not the basis of a social relationship between themselves and the child. 
These references indicate that giving away one’s oocytes pose a challenge to many things, 
not least conventional family structures. In the context of reproductive provision, the tissue’s 
value remains functional but is detached from the individual’s intention to become a mother. 
This occurs by investing in the maternal aspirations of another woman and situating öocyte 
extraction within the affective framework. Thus, despite the fact that oöcyte donation is an 
ambiguous process simply translating the physical act of oöcyte extraction from one context 
to another is not straightforward. This analysis shows that just because reproductive oöcyte 
donors are not undertaking the process for themselves, they are undertaking the process in a 
detached manner.  
 
This analysis has so far sought to explore some of the ambiguities involved in reproductive 
oöcyte donation as it is practiced in Australia, where the donor is neither entirely 
disinterested in the recipient or expects to be reciprocated. I have demonstrated that 
relationships between women in the oöcyte donor cohort and their recipients do have 
instrumental components to them, although these are centered on child-friendly and ‘family’ 
values. Overall, however, the practice is overlaid with affective elements and a ‘feeling’ of 
reward in undertaking the process.  
 
Embryo provision: an overview 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is to elucidate the perceptions and attitudes of oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research. To achieve this aim, I have drawn comparisons with other 
                                                
74 The term “constituted” is not meant to mislead the reader and suggest that these women are essentially 
donors. 
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tissues; namely blood and embryos. I now wish to discuss the latter in more detail. Oöcytes 
and embryos are both reproductive tissues but exist under different regulatory and symbolic 
regimes. In the following section, I examine how women undertaking fertility treatment 
imagine the provision of embryos and I show how the experience of fertility treatment and 
the context of the nuclear family differently impacts their choices. I show that while 
reproductive oöcyte donation may be considered an example of disembodied motherhood, 
which for most women is problematic, there are certain parallels between the ways in which 
fertility patients regarded giving away their embryos.  
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is necessary to clarify whether the embryos to which 
our respondents referred were ‘fresh’ or ‘frozen’ (Ehrich, Williams and Farsides (2010). 
‘Fresh’ embryos have recently fertilised; they have not been cryopreserved. These embryos 
will vary in quality, from poorly fragmented to well fragmented. The level of cell 
fragmentation may change if the embryo is cultured to a blastocyst (Scott et al. 2012). 
“Frozen” embryos have been cryopreserved and stored with the intention of using them if 
earlier implantations are unsuccessful. Clinic policies vary in whether they will freeze 
embryos that cannot be implanted (those that have been deemed to be of good quality) 
(Haimes and Taylor 2009; Scott et al. 2012). The clinic with which this study is associated 
did freeze patients' embryos (those which had divided to an acceptable degree) and had a 
policy of implanting all frozen embryos in succession before women would be allowed to 
undergo another round of ovarian stimulation and oöcyte extraction. Our participants are 
referring to those embryos that are frozen but will not be used by them because they do not 
want more children. 
 
Thus, this discussion diverges from the implications of Scott et al.’s (2012) assertions 
regarding the process of informed consent when requesting “fresh” embryos. Examining the 
legal implications of requesting “fresh” (recently fertilised) embryos for stem cell research in 
the UK,75 the authors argue that the process should be subject to three levels of consent: 
firstly an embryo’s disuse in clinical treatment, secondly, its use in research and thirdly that 
the patients consent to further ART treatment. This contention is based on the contingent 
factors that assess embryos as excessive to treatment. These factors include the difficulty, 
                                                
75 The article draws on the same data reported by Ehrich, Williams and Farsides (2010) and Ehrich et al. (2012) 
hitherto discussed in this dissertation. 
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even ‘art’ of grading embryos and clinical methods that may impact on this ‘grading’ such as 
culturing embryos to blastocyst stage before their implantation as well as the clinic’s 
freezing policies, (often implemented prior to the conduct of stem cell research in that 
facility). As freezing is not a uniform practice in UK fertility clinics, patients may be 
unaware or unable to keep viable embryos which invariably go to research. Some clinics 
insist that a specific numerical threshold must be reached before any embryo is frozen or 
embryos are frozen at a specific day which can affect their subsequent utilisation. Typically 
“less than 70% of day three cleavage stage (non-blastocyst) embryos survive thawing, 
although the survival rate typically increases to near 90% if blastocysts have been frozen” 
and subsequently implanted (Scott et al. 2012, 262). Another factor is that patients are 
considered the ‘owners’ of embryos and embryologists do consider the views of patients and 
will inevitably yield to patients’ wishes to freeze embryos.  
 
Embryo provision to research: keeping the family nuclear  
 
The following discussion will include meanings of the tissue and their implications for the 
individual’s sense of self and social relations. Continuing the reference to Robert’s (2007) 
“kin ethics” framework, I suggest that even once treatment stops, participants continue to 
perceive the embryo as a potential child and make decisions about their use in relation to this 
meaning. While, data from this study concurs with that of de Lacey (2007), whose South 
Australian participants discussed disposition choices about embryos, the conclusions I draw 
are different. De Lacey explored decisions around providing “surplus” embryos to another’s 
reproductive path or the research path and found that women were more inclined to give 
embryos to scientific research rather than be implanted in another woman who would gestate 
the foetus and raise the child. Participants took this position even though giving embryos to 
research technically involved the destruction of the tissue because they regarded the embryo 
as too similar to a potential child. De Lacey (2007, 1755) argues that the decision to discard 
or give to scientific research and not donate for reproduction on the basis that the embryo is 
too similar to a potential child is irrational because the embryo is effectively destroyed. The 
following quotes from women in cohort one captures what de Lacey calls a paradox about 
providing the embryo to scientific research: that these decisions are not based on reducing 
the embryo to a technical entity but precisely the opposite–embryos are too child-like to be 
given to another family: 
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Caroline: Again, because…and it’s kind of contradictory, in a way. A fertilised 
embryo [sic]76 is our child, and I just…I don’t know.  I wouldn’t want our child being 
with someone else. It’s ours. Perversely, I suppose, I wouldn’t mind the embryo being 
used for medical purposes to enhance knowledge and make things better in the future, 
even though it would obviously mean destroying the embryo! (laughs) So I suppose 
it’s a bit perverse, but. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Eva: Because it [scientific research] wouldn’t be creating a human being.  It would 
just be helping the technology, or helping somebody else become pregnant, [through 
research] or maybe even – if it wasn’t working for me, helping me, at some point down 
the line, become pregnant. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
De Lacey’s (2007) ‘paradox’ may make more sense when the context in which embryos are 
created and exist is taken into consideration. Drawing on Robert’s distinction between either 
“kin” or “life” ethics discussed in chapter six, I suggest that many participants in this study 
favoured giving their embryos to scientific research because it avoids the issue of having 
‘their’ children grow up in another family, particularly in anonymous circumstances.77 Many 
participants expressed the idea of not knowing what could happen to the child as they grew 
up in another family and the ‘inevitable knock on the door eighteen years time’. Participants 
from the fertility patient cohort (quoted below) have trouble envisioning their embryos as 
existing outside the boundaries of the nuclear family. 
 
Joanna: I wouldn’t want to know them [prospective parents]! (laughs) I wouldn’t 
want to know because I might take it – “Give it back”! Yeah, it’d be in my head like 
where do they live. Are they treating him or her right? 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Interviewer (K.C.): So, would you ever donate embryos to another couple? 
                                                
76 The correct term is fertilised oöcyte 
77 It is important to reiterate that the participants were making hypothetical statements. 
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Sarah: I’d feel really strange about having my own offspring given to somebody else. 
Effectively that’s what it is. I’m happy for others to do it! (laughs) But I don’t know if 
I’d be comfortable with doing it myself. Sharing my own embryos.   
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Bridgit: [No] because it’s basically giving your child away.  Like, it’s genetically your 
child, and the thought of having someone that’s genetically mine, that’s exactly a 
genetic match – not a genetic match, but like a full brother or sister to my children. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Some respondents in this cohort suggest that the decision to provide embryos to scientific 
research is a way of recognising the value of their embryos while guaranteeing its immediate 
reproductive potential (as a child) will be disabled. Embryos are not given to scientific 
research because they are “waste” material, that is, because they are clinically unviable. 
Embryos are given to scientific research because they remain within the framework of “kin 
ethics” (Roberts 2007): their reproductive capacity does not change. This shows an 
important difference between embryos and oöcytes where the latter are valued in more 
functional terms and are given to scientific research once this function no longer exists. With 
some qualifications, this also diverges from the assertions made by Williams et al. (2008, 8) 
regarding embryos tested prior to implantation for diseases.78 Pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) involves testing embryos for “serious genetic conditions” by testing one or 
two cells; embryos which do not indicate the presence of genetic disorders will be implanted 
into the patient’s uterus. Usually, in the practice of PGD, embryos which test positive for 
genetic diseases will be discarded, however, scientists working in human embryonic stem 
cells and PGD perceived that the emerging field of hESC research could “ partially [disable] 
the destruction of a number of these embryos as waste” (2008, 15).  
 
My own analysis suggests that traditional ideas about biology and kinship influence 
participants’ decisions to provide their embryos to scientific research. I again refer to 
Roberts’s (2007) framework distinguishing between kin and life ethics. Giving embryos to 
scientific research preserves the notion that the embryo is akin to a child but importantly it 
                                                
78 This study did not discuss the process of PGD with any of the participants. 
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also refers to the social entity in which the child should exist: the nuclear family. Giving 
embryos to another woman or couple in order to enable pregnancy would profoundly 
challenge traditional notions that connect parenthood and biology. It may also pose a threat 
to their intentions to become a mother in a conventional sense because another woman will 
gestate the embryo. The embryo, like the oöcyte, is used to serve the needs of the individual 
self and their trajectory in biological and symbolic ways. The lack of oöcytes challenges the 
possibility of biologically becoming pregnant while embryos (usually ‘spare’ because 
fertility desires have been fulfilled) challenge the individual to consider disconnecting 
biology and kinship as it is legally and socially most legitimate in contemporary Australian 
society. The reproductive identity of these participants is intimately linked to notions of the 
nuclear family as a bounded structure. 
 
Embryos and a commons of (in)fertility  
 
I have demonstrated that oöcyte provision occurs and is likely to occur within a context 
where a specific benefit or beneficiary has been identified. Reproductive oöcyte donation 
allows the donor to remedy the fertility problem of an individual couple and literally witness 
the result of their effort in a concrete and tangible way. When speculating on the conditions 
under which they may provide their oöcytes to scientific research, the participants in this 
study do not show a strong inclination to use oöcytes as a means to accumulate scientific 
knowledge but rather to realise their reproductive capacity. In contrast, for participants 
(hypothetically) considering the disposition of ‘spare’ embryos, these sentiments are not 
especially important. Most participants refuse to give embryos away for reproductive 
purposes, preferring instead to give them to research. As I have explained above, this 
maintains a traditional biological basis of kinship. The decision to donate for research or 
reproductive purposes, for a small number of participants in cohort one, also occurs on the 
basis of identifying with recipients in a general and abstract way. This is the most significant 
difference between the provision of oöcytes and embryos; the former is preferably given to 
the specific benefit or beneficiary while the latter is given to the generic or abstract recipient.  
 
In early drafts of my analysis, I applied the term ‘fertility patient’ in a broad way without 
realising that the label implied something about my perceptions of the cohort. The term is 
not just descriptive but designates women who had fertility treatment as if this experience is 
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the totality of their identity rather than acknowledging the fact that it is only one social 
role.79 However, on further reflection I also suggest that it is precisely this limited dimension 
of their identity and experience that came to bear on their responses to interview questions. 
Women who experience fertility treatment become generalised and identify as fertility 
patients and with a community of people with similar experiences. Participants inhabit the 
generalised category of ‘fertility patient’ through the process of seeking fertility treatment. 
For instance, clinicians will often discuss treatment options with reference to statistics that 
are based on aggregate data of past treatments in a local or global context. Patients will 
eventually contribute to these statistics with their own decisions for treatment. I argue that 
the experience of being treated for fertility helps the individual to identify with other real but 
also inter-personally anonymous people in the same context.  
 
Thus, giving embryos to research can also be constructed as a way of enabling families in a 
mediated form. Participants who expressed a preference for (hypothetically) giving their 
embryos to research do so with an acute understanding and knowledge of the presence of 
other fertility patients. The women in cohort one are fully cognisant of the fact that having 
treatment involving ARTs draws on a vast array of research from the past involving people 
who have donated their gametes or embryos. Even though these women have not met 
everyone who has required fertility treatment in Australia or overseas, they will have a sense 
of their physical or virtual presence as they sit in waiting rooms, hear of specialists’ long 
waiting lists or peruse their views on internet-based forums or in other publications.  
Treatment creates a discrete community to which the individual belongs by virtue of seeking 
treatment. I suggest that research is material practice that can connect the patient self and the 
community of infertile people. Their experiences, treatment outcomes and embryos may be 
legitimately situated within this common space by clinicians and researchers who publicise 
research findings and treatment outcomes.  
 
Francesca: The last thing we would do is just dispose of the oöcytes and not do 
anything with them, because I’m strongly...the research that’s brought IVF to Australia 
is the research that’s given us this child. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
                                                
79 It is why I use the less efficient label “women undergoing fertility treatment”. 
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Mandy: [providing oöcytes] for infertility [research], it would – if I felt that it was 
helping someone who was going through, or future people, who were going through 
something similar to what I was going through, in regards to having children.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Eva: Because it [scientific research] wouldn’t be creating a human being.  It would 
just be helping the technology, or helping somebody else become pregnant, or maybe 
even – if it wasn’t working for me, helping me, at some point down the line, become 
pregnant…  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Mandy: for infertility, it would – if I felt that it was helping someone who was going 
through, or future people, who were going through something similar to what I was 
going through, in regards to having children, which is what the eggs are all about, then 
I might consider it.   
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
These responses may resemble the notion of imagined community, borrowed from 
Anderson’s theory of the nation-state (1983). In contrast to other forms of political 
organisations such as monarchy, the nation-state is impersonal and abstract and it is highly 
unlikely that an individual will meet all of their fellow citizens. Anderson (1983, 31) argued 
that despite the intangibility of the modern political association, even if it is based upon 
territory, there are means through which individuals “know” of their fellow inhabitants such 
as those that involve national narratives such as reading the paper whereby the individual is 
reminded of “their steady, anonymous, simultaneous” presence.  
 
Embryos for reproductive purposes: the abstract recipient 
 
Giving embryos to research is expected to make fertility treatment better but it is not 
intended to alleviate the infertility of anyone specific. In contrast, a subset of participants in 
cohort one do consider giving their embryos directly to infertile couples. Rebecca, 
characterises research into fertility as completely negative suggesting that it does not create 
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anything. What she means is that research disables the immediate reproductive capacity of 
the embryo and shifts it to more diffuse and generic ‘products’ such as knowledge and 
therapy. From Rebecca’s perspective, embryos are like oöcytes and their use is meant to be 
reproductive in a strict sense. Both women quoted below express the sentiments usually 
offered by reproductive oöcyte donors who consider the tissues to be reproductive but may 
be more flexible about the circumstances in which this potential may be realised.   
 
Rebecca: Well, to me our embryos – we don’t need them for ourselves anymore, our 
embryos, so I’m happy to give them away…obviously they can’t become anything if 
they’re just donated to research compared to if they were given to another couple. 
There is the chance they could become a human being, as beautiful as our two 
beautiful children! And you know giving them to another couple, we just think that 
would be incredible.  
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Interview (KC): Would you consider donating spare embryos to a more general 
scientific research program that wasn’t attached to fertility? 
Lisa: if I had no need for them and it’s going to help somebody else down the track, 
and no-one else needs them, then sure. I think I’d rather offer them to someone, and 
any leftovers could then go to research. That would be my way of thinking for 
anything. And research, to me, is research. Be it into infertility or whatever, it’s 
research. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Francesca: well, everyone deserves the right to have a child, especially a couple going 
through this. You don’t go through this unless you desperately want children. It’s not 
something you do light-heartedly. So yeah, that’s what we decided we would do…If 
it’s a couple we knew that needed it and was willing to accept it, we’d be happy to do 
that – especially if it was a sibling or something along those lines. …I’m happy to 
donate to a couple that’s not necessarily someone we know either.  We feel it’s 
important to give another couple the opportunity that we were lucky enough to have, 
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because not every couple can produce oöcytes like I can (laughs). If we can give one 
couple the gift of a child, why not? 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Francesca’s perspective in particular echoes strongly with those of reproductive oöcyte 
donors because it presupposes a specific and deserving recipient. Women who have had 
fertility treatment see similar distinctions regarding their embryos, differing in means but 
ending in the same way; whether they provide their embryos to research or reproduction, 
they perceive it as helping to create children and families.  In relation to stem cell research 
(not SCNT), many participants expressed hope that the therapies derived from provision 
could benefit individuals they know. I suggest that embryos are much more likely to be 
perceived as a tissue ‘in common’ and thus the theoretical leap from specific (fertility) 
research to more general (stem cell) research is not particularly problematic.  
 
Eva: Just knowing that someday it might create…even if it doesn’t grow a kidney,80 
then maybe it could help with something – who knows what our children will get, or 
something that could help my family. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
Isabel: Yes – I’m not necessarily more just for fertility [research].  Again, for me, 
then, if they’re [embryos] going to be donated for research… I actually think that in 
this day and age it’s something that I think is needed, because we’re an aging 
population, so more and more people are coming down with particular conditions that 
they need to find cures for, or ways to make people’s quality of life that little bit better 
than what they would have to go through before.  If stem cell research can help that, 
I’d like to know that I was able to assist in some way. 
(Undergoing fertility treatment) 
 
As demonstrated, women perceive embryos in complex ways and are not unanimous in their 
hypothetical decisions about ‘spare’ 
                                                
80 Eva’s husband had a kidney transplant in his early twenties from a kidney donated by his father; Eva 
describes it as a “63 year old kidney”. It is likely her husband will need another kidney transplant in the future. 
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 embryos. These results show that the consequences for the maternal social role are different 
when the individual is giving embryos. On the one hand, refusing to give embryos to others 
who are also experiencing infertility maintains the ‘natural’ connection between biology and 
kinship because the embryo remains within their biologically related family. On the other 
hand, donating embryos for reproductive purposes can also help to “reproduce” the idea of 
family outside the (potential) donor’s own experience. Whether the provision of embryos is 
“direct” or “indirect”, both forms of embryo provision rely on the generalised and abstract, 
rather than the specific, donor and recipient.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter addressed a number of research questions including what is involved in the 
decision making process of oöcyte and embryo provision for reproductive and research 
purposes and presented the following results: 
 
The oöcyte donors in our study: 
 
1. Prefer to donate oöcytes to recipients they can identify but do not expect long-term 
relationship with their recipients and/or the children their donation helps to create 
2. Seek to find ‘good parents’ for their oöcytes that are largely defined as having economic, 
social and personal stability. 
3. Experience the process as rewarding because they personally witness the outcome of the 
process 
4. Do not perceive oöcyte provision to SCNT research as similarly rewarding, suggesting 
the benefits are too impersonal.  
 
Participants in cohort one who discussed embryo provision for research or reproductive 
purposes in a hypothetical manner: 
 
1. At times regard the provision of embryos – entities which they consider to be their 
children – to research as a means of disabling that reproductive capacity, thereby 
maintaining a symbolic and tangible link between biology and kinship.  
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2. Understand the provision of embryos as a means of relating to the ‘imagined community’ 
of other fertility patients from whom their own treatment is derived.  
 
These results show that women utilise their reproductive tissues for themselves or others and 
that these differences have specific consequences for their intentions to become a mother. 
For instance, most participants, irrespective of cohort, do not want to give their oöcytes to 
SCNT research because this will undermine their intention to become a mother. Where the 
donor has identified a specific benefit or beneficiary, the process of oöcyte extraction is 
placed within an affective framework. This framework can change perceptions of effort, risk 
and reward. A woman may be transformed into a “good egg” if there are concrete, rather 
than abstract, dimensions to undertaking oöcyte extraction. This framework also changes 
expectations of reciprocity. Without necessarily having a prior relationship with the 
recipient, the donor undertakes to correct a perceived imbalance for the recipient and this 
contributes to the suspension of obligations of reciprocity, where gift and counter-gift must 
be offered.  
 
I have explained the potential provision of embryos to research in two broad ways. Firstly, as 
a way of keeping the family nuclear. Because their provision has different consequences for 
women’s intentions to become a mother, most women in cohort one will given their embryos 
to stem cell research because their intentions to become, and be, a mother specifically means 
that this should occur within the nuclear family. Secondly, embryo provision to research is a 
consequence of one’s experience of fertility treatment. Embryos are given to a community of 
other fertility patients but these people only share a generic quality – their fertility treatment. 
Giving to such a community does not involve a thorough evaluation of their characters or 
personalities. In this way, the logic underlying the provision of embryo is different to the 
logic underlying oocyte provision: the embryo is given to the generic and abstract 
beneficiary and benefit. 
 
So far, these chapters have sketched out the ways in which reproductive tissue provision is 
contextual and differs in relation to the donor, the recipient and its social and historic 
specificity. Giving reproductive tissues can occur in two ways, by identifying a specific or 
generic benefit or beneficiary. The relationships that are created by doing so do not always 
adhere to expectations of reciprocity. These findings will be discussed in more depth in 
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chapter eight, which will address research questions in relation to gift-giving in Australia 
and the connections between gender, altruism and political associations in a “scientific” 
society. 
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Chapter Eight: Scientific Utilisations Of Reproductive 
Tissues in Australia: Recognising Discretionary Reciprocity 
and Passionate Dimensions 
  
Summary 
 
This thesis is concerned with the issue of oöcyte provision to SCNT research, a novel 
technique that may transform the nature of transplant medicine. So far in the Global North 
very few women have provided oöcytes within the context of altruistic-donation, the 
paradigmatic model of tissue provision for therapeutic and research purposes. Scientific 
researchers, bioethicists and policy makers81 charged with its ethical oversight have thus far 
examined the issue within analytical frameworks, discussing the risks of oöcyte extraction 
and the benefits of scientific research. It has been suggested that the introduction of a 
payment system will increase the number of providers generally and these new providers are 
likely to be motivated by impersonal incentives like money and/or an abstract interest in 
science. These providers are contrasted with ‘passionate’ donors, women who have personal 
stakes in the research or may exchange their oöcytes for cheaper fertility treatment. Overall, 
the introduction of a payment system has been controversial because it is expected to target 
the vulnerability of women. 
 
Chapter Two examined the regulation of SCNT research in two countries, the UK and 
Australia, arguing that while these have common political and social heritage, each 
jurisdiction has approached SCNT research differently. Australia allowed SCNT research 
from 2007 but continues to ban the use of animal oöcytes and payment to individuals. In 
contrast, the UK permitted the research from 2001 and owing to the low levels of donated 
oöcytes it began compensating donors (in the amount of £750) in 2011.  
 
In Chapter Three, I surveyed the literature regarding oöcyte provision to SCNT research, 
paying close attention to the debate about the necessity of instituting a payment system and 
whether this will constitute an undue inducement, undermining the principle of free and 
autonomous participation in scientific research. I then discussed Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) 
                                                
81 Scholars such as Skene has had an advisory role as the Deputy-Chair of the Lockhart Committee and was its 
spokesperson after the Chair, Justice Lockhart suddenly died. 
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account of blood provision for therapeutic purposes because the tissue economies literature 
continues to debate the implications of his work. Titmuss advocated an anonymous blood-
donor model that avoided payment of any kind in order to exclude potential blood vendors 
who would put their own interests before the common good. Titmuss wanted to encourage 
altruism on a national scale where individuals could embrace the ‘universal stranger’ rather 
than direct their gift towards specific recipients.  
 
In chapter four, I developed my own eclectic framework for analysis. I critiqued the current 
approach on the basis that it remains too close to static binaries of gifts and commodities, it 
persists in constructing a conflict or division between a monolithic category of science and 
individuals and continues to uphold the idea that the ideal donor is motivated by rational 
means and gives to research as an abstract good directed to general – rather than specific – 
recipients. From this analysis, I generated research questions about the practical contexts of 
giving reproductive tissues and their sociological constructions by potential donors. In 
chapter five, I discussed the epistemological rationale for the current research achieving a 
dynamic understanding of gift giving as a relational process between donor, recipients and 
the broader institutional context in which it takes place. I presented the research design and 
outlined the means of recruiting the sample and the research methods utilised to achieve the 
study’s aim.  
 
Chapters six and seven reported the results of the research, organised in a thematic way by 
drawing on responses from cohorts to various questions. The results indicate that there is a 
general consensus among participants that they would not provide their good eggs for SCNT 
research. Participants in this study perceive oöcytes as a tissue whose significance is based 
on their reproductive function; it is a fragile reproductive tissue that must be managed and 
protected carefully. The results show that the majority of respondents are more inclined to 
provide infertile/clinically unviable oöcytes than fertile ones. The provision of infertile 
oöcytes to SCNT research may be considered a strategy of waste management, which 
enables further use of infertile eggs in a meaningful way.  
 
In examining the narratives of reproductive oöcyte donors, I sought to demonstrate that the 
affective overtones – namely the identification of a specified beneficiary or benefit – are a 
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crucial motivating factor in the process of oöcyte extraction and provision.82 Even if the 
oöcyte has a predominantly functional rather than moral significance, reproductive oöcyte 
donors are enabling the creation of sentient beings who need ‘good parents’. Based on this, I 
argued that the relationship between donor and recipient was an important element in 
undergoing the process of oöcyte extraction and argued that the technical and medical 
elements of oöcyte extraction are perceived as a means to an end, not an end in themselves. 
The provision of embryos created within the context of fertility treatment was also shown to 
vary. Viable, stored embryos, those which were considered surplus to the individual’s family 
size, were often considered appropriate for scientific research. Using Roberts’ kin ethics 
framework, I suggested that this is an important strategy for maintaining the biological 
foundations of kinship. From this data, I argued that whether participants wished to provide 
embryos ‘directly’ to others for reproductive purposes or to give embryos to fertility 
research, they were interacting with other fertility patients and their treatment had generated 
a specific identity in relation to the embryo.  
 
In discussions about providing oöcytes to SCNT research, most participants preferred to give 
in circumstances of a specified benefit or beneficiary. In the absence of these conditions 
(these do not currently exist), there was some confidence expressed that for-profit companies 
are more capable of transforming the initial gift into a clinical benefit, rather than non-profit 
researchers. The reciprocal relationship between the oöcyte provider and the research 
recipient is complex; on the one hand, some form of reciprocity is expected in recognition of 
the high level of commitment oöcyte extraction requires and the fact that companies will 
make a profit out of their research; on the other hand, the precise level of economic benefit is 
elusive and participants distinguished between two forms of money, ‘payment’ and 
‘compensation’. Participants who were undergoing fertility treatment consistently argued 
that egg-sharing models are potentially the most exploitative of women like themselves, 
because these models do not offer ‘true’ choice to women who may not have the financial 
resources to pursue fertility research. Instead, egg-sharing was perceived to prey on women 
                                                
82 As noted in chapter five, attempts at analysing the data changed between 2009 and 2013. Initially I tried to 
reconcile the data with existing literature on reproductive oocyte donation. However, I found this to be 
predominantly situated within a feminist discourse that was hostile to the process by assuming that it was based 
on inherent exploitation of women’s reproductive (biological) or social capacities. Eventually, I decided to use 
these narratives as a way of understanding what was different about oocyte provision to SCNT research. Prior 
to my candidature, I thought very little about oocyte provision for research and reproductive purposes and do 
not believe I was particularly ‘surprised’ by the results.  
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with little financial resources to utilise ARTs. Based on the data, I suggested that oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research was not considered rewarding in itself and it requires an 
affective dimension such as a specific benefit or beneficiary in order for it to be undertaken 
in an altruistic-donor context. 
 
In the following chapter, I intend to discuss the diverse attitudes, perceptions and practices 
regarding reproductive tissue provision for research and reproductive purposes in order to 
examine the significance that intending to become a mother may have. I first discuss the 
connection between gender and altruism, asserting that these are not as inflexibly connected 
as is often claimed by feminist scholars debating this issue. I sustain this claim by discussing 
the concept of discretionary reciprocity. This concept is derived from evidence showing that 
the specific social contexts in which gifts are given can determine the level of reciprocity in 
the relationship between the donor and recipient. Moreover, the construction of the 
recipient’s needs is crucial to the donor’s expectations of reciprocity. I contend discretionary 
reciprocity can account for practices of giving in known contexts that do not institute 
reciprocal relationships.  
 
I further discuss whether reciprocity for oocyte provision to SCNT research is invariably a 
fairer system by looking closely at the difficulty of finding an equivalent for oocytes, evident 
in the need by participants to distinguish between ‘compensation’ and ‘payment’. I do so by 
critically discussing Mauss’s approach to gift-exchange that insisted that objects had an 
inherent gift status because they were spiritually vital. I refer to the claim made in chapter 
four that the kula ritual to which Mauss based his claim of gift-giving-as-exchange does not 
actually reflect on how these objects came to be equivalents at all. It is important to 
understand this point in order to understand how some gifts can be constituted as ‘free’ – 
outside cycles of reciprocity. I then explore the implications of this point for contemporary 
debates regarding the institution of a payment model in Australia. Drawing on critical 
approaches to materiality discussed in chapter four, I argue that the object of money (as 
currency) is constituted in two ways; as ‘compensation’ or ‘payment’. Rather than being an 
inert object, money becomes vital once it passes a symbolic threshold. This can explain the 
ethical differences between the two forms and the concerns that participants and some 
scholars express about the institution of a payment system.  
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In spite of a weakened position as the only valid or pre-eminent means of explanation, 
scientific research continues to be an important part of contemporary society in an economic, 
social and cultural sense. Principle-based approaches may differ as to whether individuals 
should be paid to provide oöcytes to SCNT research but are united in the belief that the ideal 
donor is “rational”, that is disinterested in their own needs and will be motivated by abstract 
principles such as the advancement of scientific knowledge. As there are many ways people 
may enact the social role of contributor to science, I argue that the rationalised approach 
does not actually capture the ways which many people make sense of their contributions to 
scientific research. I do not claim that passionate and rational imperatives are mutually 
exclusive but that it is important to acknowledge that contributions to scientific research 
have passionate aspects. I use the term passionate to claim that people who give tissues are 
not abstract individuals but members of a community and they understand that giving (or 
withholding) their tissues can be connected to past efforts of donors and scientists. I refer to 
Levi-Strauss’s concept of generalized exchange. The current generation make their decisions 
about tissue provision in relation to the experiences of past members of the community 
because their identities are an effect of these practices. In the studies I draw upon, the 
abstract principle of accumulating scientific knowledge is present in the background but 
science effectively operates as a mediator between members of a community who enact a 
form of generalized-exchange. Thus, I claim that the momentum of scientific research is 
based on a relationship between individuals and specific identities, the tissue and the 
collective the research claims to benefit. Current appeals for women-in-general to provide 
their ‘good’ eggs to SCNT research does not evoke a specific social role such as mother, 
daughter, niece or aunt and thus remains too abstract to motivate one to undertake the 
process of oöcyte extraction.    
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Gifts, anonymity and reciprocity 
 
The results from this study demonstrate that gift-giving practices are variable, even with the 
same tissue and in identified contexts. This challenges Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) central claim 
that blood provision for therapeutic purposes can be a ‘free’ gift based simply on altruism. If 
blood provision is donated under conditions of anonymity, the relationship does not 
constitute a gift-exchange. The act of blood donation permits individuals to embrace the 
universal stranger and view their blood as a therapeutic connection rather than a basis for 
social divisions. At this level of analysis, Titmuss appears to diverge from Mauss’s (2002 
[1954]) analysis of the free gift as a social fiction, insisting that it can work despite much 
empirical research of contemporary gifting practices (Cheal 1988; Komter 2005; Shaw 
2008b, 2011). From this research it is evident that reciprocity is rarely enacted in precisely 
equivalent terms but that ultimately, the “failure to return a gift, or say thank you for that 
matter, symbolizes a refusal to cement the social and moral bond” (Shaw 2011, 299). 
However, I suggest that Titmuss and Mauss are not entirely opposed in their approaches 
regarding gift giving and that the former sought to structurally manage the imposition of a 
free gift system. Titmuss did not deny that gift giving would probably inevitably lead to gift-
exchange (the establishment of cycles of reciprocity) and thus insisted that the only way to 
avoid this was inter-personal anonymity. Hence, despite the differences between Mauss and 
Titmuss, they appear to converge regarding the universal nature of reciprocity between 
people inter-personally known to each other.   
 
The relationships between donors and their recipients in this study is a mixture of 
motivations and intentions and their altruism is not devoid of more practical concerns. As 
discussed in chapter seven, Australian fertility clinics do not act as oöcyte ‘brokers’ and have 
instead instituted an informal process of oöcyte donor recruitment between individuals.83 
Fertility clinics actively encourage their patients to find their own donors through their social 
networks or by advertising. After finding a donor, the recipient is expected to attend a 
fertility clinic with her donor in order to undergo a series of medical and psychological tests 
and mandatory counselling sessions prior to formalisation of the agreement with informed 
consent. The sense of intimacy that emerges between the donor and recipient is formed 
                                                
83 The company IVF Australia which has offices in NSW, Victoria, and Queensland does recruit semen 
providers.  
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outside of the clinic because the clinic does not undertake brokerage duties. As a 
consequence, the clinic mediates the technical aspects of oöcyte extraction and formally 
recognises the relationship between the donor and recipient with legal documents. Outside 
the context of oöcyte donation, the site is of little consequence to the donor.  
 
There are ‘instrumental’ elements in the process of providing oöcytes, even in the context of 
altruistic and inter-personally identified donation. Part of a narrative donors construct about 
their recipients is that they have been chosen precisely because they represent a ‘good 
parent’. Designating the recipient as a ‘good parent’ provides further basis for the donor to 
argue that she found someone whose needs are urgent and justified. The donor constructs 
herself as correcting a significant imbalance in the recipient’s life and returning it to 
equilibrium—achieving parenthood. Donors themselves retreat from cycles of reciprocity in 
two ways; they decline the importance of financial reward claiming they are rewarded by 
having helped another person and they insist that they do not wish to pursue long-term 
relationships with the recipients or children born from their donated oöcytes. Indeed, for 
some participants in our cohorts, particularly those in healthy donor cohort and women who 
had ‘spare’ embryos, the prospect of being identified as a donor was perceived as disturbing 
familial boundaries. Women who donated their oöcytes maintain that they are satisfied with 
choices made at the time of donation about the suitability of recipients and do not attempt to 
ensure that the recipients will live up to their expectations to behave as ‘good parents’. 
 
In the context of reproductive oöcyte donation Titmuss’s idea of the gift is compromised 
because it occurs as a form of identified tissue provision, that is, individuals are known to 
each other and the tissue is directed at a specific recipient rather than the universal stranger. 
By all accounts, it should involve the inevitable formation of reciprocal relationships. 
However, the consequences are surprising. The data indicate that establishing and/or 
maintaining social relations through gift giving is dependent on the context in which this 
occurs. Participants in our study do not always seek to maintain relationships with their 
recipients because the gift given can effectively act to undermine the biological basis of 
kinship. In seeking to help recipients become ‘good parents’, they maintain the nuclear 
family. Cycles of reciprocity involving recognition of the donor would further threaten the 
recipient woman’s ability in particular to be the child’s “authentic” mother because 
traditionally, the mother has been the figure who has contributed her DNA and gestated the 
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child (Jackson 2006). 84  The decisions made about reciprocity are connected to legal 
structures and social norms that privilege a particular definition of the family in which gift 
giving must be situated. Gift giving does not necessarily create gift-exchange because it does 
not occur in a social vacuum. In this context, the institution of the family comes to bear on 
the practice of gift giving. The idea of the family as nuclear, comprised of children with one 
biologically-related mother and father, helps to shape the role of the donor and the cycles of 
reciprocity that may be appropriate.  
 
Using anonymous donor systems to circulate blood and other tissues has broader 
implications for society. It can have a radical effect on society by establishing the inherent 
right to health, a condition to be objectively determined by medical authorities. A system 
where blood was given for specific races or castes reproduced systemic social divisions. 
Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) call for individual to embrace the ‘universal stranger’ through 
anonymous blood donation corresponds with other representations regarding donor’s 
selection of recipients. For instance, Bauman’s perspective quoted below suggests that 
recipients should be seen as an undifferentiated mass of needy people. Gift giving should not 
involve the evaluation of the recipient 
 
[I]n the case of the gift...the needs and the rights of others are the main - perhaps the 
only - motive for action...The goods are given away, the services are extended merely 
because the other person needs them and, being the person it is, has the rights for the 
needs to be respected (Bauman 1990, 90). 
 
In contrast, reproductive oöcyte donors demonstrate that they do not understand parenthood 
to be a universal expectation or ‘right’ to be granted simply because one wishes it; rather, 
some recipients are more ‘deserving’ than others. Reproductive oöcyte donors in our study 
do not regard fertility patients as a homogenous group of undifferentiated people in need. 
Instead, the ‘good parent’ has struggled with his or her fertility but also adheres to social 
norms about economic stability and child-centered parenting styles. While donors do not 
exclude people based on common social divisions such as race, sexuality or age, they 
nevertheless favoured couples whose parenting abilities were reinforced by their economic 
                                                
84 There is also much evidence to suggest that these issues occur within assisted insemination donation (Daniels 
1998; Hargreaves 2006; Grace, Daniels and Gillet. 2008).  
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status and the hardship of struggling infertility. Their strategies to select recipients indicate 
at least two things about families in contemporary Australian society: first, individuals 
expect to be able to make moral decisions about the creation of families without interference 
from government regulation and conservative social norms.85 Second, only some efforts to 
access healthcare are regarded as reasonable, that is parenthood is not a universal right. 
These strategies indicate that in some contexts, donors will not necessarily assess their 
recipients as worthy (indeed, there are legal restraints about this). Titmuss argued in the case 
of blood donation that the recipient has an inherent right to receive its therapeutic benefit. 
However, in the case of reproductive oöcyte provision, some recipients are more deserving 
than others because they represent ‘good’ parents. The evaluation practices in which our 
donors engaged reflect enduring social norms about ‘good parents’. Overall, gift giving in 
identified contexts does not inevitably lead to cycles of reciprocity because the recipient’s 
needs are situated in the broader social context.  
 
Discretionary reciprocity 
 
In contrast to reproductive oöcyte provision, participants do not consider the recipient of 
scientific oöcyte provision should be excluded from the obligations of reciprocity. This 
expectation of reciprocity is related to the fact that their decisions to donate are related to 
distinguishing which recipient is best situated to transform the gift into something tangible 
and ultimately useful. The scientific recipient is not characterised as deficient and thus the 
donor can argue they are addressing an important – but not a desperate – need. This 
especially relates to ‘for-profit’ research organisations because they can match the 
commitment to pursue ‘bench’ research with the material resources required to translate it 
into therapeutic applications. Thus, it may be argued that the industrialisation of scientific 
research, to some degree, contributes to expectations of reciprocity by potential donors 
(Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008; Dickenson and Alkorta Idiakez 2008). In this context of 
giving oöcytes, recipients are expected to recognise the effort of the donor in some way, 
perhaps as further acknowledgement that the donor has chosen wisely and given to the 
                                                
85 This does not neglect the fact that fertility treatment can still be limited or entirely denied to people who are 
not heterosexual and/or married. Also, this study did not actively seek to interview people whose sexual 
orientation or marital status impacted on their fertility treatment. In South Australia and Victoria, there are 
legislative restrictions imposed on same-sex attracted couples seeking fertility treatment including the use of 
donor gametes and in the state of Victoria, all prospective IVF patients are expected to undergo a police 
background check (Betts 2010). 
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‘right’ recipient. This is different from the basis of reproductive oöcyte donation where the 
recipients are identified as deficient in their capacity to be fertile. Despite the donation 
occurring between identified parties, norms of reciprocity are suspended. The gift resembles 
an act of charity, designed to restore the recipient to a point of equilibrium and, importantly, 
reciprocity is imagined to be superfluous to the donor's effort because she does not perceive 
the process to be a drain on her emotional and physical resources.  
 
It is beneficial to situate these different orientations regarding the provision of oöcytes 
within broad frameworks of gifts, giving and reciprocity defined by Titmuss (1997 [1970]) 
and Mauss (2002 [1954]). I refer to results that show participants’ evaluation of potential 
recipients consequently determines the type of relationships into which the parties enter, 
rather than an inevitable desire to give to others. The findings presented in this dissertation 
strongly indicate that participants’ expectations of reciprocity are contextual. I refer to this 
variability as discretionary reciprocity. When asked about receiving something in return for 
oocytes, participants in this study expect those recipients, such as a commercial research 
company, who can reciprocate to do so, while others, such a people using oöcytes for 
reproductive purposes are excluded from cycles of reciprocity. Gifts of oocytes for 
reproductive purposes are restrained in their uni-directional form by social norms that inhibit 
ongoing relationships between donors and recipients. By using the term discretionary 
reciprocity, I contend that practices of giving oöcytes are largely determined by the donor’s 
perception of whether the recipient is capable of reciprocating their gift. That is, gift giving 
does not necessarily lead to gift-exchange. 
 
The concept of discretionary reciprocity may appear to be redundant given that any object 
can be used to reciprocate the gift and research shows that it is rarely symmetrical (Komter 
2005; Shaw 2011). But my point relates to the idea that it is not the nature of the returned 
gift that is important but whether the gift should be returned at all. For instance, reproductive 
oöcyte donors do not need to be given oöcytes or a child in order to be reciprocated, 
anything may constitute a return gift. As I have demonstrated, the donor constructs the 
reproductive oöcyte recipient in a specific way, as incapable of fulfilling her own intentions 
for motherhood. In comparison with research companies, these women/couples are running 
their own “deficit”. This is why I suggest that despite all that reproductive oöcyte donors 
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give, the participants in our study rarely represented themselves at a loss of time or oöcytes. 
Hence, this claim diverges from conceptualisations of reciprocity as a universal part of gift 
giving (gift-exchange) where the parties are known to each other (Mauss 2002 [1954]; 
Titmuss 1997 [1970]). 
 
The term discretionary reciprocity may, to a degree, correspond with Testart’s (1998) 
critique of Mauss’s (2002 [1954]) conceptualisation of reciprocity as a universal part of gift 
giving. Testart demonstrates that in many contexts in which contemporary Western people 
give to others, such as change to homeless people on the street or invitations to dinner, the 
obligation of reciprocity is not reinforced by any legal sanction. In contrast, the chiefs 
partaking in potlatch ceremonies of Northwest Canada, to which Mauss referred, must 
reciprocate by destroying more of their wealth because “it is indeed the honour and the 
prestige of the chiefs that is at stake in the obligation to reciprocate” (Testart 1998, 99). 
Furthermore, the potlatch was an institutional and broader social event between groups 
rather than individuals. Thus if the tribal chief refused to partake in the potlatch in the 
prescribed way, his and others’ social roles may be jeopardised. However, distinguishing 
between legal and social sanctions does not sufficiently account for the fact of giving in the 
first instance and feelings of gratitude or potential offense if the gift is not reciprocated. In 
my own analysis of giving oöcytes in two different contexts, the term discretionary 
reciprocity indicates that the donor does not always give with the expectation that the gift 
will be reciprocated. Whether oöcytes are given without expectations of reciprocity is 
determined by the donor’s perceptions of the recipient and the reasons for giving oöcytes. 
This does not just refer to whether oöcytes are given with altruistic or instrumental intention 
but the outcome the donor hopes to achieve.  
 
Destablising the connection between altruism and femininity  
 
This analysis of oöcyte provision also diverges from predominantly feminist-oriented 
scholarship of the practice for predominantly reproductive purposes (Pollack 2003; Almeling 
2006, 2009; Shaw 2007, 2008a; Nahman 2008). Analysing the donor narrative, rather than 
isolating the reasons that contribute to their decisions, indicates that they have instrumental 
and altruistic concerns despite the fact that they cannot and do not expect to be financially 
remunerated for their actions. I argue that these two strands of motivation are the basis for 
 
186 
suspending norms of reciprocity and can account for the donor’s commitment throughout the 
relatively long process. This is not to dismiss scholarship that shows how assumptions about 
feminine and masculine behaviour can have material affects on policies and their 
implementation (Almeling 2009, 2011). Rather, it points to the limiting and one-dimensional 
assumptions about behaviour as either altruistic or instrumental, not both. For instance, in 
the context of the US, Spain and now the UK, rhetorics of altruism continue to be applied to 
oöcyte donation rather than semen, despite the fact that oöcyte donors are financially 
remunerated for their effort. 
 
As previously cited, Almeling (2011) argues that gift rhetoric persists in the context of 
providing eggs even when it is essentially a commercial aspect (money is traded for eggs) 
because ultimately it is the family that is for sale. Family life has long been considered a 
non-market space and thus egg selling “is a more direct violation of the cultural distinction 
between market and family than is paid sperm donation” (2011, 88). According to 
Almeling’s own approach, to consider the organisational and personal experiences of egg 
provision, maintaining the sanctity of the family may be considered a cultural imperative and 
thus is the organising principle of the entire process of commercial egg provision in the US. 
However, Almeling does not thoroughly speculate on the consequences of breaking such a 
taboo except to say women who are considered to be career egg providers or display too 
much interest in the financial aspects are either encouraged to downplay this or are rejected 
from the process. These exclusionary tactics are also reported by Pollack (2003). 
 
Feminist assumptions that the “powerful stereotype of female self-sacrifice [would create] in 
the minds of some women…an expectation that they surrender their own interests and 
assume the risks of egg extraction” (George 2008, 290) is comparable with similar 
assumptions on the part of scientists, such as Ian Wilmut, who appeal to women to donate 
oöcytes. The UK newspaper, The Guardian, quoted Wilmut saying:  
 
I have never doubted that women would donate if they thought we were helping people 
to have treatment. Our hope and belief is that women who have seen the devastating 
effect of [motor neurone] disease will be prepared to make such a donation (Sample 
and McLeod 2005). 
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Wilmut suggests that women could be motivated by the prospect of helping people with 
severe disabilities or diseases, now or in the future, and makes seamless the trajectory 
between women’s contributions, scientific research and therapeutic application. He “banks” 
on the currency of science, through which human society benefits from the conduct of 
scientific research. Both views contend that women can be referred to in an abstract and 
universal sense, as a category that is not socially and historically specific. This relies on a 
specific construction of the individual as being in tension with other individuals or the 
broader society and culture (Martin 1988; Strathern 1988). Gender is analysed in such a way 
as to deny the possibility of diversity or multiplicity; the conclusion is that women will feel 
obliged to give because it is an expression of femininity or women will sell their oöcytes 
because they are socially and economically vulnerable vis-à-vis men. In both instances, 
giving and/or providing is a consequence of patriarchal and capitalist power relations. The 
argument is circular: to be a woman in contemporary society is to give and/or provide and to 
give and/or provide is to be a woman. These views do not recognise the diversity of 
decisions made about oöcyte provision and ambiguities related to the conduct of scientific 
research. 
 
The data from this study suggests that a general anxiety about women being exploited for 
their socially defined roles as altruists and a distorted sense of self-sacrifice is largely 
unfounded, and that it is necessary, to revise the basis of this premise. Most participants, 
particularly those with experience of fertility treatment, emphatically reject the idea that they 
would give their ‘good’ eggs to SCNT research. This is contrary to the view of Ballantyne 
and de Lacey (2008) and Roberts and Throsby (2008) that such women will become oocyte 
suppliers by default. In part, this is because participants experience and construct their 
oöcytes as a fragile resource in the pursuit of their intention to become mothers. In order to 
achieve their maternal aspirations, women intend to keep all oöcytes until they have been 
differentiated through the process of fertilisation. Once this designation has been made, 
women will consider providing infertile/clinically unviable oöcytes to SCNT research. I 
contend that this finding provides important insight into the general lack of altruistic 
donation of oöcytes to SCNT research in the Global North and indicates that pressures 
women face to be ‘generous’ are not inevitable. As much as I would like it, this statement 
does not have universal resonance but it does echo Haimes’s (2013) findings that women in 
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the UK do not inevitably provide their oocytes for research even when they are “paid to 
share” (Roberts and Throsby 2008) and that those who did partake in the scheme had high 
incomes. The general lack of good eggs for SCNT research demonstrates that expectations 
of femininity-as-altruistic may be less powerful than social norms about motherhood and 
kinship structures. It suggests that while giving is generally considered an unqualified good, 
it occurs in relation to other intentions or narratives that the individual may intend to pursue, 
between which there may be tension or conflict.  
 
Reproductive tissue and the politics of motherhood 
 
At this stage, I want to connect this discussion to ideas about the citizen emerging in the 18th 
century, with which feminist and other liberal theorists in contemporary society continue to 
grapple. I suggest that ideas about the citizen are central to understanding the current lack of 
oöcytes and attempts to solve the problem. Historically, women have been excluded from 
enjoying the full rights of citizens, often refused recognition as independent political 
subjects, without the right to vote, own property or self-determination (Dickenson 1997). In 
the modern era, while the universality of equality was being promoted, the division between 
the feminine private sphere and the masculine public sphere was partially attributed to the 
nature of the sexes (Phelan 1999); for example, according to the 18th century political 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, women could not sustain the kind of abstract thought 
needed to engage in democracy, whereas men could be rational and objective (Phelan 1999). 
The private sphere of the home was seen as an important counter to the cold and calculating 
public sphere. Passions belonged in the private sphere and specific and private interests 
could be privileged over the universal and common good. These ideas continue to shape 
perceptions about feminine and masculine behaviour and are central to the discussion of 
oöcyte provision for SCNT research. I want to suggest that divisions between public and 
private spheres and expectations of altruism persist and are at the heart of the paradox of 
assumptions that women would altruistically give their oöcytes for SCNT research and the 
fact that so far, societies of the Global North have not witnessed significant demonstrations 
to do so.86  
                                                
86 I do not mean to suggest that by looking only at oocyte provision to SCNT research will deconstruct 
ideologies of altruism, or that other forms of tissue provision such as blood and organs do not grapple with 
similarly low rates of donors. However, I do think it is important to acknowledge that the emergence of stem 
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The political scholar Pateman (1992) argues that women have had a specific role within the 
public sphere that the state has largely been able to define and regulate. Pateman (1992, 19-
20) explores the capacity of women to make a ‘political contribution’ in a society divided 
between public and private spheres, arguing that it “rests on a major paradox: [women] have 
been excluded and included on the basis of the very same capacities and attributes”. What 
she means by this is that motherhood, which has been perceived as the ultimate expression 
of subjective feeling and the most intimate of relationships, has a political dimension to it 
(Voet 1998). This is distinct from other approaches which have defined political status and 
duty in narrow terms such as voting.87 According to Pateman (1992, 19-20), the political 
dimensions of the maternal role has its origins in political philosophy regarding republics. 
Modern republican polities were based on an actively engaged citizenry. In this gendered 
political order, men were expected to express their duty militarily, as defenders of the 
territory, while women expressed their duty as breeders of future citizens. As Pateman 
(1992, 29) points out, men’s duty to protect the state has transformed from serving in war to 
being economically productive but for women “motherhood and citizenship remain 
intimately linked”.88 Most recently in Australia, the idea of ‘citizen mother’ has been 
explicitly expressed by the federal Treasurer of Australia, Peter Costello who in 2004, urged 
women to increase their individual fertility rate by having three children; one each for dad, 
mum and country (Waldby and Cooper 2008). It is also evident in ongoing debates in 
Australia about women’s participation in employment, access to superannuation and 
adequate childcare facilities. The implications of maternal citizenship – as an expression of 
duty to others within a defined territory or in service to an ideological principle – are central 
to questions about oöcyte provision for SCNT research because it effectively provides a 
novel expression of women’s reproductive capacity, their own subjectivity and relationship 
with the polity. In utilising female gametes and relying on embryos that require significant 
female labour to produce, regenerative medicine can be considered a novel form of the 
political or “public” use of women’s reproductive capacity. This is related to the “public 
                                                                                                                                                 
cell research was greeted with a lot of scholarship based on assumptions about women’s “inherent” 
vulnerability and the inevitable imposition that scientific utilisations of reproductive tissues will generate. 
87 This idea is also different from de Beauvoir’s existential analysis of motherhood which are situated at the 
level of the individual.  
88 In contemporary societies, these divisions are of course blurring with participation in the workforce 
increasingly becoming the central duty and status symbol of citizens despite the difficult faced by minorities 
(Aapola, Gonick and Harris, 2005).  
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good” of scientific research and attempts by successive governments around the world to 
utilise its discoveries to improve health and control populations. Women’s bodies give to the 
polity through the production of scientific knowledge.  
 
Giving oöcytes to SCNT research could represent a distinct manifestation of female 
citizenship where the traditional utilisation of the oöcyte for kinship purposes is transformed 
into material for the universal stranger and an anonymised polity. This Titmuss-esque 
sentiment was encapsulated in Ian Wilmut’s appeal to women to provide oöcytes for his 
SCNT research discussed earlier. However, the novel tension between ‘mother’ and ‘citizen’ 
manifests differently regarding decisions about embryo provision to research. The kinds of 
relationships on which reproductive tissues should be based remains unexamined. At this 
stage, I simply wish to focus on the fact that the choice of motherhood instead of the 
provision of oöcytes to SCNT research does, to some degree, reinforce the idea that 
women’s reproduction does not have a Political89 dimension such as the interests of the state. 
In choosing to utilise their fertile oöcytes as reproductive tissues in the traditional sense and 
achieve aspirations to become mothers,90 participants in our study prioritise relationships 
that are ostensibly absent from the public sphere and exist in the private sphere, as intimate 
relations. Women’s altruism then is normative in specific contexts rather than an essential 
dimension of femininity.  
 
The preceding argument regarding the sustained preference to use oöcytes as traditional 
reproductive tissues remains inadequate in relation to the (hypothetical) provision of 
embryos for patients who have undertaken fertility treatment. In fact, the inverse seems to be 
applicable here; many participants give their embryos to research (fertility or stem cell) 
precisely because they are reproductive material–potential children. If they are surplus to the 
individual family’s requirements, they are not usually given to another family to raise as 
their child. The embryo being a fusion of oöcyte and sperm, it carries the DNA of both 
‘parents’ and, on a practical level, this means that the decision to donate them is a joint one. 
It may also indicate a specific protection of the male’s offspring, one not afforded to oöcytes, 
                                                
89 I use the capitalised term to denote the traditional and non-feminist sense which separates the individual self, 
society and the state.  
90 It is important to note that motherhood is not a uniform identity but for the purposes of this argument must be 
seen as a role that can be pursued. 
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and this connects to normative constructions of femininity.91 Yet, such patriarchal reasoning 
does not adequately explain responses regarding embryo provision to research; here, 
intentions to become a mother lead to different outcomes and decisions regarding the 
scientific utilisation of embryos.  
 
Giving away embryos to scientific research has the opportunity to disable their immediate 
reproductive potential and inevitably invokes the individuals’ experience of fertility 
treatment, without which the embryos cannot exist. Importantly, it usually occurs once the 
woman has become a mother rather than before or during the process. In the context of 
embryo provision specifically to scientific research, motherhood is not undermined; in fact, 
it may actually reinforce norms about motherhood that existed prior to the development of 
ARTs. This occurs because they want the biological and social basis of motherhood to 
remain intact. Participants do not want other women to gestate the foetus and for other 
families to raise the child to whom they are genetically related. Thus, intentions to become a 
mother in this context actually signify becoming a mother within the context of the nuclear 
family, where children have one mother and father from whom they have inherited their 
genetic makeup. Thus, we have a concrete framework for understanding the ‘conflict’ that is 
inherent in the question of women providing oöcytes to SCNT research; the role of ‘mother’ 
is not easily reconciled with ‘research oöcyte provider’, although we have seen that ‘mother’ 
may be reconciled with ‘embryo provider’. Based on these findings, I assert that intentions 
to become a mother manifest differently in the case of oöcyte and embryo provision. 
 
The different utilisations of reproductive tissue have compelling implications for discussions 
of risk in relation to femininity and reproduction. Risk is not a universal concept and its 
understanding and management vary on the basis of gender, age and class (Bunton, 
Crawshaw and Green 2004). Participants in our study, particularly those in cohort one, 
employ a specific strategy that imposes a quantitative plan to counteract the qualitative 
opaqueness of oöcytes. In this context, good eggs must not be lost and because the fertility 
of oöcytes is unknown prior to fertilisation, all oöcytes are potentially ‘good eggs’. Each 
utilisation runs in parallel to the other, that is utilising oöcytes for research annuls the 
                                                
91 As shown in chapter six, one participant in cohort one, Caroline, articulated this by suggesting: Because “my 
oöcyte and Paul’s sperm together is our child.” I also refer to the fact that clinical guidelines will expect any 
disposition questions to be resolved by both patients.  
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possibility of using them for reproductive purposes and vice versa. In contrast, for 
participants in cohort one, the frozen embryo can be utilised for both reproductive and 
research purposes. Having “finished their families” giving embryos to stem cell research 
maintained the connections between biology and kinship; indeed for some participants and 
scientists, stem cell research is an extension of its traditional reproductive capacity (Franklin 
2006; Parry 2006). Thus, the biological properties of each tissue have different implications 
for the individual’s intention to become a mother and oöcytes and embryos are utilised 
differently to achieve this.  
 
Forms of money and problems of equivalency 
 
So far I have suggested that oöcyte and embryo provision to research must be understood by 
paying close attention to the relationships between the tissue, the donor and recipient as well 
as broader institutional contexts in which these practices occur. I discussed the term 
discretionary reciprocity to refer to evidence showing that donors perceive the merits of 
recipients distinctly and this contributes to different expectations of reciprocity. In this 
section I discuss further the complexities of gift giving in the scientific context and the 
problems related to establishing a financial equivalent for oöcytes. I will examine how the 
same object–money (as currency)–can exist in two different forms. I argue that the form of 
‘compensation’ is more palatable to participants because it may not influence their decisions 
to provide oöcytes for SCNT research in the same way as ‘payment’. I sustain this claim by 
drawing on critical approaches to materiality discussed in chapter four.  
 
An oöcyte can be a unique example of such an object in the ‘rationalised’ Western society; 
as the bearer of the donor’s DNA, it can be considered quite literally to carry the individual’s 
essence. DNA has special resonance in contemporary society, replacing blood as a signifier 
of the individual’s status in society. Genetic testing can be used to augur some events in an 
individual’s biography; in contrast, blood tends to tell the story in reverse and reflect the 
risks an individual has or has not taken (Valentine 2005). Yet giving oöcytes, particularly for 
reproductive purposes, can be quite a paradoxical process because the very substance donors 
are giving could undermine the broader implications of the undertaking; helping others to 
create a family while undermining the chances of having their own. As reported by other 
scholars such as Kirkman (2003), Orobitg and Salazar (2005) and Haylett (2012), the data 
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collected in this study reflects the efforts of donors to minimise the possibility that the 
oöcyte can represent a social relationship between themselves and the potential offspring. If 
the conventional connection between biology and kinship is emphasised, it is likely to 
undermine the donor’s attempts to give the recipient woman an authentic sense of 
motherhood, not just a child.  
 
The individualising force of an oöcyte is less important than its functional capacity. 
Therefore, once this functionality is proven, infertile oöcytes are moved from the 
reproductive sphere to research. These latter oöcytes no longer represent a reproductive 
tissue and their claim to the reproductive sphere is lost. In contrast, giving embryos for 
reproductive purposes has the potential to maintain this individualising force. How the 
fertility patient feels about this will determine if the embryos is shifted from the sphere of 
reproduction to research. The embryo is never devoid of its individualising force but neither 
can this be entirely separated from the broader basis of biological function–namely, the 
kinship the embryo signifies.    
 
Understanding this broader context of oöcyte provision to SCNT and the multidimensional 
social space in which objects are located is necessary but may not fully explain why it is 
difficult for participants in our study to define an appropriate form of reciprocity in exchange 
for oöcytes. Advocates of a payment system in particular have not sufficiently examined 
specific moral issues which emerge with monetisation, that is participants felt that being 
motivated primarily by money provoked questions about one’s ability to maintain a sense of 
autonomy. However, this does not mean it is necessary to reiterate arguments regarding the 
inherent ‘evil’ of money; instead, it is important to distinguish between two forms of 
money–‘compensation’ and ‘payment’ – and examine their symbolic dimensions in relation 
to donor motivation. 
 
For our participants, there remained considerable ambiguity about a financial equivalent to 
providing oöcytes to SCNT research. This issue draws attention to some inadequacies in 
advocating for women to be paid on the basis of an impersonal motivation, rather than the 
personal motivation of helping a sick family member or friend by advancing research related 
to their disease (Isasi and Knoppers 2007; Thompson 2007; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008 
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and Skene 2009; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011; Haimes et al. 2013). Economic 
remuneration is expected to motivate women on an impersonal basis and relieve pressure on 
women to provide oöcytes on a personal basis. On another level, these scholars recognise 
that oöcyte extraction is a long and onerous process for women, though Skene (2009) is most 
explicit in claiming that payment would align oöcyte extraction for SCNT research with 
other ‘risky’ forms of labour. Based on the analogy of work, the expectation of economic 
remuneration is likely. Participants in this study do consider oöcyte provision to be hard 
work requiring more discipline than other forms of tissue provision such as blood. However, 
they did not conflate this discipline with labour, which is a form of activity that is exchanged 
for economic remuneration. The anxiety generated by ‘payment’ might evoke the spectre of 
undertaking oöcyte extraction as an income source.   
 
So far, I have argued that the functional capacity of oöcytes generally inhibits the movement 
of ‘good eggs’ from one sphere to another but identifying a good parent may actually ‘shift’ 
oöcytes to be used for another woman’s intentions to become a mother rather than one’s 
own. If money is to be given in exchange for oöcytes, this amount must be quantified. 
Finding an equivalent for oöcytes given to scientific research is complex; I illustrate this by 
examining results that show that the same object in a different form provokes specific 
reactions. This evidence unsettles simplistic assumptions about the monetisation of 
equivalency because not all money is the same. I argue that money can be more animated 
than usually allowed and this has important consequences for potential donors. The 
significance of the form with which donors are comfortable demonstrates that contrary to 
prevalent scholarly thought in this debate, money is not an instrumental mechanism that will 
automatically increase the supply of good eggs.  
 
The participants in our study did not reach a consensus about the appropriate remuneration 
for oöcyte provision for SCNT research. One consensus they did reach was their preference 
for being ‘compensated’ rather than accepting ‘payment’ for their efforts.92 I consider this 
distinction to be an important finding of this research. Preferences for ‘compensation’ over 
‘payment’ signify that perceptions of gift giving not only involve the recipient and what they 
may reciprocate, but suggests a specific moral deed on the part of the donor. Here I develop 
                                                
92 This distinction is also evident in institutional practices which maintain distinctions between compensation 
and payment.  
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the claim that the object of money (as-currency) takes two forms: ‘payment’ and 
‘compensation’. Being ‘paid’ to provide oöcytes for SCNT research generates anxieties 
about being motivated entirely or primarily by an impersonal incentive. One basis for this 
assertion is that there is likely to be no real difference in the sum of money women receive in 
‘payment’ or ‘compensation’ to provide oöcytes for SCNT research. As the example of 
oöcyte provision in Romania demonstrates, women who are ostensibly ‘compensated’ are 
given a sum of money that is so generous by local standards that it can be a basis for women 
to undertake oöcyte extraction as an independent income source (Nahman 2008).  
 
Thus, it is imperative to recognise and reflect on the oppositional meanings and feelings, 
these two words evoke.93 As the participants in our study actually rejected the idea of being 
‘paid’ with money, I claim that ‘payment’ can be interpreted as a sum of money that not only 
counterbalances the effort involved in oöcyte extraction but, more importantly, it is a sum of 
money that transforms the decision to provide oöcytes into one that is based primarily on an 
impersonal incentive. ‘Payment’ shifts the reasons for providing oöcytes to the donor’s own 
benefit rather in relation to a specified beneficiary or benefit. In contrast, ‘compensation’ is a 
sum of money that recognises the significant effort of the donor but is insufficient enough 
that it remains peripheral to the decision to provide oöcytes. ‘Compensation’ does not 
eclipse other motivations the donor may have and thus it is offers an ethical basis for 
providing oöcytes. The different feelings towards being ‘paid’ and ‘compensated’ suggest 
that the problem per se is not the exchange of money for oöcytes. This unsettles Titmuss’s 
strict binary between money and selling on the one hand and donation and altruism on the 
other. These results indicate that expectations of reciprocity is quite a different process to 
establishing an appropriate equivalent for an object, even in the context of industrialised 
science where oöcyte provision for SCNT research occurs.94 
                                                
93 As Wearing (1996, 130) states, “symbols are powerful tools, and can be used effectively to control and 
influence our own behaviours and beliefs”. 
94 Sandel (2012) can be considered an update of Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) critique of the encroachment of 
market norms that have created a market society rather than simply a market economy. Sandel considers many 
examples where a market exchange has been introduced or come to dominate practices or areas of life where, 
until recently, none existed. One example among many is that lobby groups can hire people to stand in lines for 
important congressional meetings until the meeting begins and they take their place in the meeting. Without 
this line-standing service, the lobbyist would not be able to attend the meeting without sacrificing his or her 
own time. Although this is not related explicitly to my topic of the scientific utilisation of eggs, I reflect on this 
point to some degree to show that Sandel’s (2012) approach while never predictable or simple does tend to 
involve the challenge to market logic on the basis of two principles: fairness and corruption. Sandel’s 
discussion of blood provision follows this line of thought. Based on his rejection of an economist view that 
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The ambiguous division between ‘compensation’ and ‘payment’ shows that some 
manifestations of reciprocity may actually threaten a certain perception that the donor has of 
herself. I do not regard this a matter of potentially becoming further indebted, but that of 
having her motivation and, most importantly, her ‘existential certainty’ questioned. What I 
mean by this is that in most analyses of gift giving, a delicate balance is evident. Based on 
recent research into gift giving in The Netherlands, Komter (2005) argues that the ‘original’ 
gift given by the donor must be so that the recipient returns the gift with interest without too 
much imposition. The original gift cannot be so much that the recipient feels or is incapable 
of reciprocating. Mauss (2002 [1954]) discussed potlatch ceremonies of Northwest Canada 
as contests of honour. Here, tribal chiefs competed with their counterparts in destroying their 
wealth by hurling it into the sea or burning it. Mauss argued that the intention of the ritual 
was to shame others for their lack of generosity to their god(s). In the context of oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research, it is possible to assume giving oöcytes creates an imbalance for 
the donor herself, because the process of oöcyte extraction can take a significant toll on her. 
Maintaining a disdain for payment could be construed as an effort to ‘shame’ recipients for 
their inadequacies. However, this interpretation is not sufficient for two reasons: first, the 
reproductive donors in our study saw the process of oöcyte extraction as a means to an end 
and did not consider themselves to become deficient by it; in fact, the recipient’s own deficit 
was restored by the donation. Second, in this context the donor would be ‘shamed’ if she is 
given more money than was sufficient because it would indicate that her intentions are 
instrumental more than anything else.  
 
My claims about the existential threat ‘payment’ poses are sustained by the lack of 
consensus regarding what constituted an appropriate equivalent. While it was consistently 
argued by participants that in the context of oöcyte provision for SCNT research, the 
recipient should reciprocate in some way, the impersonal equivalent of ‘payment’ could be 
interpreted in a negative way, appearing to primarily motivate the donor. In other words, 
                                                                                                                                                 
market transactions have no impact on the thing traded, Sandel argues that once blood provision is made a 
commercial transaction, the act of non-commercial (altruistic) blood provision may then be considered a way 
of depriving the blood seller of their income. Another counter-argument to economist view of altruistic blood 
provision is that it relies on the idea that altruism, like other virtues, is naturally in short supply and presumably 
the state and/or society should not expect individuals to deplete such resources. Interestingly, acting in such 
virtuous ways with families and friends is considered normal and needs to be protected. 
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despite its lack of specified benefit or beneficiary, participants believe that giving oöcytes to 
SCNT research should not be entirely instrumental.95 This helps to construct, to a degree, 
oöcyte provision as free and beyond reciprocity. Ultimately, however, the picture is more 
complicated than this. If the donor is ‘compensated’ her real intentions remain clear and 
untarnished; she simply has had her hard work recognised. ‘Payment’ not only takes on the 
character of coercion but undermines the intention of the donor to help.  
 
This returns us to the spirit of the contemporary debate in surprising ways. Titmuss wanted 
to foster support for the universal stranger on the basis of his or her inherent humanity, not 
because the donor would stand to gain by helping. His discussion of this is a construction of 
a dichotomy between self-oriented vendors and other-oriented donors. However, more 
recently Thompson (2007) and Ballantyne and de Lacey (2008) argue that payment is the 
only effective means to avoid the problem of other-oriented donors; ‘payment’ creates the 
opportunity for self-oriented vendors to sell their oöcytes and relieve pressure from women 
who are other-oriented and whose incentives are personal. As ‘payment’ raises more 
questions about the donor’s ethical behaviour than does ‘compensation’, these results 
indicate that providing oöcytes for SCNT research on an entirely impersonal basis is 
existentially suspect.96   
 
Payment and freedom 
 
Paying women to provide oöcytes to SCNT research with money can be seen as a 
continuation of depersonalising relationships that characterise contemporary society. This 
would create the scenario Titmuss hoped to avoid: a social world of individuals who 
contracted with others as instrumental means. Titmuss’s model of blood donation was as 
much about exclusion as it was about inclusion; keeping the right people in and the wrong 
people out. However, in this representation, money appears to be irresistible for those whom 
fate has reduced to poverty. By selling their blood, the needs of the poor are met despite the 
potential danger to others. In contemporary approaches to the question of exchanging 
oöcytes for money, it is a rational outcome of the calculation between the potential donor’s 
                                                
95 This was not a view shared by women undertaking fertility patients regarding other potential oöcyte 
providers who they often constructed as money-hungry, poor and solely motivated by pecuniary interests.  
96 Assumptions that there is a specifically feminine form of ethical reasoning are not supported by the 
following discussion. 
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own effort to provide oöcytes and the commercial profit research with the oöcytes is likely to 
provide (Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008; Waldby and Cooper 2010). Accepting money 
should be largely uncontroversial. However, as I have already suggested, ‘payment’ 
provoked an anxiety that ‘compensation’ did not. If these are essentially two forms of the 
same thing, it is necessary to employ an alternative narrative to the rational arguments so far 
provided.  
 
It is immediately apparent that the these distinctions are nebulous. Participants in our study 
found it difficult to quantify ‘compensation’ versus ‘payment’ because the threshold between 
the two is subjective and contextual; it will mean something different to individual who must 
contend with the local costs of living. As oöcyte provision in a global context illustrates, one 
woman’s token payment is another’s annual wage (Nahman 2008; Almeling 2009). For the 
purposes of this discussion, I will explore further the latent meanings of money–whether it is 
regarded as ‘compensation’ or ‘payment’ –as a means of remunerating the individual 
provider financially. Participants in our study demonstrate a clear lack of seeking to 
capitalise on their resources – this includes the opportunity to receive reduced-cost, or free 
fertility treatment. This cannot simply be explained by gendered norms related to self-
sacrifice, the importance of achieving motherhood or the honour of giving in greater 
capacity than the recipient. I argue that ultimately the difference between ‘compensation’ 
and ‘payment’ is related to latent meanings of the object of money(as-currency) in Western 
societies. Drawing on critical approaches to materiality, I argue that the object considered to 
be entirely anonymised and inanimate is actually the reverse.  
 
Western philosophical traditions encompass two broad schools of thought regarding money; 
one in which money can be morally fraught and one in which money can liberate (Bloch and 
Parry 1989). In recent history, establishing equivalences is regarded as having a uni-
directional trajectory. Indeed, the social theorist Georg Simmel (1950) argued that money is 
the very essence of modernity. What Simmel meant by this is that the predominance of the 
money economy is part of the modern West’s radical break with traditional society. The 
modern era is based on urbanisation, industrialization and new forms of personal conduct 
and social relations. In particular, urbanisation draws together people who have no ‘natural’ 
connection between each other in addition to creating significant distance between producers 
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and consumers. 97  Individuals interact with mediators, such as the retailer, and this 
relationship is instrumental. The qualitative dimensions of ‘things’ diminish in importance 
and are eclipsed by quantitative considerations. Simmel (1950, 330) argued that the most 
important question for the individual in the metropolis is “how much?” 
 
Simmel represented the predominance of the money economy as a fait accompli–that more 
and more ‘things’ will be reduced to their quantitative dimensions. However, he also 
maintained that such an economy produces a new level of freedom unprecedented in history. 
Simmel (1990 [1900], 286) contrasted the social and property hierarchies within the feudal 
and modern eras to argue that individuals are given more autonomy to conduct their affairs 
through the increasing use of money: 
 
The lord of the manor who can demand a quantity of beer or poultry or honey from a 
serf thereby determines the activity of the latter in a certain direction. But the moment 
he imposes merely a money levy the peasant is free, in so far as he can decided 
whether to keep bees or cattle or anything else.  
 
A transaction with money changes the relationship between the transactors and provides a 
level of anonymity and flexibility. Trade with money releases one individual in the 
relationship from having to adhere to narrow definitions of conduct and products. Simmel’s 
semi-optimistic perspective on money is different to the other branch of philosophical and 
religious approaches in the Western tradition. For example, in Ancient Greek society, 
Aristotle (cited in Bloch and Parry 1989, 2) wrote that the finite needs of humans could be 
satisfied by home-based production and any “[p]rofit-oriented exchange is…unnatural; and 
is destructive of the bonds between households...Money as a tool intended only to facilitate 
exchange is naturally barren, and, of all the ways of getting wealth, lend at interest – where 
money is made to yield a ‘crop’ or ‘litter’ – is ‘the most contrary to nature’”.  
 
While the approaches of Simmel or Aristotle may appear oppositional, I claim that they are 
based on the same principle: the object of money, has inherent qualities that may transform 
people and relationships at a personal and structural level. As currency has existed for 
                                                
97 It is difficult to ignore a similar sense in this narrative of once naturally entangled objects (in this case 
humans) and the detachment and disassociation that the monetised modern period has brought (Callon 1998).  
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centuries (Miller 2002), I do not claim that it is money per se which provokes anxiety for 
participants. Indeed, my argument is that money-as-currency is not the problem because 
participants would ultimately accept a material equivalent for their oöcytes but preferred 
compensation over payment; this demonstrates that money-as-currency is "dangerous’ only 
when it surpasses a certain amount. This threshold, however, is largely symbolic. I argue that 
the issue of offering money for women to provide oöcytes for SCNT research evokes the 
promise to which Simmel referred–the potential for freedom –and yet also raises significant 
ethical questions about that behaviour. To imply that ‘money’ is the focus of an individual’s 
motivation is to upset the perception of the donor as motivated by more noble ambitions. My 
claim is based on the anxieties evident in our participants.  This evidence suggests that 
money-as currency is not an inert and innocuous object–a thing, as Waldby & Mitchell 
(2006, 68) label it, of “pure exchange value without use value of its own [circulating] 
anonymously, changing from hand to hand, indefinitely substitutable for itself”. Rather 
money in the form of ‘payment’ is represented as having a vitality of its own that may 
undermine the existential certainty of the donor.  I would suggest that money is not simply a 
thing onto which the individual may project their own meanings but has its own subjectivity. 
In different amounts, it can change its ability to compel people to change their minds, 
particularly in contexts where a desired behaviour is lacking,– such as the provision of 
oöcytes for SCNT research. Thompson (2007), Skene, (2009), George (2008) and Thompson 
(2009) each wield the prospect of giving money to women who provide oöcytes to SCNT 
research as a powerful structural change. While I do not suggest that money is a sentient 
being – indeed, there may be objections to using the term ‘subjectivity’ because it is usually 
used to refer to a vital being with the capacity to make decisions–I do suggest that the 
disdain for ‘payment’ reveals a hesitation on the part of our participants to give their oöcytes 
for an impersonal motivation. This suggests that doing something for an entirely 
instrumental reason will create a certain existential anxiety about the donor’s own sense of 
freedom.  
 
To reinforce this argument, I draw on Miller’s scholarship, which provides a nuanced view 
of human subjectivity, the material world and the relationship between the two (Miller 2001; 
2002; 2003; 2005 and 2008). Miller (2008, 287) critically examines assumptions evident in 
scholarly approaches towards the animated social world and its inanimate material 
counterpart, arguing that “[w]hatever a person does, whether cooking or moving from one 
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room to another, the order of things in time and space reinforces their basic beliefs about the 
natural order of the world”. The social world does not just include the relationships between 
human individuals and groups (precisely that which sociology is meant to examine) but the 
objects that populate physical spaces. Objects are a crucial means of relating to others and 
ourselves and contribute to individual subjectivity.  
 
The relationship between humans and objects are usually regarded as operating in a single 
direction. Objects such as furniture or machines are produced by humans and exist merely in 
relation to the human, not in and of themselves. Another view posits that objects and 
humans are mutually constitutive, that objects be as vital as humans. As Miller (2008, 287) 
argues “people exist for us in and through their material presence”. On the one hand, he 
means that it is on the basis of consuming certain ‘paraphernalia’ throughout their lives that 
people become ‘subjects’; ‘things’ such as books, music, food, cars, clothes, houses are part 
of a process of subjectification. This view differs from scholarship which studies the 
economic implications of being able to consume things. A common lament from scholars 
and lay people is that in contemporary society, people identify themselves and others 
through ‘things’, not through more traditional forms of identity such as place or family (J. 
Shaw 2010).98 On the other hand, Miller (2008) goes on to argue that ‘things’ have their own 
agency and exist in social spaces; they have their own intrinsic meaning that must be 
negotiated. Humans have common understandings of things and how to use them; we don’t 
eat on chairs, we sit on them; we do not cook in cars, we drive them. It is this meaning that I 
wish to draw on in relation to money and to illustrate with an anecdote from the 
anthropologist Bloch, describing an incident that occurred on his leaving fieldwork in 
Madagascar. Handed a wad of bills from his host, Bloch (1989, 165 emphasis added) 
remembers the shameful feelings on its presentation “without even a decontaminating 
envelope”.  
 
Critical approaches to materiality are distinct because they dissolve the dichotomy between 
the inanimate world of the West and the vital objects of ‘archaic’ gift-exchange societies to 
which Mauss (2002 [1954]) referred. From this study, we have seen that the gift giving does 
not necessarily involve a gift with an individualising force and other factors contribute to the 
                                                
98 This tends to ignore the fact that before the advent of consumer society, one’s access to objects also indicated 
their social status (see Bauman 1991).  
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movement between spheres of exchange. On the other hand, the object that is usually 
referred to as having the least differentiation and vitality (notwithstanding Zelizer’s (2011) 
research on “pin-money”) can unsettle its recipient. As Bloch recalls, money that had no 
ornamentation to hide it provoked disturbing feelings about pollution and by default its 
other–purity.  The wish for the gift of cash to be obscured by the another object (the 
envelope) appears to suggest that the problem is not money-as-currency per se but its 
exposure and, by extension, that of the recipient. Bloch’s situation recalls paying women to 
provides oöcyte to SCNT research because money-as-currency is the centre of the 
relationship and may transform the transaction into an entirely instrumental one. 
 
The results from our study show two forms of the same object provoking different reactions. 
Other research suggests that reciprocity is rarely symmetrical (Komter 2005) or “tit-for-tat” 
(Shaw 2011, 298); Young (1997) argues that to return a gift with the same object is not 
giving (or rather generous) at all. However, my analysis is distinct because it illustrates that 
in this context there is no difference in the object given (money-as-currency) but in the 
significance of the amount: the difference between accepting ‘enough’ and ‘too much’ 
money. Thus, the same object provokes different reactions because it will refer to and 
perhaps undermine the donor’s original intentions. ‘Compensation’ is perceived to recognise 
the effort of the donor while ‘payment’ will suggest she has no other motives than 
instrumental ones. One’s personal identity hinges on this rather fragile and symbolic 
separation between being motivated by impersonal incentives and personal ones. This 
analysis reveals that there is something beyond the analytical understanding of oöcyte 
provision to SCNT research and these different perceptions must be taken seriously in order 
to effectively address the shortage of good eggs. Relationships between people, animals and 
objects, made and found, constitute the social world. Having money or other economic 
wealth is usually regarded as a status symbol and its increase can signify good management. 
In this context, however, if money is considered ‘payment’ rather than ‘compensation’ it will 
change the moral status of the individual in a negative way. 
 
The preceding discussion has sought to elaborate on some difficulties in establishing and 
quantifying an equivalent for women to provide oöcytes to SNCT research. Based on data I 
have argued that participants find it difficult to accept ‘payment’ because it is regarded as 
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too impersonal an incentive and this is why they preferred to be ‘compensated’. As both of 
these terms represent money-as-currency, I speculated on the symbolic differences between 
the two. I argued that ‘payment’ represents a virtually vital object with the capacity to 
compel individuals to make decisions they ordinarily would not make. This analysis 
connects latent views of money-as-currency, individual independence and donor motivation. 
In doing so, the debate regarding oöcyte provision for SCNT research is critically reframed 
as privileging a rationalist conception of materiality rather than capturing the complex 
relationship between humans, their bodies and human-made objects such as money. 
Including these latter perspectives will contribute to more holistic explanations of 
participant’s resistance to payment or providing oöcytes to SCNT research in the first 
instance.  
 
Checking passion at the door: rationally finding the ‘public good’  
 
I have thus far discussed the results of this study within a framework that draws on 
anthropological and sociological understandings of social life and that counters more 
rationalised representations of human and material subjectivity. SCNT research asks women 
to utilise their oöcytes in the ‘public sphere’ of scientific research rather than their traditional 
reproductive utilisation in the ‘private sphere’ – to create children. I have demonstrated that 
it is difficult for women to become ‘good eggs’ – donors providing social benefit – because 
the reproductive capacity of their good eggs is mutually exclusive with SCNT research. In 
contrast, stem cell research does not undermine the reproductive capacity of excess-to-
treatment embryos. These differences relate to the individual’s intention to become a mother. 
The following analysis attempts to capture the relational dynamism between citizens and 
scientific research. My analysis will examine the current lack of oöcyte provision for SCNT 
research and the solution of paying women in reference to the specific place of scientific 
research in an ostensibly scientific society.  
 
Increasing the number of rational providers is the anticipated result of introducing economic 
remuneration in exchange for ‘good eggs’ (Thompson 2007; Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008: 
Skene 2009). These women are contrasted with those who are interested in the potential 
outcomes of SCNT research or those who are being treated for [in]fertility – the latter 
representing at best, a sample of convenience or at worst, coercion and debts of gratitude 
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(Ballantyne and de Lacey 2008; Scully et al. 2012). For these scholars, motivation by 
payment is the lesser evil in this scenario and represents the main difference with Titmuss’s 
blood donor model. These arguments are based on technical aspects of the process of 
extraction and the ultimate use of the tissue; drawing blood is not especially painful and 
sharing the substance is a signifier of good health or risk management (Valentine 2005). 
Giving good eggs to SCNT research is an onerous process requiring self-discipline and may 
involve adverse reactions to the medication. In contrast to semen, the fertility of oöcytes is 
not dependent on the lifestyle and genetic identity of the provider (Oliva et al. 2001; 
Dickenson 2006). Payment is considered to bear no relationship to the individual’s moral 
character but rather the inequitable structure of scientific research.  
 
Ultimately, however, the payment model is not very dissimilar from the donor model 
advocated by Titmuss, who was anxious to exclude those people who privileged their 
‘private’ interests over the common good.99 While superficially distinct, Titmuss and the 
inheritors of his legacy remain committed to the idea that the best kind of donor is one 
whose motivation occurs on an impersonal basis and whose intentions are directed at the 
general, rather than specific, benefit or beneficiary. In this case, the progress of scientific 
research should be considered a good in itself. Titmuss advocated for citizens to give blood 
in a similarly abstract way; that is, to give to the generic recipient and to do so without 
personal benefit. His approach is based on ‘rational’ rather than ‘passionate’ associations 
because it does not allow donors to pick and choose their recipient on personal preference 
(or vice versa).  
 
Efforts by scholars and lay people to dismantle divisions between the public and private 
spheres and the assumptions on which they are based have not permeated the discussion of 
oöcyte provision to SCNT research. Predictions that women will act altruistically in the 
public sphere are carried over from expectations of their behaviour in the private. The 
scientific utilisation of women’s reproductive capacity moves that reproductive capacity into 
the public sphere in a more obvious way than having children. So far this request has been 
made on the basis of altruism which invokes the woman of the “private” sphere. “Payment” 
                                                
99 I do not claim that disinterestedness is a specifically Western approach to ethics or politics: as Reddy (2007) 
shows there are Sanskrit origins to embracing humanity in a universal manner.  
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transforms the exchange into an impartial transaction where specific interests are again 
effaced or precluded. Advocating that oöcyte provision to SCNT research should be paid 
because it will encourage the impartial contributor (Thompson 2007; Ballantyne and de 
Lacey 2008) remains committed to the view that citizenship is awarded based on the ability 
to exercise impartiality (here manifest in the eschewing of emotional interest in SCNT 
research) despite being generally critical of traditional approaches to gender roles and public 
life where women could not be considered as citizens with civil, political and social rights 
because they were considered incapable of transcending the specificity of their worldview or 
experience.  
 
Participants, particularly in the ‘healthy donor’ cohort, showed distinct preferences for 
oöcyte provision in contexts of a specified beneficiary or benefit. This condition produced 
the least amount of anxiety or concern about undertaking the process, including the loss of 
potentially fertile oöcytes, and is the difference between simply supporting this scientific 
research and contributing to its progress. Within such an affective framework, participants 
can reconcile a number of problems pertaining to oöcyte extraction for SCNT research, 
including property relations and the process of extraction. While ‘passionate’ associations, 
based on specificity, describe the provision of tissues more accurately, this does not mean 
that “rational” and “passionate” contributions are mutually exclusive. “Passionate” 
contributors to scientific research can also recognise the rational dimensions of the act. For 
instance, science is an endeavour based on rational principles: scientists converge to discover 
universal knowledge and their associations are built on merit rather than personal preference. 
Based on the principle of evidence, science is also democratic and scientists are not expected 
to adhere to previous knowledge if evidence to the contrary is found. Science is conducted in 
rational ways and it also represents rationality – reason based on evidence. All of these 
principles are evident in scientific research but they are not the only factors which motivate 
people to contribute to its advancement. For lay contributors, they are latent: present but are 
usually in the background. 
 
In asserting that participants seek to provide to research with a specific beneficiary or 
benefit, my analysis corresponds with other research regarding various forms of donation in 
the Australian community where people are most likely to give in scenarios where they can 
identify a specified benefit or beneficiary (Lyons, McGregor-Lowndes and O’Donoghue 
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2006). This finding poses yet another problem for scholars examining the issue because it 
undermines advocacy for impartial donors who are expected to be motivated by an 
immediate economic benefit to themselves. However, my claim helps to further elucidate the 
problem of ‘payment’ by showing that donors identify with specified (although not 
necessarily interpersonally known) others and situate their tissue or the process of giving 
within this framework. In contrast to approaches that seek to minimise the intrusion of the 
passionate over the rational which is the only way the common good will be achieved, I 
argue that rational imperatives of scientific research can be achieved through passionate 
means. I will discuss this further in relation to scholarly debate and then examine how 
people actually provide their tissues, rather than how they ought to. 
 
Inter-personal anonymity and generalized exchange 
 
Contrary to approaches which discuss tissue provision to scientific research as a contest 
between the individual’s rights and the ‘public good’, I assert that contributing to scientific 
research is implicated in the specific social roles and relationships that are related to an 
individual's family or national/international communities. Tissue provision is not simply a 
‘gift’ made to the institution of science, in the hope of progressing scientific research in an 
abstract or universal way; rather, science can be a means of connecting people together (as 
fertility patients) or can have implications for existing social relationships and identities 
(such as indigenous people). For some of our participants contemplating embryo donation to 
research, their own treatment was due, to some extent, to the donations of previous fertility 
patients. This indicates that science has had a real effect on these individuals in relation to 
their reproductive tissues and their decisions to donate embryos are made within this context. 
Participants situate their contributions within the experience of fertility treatment. They 
express gratitude towards previous donors and propel their gratitude forward rather than 
backward. Patients do not attempt to identify specific donors or researchers. I suggest that 
their relationship with other fertility patients is built on the donor’s own fertility treatment, 
an experience that provides membership into a community of other fertility patients (in the 
past, present and future) from whom the donor feels they have received benefit. These 
participants situate themselves in a continuum of research and treatment. My assertions 
correspond, to some degree, with claims made by Scully et al. (2012) about gratitude, serial 
reciprocity and embryo provision. The authors argue that it is unlikely that their sample of 
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fertility patients perceive treatment as a gift because it operates under the auspices of UK’s 
National Health Service (NHS) and is considered a medical service. 100  Nevertheless, 
participants situated their decisions to provide their embryos within a broader community of 
previous donors and future patients. To analyse the motivations of donors, Scully et al. draw 
on the concept of serial reciprocity, which refers to gifts reciprocated from unknown 
individuals.  
 
In anthropological literature, serial reciprocity is usually referred to as generalized exchange 
(Levi-Strauss 1969). I argue that this term captures the ways in which people understand 
their contributions to scientific research as instances of gift-exchange occurring between 
individuals who are not inter-personally identified but who are nonetheless connected in 
some way.101 Diverging from Mauss’s examples of identified and intimate gift-exchange in 
the kula, Levi-Strauss argued that cycles of reciprocity are evident even when the same 
person or group to whom it is presented do not reciprocate the gift given. Generalized 
exchange can be used in relation to contemporary Western societies that have experienced 
mass migration and industrialisation, where kinships are no longer the only significant social 
reference point for individuals. In the absence of strictly face-to-face relationships, Levi-
Strauss (1969, 265) argued that “generalized exchange establishes a system of operations 
conducted ‘on credit’ [and participants must have] the confidence that the cycle will close 
again…The belief is the basis of trust and confidence opens up credit. In the final analysis, 
the whole system exists only because the group adopting it is prepared, in the broadest 
meaning of the term, to speculate”. The concept of generalized exchange enables a sociality 
through which individuals can make sense of their identities and relationships over time and 
on a number of different levels to encompass those that are inter-personally anonymous but 
nevertheless remain identified in some way (Svendsen 2007).  
 
So far my use of the concept of generalized exchange is broad and I argue that it is more 
relevant for participants in cohort one and a more appropriate form of circulation for 
embryos than oöcytes. Whether the embryo is given for reproductive or research purposes, 
its donation draws on the individual’s experience of treatment as a fertility patient and 
                                                
100 This point may diverge from my earlier claim regarding oöcyte donor’s perceptions that having children is 
not a universal right and must only be bestowed upon “good parents”. 
101 Titmuss (1997 [1970], 278-279) was critical of Levi-Strauss’s adherence to Mauss’s insight that gift-giving 
had to have instrumental dimensions to it. 
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involves a vague understanding that ‘people like me’ need the embryo. The ‘me’ which is 
referred to here emerges from a specific experience – fertility treatment. Embryo donation 
relies on a generalised and anonymous recipient both in terms of bureaucracy and individual 
preferences. Participants in our study expressed no desire to meet potential recipients, 
trusting in their worthiness. This belief could be considered as a projection of one’s own 
experience – including emotions, dreams, hopes and disappointments – onto the recipient 
who ‘becomes’ the generic fertility patient. I argued in chapter seven that this is largely due 
to the fact that the donor herself has become a generic fertility patient, incorporated into the 
history of reproductive medicine, becoming ‘another statistic’ and adding to its knowledge in 
some minor way. 
 
It is not possible to precisely distinguish between the passionate motivations and rational 
imperatives that are involved in embryo donation. Instead, the act of donation is a mixture of 
both; science creates the community of contemporary fertility patients and acts as a meeting 
ground between its members. Embryo donors can be confident in the achievements of 
scientific research because they have experienced its tangible outcomes (without necessarily 
being a success story of reproductive medicine). However, their motivations are also 
passionate because they are targeting the donation towards specific individuals–other 
fertility patients. This proposition highlights the degree to which decisions about tissue 
provision are made in relation to the individual’s everyday experience, thus shifting the 
emphasis of giving tissue from whether the individual is simply free or exploited to 
questions about the role science plays in that everyday life. In the context of fertility 
treatment, scientific research mediates between individuals who need the treatment in a 
direct or indirect way.   
 
My reading of tissue provision as having a significant affective dimension diverges from 
models of the social contract where sicence and society exist separately by recognising that 
tissue provision involves a person who is embedded in a very real social and historical 
context, whose rights and obligations do not simply exist in the present and without 
reference to others but those who came before them and those who are not yet born. This 
view corresponds with findings from studies around the world that highlight the social 
context of tissue provision (Lock 2001; Hoeyer 2003, 2006a and 2006b; Hoeyer and Lynöe 
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2006; Reddy 2007; Svendsen 2007; Dixon-Woods et al. 2008). Together, this empirical 
research illustrates that contributing to scientific research is implicated in a number of 
relational possibilities in which individuals are situated such as their families, their national 
or international communities or their identity as an indigenous person for whom modern 
political institutions (including science) often provide a precarious form of recognition and 
respect. They also demonstrate that the abstract good of scientific research may be 
reinforced or destabilised in relation to a specific identity and contributions to scientific 
research may occur in a number of different ways, from acquiescence and welcome to 
hostility and refusal.  
 
Positive orientations: the self and the welfare state 
 
The work of Svendsen (2007) and Hoeyer (2003; 2006a and 2006b) expand discussions 
about the contextual nature of moral choices made about tissue provision to biomedical 
research and take into account political relationships between state and citizens and citizens 
themselves. In his study of a Swedish biobank, Hoeyer (2003; 2006a and 2006b) studies 
perceptions of individuals who provided blood or tissue samples to a database of genetic 
material. Hoeyer (2006b, 217) argues that participants in his study situated their decisions 
and the genetic research in broader social, political and economic contexts and were 
concerned “with the equal distribution of research results, eugenic uses of science”. In a 
separate explication of the same work, Hoeyer and Lynöe (2006, 17) show that people have 
limited interest in the information sheets they are required to read before consent is taken 
challenging the idea that individuals decide to participate or contribute to scientific research 
exclusively on the basis of the information they read. People expressed their motivation to 
contribute their tissues “in general terms about the benefits for society and about a shared 
responsibility for advancing medicine”.102 Participants in the study perceived giving their 
tissue samples within the specific context of the Swedish welfare state, where the 
comprehensive public provision of healthcare is deeply entrenched. Moreover, they 
contended that the state has a responsibility to ensure access to healthcare and the 
subsequent results of research remain available to the public. These sentiments evoke the 
                                                
102 Participants also expressed general concern about the trajectory of scientific research but were not especially 
confident in declaring the “good” of genetic research and the biobank to which they were contributing (Hoeyer 
2003). 
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idea of a ‘social contract’ between participants, researchers and the state that funds research. 
These participants do consider that providing their blood and/or DNA is a broader political 
act because they situate their overall health within their own model of the social contract–
that is, the welfare state.  
 
Svendsen’s work on embryo donation to stem cell research in Denmark, a Scandinavian 
country with a similarly comprehensive health system to Sweden, has many resonances with 
the results of my study. The research explores the perceptions and attitudes of couples who 
had situated their decisions within a continuum of their fertility treatment which is provided 
by the state. Svendsen notes that for participants, undergoing fertility treatment virtually 
marks their reproductive tissue as ‘public’ because it has involved with the assistance of 
state-sponsored clinicians. This is not to suggest that ownership of the embryos was assumed 
by the clinic, and the mechanism of informed consent was employed to make this handover 
clear. Rather, individuals undergoing fertility treatment are contemporaneously “patient and 
citizen [which] makes them become embryo donors” (Svendsen 2007, 37).  
 
I would suggest, however, that the term ‘patient’ is only a arbitrary marker of citizenship, as 
some states provide comprehensive healthcare for their citizens while other states vary in 
their provision. Nonetheless, Svendsen (2007) provides key insight into the specificities that 
may characterise such associations and points to reasons for cultural differences with 
Australian women in this study. That Danish couples in Svendsen’s study expressed their 
decision to provide embryos to state-financed hES cell research as self-evident (although not 
coerced) demonstrates that they connect the activities of the public health care institutions 
that handle embryo donation with hES cell research and their fertility treatment. The national 
context of Denmark was a significant contributor to both the production of embryos and 
embryonic stem cell research conducted there and they both may be considered to be part of 
national ‘commons’. In contrast, the women undertaking fertility treatment in our study did 
not connect their embryos to their specific fertility clinic. As mentioned in chapter seven, 
this cohort were treated at a non-profit fertility clinic, heavily underwritten by the federal 
government’s system of universal healthcare called Medicare, which funds to varying 
degrees medical treatment, pharmaceuticals and the unrestricted use of ARTs). Preferences 
to give to other fertility patients may best resemble Titmuss’s universal stranger because 
their only defining feature was health-related. Nationality, ethnicity, class or religion did not 
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differentiate the other members of the community. Our cohort may be considered embryo 
providers in the globalised context of research. 
 
Drawing on two studies, I have so far argued that tissue provision to scientific research does 
not necessarily sit outside the remit of the social contract, probably because the social 
contract is a dynamic process rather than a static entity. However, beyond this basic point, 
the notion of the citizen relies on an abstraction by connecting unrelated individuals on the 
basis of living, working and being born in a specific geographical territory. Citizenship is an 
objective reality, it is not personally constituted; that is an individual cannot exclusively 
declare what features of citizenship to which they are entitled and will adhere. While 
contributions of embryos in Denmark and blood/DNA in Sweden were made in the context 
of the nation–as citizens–and were thus rational, they were also passionate because they 
were directed at specific recipients who share the donor’s attribute of national citizenship. 
Even if we move away from nationalised contexts to examine further the connections 
between social role, tissue and its circulation, we find similar ‘passionate’ contributions to 
scientific research. Here, I draw on the study by Dixon-Woods et al. (2008) about the 
provision of cancerous tissue from paediatric cancer patients in the UK, a study that 
resonates with Australian data about providing cancerous tissue for scientific research 
(Morell et al. 2011). Dixon-Woods et al. (2008, 67) found that many participants did not 
place significant ontological value on the tissue once it had been removed. Many “identified 
the tumour material as being ‘external’ to the child and having an intruder status” or 
considered it waste and most, if not all participants were likely to consent to the provision of 
tissue for scientific research. The authors connect the largely enthusiastic provision of such 
tissue within the context of belonging to the childhood-cancer community. The community 
is a ‘tangible’ entity characterised by a process of generalised reciprocity involving gifts of 
the past (or present) helping to contribute to the treatments of today (or future). Dixon-
Woods et al. (2008, 72) argue that their “data suggest that participants see themselves as 
belonging to a distinctive community united by a sense of common purpose, in which values 
are shared and members of the community are to be trusted”.  
 
So far I have discussed largely positive connections between individuals and the provision of 
their tissue to scientific research. Positive orientations toward scientific research are based 
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on one of two experiences: the individual has received some form of benefit, such as state-
sponsored healthcare, or the experience of illness has resulted in the specific tissue becoming 
a point of convergence between the donor and the community of people with the same 
illness. These imagined communities operate on the principle of generalized-exchange and 
can refer to past and future members. On the one hand, these are rational contributions and 
associations because the members are generic and their personalities matter less than their 
nationality or illness experience. On the other hand, these contributions are also passionate 
because they are directed towards a specific community or outcome. This research shows 
that, strictly, there are no obligations or sanctions if the individual does not contribute their 
own tissue, but the current generation often follows the behaviour of previous generations of 
citizens and/or ancestors because their own experiences and narratives are a culmination of 
these effects. 
 
Marginal identities and scientific research 
 
Here, I want to develop my claim that contributing to scientific research invokes a 
perception of science-as-benefactor. Science is not universally regarded in positive ways and 
is perceived and experienced as science, involving practices which are controlled by 
commercial or political interests (Harvey 2007). Harvey argued that despite the many public 
scandals which had occurred in the UK, most people included in his research observations 
were committed to fundamental scientific principles. Yet, it appears that this commitment to 
science is based on experiencing it as a benevolent institution. Individuals or groups who 
identify as a marginalised polity may regard science with hostility because historically it has 
been a means of that marginalisation. Withholding tissues from scientific research 
constitutes a form of resistance to science.   
 
I return to the example of the HGDP and the opposition some communities expressed (Lock 
2001; Reddy 2007). This scenario shows that that relationships between scientists, scientific 
production and “the public” can be dysfunctional and acrimonious, with people suspicious of 
– and hostile to – the use of their bodily tissue, despite its “grand vision”. As discussed in 
chapter two, the HGDP evoked the spectre of former oppression and dispossession because 
colonial powers had utilised scientific research to rationalise unfair and violent social 
divisions. Scientific research continues to be considered a means of marginalisation. This 
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oppositional posture may be due to the fact that the post-colonial identity involves not just a 
separation from imperial governance but the social and cultural institutions and/or values 
with which the imperial power has historically been aligned. This point corresponds to a 
similar assertion made by Rabeharisoa and Callon (2002), who report that in the United 
States, some African-American people diagnosed with sickle-cell anaemia have refused to 
“cooperate” with researchers or clinicians and remain politically disorganised, viewing the 
organisation of a “patient group” as a mechanism of novel stigmatisation that may continue 
the history of scientifically-derived racial oppression. 
 
In both of these contexts, science is not perceived as the benign benefactor of humanity but 
as invested in the political aspirations of oppressive people or processes. Contributing to its 
production is perceived as assisting in the creation of further rationales on which to base 
prejudice. This orientation challenges the generality of Harvey’s (2007) approach, insisting 
that those who embrace science may have nothing to fear from it and do so on the basis that 
it has supported rather than oppressed a specific conception of their identity (for example, 
the rational European). As I argued in chapter four, in the wake of the HGDP controversy, 
scientific research has been situated within broader political transformations between nation-
states and/or colonisers and indigenous populations where it is labelled as ‘Western’ or neo-
imperialist rather than the universal and apolitical institution it purports to be. However, 
precisely drawing a line between the former colonisers who ‘identify’ positively with 
science (Caucasian Europeans) and the formerly colonised who ‘identify negatively with 
science is scientifically implausible. This is evident from Reddy’s (2007) research with 
Indian Gujaratis in Houston, Texas. Collecting blood samples to construct a Haplotype Map, 
in the wake of the HGDP, was not quite the ethical or political minefield anticipated by 
Reddy, his collaborators or ethical review boards. Rather, many members of the community 
identified positively with the ‘goods’ that were expected to emerge and were “realistic about 
risks and misuses, placing responsibility for monitoring and reporting with the brokers of the 
transaction” (2007, 454).   
 
Examples of negative orientations towards science are also passionate because they connect 
scientific research with specific outcomes and groups. Scientific research is not imagined as 
an impersonal endeavour to which an individual can democratically and autonomously 
contribute. Rather, based on the past, some members of indigenous communities continue to 
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believe that science is a mechanism for their oppression. This demonstrates that individuals 
and/or communities can be positioned differently in relation to the conduct of scientific 
research, which has also had variable effects on different communities. From the research 
cited, the experience of some indigenous groups destabilises the assumption that scientific 
research and knowledge inevitably achieves an abstract or concrete good.103 Scientific 
researchers are real and imperfect people whose quest for knowledge may directly or 
indirectly contribute to social divisions. Flattening the terrain and declaring that there can 
only be one ideal donor whose interest in science is general and abstract does not sufficiently 
capture the diversity of experiences.  
 
Women as a general category  
 
Finally, I return to the question of oöcyte provision to SCNT research. Earlier in this chapter, 
I briefly discussed the eminent UK scientist Ian Wilmut’s attempt to mobilise women to 
provide oöcytes for his research into Motor Neuron disease using the technique of SCNT. I 
argued that Wilmut’s claims were based on a number of abstract and universal categories, 
including the homogenous groups of ‘women’, ‘scientists’ and ‘patients’ and the therapeutic 
benefit of scientific research. Notwithstanding the brevity of his plea, Wilmut’s assertions 
effaces the complexity of processes such as oöcyte extraction, funding needed for long-term 
research including trials and the accumulation and translation of scientific knowledge into 
clinical practice. However, it also relies on having a bird’s-eye view regarding the scientific 
process. From Wilmut’s position, these separate elements contribute to the whole, situating 
the process of oöcyte extraction in a context of universal healthcare. This may seem 
disingenuous given that from its outset, stem cell research was conducted to achieve certain 
therapeutic and economic benefits (Baylis 2009). What is interesting is that Wilmut’s 
representation helps potential donors identify a specific benefit and beneficiary but the donor 
remains general and undifferentiated. My analysis of the results of this research show that 
invoking the role of ‘women’ in its general and ahistoric sense does not provide enough 
motivation to give good eggs. The relationship between women, scientists and MND 
sufferers has failed to materialise because it only exists in a rational way rather than having a 
passionate dimension. I contend that women (people who are anatomically female) will give 
                                                
103 The different relationships between communities and social movements is a common feature of PUSET 
literature but unfortunately there is only scope to discuss issues related to medical science.  
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their oöcytes when it is also passionate: that is, once they can connect that beneficiary or 
benefit to a specific part of their own identity. 
 
The findings of this research suggest that hostility or scepticism does not characterise the 
relationships between women and Science. Problematising women’s contributions to SCNT 
research as evident of unequal power relations (Dickenson 2006; George 2008; Baylis 2009) 
recalls some feminist opposition to medicine, or ARTs in particular, as a unique form of 
medicalised surveillance (Corea 1985). Yet, participants do not frame their lack of 
enthusiasm to provide oöcytes for SCNT research by referring to themselves as “women” – 
the inferior category in patriarchal and capitalist social relations – and thus as a form of 
resistance to or subversion of patriarchal capitalism. The term “woman” is too broad a social 
category to reconcile with the diverse experiences of participants. Without identifying a 
specified benefit or beneficiary, they cannot muster the motivation to undergo the process of 
oöcyte extraction. If participants can connect the process with a real person, concrete 
experience or outcome, they are more likely to consider undertaking oöcyte extraction. 
Furthermore, it is likely that their roles as ‘daughters’, ‘sisters’, ‘mothers’ or ‘nieces’ will be 
at the forefront of any serious contemplation to give their oöcytes to SCNT research. These 
relationships resemble those experienced between reproductive oöcyte donors in our study 
and their recipients. While the relationships donors formed with their recipients may have 
been transient, the relational context placed the process of oöcyte extraction within an 
affective framework. Donors were invested in the happiness of their recipient and the 
technical aspects of undergoing oöcyte extraction, as intense and risky as they were, became 
a means to an end. In our study, women want to provide their oöcytes to research that will 
have similarly tangible benefits for people they know. They are committed to scientific 
research in a rational way but ultimately their contributions need to have a passionate 
dimension. The difference in perceptions illustrates the difficulty of instituting the rational 
form of contributing to science and the need to acknowledge that women may have varying 
‘passionate’ interests in the conduct of SCNT research. Other research indicates that when 
these two forms of engagement are connected, participants are motivated to contribute to 
research.  
 
The responses from this study indicate clearly that a specific benefit or beneficiary is at the 
centre of oocyte provision. Scientific research may be a fundamental social and cultural 
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value of Western society, (Harvey 2007) it may also be subject to more hostile scrutiny from 
novel experts and lay members of the community but ultimately positive orientations 
towards scientific progress are rarely evoked in an abstract way; rather, science operates as a 
mediator between people who are connected on the basis of belonging to a national group, 
their lack of it – as is the case with indigenous people whose acceptance into settler societies 
continues to provoke questions about identity and authenticity – or an experience with illness 
that has incorporated them into a sub-group. It may help transform emotions for specific 
beneficiaries into knowledge for everyone, but it must begin with this. By contributing to 
scientific research, individuals recognise themselves as part of a community in the same or 
future temporal space; they may also identify with others at different political levels, such as 
helping people of the same race, nation or simply the human species (Reddy 2007). Some 
sort of relationship is evoked through the provision of tissue, rather than the abstract and 
isolated human individual for whom tissue provision means the rational deliberation of costs 
and benefits.  
 
To answer a central question from Titmuss’s (1997 [1970]) work on blood provision, ‘who is 
my stranger?’, I have responded with heterogeneity. The answer is that the donor’s stranger 
depends on the donor in a specific social and historic context. The relationships in which 
individuals exist may all compete to lay claim to their tissues; however, it is often through 
some experience through which tissues are produced that help determine their trajectory. To 
embrace the universal stranger and recognise the humanity of every individual is ideal but it 
does not necessarily motivate contributions to scientific research, particularly if those 
contributions involve an extraordinary commitment on the donor’s part. Nor does such an 
approach acknowledge that individuals and communities are situated differently to science. 
Effacing these differences and insisting that the best donor is rational does not necessarily 
lead to more contributions to scientific research. I have argued that this universality is 
difficult to sustain in contemporary society where the individual is implicated in many social 
roles and relationships in his or her life.   
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Directions for Future 
Research 
 
The aim of this thesis was to develop a framework that could connect a scientific utilisation 
of reproductive tissues with women’s intentions to become a mother and examined practical 
contexts of giving such tissues and the sociological constructions around these. My 
discussion has examined tensions in the current regulatory environment, focusing on the 
issue of introducing a payment system in exchange for "good eggs", mature and fertile 
oöcytes, and the ostensible shift from Titmuss’s (19970 [1970]) donor model this view 
signals. I have argued that despite the polarised stances this issue generates, they are based 
on the same imperative to rationalise scientific research with the imposition of universal 
principles. Not surprisingly, at the heart of this rationalisation is the rational donor or 
contributor to science who makes decisions autonomously, voluntarily and without a specific 
interest in their outcomes. This model flattens the social terrain, the different investments 
individuals or groups may have in scientific research and certain tissues and insists that 
‘passionate’ contributions are inherently based on coercion and exploitation. 
 
The analysis contained in this thesis draws on primary data collected within the context of a 
three-year ARC project (2008-2011), specifically the period between July 2009 and August 
2010.104 There were three cohorts in this study: women had experience of fertility treatment 
for themselves (cohort one), women had given their oöcyte for reproductive purposes (cohort 
two) and women who are regarded as the ‘healthy donor’ as they are at an age where their 
fertility is at its peak and they are unlikely to be engaged in fertility treatment (cohort three). 
The research implemented two methods to collect data, semi-structured interviews (cohorts 
one and two) and focus groups (cohort three). The data collected potential donors’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards giving their oöcytes and embryos for research or 
reproductive purposes. The specific experiences of each cohort were discussed in order to 
contextualise their responses; for instance, participants in cohort one were asked about their 
fertility treatment, participants in cohort two were asked about their decisions to donate 
oöcytes for reproductive purposes and participants in cohort three were asked about other 
                                                
104 As mentioned in chapters one and five, the ARC funded the project from 2008 to 2011. We collected data 
between 2009 and 2010 when the specific ethics committees granted approval.  
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forms of tissue donation. All cohorts were asked about their attitudes towards scientific 
research generally and stem cell research specifically. 
 
Principal Findings 
 
The data from this sample provide important insights into the biological and social factors 
that have thus far inhibited the altruistic donation of oöcytes to SCNT research. The lack of 
donated oöcytes to SCNT research is not based on a hostile or unfavourable view of stem 
cell research generally. Many women expressed positive attitudes towards the conduct of 
stem cell research and considered that other women’s participation was sufficient for its 
progress. I contend, based on these findings that the primary reason for the lack of oöcytes 
donated to SCNT research is that oöcytes are essential for women who intend to become a 
mother in the immediate, short or long term future. Given that the biological properties of 
oöcytes means that utilisation for research or reproductive purposes is a mutually exclusive 
option, women prefer to keep their oöcytes to offset the possibility that the oöcytes they are 
left with are infertile. Giving infertile oöcytes to research may represent a form of waste 
management. Oöcytes are essential first-steps to realise one’s intention to become a mother, 
however, the biological and social properties of embryos relate to the maternal social role 
differently and thus giving these tissues to research is based on a different logic. Embryos 
relate more specifically to questions of biology and kinship. For many participants in cohort 
one, giving embryos for reproductive purposes hypothetically represents a destabilisation of 
the family as nuclear (where children are raised by one mother and father to whom they are 
biologically related). 
 
Analysis of the contexts in which reproductive tissues are given (in actual or hypothetical 
situations) provide important insights into the issue of oöcyte provision for SCNT research. 
Following Levi-Strauss’s (1969) model of generalized-exchange, donors connect with a 
specific recipient (who may be inter-personally anonymous) and/or experience the benefit of 
scientific research themselves. I demonstrated that oöcytes and embryos are given away 
within an affective framework which varies between the identification of specific 
(sometimes inter-personally identified) recipients and generalised ones. In relation to 
oöcytes, narratives of participants in cohort two show donors’ preferences to identify a 
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specific recipient whom they have evaluated as ‘good parents’. With the identification of a 
specific beneficiary the donor validates the desire for parenthood with reference to social and 
personal markers of “good parents” and by default demonstrate that all people who need 
oöcytes for reproductive purpose are not deemed worthy. This indicates that the donor’s 
altruism – concern for the other – also has an instrumental basis. In contrast, participants 
spoke about hypothetical situations of embryo provision in the Titmuss-esque spirit of 
embracing the “universal stranger”, that is a recipient who was not inter-personally 
identifiable to the donor but whose needs, nonetheless, are recognised by the donor as valid. 
I interpreted participants’ hypothetical discussions of embryo provision for research or 
reproductive purposes within the context of generalized-exchange where donors and 
recipients were known to each other in generic ways. I argued that the experience of fertility 
treatment had generated a new identity for the individual and membership into a community 
of fertility patients whose experience of fertility treatment was constituted by the previous 
donations of fertility patients. Within this largely “imagined community” (Anderson 1983), 
the embryo connected the donor with other people who also wanted to have children in an 
indirect or direct way. Research was an indirect relationship between the donor and 
recipient(s) while reproduction was a direct way that the donor and recipient could connect.  
  
I identified the affective framework – the identification of a specific benefit or beneficiary as 
an important factor in giving away reproductive tissues. The affective framework is present 
in the way participants from other studies have imagined giving away their tissues such as 
embryos, blood and DNA. However, I have shown that the affective framework is absent 
from the context of oöcyte provision to SCNT research. Here, the donor is referred to in such 
general terms that there is little connection between potential benefits or beneficiaries. For 
instance, the potential donors of oöcytes can simply be referred to as “women”, an abstract 
category, undifferentiated by personal relationships, experience or interests in scientific 
research.  
 
Limitations 
 
All research benefits from hindsight and care is needed in interpreting these claims.  SCNT 
research is a novel method and this research study was designed to be exploratory in order to 
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capture in-depth and context-specific account of perceptions and attitudes towards the 
scientific utilisation of reproduction tissues. It did not use an experiment to produce findings. 
The findings and claims may be limited in several ways. First, the research methods used 
were focus groups and interviews and the sample of 43 women generated an enormous 
amount of data. However, given the small number of participants recruited, it is unable to 
provide a basis for generalisations based on causal relationships between variables. Second, 
the data are based on hypothetical situations. Like much research conducted on the same 
subject around the world, (refs), this dataset is an important means of gauging public 
opinion. However, it is important to remember that the clinic from which our participants 
were recruited did not engage in stem cell research and did not ask their patients to provide 
oocytes for reproductive or research purposes. Therefore, the participants’ views, with the 
exception of cohort two, are not based on real-life experience of providing tissues to stem 
cell research. Thirdly, it is not entirely known whether reproductive oocyte donors in this 
study were the beneficiaries of some sort of reciprocity despite their own claims that this was 
the case. Finally, the findings of this study are not inevitable and changes are likely to reflect 
changing dynamics in society, gender norms and technological advances in both SCNT 
research and reproductive biology. For example, if oöcyte vitrification becomes a more 
stable and less experimental procedure, allowing women to rationally manage their fertility, 
perceptions of oöcyte use for scientific research will likely change, as well as individuals’ 
willingness to donate. Finally, these results may show a bias towards women whose first 
language is English and are highly educated (almost 52% had received a tertiary education 
while a further 40% of the sample had obtained some education beyond high school).  
 
Nevertheless, these findings are consistent with emerging research that has also examined 
women’s decisions, particularly those who undertake fertility treatment, to provide their 
reproductive tissues to stem cell research. For instance, Klitzman and Sauer (2009) also 
report that women are unlikely to provide oöcytes for SCNT research in order to protect their 
intentions to become a mother. Haimes, Taylor and Turkmendag (2012) and Haimes (2013) 
show that in spite of measures designed to source more good eggs such as egg-sharing, 
women do not inevitably jettison their intentions to become a mother. While research in this 
area is sparse mainly because the field of regenerative medicine has grown substantially in 
the last 20 years, this emerging field of scholarship demonstrates that oöcyte provision for 
SCNT research must be researched further in order to elucidate the specificities of the issue.  
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Interconnections between findings and theory 
 
The current study has important implications for scholarly fields related to both substantive 
and theoretical issues. At an empirical level, this research elaborates on our understanding of 
gift giving practices. By approaching gift giving as a practice it is revealed to be anchored in 
a specific social context resulting in variable expectations of reciprocity between donors and 
recipients, even in known situations. For instance, Titmuss (1997 [1970]) insisted that for 
blood provision to be a “free gift”, it had to be anonymous. However, from this research we 
know that donors can be motivated by both altruistic and instrumental concerns and giving 
in known contexts does not have to compel the recipient to reciprocate. I argued that 
different expectations of reciprocity can be understood with reference to the concept of 
discretionary reciprocity. This concept recognises that the obligation to reciprocate depends 
on the donor’s perceptions of the recipient and the reasons why they are giving the tissue in 
the first place. 105 The concept of discretionary reciprocity facilitates a shift from an 
inextricable connection between women’s gift giving and restrictive perceptions of 
femininity because it recognises that the different circumstances in which oöcytes and 
embryos are given can facilitate distinct identities for women. In the context of oöcyte 
donation for reproductive purposes, the context of helping another to produce a family can 
over-ride the imperative for reciprocity in known contexts. In contexts of scientific oöcyte 
provision, the recipient is chosen because they have the ability to transform the gift into 
something substantial. Yet, expectations of reciprocity can become mired in the complexity 
of establishing a financial equivalent for oöcytes.  
 
This research shows that approaches regarding the commodification of objects do not refer 
to the social consequences of giving away tissue, that is, how the donor is affected by their 
gift. As discussed above, whether reproductive tissues may progress to the state of 
disentanglement (albeit always incomplete) depends on the social consequences for women. 
Giving reproductive tissues constitutes the maternal social role in two distinct ways: giving 
oöcytes might jeopardise the intention to become a mother while giving embryos helps to 
                                                
105 I refer to Mauss’s (2002 [1954]) own language regarding reciprocity. In this paradigm where reciprocity is a 
universal part of gift giving, the obligation to reciprocate is invariably felt by the recipient. However, I have 
tried to separate the two parties and the objects given in the process and insist that the donor can contribute to 
decisions about whether the recipient should reciprocate. 
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maintain the biological basis of conventional kinships. This research also assists in 
destabilising the assumption that gift giving inevitably involves the circulation of ‘vital’ 
objects while commercial transactions presuppose inanimate things, evident in Mauss (2002 
[1954]) work on gifts. Rather than assume that commodities are those things which have 
been “decontextualized, disassociated and detached” (Callon’s 1998, 19), I argue that 
reproductive tissues defy this binary in surprising ways. Objects that are circulated as gifts 
do not have an inherently vital status, this is evident in the fact that oöcytes were the tissues 
which were viewed in functional terms, without a moral status in and of themselves. In 
contrast, embryos were situated within the framework of “kin ethics”, perceived as siblings 
of children born through their parents’ use of ARTs. Their provision to research rested 
precisely on the premise that they were children who could not be given to another family.  
 
At another theoretical level, the examination of oöcyte donation for SCNT research 
facilitates speculation about the degree to which scientific research represents both a “public 
good” itself and the means of realising it. Whether institutions pay people to provide tissues 
or rely on donors relates to questions about the basis of political associations, the moral 
authority of the individual and the potential for the “public good”. Distinct from questions 
about inclusion in the public sphere and the process by which the “public good” is decided, 
the ideal of political associations are that they are “rational”, a polity constituted by features 
common to all members, such as being born (including recent ancestors) or working in the 
same geographical territory rather than “passionate” which are feelings shared between at 
individuals in an idiosyncratic way. The ideal citizen should be “rational” by detaching him 
or herself from his or her own interests and considering the implications of their decisions 
for the “public good”. In this paradigm, human tissues are provided to scientific research 
simply on the basis that scientific research is a “public good” and posing a benefit in the 
immediate or distant future and distinguishing the “modern West” from its religious and 
theoretical past. In contrast to the ideal of “rational” contributions to scientific research, I 
contend that it is important to recognise that there are passionate dimensions to people’s 
decisions. Passionate tissue contributions do not have to be directed at one person who is 
known to the donor, but they involve the identification of a specific beneficiary who is exists 
in relationship to the donor as fellow citizens, through an experience such as fertility 
treatment or other medical treatment provided by a nationalised health service.  
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To understand the complexity of the scientific utilisation of human tissues, analysis should 
consider moving beyond models based on abstracted views of individuals and the social 
space they inhabit. That people actually give their tissues in “passionate” circumstances – 
where they have been able to identify a specified benefit or beneficiary – shows that many 
theorists who dismiss passion as a basis of political association do not adequately capture 
human experience. Insisting that tissue provision must be rational and motivated by 
impersonal incentives does not sufficiently recognise the different relationships and 
experiences individuals and communities can have with scientific research in contemporary 
Australian society. The examples I draw on illustrate that when tissues are given to scientific 
research, they often draw on relationships the individual has with others (Lock 2001; Hoeyer 
2003; 2006a and 2006b; Hoeyer and Lynöe 2006; Svendsen 2007; Reddy 2007; Dixon-
Woods et al. 2008).  
 
Implications 
 
The ARC project of which my candidature was part undertook community engagement in 
two broad ways. Firstly, the immediate project team authored a public submission to the 
federal government’s Legislative Review Committee in 2011 (as stated in the dissertation, 
this review was foreshadowed in the original Parliamentary Acts of 2006). Secondly, 
Professor Waldby and Associate Professor Kerridge chaired the National Oocyte Donor 
Workshop at the University of Sydney in 2011. This workshop was intended to disseminate 
results to the attendees and generate further discussion for policy initiatives. I contributed to 
both of these. So far this thesis has contributed to policy discussion in the Australian context 
through the publication of articles (listed in appendix O). It is hoped that once the revisions 
of this thesis are accepted, I will publish more sole-authored articles. These publications will 
be directed to policy-makers as well as the academic community.  
 
By insisting that contributions to scientific research must adhere to the criteria of the 
“rational” contributor, the hitherto lack of donated oöcytes is likely to be understood as 
revealing an oppositional or apathetic attitude towards the progress of scientific research. 
From the current analysis, we know that factors thus far inhibiting the altruistic donation of 
oöcytes to SCNT research are based on the relatively long period of medication and surgery 
 
224 
required for oöcyte extraction and the lack of an affective framework. The day-to-day 
process of taking medication, culminating in surgery is unlikely to be sustained on the basis 
of generalised and abstract exchange. Neither does the inclusion of money automatically 
transform the relationship a potential donor’s motivation into a concrete one. Rather, there is 
a symbolic threshold between ‘compensation’ and ‘payment’. Being “paid” rather than 
“compensated” may also provoke moral dilemmas for individuals who insist that financial 
concerns should be peripheral to the decision to contribute to scientific research. This is not 
to suggest that the decision to give oöcytes under different circumstances cannot be made – 
the fact that many women around the world sell their oöcytes attests to this – however, I 
remain committed to the assertion that without this specificity the donor will ultimately 
‘float’ losing interest in the process or feel exploited.   
 
Tissue provision to scientific research resonates deeply with individuals at an everyday level, 
connecting them with different experiences of political subjectivity and healthcare. Policy-
makers in Australia may find that the following points have important implications for 
general guidelines related to tissue provision for scientific research. First, my work suggests 
that tissues must be recognised as a heterogeneous category because they have different 
moral and social dimensions that affect their provision. Reproductive tissues such as oöcytes 
and embryos uniquely constitute the maternal social role and are given to research in specific 
circumstances and for different reasons. Secondly, the examination of oöcyte provision to 
SCNT research shows that donor perspectives themselves must be recognised as 
heterogeneous: there is not one donor perspective but many. Furthermore, the relationships 
between potential donor groups must be managed carefully; for instance in this dataset some 
participants in cohort one sought to construct “healthy donors” as “ideal” while 
simultaneously excluding themselves – these constructions are not mutually beneficial and 
must be treated with care. Thirdly, attitudes about scientific research must be understood in 
their specificity: problematising scientific research as constituting unequal social relations 
simply universalises attitudes towards scientific research in reverse. Finally, maintaining a 
focus on whether women should or should not be paid to provide oöcytes for SCNT research 
will simply reiterate a critique of scientific utilisation of human tissue as based on unequal 
social relations – a contest between the moral authority of the individual and the “public 
good” – as if these are not mutually constitutive. 
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This last point is an important means of shifting the parameters of the debate from one that 
currently focuses on whether paying women to provide oöcytes to SCNT research is a means 
of freedom or coercion to one that meaningfully addresses the degree to which the conduct 
of scientific research is a “public good” in the immediate and long-term future. Governments 
focusing on the immediate prospects of establishing a bioeconomy consequently adopt a 
capitalist model of property relations without attention to future consequences of these 
decisions. In the context of healthcare, the implications are serious because potentially life-
saving technology is likely to be prohibitively expensive for governments and individuals. 
As discussed in chapter four, the response to these structures may be to pay women to 
provide oöcytes in order to be recognised as the ‘labourers’ they are. Yet with adequate 
financial recognition of this ‘labour’, structural capitalist property relations remain in place 
and the capitalist maintains ownership of the products of labour. In the absence of adequate 
attention to the long term consequences of maintaining this capitalist structure in the context 
of healthcare, the questions which emerge with the provision of tissues is unlikely to be 
resolved to the satisfaction of scientists, corporate interests and different sections of the ‘lay’ 
community. 106 
 
Towards future research 
 
Some questions go beyond the remit of the current framework and it would be fruitful to use 
some of the conceptual insights gained from this study as the basis for further research. In 
relation to gift giving literature, this may include examining my claim that reciprocity can be 
a discretionary part of contemporary gift giving practices, rather than a universal one. 
Studies can examine in what contexts is reciprocity expected, from which recipients? 
Another area of potential research relates to the claim I have made that rational political 
associations – community based on generic attributes of members – and the ends it seeks to 
                                                
106 Ethical practice in the Australian context needs to take into account the implications of scientific research 
in a long-term context. I believe from the data contained in this dissertation and a critical reading of the 
literature that an emphasis on individuals does not effectively take into account the social implications of 
scientific research. We should not simply rely on existentialist questions of autonomy and construct a contest 
between the community and individual rights. As a scholar, I would like to see the development of policy that 
carefully draws on insight from individuals and leadership about meeting needs of the community. Sociological 
research that conceptualises, rather than simply reporting data and perfunctorily engage with theoretical 
concepts such as risk can make an important contribution to debates.  
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achieve can also have “passionate” dimensions, where giving occurs with the identification 
of specific benefits or beneficiaries. One way to elaborate on this claim would be research 
into the kind of community that is commensurate with oöcyte provision to SCNT research. 
What might make the process of oöcyte extraction a part of the relationship in an inter-
personally anonymous context, that is the national community in the medium, long or distant 
future? This may involve collaboration with scientists interested in, or actually conducting, 
SCNT research. Beyond this, two issues with which this research project could only briefly 
touch upon suggest themselves; namely, taking full advantage of Australia’s cultural and 
religious diversity to develop further a nuanced account of the Australian communities 
perceptions about scientific research and doing a comparative study between other kinds of 
tissue provision to scientific research.  
 
Another worthwhile direction for future research is to develop a more explicit dialogue 
between ‘tissue economies’ and ‘public understandings of science and technology’ literature. 
This undertaking could involve examining the data in relation to theories about ‘publics’ and 
‘experts’ in a comprehensive way. Rather than simply evaluating whether the lack of oöcytes 
for SCNT research indicates a low level of trust in the latter, it is possible to develop a 
nuanced account of trust in impersonal systems that acknowledges the ‘passionate’ 
dimensions that continue to shape our everyday lives. The ramifications for social theories 
about risk societies and individual risk strategies could be interesting to witness (Lyotard 
2001 [1984]; Giddens 1991: Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994). Future research can 
also examine the extent to which scientific institutions, autonomously and together with the 
state, must engage with its constituents in order to progress and maintain a sense of 
legitimacy.  
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Appendix A: Letter and information to patients and donors of X Fertility 
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Dear IVF Patient, 
 
We are writing to you as someone who may be interested in taking part in a research project about egg 
donation in Australia.  The research study is being run by The University of Sydney with the support of X 
IVF.   
 
The research project is called “Human Oocytes for Stem Cell Research: Donation and Regulation in 
Australia”.  It is jointly funded by the Australian Research Council and X IVF clinic. The research team is 
especially interested in women’s attitudes about the issues of donating oocytes (human eggs) for stem 
cell research purposes. The researchers believe that the perceptions and insights of women who have 
actually experienced the procedure of egg collection through IVF cycles are very important in developing 
guidelines that will ensure ethically sound and safe egg donation procedures in Australia.  
 
You are invited to take part in an interview that will focus on your experiences and perceptions of IVF 
treatment.  You will also be asked about your attitudes to egg donation for both reproduction and stem 
cell research. These questions will only be hypothetical; the research team is not asking you to donate 
eggs now or in the future.  
 
The hour-long interview would occur at a time and place which is convenient to you. The interview is 
strictly confidential and will be conducted by a female researcher (Katherine Carroll or Margaret Boulos) 
from Sydney University.  The researchers are independent from X IVF clinic. X IVF staff will have no 
knowledge of your decision to participate in the study. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, 
you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and your decision to participate will not affect your 
access to current of future treatment at X IVF clinic.   
 
If you agree to take part in this research, the researcher would ask you a series of interview questions. 
The interview would be recorded so that the questions and answers can be transcribed for analysis. The 
transcribed interview will not name you, and we will take out any features that could identify you.  The 
research study has been approved by NSW Health Human Research Ethics Committee (approval 
number HREC/09/WESTMEAD/15) 
 
 
If you would like to participate in the study, please follow the following steps: 
 
(i) Read the “participant information form” that has been included in this letter.  This document will 
tell you more about the study.   
(ii) Complete the “consent for contact” form that has been included with this letter. Please note your 
preferred contact time and number for us to call you on in order to arrange an interview. 
(iii) Return the “consent for contact form” to us using the reply-paid envelope.  
 
If you have any further questions about the research, please feel free to telephone or email Katherine 
Carroll a member of the Sydney University research team. Her contact details are listed below: 
 
Ph: 9036 7994   email: katherine.carroll@usyd.edu.au  
 
 
We thank you for your time and should you choose to be involved in this research, the research team 
look forward to meeting you and hearing your experiences. 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
N.B. signature of clinician removed to protect confidentiality. 
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Consent	  for	  Contact	  Form	  	  I	  have	  read	  and	  understood	  the	  participant	  information	  form	  and	  I	  consent	  to	  be	  contacted	  by	  a	  member	  of	  the	  research	  team	  to	  arrange	  a	  time	  for	  an	  interview	  at	  my	  convenience.	  	  	  
NAME	  (PRINTED):	  	  
SIGNATURE:	  	  
DATE:	  	  	  	  
Preferred	  contact	  number:	  	  
Preferred	  contact	  time:	  	  
Please	  leave	  a	  message	  if	  I	  do	  not	  answer	  the	  phone:	  	  YES	  /	  NO	  	  	  	  Please	  ensure	  all	  questions	  are	  completed	  and	  then	  place	  this	  form	  in	  the	  reply-­‐paid	  envelope	  and	  send	  to:	  	  	  Katherine	  Carroll	  A-­‐26	  RC-­‐Mills	  Building	  	  School	  of	  Sociology	  and	  Social	  Policy	  University	  of	  Sydney	  2006	  	  	  	  
On behalf of the Sydney University Research Team we thank you for your 
time and look forward to meeting you! 	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Appendix B: Cohorts one and two Demographic Information form (version: 
February 2009) 	  
 
 
 
Demographic Information 
 
 
Postcode of residential address     _______________ 
 
Age Range (Please circle) 
 
1.   21-25  
2.   26-30     
3.   31-35 
4.   36-40 
5.   41-45 
6.   46-50 
7.   51-55 
 
Occupation _____________________________ 
 
Highest Educational Qualification  (please circle) 
 
1.  Postgraduate Degree Level 
2. Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level 
3. Bachelor Degree Level 
4.  Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level 
5.  Certificate Level 
6.  Secondary Education 
7.  Primary Education 
8.  Pre-primary Education 
9.  Other Education  
 
 
Relationship Status   _______________________ 
 
Number of Children _______________________ 
 
First IVF cycle:  Month ____  Year ____ 
Last IVF cycle:  Month ____   Year ____  
  
Are you continuing your IVF treatment now or in near future: yes / no 
 
RESEARCHER USE ONLY: 
 
Participant Code Number	  __________________	  	  	  
 	   249 
Appendix C: Women undergoing fertility treatment – interview schedule 	  
	  
! 1 
Oocyte donation and regulation in Australia for Stem Cell Research: IVF patient interview schedule !
1. Introduction 
 
Researcher introduces self, the research topic and expected outcomes 
 
Interview Preamble – 
 
In this interview we are seeking your insights and understandings of egg and embryo donation 
for stem cell research. We wish to interview you about this topic because you have personal 
experience of IVF and/or egg donation to assist other women to have a child. We understand 
that you yourself have not donated for stem cell research. However during the interview we 
will explain to you different aspects of donation for stem cell research, and ask for you 
opinions and feelings about it. We feel that, as someone who has been through IVF, you have 
unique insights into this topic, and we wish to draw on your experience to improve the process 
for women who will donate and embryos for stem cell research in the future. We are social 
researchers and our interview is not intended to persuade you to donate yourself, now or in the 
future. We are only interested in your opinions and feelings about the subject. We will use this 
information to formulate recommendations for the ethical regulation of oocyte donation for 
stem cell research in Australia.  
 
Discuss role and rights of participant, the consent process, and confidentiality 
Ask participant if has any questions 
Provide participant with demographic survey to fill in 
Reconfirm consent to record, and test recording. 
 
2. Introductory Discussion 
 
How did you come to choose X IVF as a clinic for you? 
What has your experience been at X IVF? 
Is this your first time with IVF? How has your experience been of IVF? 
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! 2 
Oocyte donation and regulation in Australia for Stem Cell Research: IVF patient interview schedule 
 
3. Embryo Donation in ART 
 
When you have ART you have several options about your embryos. You can use some for your 
treatment cycle, you can dispose of the ones you don’t want for treatment, and freeze the rest to 
use later if the cycle, doesn’t work. You can donate them for research or to another couple. 
 
Would you donate to another couple/woman? 
 
Anonymous donation or to a known person? 
 
Would you consider donating embryos for research into infertility? Why/why not? 
 
Would you consider donating embryos for commercial research e.g. genetics? Why/why not? 
 
In each of these cases (if yes) – how would decide when to donate them (e.g. once achieved 
pregnancy, after having several unsuccessful cycles, once embryos had been kept for a 
particular amount of time?) 
 
4. Egg donation in ART 
 
Now lets talk about egg donation – X IVF doesn’t ask women in ART to donate eggs, so I am 
just asking for you opinion and ideas. 
 
Bear in mind that eggs can’t be kept because they don’t freeze well. So you are thinking about 
donating your fresh eggs while you are going through a treatment cycle.  
 
Would you consider donating eggs for research into infertility? Why/why not? 
 
Would you consider donating eggs for commercial research e.g. genetics? Why/why not? 
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Oocyte donation and regulation in Australia for Stem Cell Research:  IVF patient interview schedule  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Would you donate to another couple/woman?  
 
Anonymous donation or to a known person? 
 
If answer is different from embryo donation, what is the difference for you? 
 
Who would you discuss donation of embryos or eggs with? Partner, family, friends, anybody?  
 
5. Patients with (or seeking) their own egg donors [skip if not applicable or if short of time] 
 
How did you find out you needed an egg donor? 
 
How are you looking for an egg donor / how did you find an egg donor? Why are they donating for 
you? How would you describe your relationship with them?  
 
Do you have Family / Friends who have donated / received donated eggs to assist conception?  
Were you involved in helping them decide? What things did you discuss? 
 
6.  Donation for Stem Cell Science  
 
Have you heard of stem cell research? Where did you hear about it? What is your understanding of 
stem cell research? Why is it important? 
 
Have you heard of SCNT (therapeutic cloning)?  
 
 If yes, What is your understanding of the potential benefits of SCNT and stem cell research?  
 
[interviewer to give simple explanation of need for embryos and eggs and potential benefits and that 
it is experimental research] on separate attachment 
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Oocyte donation and regulation in Australia for Stem Cell Research:  IVF patient interview schedule  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Do you have any family or friends with conditions that might be helped by stem cell research in the 
future? E.g. diabetes, MS, spinal cord injury, Parkinson’s disease, stroke, heart or kidney disease 
 
If yes, how does this make you feel about stem cell research? 
 
6a. Embryos for SCNT 
 
Would you consider donating embryos for stem cell research? Why/why not?  
 
How would you decide when you would donate them? (e.g. once achieved pregnancy, after having 
several unsuccessful cycles, once embryos had been frozen for a particular amount of time?) 
 
6b. Eggs for SCNT 
 
Would you consider donating eggs for stem cell research? [remind that they must be diverted from 
treatment and can’t be stored] Why/why not? If yes, how would you decide which ones to donate?  
 
Is there any difference for you between donating eggs to another couple and donating to stem cell 
research? What is it? 
 
Now that you have gone through IVF have your feelings about your eggs changed? If yes, in what 
way have your feelings changed? If no, why not? 
 
(If pregnancy was achieved) Do you think the pregnancy from IVF has influenced your feelings 
about your eggs? 
 
(If pregnancy not achieved) Have the unsuccessful cycles of IVF influenced your feelings about 
your eggs? 
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5 
The ideal egg donor for stem cell research (medically speaking) is a young women (18-30) with 
high fertility, who would not be attending an ART clinic.  
 
Do you think that this group of women should be asked to donate for stem cell research?  
 
What kind of information should they be given before they agree to donate? 
 
7. Payment and Incentives 
 
Different countries use different approaches to encourage women to donate eggs for stem cell 
research and to assist other women’s reproduction. I’d like to know what you think of these 
different approaches 
 
In the UK women can get discounted IVF fees and compensation of expenses up to £250 (check) if 
they donate eggs for stem cell research – this is called ‘egg sharing’.  This may involve donating 
viable eggs that could be used to make embryos. IVF treatment in the UK is more expensive than 
Australia.  
 
In the UK women who are not IVF patients can also donate eggs for stem cell research. They are 
not paid but they can receive up to £250 (about $500) as compensation for expenses.  
 
In the USA women can sell their eggs on an open market, and young white women with university 
degrees can charge very high prices (up to $100,000 per cycle, but usually around $15,000 - 
$20,000). Women can also sell eggs for research purposes, but the fees are not as high as for 
reproduction. (around $4000) 
 
Some women in other countries are paid to provide eggs for couples having IVF - they can be 
young students in America or Spain, or mothers and/or poor working women in Romania or India. 
These eggs may also be used for stem cell research. Do you have any thoughts/feelings about this? 
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6 
 
In Australia no payment is given to egg donors. “Reasonable” costs to the donor are reimbursed by 
the recipient.  These may include immediate medical and travel expenses, and babysitting.  Is this 
fair?  
 
Do you think Australian egg donors should be paid?  
 
In some cases donated eggs may be used for research that generates profits.  In light of this, what do 
you think about payment for research eggs?  
 
Do you have any professional, religious or spiritual views that influence your decisions and 
opinions about egg donation for stem cell research? 
 
8.  Policy  
 
Should women be asked to donate eggs for stem cell research?  
 
Should Australia be involved in stem cell research?  
 
What information should women be given if they agree to donate eggs for research? How could it 
be most effectively delivered? 
 
What do you think are necessary protections for women who choose to donate eggs for research? 
 
9. Closure 
Is there anything else you would like to add that you think is important? 
Would you like to be sent a report on the findings from this study? 
Would you be prepared for us to contact you for a follow-up interview in 6 months time? 
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Oocyte donation and regulation in Australia for Stem Cell Research:  Donor interview schedule  
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Researcher introduces self, the research topic and expected outcomes  
 
Interview Preamble – 
 
In this interview we are seeking your insights and understandings of egg donation for stem cell 
research. We wish to interview you about this topic because you have personal experience of IVF 
and/or egg donation to assist other women to have a child. We understand that you yourself have 
not donated eggs for stem cell research. However during the interview we will explain to you 
different aspects of egg donation for stem cell research, and ask for your opinions and feelings 
about it. We feel that, as someone who has been through IVF, you have unique insights into this 
topic, and we wish to draw on your experience to improve the process for women who will donate 
eggs for stem cell research in the future. We are social researchers and our interview is not intended 
to persuade you to donate yourself, now or in the future. We are only interested in your opinions 
and feelings about the subject.  We will use this information to formulate recommendations for the 
ethical regulation of egg donation for stem cell research in Australia. 
 
Discuss role and rights of participant, the consent process, and confidentiality 
Ask participant if has any questions 
Provide participant with demographic survey to fill in 
Reconfirm consent to record, and test recording. 
 
2. Personal Donation Decision   
 
How did you become an egg donor? Would you tell me your donation story? 
How did you come to your decision?  
Did you discuss the decision with others? Who? 
[If donor has a partner - prompt for her perceptions of partner’s belief] 
 	   256 
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2 
 
 
 
 
 
What was their opinion?  
What were the factors that influenced your decision?  
Did your decision waver over time?  
How do you feel about your decision now? 
 
If and when you told people about your decision to be an egg donor, what kind of reactions did you 
experience/expect? What kinds of reactions did you actually get? 
 
Do you have Family / Friends who have donated / received donated eggs to assist conception?  
Were you involved in helping them decide? What things did you discuss? 
 
3. Donation Experience  
 
Is this your first time donating?  How has your donation experience been? 
 
[If not first time] – how was this experience compare to other IVF experiences? 
 
 How were the staff involved in your donation process? Can you describe the process? (e.g. Who 
did you interact with and at what moments in the process?) 
 
What kinds of issues did the staff discuss with you when you agreed to donate?  
Was the experience of donation different to what you were expecting? How? 
Can you tell me about the consent process? 
Would you change the consent process?  
If yes, in what way? If no, why not? 
 
Legally, once your donated eggs are combined with the sperm (from  the recipient’s male partner or 
sperm donor), the egg belongs to the recipient. What are your feelings about that ? 
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3 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Other kinds of egg donation 
 
You have donated eggs to a woman who you know. I want to ask you about some other donation 
options. 
 
Would you consider donating eggs anonymously? i.e. to someone you don’t know, decided by the 
clinic? Why/why not? 
 
Is there any type of person you would not donate to? 
 
Would you consider donating eggs for research into infertility? Why/why not? 
 
Would you consider donating eggs for commercial research e.g. genetics? Why/why not? 
 
5.  Donation for Stem Cell Science  
 
Have you heard of stem cell research? Where did you hear about it? What is your understanding of 
stem cell research? Why is it important? 
 
Have you heard of SCNT (therapeutic cloning)?  
 
 If yes, What is your understanding of the potential benefits of SCNT and stem cell research?  
 
[interviewer to give simple explanation of need for embryos and eggs and potential benefits and that 
it is experimental research] on separate attachment 
 
Do you have any family or friends with conditions that might be helped by stem cell research in the 
future? E.g. diabetes, MS, spinal cord injury, Parkinson’s disease, stroke, heart or kidney disease 
 
If yes, how does this make you feel about stem cell research? 
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Would you consider donating eggs for stem cell research? Why/why not? 
 
Is there any difference for you between donating eggs to another couple and donating to stem cell 
research? What is it? 
 
Now that you have gone through egg donation have your feelings about your eggs changed? If yes, 
in what way have your feelings changed? If no, why not? 
 
The ideal egg donor for stem cell research (medically speaking) is a young women (18-30) with 
high fertility, who would not be attending an ART clinic.  
 
Do you think that this group of women should be asked to donate for stem cell research?  
 
What kind of information should they be given before they agree to donate? 
 
6. Payment and Incentives 
 
Different countries use different approaches to encourage women to donate eggs for stem cell 
research and to assist other women’s reproduction. I’d like to know what you think of these 
different approaches 
 
In the UK women can get discounted IVF fees and compensation of expenses up to £250 (check) if 
they donate eggs for stem cell research – this is called ‘egg sharing’.  This may involve donating 
viable eggs that could be used to make embryos. IVF treatment in the UK is more expensive than 
Australia.  
 
In the UK women who are not IVF patients can also donate eggs for stem cell research. They are 
not paid but they can receive up to £250 (about $500) as compensation for expenses.  
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In the USA women can sell their eggs on an open market, and young white women with university 
degrees can charge very high prices (up to $100,000 per cycle, but usually around $15,000 - 
$20,000). Women can also sell eggs for research purposes, but the fees are not as high as for 
reproduction. (around $4000) 
 
Some women in other countries are paid to provide eggs for couples having IVF - they can be 
young students in America or Spain, or mothers and/or poor working women in Romania or India. 
These eggs may also be used for stem cell research. Do you have any thoughts/feelings about this? 
 
In Australia no payment is given to egg donors. “Reasonable” costs to the donor are reimbursed by 
the recipient.  These may include immediate medical and travel expenses, and babysitting.  Is this 
fair?  
 
Do you think Australian egg donors should be paid?  
 
In some cases donated eggs may be used for research that generates profits.  In light of this, what do 
you think about payment for research eggs?  
 
Do you have any professional, religious or spiritual views that influence your decisions and 
opinions about egg donation for stem cell research? 
 
7.  Policy  
 
Should Australia be involved in stem cell research?  
 
Should women be asked to donate eggs for stem cell research?  
 
What information should women be given if they agree to donate eggs for research? How could it 
be most effectively delivered? 
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What do you think are necessary protections for women who choose to donate eggs for research? 
 
 
8. Closure 
Is there anything else you would like to add that you think is important? 
Would you like to be sent a report on the findings from this study? 
Would you be prepared for us to contact you for a follow-up interview in 6 months time? 
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Appendix E: Cohorts One and Two Participant Information (version: July 
2009) 
	  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION (IVF Patient) 	  	  
Study Title:  Human Oocytes for Stem Cell Research: Donation and Regulation in Australia 
 
Short Title:  Human Oocytes for Stem Cell Research 	  
Chief Investigator:  A/Prof Catherine Walby      
Catherine.Waldby@usyd.edu.au             
Department of Sociology and Social Policy  
University of Sydney 
 
Principal Investigator: A/Prof Ian Kerridge 
 
Researchers: Katherine Carroll and Margaret Boulos 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This study will explore the meaning of oocyte (egg) donation for women, scientists, IVF 
clinicians, ethicists and policy makers.  In particular, the focus of this study is on the social and 
ethical issues raised by donated eggs that are used for stem cell research. The information 
collected from this study will contribute to the development of ethical guidelines and practices 
for Australian stem cell research.  It will contribute to the protection of women’s health and 
autonomy through the design of sound donation practices and support services.   
 
Who will be invited to enter the study? 
 
You have been invited to enter the study because you have undergone egg collection.  If you are 
a woman who has undergone egg collection or IVF treatment at X Fertility Clinic (“the Clinic”) 
you have been identified through the Clinic’s database as someone who might be interested in 
taking part in the study. Because of your experiences of egg collection and / or IVF, you may be 
able to provide special insights and perceptions about the issues that surround choosing to donate 
eggs. If you are interested, you need to give us permission to contact you via telephone to 
request a face-to-face interview.  
 
What will happen on the study? 
 
 
If you choose to take part, this would involve a one-hour interview with a female member of the 
Sydney University research team.  The interview would be conducted at X IVF Clinic at a time 
that is convenient to you.  The interview would involve talking about attitudes and feelings 
regarding egg donation for both reproduction and research purposes. You do not need to have 
actually donated eggs – we are interested to talk to women who have general experience with 
egg collection or IVF.  
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This research study is not about asking you to donate oocytes now, or in the future. The 
researcher will discuss with you any ideas that you may have about appropriate consent and 
protection procedures for women undertaking egg donation for research.  The researcher will 
also ask you about your perceptions of stem cell research and your understandings of the 
potential benefits that eggs may provide stem cell research. You do not need to understand the 
science to help us with our research.  
 
If you are at the beginning of your IVF treatment you may also be asked to be part of a smaller 
longitudinal (across time) component of this research project. This would involve up to three 
separate hour-long interviews across a two-year period to understand how your experiences and 
perceptions of egg donation may change over time. You will be given the choice as to whether 
you would like to be contacted for a further interview between today’s date and 2011. 
 
The interview(s) is/are confidential and are you will not be identified.  The interview will be 
recorded for research purposes only.  Once anonymously transcribed, the recorded interview will 
be kept as a password protected file on a password access only computer.  This computer is kept 
in a locked office by the chief investigator (Catherine Waldby) for the duration of the research 
project.  Upon completion of the project, the interview files will then be destroyed after seven 
years. 
 
The anonymised transcripts of your interview may be used for academic papers, reports 
and presentations.  Any participants in this study will have their identity concealed and 
your identity of any identifying features will not be disclosed to anyone in publications or 
presentations.   
 
 
Are there any risks? 
 
There are no likely physical or psychological risks as a result of taking part in this study.  As we 
will be discussing your experiences, perceptions and decision-making processes associated with  
IVF  or egg donation there may be a small possibility that you find discussing some personal 
issues uncomfortable.  If you feel any anxiety or distress during the interview a trained 
counsellor will be made available to you, should you request it. 
 
Are there any benefits? 
 
Your participation in this research provides you with the direct benefit of being able to discuss 
your experiences with independent researchers. Participating in this research also enables you to 
contribute to the wider community of women who are using IVF treatment and who are also 
considering egg donation in the future.  
 
 
Confidentiality / Privacy 
 
All aspects of this study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers 
from the University of Sydney will have access to your personal information. Any publication of 
the results from this study will use only de-identified information. 
 
 
Do you have a choice? 
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Yes. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You can choose the day and time of 
your interview, and it should be convenient for you and your family.  If you choose not to join 
the study, or you wish to withdraw from it at any time, your medical care now and in the future 
will not be affected. 
 
 
Complaints 
 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the study, or your rights as a study participant, 
you may contact 
 
X Hospital Patient Representative: name removed to protect confidentiality 
Telephone No:  
 
 
Contact details 
 
If you have any problems while on the study, please contact  
 
 Name removed to protect fertility Centre’s confidentiality 
  Telephone No:  
 
 Fertility Centre Counsellor 
 Telephone No: 
 
 Katherine Carroll (Post-doctoral Research Fellow, University of Sydney) 
 Telephone No: (BH) 90367994  (AH) 0403 974 013 
 
 A/Prof Ian Kerridge (Principal Investigator) 
 Telephone No: 9036 3405 	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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 	  
Study Title: Human Oocytes for Stem Cell Research: Donation and Regulation in 
Australia 
 
 
Name of Researchers: Catherine Waldby, Katherine Carroll, Margaret Boulos 
 
I understand that the researcher will conduct this study in a manner conforming with ethical and 
scientific principles set out by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia 
and the Good Clinical Research Practice Guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, or have had read to me the Participant Information Sheet relating 
to this study.   I acknowledge that I understand the Participant Information Sheet.  I acknowledge 
that the general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences which may 
occur to me during the study have been explained to me by ____________________________ 
(“the researcher”) and I, being over the age of 16 years acknowledge that I understand the 
general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences which may occur 
during the study. 
 
I acknowledge that I have been given time to consider the information and to seek other advice. 
 
I acknowledge that refusal to take part in this study will not affect the usual treatment of my 
condition. 
 
I acknowledge that I am volunteering to take part in this study and I may withdraw at any time. 
 
6. I acknowledge that this research has been approved by the Sydney West Area Health 
Service Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
7. I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Participant Information 
Sheet, which I have signed. 
 
8. I acknowledge that any regulatory authorities may have access to my medical records 
to monitor the research in which I am agreeing to participate.  However, I understand 
my identity will not be disclosed to anyone else or in publications or presentations.   
 
 
Before signing, please read ‘IMPORTANT NOTE’ following. 
 
Name of participant ___________________________________    
Date of Birth _______________________ 
 
Address of participant  
 	   265 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Name of parent or person responsible (where applicable) 
______________________________________ 
 
Address of parent or person responsible (where applicable)  
_____________________________________ 
 
Signature of participant ______________________________________   
Date: ______________________   
 
Signature of parent or person responsible (where applicable)  ________________ 
Date: ________________ 
 
Signature of researcher ______________________________________   Date: 
____________________ 
 
Signature of witness ________________________________________    
Date:________________________ 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE 
This consent should only be signed as follows: 
Where a participant is over the age of 16 years, then by the participant personally. 
Where a participant is between the age of 14 and 16 years, it should be signed by the participant 
and by a parent or person responsible. 
Where a participant is under the age of 14 years, then the parent or person responsible only 
should sign the consent form. 
Where a participant has impaired capacity, intellectual disability or is unconscious, then specific 
approval for the process for obtaining consent must be sought from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
 
 
WITNESS: 
 
I, __________________________________ (name of witness)  hereby certify as follows: 
 
1. I was present when ______________________________ (the ‘participant’) appeared to 
read or had read  to him/her a Participant Information Sheet comprising (         pages); or was 
told by ________________________ the participant that he/she had read the Participant 
Information Sheet (delete as applicable). 
 
I was present when _____________________________ (the ‘researcher’) explained the general 
purposes, methods, demands and the possible risks and inconveniences of participating in the 
study to the participant.  I asked the participant whether he/she had understood the Participant 
Information Sheet and understood what he/she had been told and he/she told me that he/she did 
understand. 
 
I observed the participant sign the consent to participate in research and he/she appeared to me to 
be signing the document freely and without duress. 
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The participant showed me a form of identification which satisfied me as to his/her identity. 
 
I am not involved in any way as a researcher in this project. 
 
(Delete this clause if not applicable) I was present when _________________________ (the 
‘interpreter’) read the Participant Information Sheet to the participant in the 
__________________ (insert appropriate language) language.  I certify that when the researcher 
explained the general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences of 
participating in the study that what was said by both the researcher and the participant was 
translated by the interpreter from the English language into the above language and vice versa.  
When I spoke to the participant, what I said and what the participant said was translated by the 
interpreter from the English language into the above language and vice versa. 
 
 
Name of witness  _________________________ Relationship to participant 
__________________ 
 
Address of witness  _____________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of witness  ________________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
Name of interpreter (if applicable) _______________________________________ 
 
Signature of Interpreter (if applicable)  _______________________   Date:  
_________________ 
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Appendix G: Cohorts Three A and B – Campus advertisements 
	  
 
 
STEM CELL RESEARCH 
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS NEEDED! 
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ARE YOU A WOMAN AGED BETWEEN 18 AND 30? 
RESEARCHERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY ARE HOLDING FOCUS 
GROUPS WITH YOUNG WOMEN TO HEAR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT EGG 
DONATION FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH. 
WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN YOUR THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS 
ABOUT EGG DONATION AND YOU WON’T BE ASKED TO DONATE BY 
US NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. 
FOCUS GROUPS WILL BE HELD ON CAMPUS DURING SEMESTER. 
DISCUSSIONS WILL LAST ABOUT 2 HOURS. 
YOU WILL BE REIMBURSED FOR YOUR TIME. 
 
CONTACT MARGARET BOULOS: margaret.boulos@sydney.edu.au  
MARGARET BOULOS 
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STEM CELL RESEARCH 
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS NEEDED! 
 
 
ARE YOU A WOMAN AGED BETWEEN 18 AND 30? 
RESEARCHERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY ARE HOLDING FOCUS GROUPS 
WITH YOUNG WOMEN TO HEAR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT EGG DONATION FOR STEM 
CELL RESEARCH. 
WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN YOUR THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS ABOUT EGG 
DONATION AND YOU WON’T BE ASKED TO DONATE BY US NOW OR IN THE 
FUTURE. 
FOCUS GROUPS WILL BE HELD ON CAMPUS DURING SEMESTER. 
DISCUSSIONS WILL LAST ABOUT 2 HOURS. 
YOU WILL BE REIMBURSED FOR YOUR TIME. 
 
CONTACT MARGARET BOULOS: margaret.boulos@sydney.edu.au  
MARGARET BOULOS 
 
DO YOU HAVE A RELATIVE OR CLOSE FRIEND WITH A CHRONIC HEALTH 
PROBLEM LIKE DIABETES, PARKINSON’S DISEASE, SPINAL CORD INJURY OR 
BRAIN DISEASE? 
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Appendix H: Cohorts Three A and B – Honi Soit advertisement for (28 July 
2010) 	  
Page 1 of 1 
 
SHARE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT DONATING EGGS FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Researchers in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy are holding focus groups with women about their attitudes towards egg donation for 
stem cell research. 
∞ If you are a young woman aged between 18 and 30, 
∞ And may also have a relative or close friend with a health problem like diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, spinal cord injury or brain disease, 
contact Margaret Boulos for further information by email: margaret.boulos@sydney.edu.au. 
Staff and students are welcome to participate and you will be reimbursed for your time. Discussions will run for approximately two hours. 
Please note that the researchers are only interested in your thoughts and feelings about egg donation and they will not ask you to donate, now or in 
the future. 
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Appendix I: Cohorts Three A and B – Information Sheet (version: May 2010) 
 
Department of Sociology and Social Policy 
School of Social and Political Sciences 
Faculty of Arts 
 
 
  ABN 15 211 513 464 
 
 
 CHIEF INVESTIGATOR: ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR CATHERINE WALDBY  
 
Room 167 
RC MILLS A26 
University of Sydney NSW 2006  
AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 7206 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9036 9380 
Email: catherine.waldby@usyd.edu.au  
Web:   www.usyd.edu.au/  
 
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Research Project 
 
Title: Human Oöcytes for Stem Cell Research: Donation and Regulation in Australia 
 
 
(1) What is the study about? 
This study is interested in young women’s attitudes to egg donation for stem cell 
research.  
 
You have been invited to participate in the study because you are a member of one of 
the following groups of women: 
 
(iv) You are a woman aged between 18 and 30 years 
 
b) You are a woman aged between 18 and 30 years with a family member or friend 
diagnosed with a health condition that stem cell research may be able to treat in 
the future, such as diabetes, Parkinson’s disease or spinal cord injury. 
 
 
(2) Who is carrying out the study? 
The research team is from the University of Sydney. One of the researchers, 
Margaret Boulos, is undertaking this research to meet the requirements for a PhD 
degree under the supervision of Associate Professor Catherine Waldby (02 9036 
7206) of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney. 
 
(3) What does the study involve? 
 	   271 
This study will involve attending one two-hour focus group with approximately 8 to 
12 other young women to discuss issues surrounding oocyte (egg) donation for stem 
cell research.  
 
During the discussion we will also ask you about your attitudes towards organ 
donation, stem cell research egg donation for research. 
 
You do not need to know a lot about stem cell research. We will provide you with 
information about this topic.  
 
The focus group will be audio-recorded and written down for analysis. 
 
You will not be asked to donate egg, organs or other tissues by our research team 
now or at any time in the future nor will your name be given to any organisation 
which may contact you to donate eggs, organs or other tissues now or in the future. 
 
 
(4) How much time will the study take? 
The focus groups will run for about two hours. 
 
(5) Can I withdraw from the study? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to 
consent and - if you do consent - you can withdraw at any time without affecting 
your relationship with the University of Sydney. 
 
While you may leave the focus group at any time if you do not wish to continue, any 
contributions you have made to the discussion may still be included in data analysis. 
 
(6) Will anyone else know the results? 
Everyone in the study will be given false names (pseudonyms) so you will not be 
able to be identified in any publications or reports. Results will also be published in 
peer−reviewed academic journals and through presentations at national and 
international conferences. The results of this research will also contribute to a PhD 
thesis.  Individual participants will not be identifiable in any of these publications. 
 
(7) Confidentiality/Privacy 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the 
researchers will have access to information on participants. A code-name will be 
applied so that your responses can not be identified. Personal information will be 
kept separate from research data and kept in lockable storage. The data (transcripts 
and digital recordings) will be kept for 7 years after the research is completed in a 
locked filing cabinet to which only Associate Professor Catherine Waldby has key 
access. After this time, these files will be destroyed.  
 
(8) What are the benefits and risks? 
This research does not provide you with any direct benefits. However, participation 
in this research may enable you to contribute to the development of policies on egg 
donation for stem cell research. 
 
As recognition for your time, we would like to offer you a payment of $25 cash. 
 	   272 
 
There are no physical or psychological risks associated with this research. However, 
as you may discuss issues raised by a family member or friend’s illness, there is a 
small possibility you may experience some distress. 
 
If you find this to be the case, the researchers will ensure that you obtain counselling 
or other psychological support.  
 
(9) Can I tell other people about the study? 
You can tell others about the study but we ask that you respect the privacy and 
confidentiality of other participants by not revealing their personal information in the 
future. 
 
(10) What if I require further information? 
When you have read this information, Margaret Boulos or Katherine Carroll will 
discuss it with you further and answer any questions you may have.  If you would 
like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Associate Professor 
Catherine Waldby, on 9036 7206.    
 
(11) What if I have a complaint or concerns? 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney 
on (02) 8627 8176 (Telephone); (02) 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or 
human.ethics@usyd.edu.au (Email). 
 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Appendix J: Cohorts Three A and B –  Demographic Information form 
(version: September 2009) 
 
Demographic Information 
 
 
* This information is required 
 
* Postcode of residential address     _______________ 
 
* Age Range (Please circle) 
 
1. 18-21 
2. 22-25 
3. 26-30   
* Highest Educational Qualification  (please circle) 
 
1  Postgraduate Degree Level 
2  Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level 
3 Bachelor Degree Level 
4  Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level 
5  Certificate Level 
6  Secondary Education 
7  Primary Education 
8  Pre-primary Education 
9  Other Education  
 
* Your area of study/ occupation _____________________________ 
 
Parents’/Guardian occupation____________________________ 
 
Income (approximate range only) ______________________ 
 
Number of Children _______________________ 
 
* Have you ever had treatment for fertility issues? Yes/ No 
 
RESEARCHER USE ONLY: 
 
Participant Code Number __________________ 
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Appendix K: Cohorts Three A and B – Consent Form, including revocation of 
consent (version: September 2009) 
 
Department of Sociology and Social Policy 
School of Social and Political Sciences 
Faculty of Arts 
 
 
  ABN 15 211 513 464 
 
 CHIEF INVESTIGATOR: ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR CATHERINE WALDBY  
 
Room 167 
RC MILLS A26 
University of Sydney NSW 2006  
AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 7206 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9036 9380 
Email: catherine.waldby@usyd.edu.au  
Web:   www.usyd.edu.au/  
  
 
 
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I, .............................................................................[PRINT NAME], give consent to my participation in 
the research project 
 
TITLE:  Human oöcytes for stem cell research: donation and regulation in Australia 
 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, 
and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to 
discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s. 
 
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my 
relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the future. 
 
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be 
used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation 
to consent. 
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6. I understand that I can leave the focus groups at any time if I do not wish to continue, 
however, my contributions to the audio recording will still be used in the study.  
 
 7. I consent to: –  
i) Audio-taping YES  NO  
  
iii) Receiving Feedback YES  NO  
If you answered YES to the “Receiving Feedback Question (iii)”, please provide your 
details i.e. mailing address, email address. 
 
Feedback Option 
 
Address:  _______________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Email: _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:   
 
Name:    
 
Date:   
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Margaret Boulos 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Sociology and Social Policy 
School of Social and Political Sciences 
Faculty of Arts 
 
 
  ABN 15 211 513 464 
C/o RC MILLS A26 
University of Sydney NSW 2006  
AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Revocation of Consent 
 
Project Title: Human Oocytes for stem cell in research: donation and regulation in 
Australia.  
 
 
I wish to advise that I no longer wish to participate in the study Human oocytes for stem cell in 
research: donation and regulation in Australia. 
 
I understand that any contributions I have made prior to withdrawal from the study may be 
referred to in analysis and dissemenation of findings but my name or any other identifying 
information will not be included. 
 
I understand that my relationships with the researchers and the University of Sydney will not be 
adversely affected in any way.  
 
 
Signed:   
 
Name:    
 
Date:   
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Appendix L: Cohorts Three A and B – Focus group visual materials  	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Appendix M: Cohorts Three A and B – Focus group schedule including 
information on embryonic stem cell research and description of oöcyte 
extraction  (version: September 2009) 
 
Focus Group Schedule 
 
Bonding Question – why did you decide to come to focus group? 
  
General discussion of knowledge about stem cell research (groups 1 and 2) 
 
Provide information regarding stem cell research and SCNT to be used as basis for discussion – 
emphasise that participants are not being tested on their knowledge. 
 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research  
Stem cells are cells that generate or regenerate tissue. They are undifferentiated cells that can renew 
themselves and give rise to one or more specialized cell types with specific functions in the body, for 
example heat muscle, skin cells or kidney cells. Stem cells exist during early development of the baby in 
the womb but also occur in the adult body. The most medically useful type of stem cell is ‘pluripotent’, 
meaning that it has the capacity to develop into almost all of the body’s tissue types. Recent research 
suggests that it may be possible to produce large numbers of pluripotent stem cells that differentiate on 
demand, providing an unlimited supply of transplantable tissue. Medical researchers think stem cells may 
be very useful in treating currently untreatable medical conditions – Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s 
disease, stroke, spinal cord injuries, and arthritis – and also provide new therapies for common conditions 
like diabetes. The cells may act as substitutes for organ donation, repairing an existing heart or kidney 
rather than replacing it. It may also be possible to produce stem cell lines that are genetically the same as 
the patient, avoiding the problem of organ rejection found in organ transplants. 
Human embryos (the name for the earliest period of development of the baby in the womb, between 0-8 
weeks) are a key source of pluripotent stem cell lines. Stem cell scientists all over the world are asking 
women in IVF treatment to donate embryos that they do not want for pregnancy, so that these embryos 
can be used for research and eventually treatments. This has been controversial because the research 
prevents the embryo from developing into a child, although in fact most embryos not used for IVF 
treatment are discarded. A particular type of Stem Cell research, called Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer, 
needs human eggs as well as embryos. This is the special area of research aimed at producing compatible 
organs for patients. 
Embryonic stem cell research is only experimental at this stage. So far, only one clinical trial has been 
conducted, to test embryonic stem cells as a treatment for people with spinal cord injury. Other clinical 
trials are planned.  
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Egg Donation (description based on IVF Australia Patient information for 
reproductive egg donors) 
Before becoming an egg donor a woman is required to: 
 
• undergo a medical assessment  
• undertake psychosocial counselling to discuss the social and psychological aspects of becoming an 
egg donor. If they are married or in a de-facto relationship, their spouse is also required to attend.  
• undergo brief genetic counselling by telephone 
• undergo blood tests to ensure (as far as possible) that they are free of any serious infectious diseases 
or genetic disorder that may be passed on to any child conceived from her eggs.  
• complete the consent forms and a confidential donor questionnaire. If the donor is married or in a de-
facto relationship, their spouse is also required to give their consent to donation..  
 
Donation Process 
 
• Egg donors undergo an IVF cycle. Hormonal medications are given to induce the ovaries to produce 
and mature multiple eggs so that a good number of embryos can be created and the recipient has the 
best chance of a pregnancy.  
• The medication is given for approximately 12 days by subcutaneous injection, which is an injection 
into the skin, not a vein. Donors and/or their partner are taught how to give these simple injections so 
that the time required at the clinic is kept to a minimum.  
• Blood tests and ultrasound scans will determine when the eggs are mature enough to be collected. On 
average, this is done 12 to 14 days after starting the injections.  
• The egg collection is done in day surgery under light sedation and the donor can choose to be awake 
or asleep during the procedure. The procedure takes approximately half an hour and, on waking, there 
aren't the usual groggy side effects of a general anaesthetic. Nausea and vomiting is unusual and you 
are usually able to go home around lunchtime. 
• After egg recovery, it is not unusual to feel quite tired and slightly bloated for several days, due to the 
combined effects of the drugs and the anaesthetic. Generally, you are able to return to work or normal 
activities the day after egg collection.  
• Your menstrual period is expected approximately 8-12 days after the egg collection. Periods may be 
more irregular for 1 to 2 months after the IVF cycle but will return to normal. 
 
Short term side effects of the drugs 
 
The reaction to the drugs varies for each individual but common side effects include tiredness, abdominal 
distension, tender ovaries and breasts, vagueness and mood swings. In approximately 5% of women, in 
the second half of the cycle (after the eggs have been collected), the symptoms can become more severe 
and medical treatment is required. This condition is called "ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome” (OHSS). 
 
Future Fertility 
 
Provided there are no complications during the egg donation cycle, there should be no effect on the future 
fertility of the donor. There is, however, a very rare complication where infection can occur following 
egg collection, and reduced future fertility may be a consequence if an infection occurs. 
 
Long term side effects of the drugs 
 
Currently studies don't indicate any long-term increased risk of breast or ovarian cancer.  
 
Having established some basic knowledge about the procedure of oocyte 
extraction and stem cell research, the discussion will now turn to talking 
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about perceptions of the issues. 
 
Probes 
 
What is your understanding of stem cell research?  
Where did you hear about it?  
Was it different to this information we’ve given you? 
  
Have you heard of SCNT? 
What is your understanding of SCNT? 
 
Views and perceptions of bodily tissues (groups 1 and 2) 
Provide examples of advertisements/leaflets for organ, blood and egg donation – through projected 
images or shared enlarged copies.  
Probes 
Who has thought about signing the organ donor registry? 
     Donating blood? 
     Donating eggs for stem cell research? 
     For reproductive purposes? 
Is there any difference in these donations? What kind of differences? 
Does this effect whether you would be prepared to donate? Why /why not? 
Views and feelings about personal fertility (groups 1 and 2) 
Who has thought about having children and what is considered an ideal age to do so? Why? 
Do you think about issues around fertility? What issues tend to come up? Have you had any experiences 
with women you know that have made you think differently? 
Do you think feelings about your fertility will change much when you’re older, say at 35? 
Given what’s been said about fertility, how does that make you feel about egg donation for stem cell 
research? 
 
Issues surrounding relational responsibilities (group 2) 
Discussion of responsibilities toward family member/friend 
Are you/diagnosed person involved in contributing to scientific research?  How so? 
Have you ever thought about participating in stem cell research by donating tissues, embryos, eggs? 
Given that there is a general egg donor shortage, does that change things for you? 
 
 
Scenarios (groups 1 and 2) 
 
The purpose of the scenarios is to present hypothetical situations (drawn from real life as much as 
possible) to further understanding of the circumstances in which egg extraction can happen. While 
emphasising that there are no right or wrong answers, the point is to facilitate discussion.  
 
Scenarios Probes 
Kelly is a 22 year old woman living in San Francisco. She 
has graduated from college with a Design degree and now 
works as an Assistant in an architecture company. 
 
Kelly has a significant student loan debt from attending 
university. She lives independently from her parents in a 
share house. She doesn’t have any children. 
 
Kelly has blonde hair and blue eyes and because she is a 
How would you describe Kelly’s 
situation compared to Nadia’s? 
What difference does it make that she’s 
paid much more than Nadia? 
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college graduate with good athletic ability, she considers 
signing up to an egg donor agency that will organise the 
extraction of her eggs and give them to IVF patients. She will 
be paid approximately $80,000 for a cycle of egg extraction.  
 
Advertisements appearing in Sydney’s Child Classifieds 
under the Egg Donors section 
 
A baby from U to ME 
At the age where I am still blessed of fertility, I am wasting 
time for a marriage to work out with the wrong man. I finally 
woke up, moved on and met a husband that I never dared to 
dream. A husband that truly loves me and we want a child of 
our own. The saddest part, I am not that so blessed of fertility 
anymore. So please help us, if you are under the age of 28 
and have children of your own.  
 
A Child 
I’m hoping to meet an exceptionally kind woman (under 35 
years) who would help me create a much wanted child. All 
expenses paid. Please call Theresa. 
 
In Australia, it’s illegal to offer money 
for eggs for reproductive purposes (i.e. 
making a baby); what do you think of that 
in comparison to the U.S. and Romania? 
 
If it were legal to sell eggs for 
reproductive purposes, would you 
consider doing so? Why/why not? 
 
Under what circumstances do you think 
you it’s okay to provide eggs for 
reproductive purposes?  
 
Would you prefer to donate to someone 
you know or anonymously? 
 	  
Theresa is a 30 year old child care worker who has heard a 
lot about stem cell research on the news on TV and the 
internet. Theresa reads a newspaper article where scientists 
talk about needing women’s eggs to be able to use in 
experiments to grow stem cell lines for therapeutic research. 
It sounds like that stem cell research could produce cures for 
lots of different conditions like diabetes, heart disease and 
spinal cord injury.  She contacts the Research Centre where 
the scientists work to volunteer her eggs. She is given some 
money to cover her travel expenses and the time off work. 
 
The researchers are part of a company 
that is trying to develop therapies for 
diabetes. They will try and patent the 
therapy and charge hospitals or 
governments to use it with patients. 
Should Theresa have been made aware of 
this? 
Does that change the situation for you? 
Would you be more inclined to donate to 
a non-profit organisation rather than a 
for-profit company?  
This is an advertisement from research company in U.S.A. 
 
Research team seeks women aged 21 to 35 with at least one 
child to donate eggs for stem cell research; compensation for 
time, travel and child care expenses provided. 
 
In Australia, it’s illegal to offer money 
for eggs for research purposes, what do 
you think of that? 
 
If it were legal to sell eggs for research 
purposes, would you consider it? 
Why/why not? 
 
Under what circumstances do you think 
you may sell eggs for research purposes? 
 
So Yeon lives in South Korea. She is in her final year of a 
Medical Science degree and works part time on an 
embryonic stem cell research project at a university research 
department in Seoul.  She is hoping to continue her research 
career when she has graduated. 
 
At team meetings, senior researchers often complain that 
there is a significant egg shortage because IVF patients are 
not sharing them. The scientists say that they can’t do the 
Do you think this is a situation of 
voluntary egg donation for stem cell 
research? Why/Why not? 
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kind of research they would like without a regular supply of 
eggs. These researchers are often men.  
 
Because of this, So Yeon is thinking about donating her eggs 
to her research team, like other women at the centre even 
though they have not been directly asked. So Yeon doesn’t 
have any children but she has some idea that long term 
effects on fertility from egg extraction are unknown.  
 
 
Leslie is 22 and her older sister, Melanie (26) suffers from a 
permanent spinal cord injury. 
 
Melanie and Leslie’s family are very much engaged in 
learning about what can be done for spinal cord injury and 
keep up to date with research findings and new possibilities.  
 
Leslie thinks about donating her eggs to a research team in 
Brisbane who are working on curing spinal cord injury. 
 
What do you think of scientists engaged 
in stem cell research focusing their 
attention on people whose family 
members have a diagnosed condition? 
 
Is this fair? Why/Why not? 
 
Would Leslie’s relationship to Melanie 
be a factor in this situation? 
 
 
Wrap up conversation and thank participants.  	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Appendix	  N:	  Selected	  demographic	  information	  for	  cohorts	  one,	  two	  and	  three	  (a	  &	  
b)	  
	  
Partici-
pant ID 
Pseudonym Age 
Range 
Highest Educational Qualification No. Of 
Children 
Continue 
IVF? 
IVF01 Philippa 46-50 Postgraduate degree 1 N 
IVF02 Caroline 31-35 Certificate 0 Y 
IVF03 Eva 31-35 Postgraduate degree 1 N 
IVF04 Isabel 36-40 Advanced diploma and diploma  1 N 
IVF05 Rebecca 31-35 Bachelor degree 2 N 
IVF06 Olivia 36-40 Certificate  2 N 
IVF07 Francesca 26-30 Advanced diploma and diploma  1 Y 
IVF08 Joanna 26-30 Secondary education  0 Y 
IVF09 Mira 31-35 Secondary education 1 Y 
IVF10 Nadia 26-30 Advanced diploma and diploma  1 Y 
IVF11 Sarah 36-40 Bachelor degree 1 N 
IVF12 Dominique 36-40 Bachelor degree 0 Y 
IVF13 Bridgit 41-45 Secondary education 1 (plus 
pregnant) 
N 
IVF14 Jerrie 31-35 Certificate  0 Y 
IVF15 Atilia 36-40 Graduate diploma or certificate 2 (plus 
pregnant) 
N 
IVF16 Rasika 41-45 Postgraduate degree 0 Y 
IVF17 Denise 31-35 Certificate 0 N 
IVF18 Mandy 36-40 Bachelor degree 0 Y 
IVF19 Melissa 36-40 Postgraduate degree 2 (plus 
pregnant) 
N 
IVF20 Lisa 41-45 Advanced Diploma and Diploma  0 Y 
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Partici-
pant ID 
Pseudonym Age 
Range 
Highest Educational Qualification No. of own children 
DON01 Agnes 26-30 Bachelor degree 0 
DON02 Paola 31-35 Secondary education  0 
DON03 Donna 31-35 Postgraduate degree 1 (plus pregnant) 
DON04 Jenny 36-40 Graduate diploma or certificate 2 
DON05 Raja 31-35 Certificate 0 
	  
Partici-
pant ID Pseudonym 
Age 
Range Highest Educational Qualification 
Occupation* 
*these	  descriptions	  were	  
provided	  by	  participants. 
FG1 Rose 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Nursing 
FG2 Cara 26-30 Postgraduate Degree Level Genetics postdoc research 
scientist 
FG3 Delia 26-30 Bachelor Degree Level Philosophy student/RA 
Nursing 
FG4 Umeko 18-21 Secondary Education Student/Retail Assistant 
FG5 Erica 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Dietician 
FG6 Frances 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Music/Law 
FG7 Grace 18-21 Secondary Education Psychology 
FG8 Mona 18-21 Secondary Education Psychology 
FG9 Vanessa 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Medicine 
FG10 Olive 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Psychology & Arts 
FG11 Naomi 18-21 Certificate Level BA Arts & Media 
Communications 
FG12 Giselle 18-21 Secondary Education Psychology 
FG13 Julia 22-25 Bachelor Degree Level Classics & Ancient History 
FG14 Mathilde 18-21 Postgraduate Degree Level Sociology PhD Student 
FG15 Alicia 26-30 Postgraduate Degree Level Unemployed 
FG16 Kali 18-21 Secondary Education Sociology/Philosophy/Casual 
tutoring, market research 
recruiter 
FG17 Raphaelle 18-21 Bachelor Degree Level Journalism 
FG18 Yvette 18-21 Secondary Education BA/Law 
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Appendix O: Publications I have authored or contributed to arising from the 
common dataset 	  
 
1. Boulos, M., I. Kerridge and C. Waldby (July 2014) ‘Reciprocity in Australian 
Reproductive Oöcyte Provision’, in Nash, M. (ed.) Reframing Reproduction: Sociological 
Perspectives on Gender, Sexuality and Reproduction in Late Modernity, Palgrave Macmillan  
This chapter uses data regarding reproductive oöcytes reported in this thesis. It discusses the 
notion of reciprocity and the lack of inter-personal anonymity that characterises reproductive 
oöcyte donation in Australia in comparison with Europe and the US. 
 
2. Waldby, C., I. Kerridge, M. Boulos and K. Carroll. (2013). “From Altruism to Monetisation: 
Australian Women’s Ideas About Money, Ethics and Research Eggs.” Social Science & 
Medicine 94: 34–42. 	  
This article examines the issue of payment from the perspective of the entire sample in this 
dataset. I contributed information regarding the recruitment of focus group participants and 
its methodological rationale. I also contributed parts of my thesis in relation to the 
distinctions some participants made about ‘payment’ and ‘compensation’. 
  
3. Boulos, M. (2010) ‘On the periphery: Egg Donation for Reproduction and the Nuclear 
Family’, Conference Proceedings for The Australian Sociology Association December 6-9th 
2010. 
This early conference presentation discussed data from the reproductive oocyte donor cohort 
in this dataset. Much of it is the subsequent basis for the chapter regarding donors and their 
ambivalent or paradoxical relationships to the families they are helping to create; here I 
discuss in relation to predominantly feminist literature related to assisted reproductive 
technologies and donors.  
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Appendix P: Publications List using common dataset (submitted to ARC) 
 
Books: 
} Cooper, M., and C. Waldby (2012) Clinical Labour: Tissue donors and Research 
Subjects in the Bioeconomy. (Duke University Press, forthcoming)  
} Gottweis, H., Salter, B. and C. Waldby (2009). The Global Politics of Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Science: Regenerative Medicine in Transition, Palgrave. ---- nominated for the 
British Sociology Association Health Book Prize.  
Journal articles: 
} Waldby, C., and K. Carroll (2012). 'Egg donation for stem cell research: ideas of surplus 
and deficit in Australian IVF patients’ and reproductive donors’ accounts’, Sociology of 
Health and Illness (in press). 
} Carroll, K. (2012). 'Infertile? The Emotional Labour of Sensitive and Feminist Research 
Methodologies’, Qualitative Research (in press).  
} Webster, A., Waldby, C., and C. Haddad (2011). ‘Clinical trials in regenerative medicine: 
stem cell heterogeneity and the disciplining of ectopic life’ Biosocieties, (6) 4. 
} Waldby, C., and M. Cooper (2010). ‘From Reproductive Work to Regenerative Labour: 
The Female Body and the Stem Cell Industries’, Feminist Theory 11(1): 3-22. 
} Skene, L., et al. (2009) ‘Ethics Report on Interspecies Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer’, 
Cell Stem Cell, 5(1): 27-30. 
} Waldby, C. (2008) ‘Oöcyte markets: women's reproductive work in embryonic stem cell 
research’, New Genetics and Society, 27(1): 19-31. 
} Waldby, C and B. Slater (2008). ‘Global Governance in Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Science: Standardisation and Bioethics in Research and Patenting,’ Studies in Ethics, 
Law, and Technology 2(1).  
Book Chapters  
} Catherine Waldby (2012) ‘Reproductive Labour Arbitrage: Trading Fertility across 
Borders’ in Fredrik Svenaeus and Martin Gunnarson (eds.) The Body as Gift, Resource 
and Commodity, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge, Södertörn University. (in 
press)  
Journal articles in preparation or under review: 
} Carroll, K., and C. Waldby. 'Informed consent and fresh egg-donation for stem cell 
research: the case for incorporating embodied knowledge into ethical decision-making' 
submitted to Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 
} Carroll, K., and C. Waldby, ‘Fresh Eggs for Australian Stem Cell Research: Where will 
they come from?’ submitted to Journal of Advanced Nursing.  
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Journal article—non-refereed article: 
} Waldby, C., Carroll., K and M. Boulos, (2009). ‘Human Oöcytes for Stem Cell Research: 
Donation and Regulation in Australia’ Newsletter of the Australasian Society for Stem 
Cell Research November Vol 2 (3) pp 4-5. 
Conference Proceedings: 
} Boulos, M. (2011). ‘Good eggs’: ideal donors for SCNT research in Australia’, The 
British Sociological Association, Medical Sociology Group Annual Conference, Chester 
University UK, September 14-16 2011.  
} Waldby, C. (2011). ‘Deliberation and preservation: the role of tissue banking in the 
decision to donate eggs and embryos for stem cell research’, The British Sociological 
Association, Medical Sociology Group Annual Conference, University of Chester, UK, 
September 14-16 2011.                             
} Carroll, K., and C. Waldby (2011). ‘Embodied knowledge and ethical decision-making: 
Interfacing fertility patients and egg donation for stem cell research’, Annual Meeting of 
the American Sociology Association Las Vegas, Nevada, United States of America, 
August 20-23 2011. 
} Waldby, C. (2011). ‘Deliberation and preservation: the role of tissue banking in the 
decision to donate eggs and embryos for stem cell research’, Bringing Regenerative 
Medicine to the Clinic: Trials and Tribulations in Europe and Beyond, University of the 
Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain, April 18-19 2011. 
} Boulos, M. (2010). ‘On the periphery: egg donation for reproduction and the nuclear 
family’, Conference proceedings for The Australian Sociology Association, December 6-
9 2010. 
} Carroll, K. (2010). ‘Embodied Knowledge: Bringing a new epistemology to the informed 
consent of oöcyte donation’. Conference proceedings for The Australian Sociology 
Association, December  6-9 2010.  
} Waldby, C. (2010). ‘Oöcyte donation as reproductive labour: Experiences of women 
undergoing IVF treatment,’ The Australian Sociology Association, Macquarie University 
December 6-9 2010. 
} Carroll, K. (2010). ‘The Emotional Labour of Sensitive Research Methodologies’ 
Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Inc, The University of Sydney 
December 1-3 2010. 
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘Should women be paid for giving their eggs to stem cell science?’, 
Monash University Intensive Bioethics Course, Stonelea, November 30 2010. 
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘Legal regulation of human cloning and embryo research: the 
forthcoming review’ Darlington Centre, University of Sydney,  November 29 2010. 
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} Boulos, M. (2010). ‘Recovering the vanished lady: panic about political research’, 
University of Sydney, November 5 2010.  
} Boulos, M. (2010). ‘On the Periphery: reproductive egg donors, the normative nuclear 
family and the law’, University of Sydney October 29 2010.  
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘Bioethical Issues: Human Embryo and Stem Cell Research’, 
Australian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Brisbane September 10 2010.  
} Carroll, K. (2010). ‘Embryos or Oöcytes? Fresh or Frozen? Factors influencing donation 
to stem cell research among IVF patients’, Stem Cell Science in Australia: Commercial 
opportunities, state strategies and the global bioeconomy, September 10 2010.  
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘Law, Ethics and Human Rights’.  At the VCOG, Victorian Cancer 
Council, Melbourne, August 28 2010.  
} Waldby, C. (2010). ‘Fertility Outsourcing: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Global Precarious Labour’, The Society for Social Studies of Science (4S) Tokyo, August 
25-29 2010. 
} Boulos, M. (2010). ‘Good Eggs: young women as ‘ideal’ donors for stem cell research’ 
The Society for Social Studies of Science (4S) Tokyo, August 25-29 2010.  
} Carroll, K. (2010). ‘Fresh Egg Donation During IVF Treatment: Views from Australia’, 
Emerging Health Policy Conference, The University of Sydney, August 11 2010. 
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘Ethics of New Technologies’. Australian Society for Medical 
Research (Victoria) Melbourne Convention Centre, August 5 2010. 
} Skene, L. (2010). ‘A multidisciplinary perspective on human embryo and stem cell 
research’ Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program Conference, University of 
Melbourne, 22 July 2010.  
} Waldby, C. (2010). ‘Oöcyte Procurement for Stem Cell Research: Public Subsidy and the 
Origins of the Oöcyte Market’, Regenerative Medicine in 21c: Managing Uncertainty at 
the Global Level, 9-10 June 2010, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. (Keynote)  
} Skene, L. (2010) presented a one-hour paper on ethical issues related to the sale of eggs 
for research at a conference of Oxford and Scandinavian moral philosophers, hosted by 
the James Martin 21st Century School in Oxford, June 4 2010. 
} Boulos, M., Carroll, K., and C. Waldby (2009). ‘Egg donation for stem cell research: 
perspectives of Australian IVF patients’, The Australian Sociological Association, 
Australian National University, 1-4 December 1-4 2009.  
} Waldby, C. (2009). ‘Clinical Labour: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the 
Bioeconomy’, Keynote Address Asia‐Pacific STS Network Conference, November 25-27 
2009. 
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} Webster, A. Waldby, C and C. Haddad (2009). ‘Stem cell-based clinical trials: Beyond 
the Embryo: Transnational, Transdisciplinary and Translational Perspectives on Stem 
Cell Research’, Brocher Foundation Geneva, November 14-15 2009.  
} Waldby, C. (2009). ‘Citizenship, Labor and the Biopolitics of the Bioeconomy: 
Recruiting Female Tissue Donors for Stem Cell Research’, Embodiment of Science 
Conference Keynote at Columbia University New York, November 6-7 2009. 
 
} Boulos, M. (2009). ‘Good eggs: young women as ideal donors for stem cell research', 
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Sydney, November 6 2009.  
} Waldby, C., and M. Cooper (2009). ‘From Reproductive Work to Regenerative Labour: 
Fertility outsourcing and donor recruitment for the stem cell industries’ Sydney 
University Gender Studies Forum, September 25 2009. 
} Skene, L. (2009). Recent Developments in Stem Cell Research: Issues for the Future’ 
ABA/ANZIHLE Joint Conference (Bioethics and Health Law Conference: Future Offers, 
Future Threats) Queenstown, New Zealand, 9-12 July 2009. 
} Waldby, C (2009) ‘From Reproductive Work to Regenerative Labour: The Maternal 
Body and the Stem Cell Industries’ at The Pembroke Centre for Teaching and Research 
on Women, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island USA, April 2 2009.   
 
